• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

Dan, for pete's sake keep throwing in your knowledge.  Everybody's input keeps the discussion interesting by opening up new avenues for consideration. 

Cheers, Chris.
 
Off topic alert!

Kirkhill said:
Is it just "Islamism" the Chinese are worried about? Or is it "separatism" generally?
...
The reason I am citing it is to demonstrate how seriously China takes potential challenges to its claims to local hegemony.  It has sat on this archaeology story for a number of years because it seems to suggest that, at very least, tall blondes and redheads ended up in Xinjiang before the "Chinese", the Han,  made it up out of the coastal lands and river valleys, across the mountains and the Gobi to the Altai and the Steppes.  They have similar problems with the Tibetans (of course), Hong Kong and (in their view) Taiwan.
...

I do not agree that the Chinese have attempted to thwart research into the mummies of Urumchi.  They have been in a publicly accessible museum in Urumchi for 20 years.  Western scholars have been visiting, and speculating on, the mummies since they were found.

The Chinese do not attach a huge importance to these mummies.  As far as I can read they have no difficulty with the idea that a proto-Indo-European people may have come to and then lived in Xinjiang 4,000 and 3,000 years ago.  But, that’s not the ‘big story’ in China.  The big story (over the past half century) is the discovery that the Shang dynasty was, certainly, real and that there must have been something very like to the (previously mythological) Xia dynasty in its described time (2100-1600 BCE) and place (Henan province).   The fact that some nomads settled on the edge of the Taklamakan Desert and, evidently, stayed and established trade links to the East and West is fascinating but hardly, for the history obsessed Chinese, overly important.  They were, even to the supposedly contemporary Xia, ‘barbarians.’  (Parenthetically, I have heard it posited by an internationally recognized linguist, that words like ‘barbarian’ and ‘tartar’ have their roots in sounds like “ba-ba,” “bar-bar,” “ta-ta” or “tar-tar” which were used to describe the ‘primitive’ and incomprehensible sound of the language of the ‘other’ people – from outside of the settlements in China, the Caspian basin, Iran, the fertile Crescent and so on.)

In addition to Barber there have been many papers on the mummies of Urumchi.  Some (many?) tend to get bogged down in the ‘problem’ of a proto-Indo-European people in China saying, “See, we were here first.”  My question is: so what?  We appear to have a long settled population that appears to have traded East and West – maybe for obsidian,  which was well known and valued 4,000 years ago and is plentiful in Xinjiang.  Climate change was, almost certainly, partially responsible for their demise – see? It was all George W. Bush’s fault, after all!  But, at bottom, their arrival, ‘culture’ and passing are of minor interest to Chinese scholars.

Let me be clear: the Chinese are racist – we can see that in a whole host of linguistic and cultural attributes, beginning with how they describe themselves, their language and their country.  Institutionalised, ethno-cultural racism is not, however, unique to the Chinese. I believe it is common to almost all cultural and linguistic groups.  The Chinese, like most other peoples, mix up the issues of race, language and culture.  The current Chinese government, following 2,000± years of consistently ‘traditional’ policy is trying to make the Han people = the Chinese people with minorities, of all kinds, relegated to the margins, existing as happy folk dancers.   The Uiger are just one, albeit a problematical one , of the many minorities (the Kazak minority in Xinjiang is less of a problem).  There is a separatist movement – with Islamist overtones amongst the Uiger of Xinjiang.  The ongoing  Hanification of Xinjiang province is designed to smother that – a sort of revanche du berceau in reverse.  The central government in Beijing aims to make the Uiger a minority in their own home province.  Initially, shortly after the revolution, Han migration to Xinjiang was forced; now it is a ‘pull’ system based on economics – a slow but surer system, the Chinese believe (I think) of achieving their aim.

On balance, however, I think Prof. Mair is overstating the case.  Euro-centric scholarship bumps Sino-centric scholarship.  “We’re more important than you!”  “It’s all about us!”


 
E.R. Campbell said:
...  I tell my good lady that it was the Scots who brought civilization to China about 4,000 years ago!

The consequence of which, by the way, was a prolonged 'diet' of cold shoulder and hot tongue!
 
There are certainly many currents flowing here.

Although the Chinese are trying to flood the region with Han colonists, I think the birthrate of the local Muslim population is growing much faster than colonization. Given the skewed demographics of the Han Chinese themselves (due to the "one child" program), this problem will only increase over time.

While the Chinese are concerned about the growing Muslim population in Xinjiang, they also see a similar population boom happening in the "Stans" as well. The East may not be Red after all, but Green. All these people will be in competition with China for water and natural resources in the years to come, with the contest spreading from Central Asia into Siberia. Russia may hold the trump cards for the first few rounds with the combination of resource wealth and military power, but Russia is in its own demographic slump, and will have fewer and fewer people to man the border posts as time goes on.

Pakistan is teetering between Islamic radicalization and the current autocracy. Neither sort of government or society is stable (this is my "brittle societies" argument), but Pakistan is a nuclear power. China may have to contend with three nuclear powers on their borders (four, counting the DPRK), each with wildly different national interests, in addition to the more distant American nuclear umbrella sheltering Tiawan, Japan and the ROK.

How the Chinese deal with this combination of pressures will be interesting to watch. How we deal with the Chinese as they deal with these pressures will be crucial.
 
See Dan?  This is what I mean.  There is always someone around here to disagree with you.  :)

Edward and Arthur - more to follow

Cheers.
 
Thanks for the link Kirkhill, a good read!

Is it just "Islamism" the Chinese are worried about? Or is it "separatism" generally?

I would have to concur with Mr. Campbell, in the eyes of the Chinese Islamism and separatism are mutual. There exist the real fear within Beijing, which is shared with Moscow, that if the region were to activate some sort of pan-Islamic movement it would really upset entrenched geopolitical interests. Recall that there’s no love lost between Russia and the “Stan’s” for,

“During World War II, Russia tried to impose a final solution on her unruly Caucasian dominion, the most brutal attempt yet – genocide through deportation of entire North Caucasian nations. Six Muslim nations were deported in 1944, four of them from the North Caucus…Approximately 1/3 of the nations perished through transportation alone.”

Most of these states have far more in common with each other than they do the central, and provided the fact that both China and Russia have shown little qualms at using force to crush domestic dissent, and then throw in the countries that a_majoor has mentioned and we have one real interesting recipe!

Mr. Campbell’s your statement that it “is a ‘pull’ system based on economics” is true, but I think it should be noted that providing Xinjiang with Autonomous Region Status was largely done as a means to quell calls for greater independence. The economics of such could actually result in a distancing, through increased inter-regional trade, of Xinjiang from Beijing.

Excellent discussion all around, I have thoroughly enjoyed this thread so far,

Adam
 
a_majoor said:
There are certainly many currents flowing here.
...
Pakistan is teetering between Islamic radicalization and the current autocracy. Neither sort of government or society is stable (this is my "brittle societies" argument), but Pakistan is a nuclear power. China may have to contend with three nuclear powers on their borders (four, counting the DPRK), each with wildly different national interests, in addition to the more distant American nuclear umbrella sheltering Tiawan, Japan and the ROK.

How the Chinese deal with this combination of pressures will be interesting to watch. How we deal with the Chinese as they deal with these pressures will be crucial.

And just a year ago (Jun 06) the Chinese were on a major charm offensive in/towards India.

I think we (many of us anyway) are confused by the Chinese who, generally, think and act in the long term.  That capacity may be blunted in liberal democracies - the pressures of electoral politics ("what have you done for me lately?") being what they are.  Additionally, as this whole thread (except my off topic contribution) discusses, China is involved in a classic regional balance of power exercise with India, Japan/Taiwan/America, Russia, Pakistan and others.  That may help to explain why, even as Mao proclaimed that China and India needed to become fast friends (1970), the Chinese were helping Pakistan to become nuclear power.

Last year the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting dominated the news in Beijing in early June.  The big story was 'security cooperation.'  The Chinese appeared highly relieved that their fears (fanned by their own government) of Islamist influence would be assuaged by increased Chinese involvement in the 'internal security' of its Muslim neighbours in Central Asia.  I'm guessing that some (many?) senior officials wished they had been less kind to Pakistan in the '70s, '80s and '90s.  The problem with thinking in the long term is that it's a highly imperfect art.  I suspect that in the '90s the Chinese were mightily pleased with themselves; they had forced India to refocus its growing power in its own backyard.  In the '90s al Qaeda seemed like a problem for the Americans and the West.  The Chinese had applauded the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet empire.  How quickly the 'long term' plan comes face to face with an immediate reality.

For many Chinese - including those in positions of responsibility - the natural borders of China are defined by any and all territory which was ever Chinese.  It's a form of long term, historically based 'manifest destiny.'  That's why, I think China often pursues apparently groundless claims to e.g. The South China Sea.  If you argue that anything which ever was Chinese is always Chinese then separatism (breaking China apart, taking territory away from China) must be a mortal sin.  Hence Uiger separatism is a major threat and Islamist 'forces' which support and sustain the Uigers are enemies.
 
Shades of "The Coming of the French Revolution"

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/articles/20070625.aspx

The Worst Nightmare Comes True

June 25, 2007:  For Communist Party officials, their worst nightmare is becoming reality. The new middle class often own their homes, and when property values are threatened by some government policy, these middle class Chinese organize and show their displeasure. There have been several recent mass demonstrations by middle class Chinese, usually protesting efforts to put factories, or other property value destroying facilities,  in the middle of newly built middle class communities. Local government officials, who control the local police, find that they cannot just use force to disperse the middle class demonstrators, as they do farmers, or  poor, working class protestors. The middle class crowd is better organized, and have useful connections themselves. The middle class have cell phones and Internet access. The middle class also has access to the upper reaches of the Communist Party, which relies on middle class administrators and technocrats, to make things happen. If the middle class turns on the Communist Party, the communists will lose. The revenge of the bourgeoisies, so to speak.  So far, the Communist Party has a deal with the growing Chinese middle class. The latter can get rich, as long as the communists remain in power. But when that power, now corrupted by all that money, interferes with property values, who prevails? Historically, the protectors of property values prevail.
 
I caught the end of an interview by Chris Patten, last Governor of Hong Kong (and not one of my favourite people) on the BBC yesterday. 

In sum he said this:  The military and the conservatives claim that if the reforms continue then the Communist Party will lose power.  The reformers claim that if the reforms don't continue then the Communist Party will lose power.  The unfortunate thing is this - in his view - they are both right.  No matter what is done, sooner or later the Communist Party will lose power.

I have long subscribed to the notion that revolutions occur when the person next to the throne can no longer tolerate not sitting in the throne AND has access to a power base.

The reformers seem to have access to a body of people: the middle class.  Is there also as geographic separation suggesting that Shanghai, Guangzhou or even Hong Kong are sufficiently secure to support a "reformist" culture to oppose (what I presume is) a conservative culture in Beijing?

My supposition is that the reformists, and in particular the middle class, are looking for a soft landing when the CPC falls.

 
Soft landings are rarely an option. Most revolutions in history did have a "soft" option at the beginning, but examples ranging from the American Revolution to the Provisional Government of Russia, attempts to make incrimental changes by the moderates are thwarted by the powers that be and eventually swept away by the more zealous revolutionaries.

The only real exceptions that I have seen are the surge of populist movements in New Europe and Lebanon (Velvet Revolution, Orange Revolution, Cedar Revolution...) where the regime has accepted the size and scope of the populist revolution and quietly stepped aside. Hordes of "Democracy Babes" in the demonstrations help as well.

China has alternated between being a unitary "Kingdom" and a collection of warring states. The current Imperial court would prefer a unitary "Kingdom", but there are many forces in play that will make that dream harder to sustain. Besides the growth of the Islamic population in the West of China, there is the North/South divide, the huge income gap between urban and rural China, demographic change, environmental degradation and the fact that resources are not located where the economic action is (the south coast). Imagine if Xinjiang becomes the "Alberta" of China.

We are living in "interesting times".
 
Not on Pakistan but definitely on China and Chaos.

This is from the Christian Science Monitor and specifically addresses South Sudan and Darfur.

Beijing has "a vested interest in the continuation of a low level of insecurity. It keeps the other major investors out," charges the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) in a report. The report argues that China welcomes the absence of real peace in Sudan as enhancing its business opportunities, whatever the cost to southern Sudanese civilians: "There is [on the part of the Chinese] an almost total disregard for the human rights implications of their investments."

And

"China doesn't want another government in charge," adds a Khartoum-based humanitarian aid worker, speaking on condition of anonymity. "They're used to dealing with this government."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0626/p01s08-woaf.html


 
The idea of the Chinese ‘middle-class’ as a reformist element has been grossly overstated by Western sources. Indeed, even the term ‘middle-class’ has misleading connotations, as the Chinese ‘middle-class’ is really best described as the Chinese upper-class. They are the relatives and associates of Party leaders, the one’s that through being close to the source of power have been able to gain economic concessions not available to the average Joe or Chan. There is much interplay between the two as in terms of how agendas are set. I believe the Chinese ‘middle-class’ to have a vested interest in the maintenance of the Chinese Communist Party. That is not to say transformation is unlikely, a progression to an oligarch structure is already occurring as the power structure is expanding to include big business.

I took a few economic courses and could tell you that at least half of those in the class were Chinese international students. The fact I met one or two Chinese international students in my political science courses says something about the nature of the information exchange with the West.

I think the greatest issue facing China is the growing disparity between urban and rural. It will be interesting to see how Chinese communist political philosophy justifies/copes with this dynamic.





 
FifthHorse said:
I took a few economic courses and could tell you that at least half of those in the class were Chinese international students. The fact I met one or two Chinese international students in my political science courses says something about the nature of the information exchange with the West.

FifthHorse,

I agree with you entirely. During my study abroad program in Beijing back in my college days, one of the locals asked me "what is your major?" and when I answered "Political Science", he bluntly said "I think Political Science is useless...that's why I am taking business." That's the gist of what he said, IIRC.
Oh well...apparently they've been raised to think that trying to effect political change as an individual is futile, such as the right to vote, which they don't have at the national level (though some counties in Yunnan province, IIRC, are experimenting with a secret ballot) and that one must focus on practical things such as trying to cash in on China's current prosperity.

On a side note about a different kind of "chaos", they need more English teachers there since the English signs done by local translators are ridiculous, since I once saw on a train station the words "CHOO-CHOO Station" printed on a huge sign.

Oh well... ;D
 
The question that intrigues me is how long do either of you (5th Horse and Cougarshark) think it might take before some of those mercantilist "middle class" types figure that they can serve themselves better by overthrowing the guys on top with the aid of the rural "have nots"?
 
Kirkhill,

Overthrow them? Aren't you aware that the CCP has inducted several successful entrepreneurs into its party membership??? (in other words, why overthrow the party when you can buy them off especially with the rampant corruption that's hard to stamp out  :blotto:) Old-style hardliners like Li Peng in the background and his Politburo Standing Committee protege Luo Gan might not be bought off but they are a minority in the party nowadays.
 
CougarShark, I was aware of that.

The problem lies not so much with the guys (and gals) that get the contracts as those that don't.  ;)
 
PS - with respect to inducting entrepreneurs into the CCP I would suggest that was unnecessary.  In my view in order to succeed in any of the Communist Parties a considerable degree of entrepreneurship and self-interest seems to have been the key.  Certainly a number of CCP Generals in the PLA apparently have exhibited significant entrepreneurial expertise in running toy factories in prison camps.
 
I think the greatest issue facing China is the growing disparity between urban and rural. It will be interesting to see how Chinese communist political philosophy justifies/copes with this dynamic.

This, IMHO, is the biggest elephant in the room.  I was in Shanghai in 2003 on a port visit.  During the visit, we hosted a "Pacific Rim" roundtable onboard where a bunch of Chinese and Canadian academics got together (along with a couple of semi-interested officers, like myself) and discussed the future.  I posed a question to one of the Chinese academics along the lines above, pointing out that while generations of rural Chinese have been content (for lack of an alternative) to live a 10th century existence, how is the Chinese government going to manage expectations amongst the rural poor, who can see their urban brethren getting rich on TV, but not seeing much in trickling down to them.

The near complete lack of a response to my specific question (the answer was alot of generalities about economic growth and distribution of wealth), led me to believe that I had struck a chord- the CCP is intensely worried about what happens when expectations of the rural poor can no longer be managed.

FWIW.
 
Kirkhill said:
PS - with respect to inducting entrepreneurs into the CCP I would suggest that was unnecessary.  In my view in order to succeed in any of the Communist Parties a considerable degree of entrepreneurship and self-interest seems to have been the key.  Certainly a number of CCP Generals in the PLA apparently have exhibited significant entrepreneurial expertise in running toy factories in prison camps.

Well in 1998 Premier Zhu Rongji ordered the PLA to divest itself of all those PLA-run enterprises (Does Bao Li Enterprises ring a bell?). It happened eventually but the PLA was slow in execution of Zhu's order.

 
I think FifthHorse is spot on re: the ‘middle class’ and, especially, the East/West (urban/rural – rich/poor (really, really poor!)) split.

But, one word of caution: in a nation of 1,300,000,000 (broadly) well educated, hard working, entrepreneurial people things can happen very, very fast.

I’m impressed (maybe depressed) at the large (and growing) number of Chinese families with children who cannot pass their (national, standardized and very rigorous) university entrance exams with high enough marks to get into one of the top 20 universities who are borrowing money to send those children to North America and Europe for their undergraduate degree, at least.  Only a very few families have ready access to that kind of money – the overwhelming majority (tens of thousands last year, I’m told)  are mortgaging the entire family’s future on each (only, now) child.  How many, really?  A young acquaintance who is one of them told me there are a half dozen like her at Ottawa’s Carleton University (BComm programme) alone.  Extrapolate that across Canada, to the (more popular) USA and to the incredibly popular UK and Australia and ten thousand per year, year after year, is not too hard to believe.

Will they try to ‘topple’ the government?  Not yet.  This is a new dynasty – the Red Dynasty, as Echo-9 another Army.ca member described it.  Most Chinese dynasties have fairly long lives – leaders have to lose their ‘mandate.’

Anson Chan was on the radio recently talking about Hong Kong vs. the Central Government.  She reiterated that, despite the deeply entrenched positions of a lot of octogenarian generals the Central Committee’s Political Bureau Standing Committee (the inner cabinet) is composed of mainly young, nimble minds who are willing and able to embrace change before it overwhelms them.

So long as the government stays out of the people’s hair and governs ‘fairly’ (that’s the corruption issue which is a HUGE problem for the Chinese leadership) it is likely to survive for quite a while longer.

The Chinese are very interested in their own history.  They are aware of how problematical interregnums can be and, I think most would like to avoid one if they can.
 
Back
Top