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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

An exercise aimed at sending a message toward India?

Defense News link

China and Pakistan Begin Biannual Air Exercise Shaheen 2

Sep. 9, 2013 - 07:18PM  | 
By USMAN ANSARI 


ISLAMABAD — China and Pakistan last week began a three-week air exercise titled Shaheen 2 (Falcon 2) in Hetian Prefecture of China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

The exercise, which lasts until Sept. 22, is the second in a series of such exercises, the first of which was held in Pakistan in March 2011.

Shaheen 2 will be the first time an air force of another country will be participating in such an exercise in Chinese airspace.


The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) first reported the exercise was to take place, citing the Chinese Defense Ministry.

The Air Force here did not reveal any further details, such as participating aircraft, or if there had been any changes to the size, scope or format of the exercise since 2011.

However, an APP report last week stated Chengdu F-7PG and Mirage aircraft had traveled to China to participate in Shaheen 2.

It also stated: “The prime objective of the exercise is to excel in the air combat capability with focus on air power employment in any future conflict.”

Pakistan’s latest fighter type, the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder, is operational with two Pakistani Air Force (PAF) squadrons, but has not been sent to participate on this occasion.
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E.R. Campbell said:
Prof Lo makes one very good point, "corruption has been the hallmark of dynasties throughout China's history. The crux of the matter is not about eliminating corruption, but containing its further spread and minimising its impact on the legitimacy of the party and government." Corruption has not been, cannot be, in my opinion, eliminated from America, Britain, Canada or Denmark ... and so on and so forth ... so why should we expect it to be eliminated from China?

But, as Porf Lo says, mainland Chinese should learn from Hong Kong that a mostly honesty system enhances profits. Look at the least corrupt countries - note that Hong Kong and Singapore, both Sinic societies with all that baggage, are both honest and rich. There is a link between honesty, which includes government respecting the right to property, and prosperity, and Hong Kong and Singapore show China that simple truth.

To go with what was mentioned much earlier in this thread when I posted about Dr. Pan Wei and his "rule of law regime" template he suggested adopting from Singapore for reforming China, take note that Singapore has an effective anticorruption agency, similar to Hong Kong's ICAC mentioned below, called the CPIB.

Plus more on Singapore's anti-corruption strategy from an article last year:

Why China Should Study Singapore's Anti-Corruption Strategy
Joshua Berlinger
Dec. 6, 2012, 8:00 PM
Singapore

Yesterday, Singapore was named fifth-least corrupt country according to Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The index — which include 176 countries around the world — is ranked based on how corrupt their administrative and political institutions are perceived to be on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) and a 100 (very clean). 

Singapore scored 87, placing only three points behind the three states which tied for first place.

China and many of the Asian tigers have a notorious reputation for their rampant graft, scandal, and illicit activity in the public sector . But in recent decades, Singapore has stood out in comparison to its peers for its lack of perceived corruption.

"Corruption [in Singapore] is fact of life rather than a way of life. Put differently, corruption exists in Singapore, but Singapore is not a corrupt society," Professor John S.T. Quah— one of the world's foremost experts on corruption and governance in Asia — noted in 1987.


Singapore hasn't always been graft free. Corruption was prominent from Singapore's colonial era until the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945. Quah posits that the following three factors lead to were the crucial elements that led to corruption in Singapore: "[low] salaries, opportunities (which depend on the extent of involvement of civil servants in the administration or control of lucrative activities), and policing (i.e., the probability of detection and punishment)."

So why has Singapore been so successful in stamping out crooked behavior, despite its history? And could its solution be a model for China, which has dealt with a plethora of embarrassing scandals in the last year?

Tough laws

Many point to the country's incredibly stringent, almost draconian penal code. Jaywalking, littering, and spitting can get you arrested, failing to flush a public toilet or chewing gum in the open can each lead to a fine, and vandalism is punished by caning.


Laws against corruption are tough as well. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau works directly with the Prime Minister's office and wields significant power; the Bureau can arrest individuals without a warrant and execute search and seizure orders carte blanche if there are "reasonable grounds to believe that any delay in obtaining the search warrant is likely to frustrate the object of the search."

Those accused of corruption usually face a 5-year jail term and up to S$100,000 ($80,000) fine, and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wants to add even more penalties as a form of deterrence, according to the Associated Press.

Lee made it clear that "it's far better to suffer the embarrassment and keep the system clean for the long-term, than to pretend that nothing has gone wrong and to let the rot spread," after a rare corruption scandal surfaced this year.

Some argue that Singapore's tough legal code have created a society that resembles an Orwellian dystopia, in which stringent laws keep the population in line and society sparkly clean.

But the results are noticeable, as Singapore has one of the lowest crime and corruption rates in the world.





It's a two-part plan

Tough laws and sentences can scare the populace into submission and make for a good read, but Singapore's anti-corruption laws are part of a two part plan. Punishment only alters the risk level of graft, not the reward factor.


The Singapore government keeps the salaries of politicians and civil servants high in order prevent talented, honest Singaporeans from leaving and to stifle the economic incentive to engage in corrupt activity. By tackling both the policing and financial factors of corruption, the payoff of corrupt activity is shifted from a low risk, high reward to high risk, low reward.

During Singapore's rule by the British and early independence, the state did not have the wealth it does today, and therefore could not afford to raise the salaries of politicians and civil servants. The shift came in the 1980s, when then Prime Minster Lee Kuan Yew enacted salary raises for senior level government officials and politicians.

"He concluded that best way of dealing with corruption was `moving with the market [to incentive good behavior]," Quah explains, "which is 'an honest, open, defensible and workable system' instead of hypocrisy, which results in duplicity and corruption."

Punishment, incarceration, and deterrence

Quah contends that there are four 'lessons' that can be learned by other Asian countries from Singapore's example:
1.Political will is the key ingredient for success
2.The anti-corruption agency must be independent from the police and political control
3.The anti-corruption agency must be incorruptible
4.Minimize corruption by tackling its major sources: low salaries, ample opportunities, and poor policing


But Quah stresses that political will is the most crucial factor: "The principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so are politicians. This is because they make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced."

At the end of his life, famed criminologist Cesare Lombroso concluded that there is no solution to the problem of crime, except punishment, incarceration, and deterrence. His assertion can be seen in Singapore's anti-corruption strategy.

So the question remains — would similar harsh laws and salary increases effectively shift the risk/reward payoffs of corruption in China?

By Lombroso's logic and Quah's policy prescriptions, it's possible. But one cannot discount the cultural, historical and geographical differences between Singapore and China (and within China) that shape government and public attitudes towards corruption.

Singapore's tough law code is reflective of its relatively conservative culture. While parts of China might share these social attitudes, others do not. And monitoring a government running a country of 5 million people living in 274 square miles is nothing compared to another with 1.3 billion people living in 3.7 million square miles.

Further, the Communist party structure poses a different set of challenges. It would be easy for the Chinese Communist Party to pass similar stringent anti-corruption laws, as unelected officials have a much easier time passing legislation.


But corruption has historically had a direct correlation to economic growth in China. Andrew Wedeman, author of Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China, notes that corruption actually feeds of rapid growth: "China is different because the Communist Party does not depend on injections of cash from the private sector."

If China's new leader, Xi Jinping, follows up on his promises to tackle corruption, Singapore's model and a revived political could signal a significant shift in the battle against corruption. But continuing economic expansion, including a plan revealed by Xinhua today to further open the Chinese economy, could hinder anti-corruption efforts, in the same manner that Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms fueled the Chinese corruption machine.


Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/why-china-should-study-singapores-anti-corruption-strategy-2012-12#ixzz2eYVvUkIR
 
An interesting, and, I think, insightful look, by the ]Globe and Mail's Africa correspondent Geoffrey York, at how (and why) China aims to push its soft power agenda in Africa, in this srticle which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/media-agenda-china-buys-newsrooms-influence-in-africa/article14269323/#dashboard/follows/
gam-masthead.png

Why China is making a big play to control Africa's media

GEOFFREY YORK
NAIROBI — The Globe and Mail

Last updated Thursday, Sep. 12 2013

When one of South Africa’s biggest newspaper chains was sold last month, an odd name was buried in the list of new owners: China International Television Corp.

A major stake in a South African newspaper group might seem an unusual acquisition for Chinese state television, but it was no mystery to anyone who has watched the rapid expansion of China’s media empire across Africa.

From newspapers and magazines to satellite television and radio stations, China is investing heavily in African media. It’s part of a long-term campaign to bolster Beijing’s “soft power” – not just through diplomacy, but also through foreign aid, business links, scholarships, training programs, academic institutes and the media.

Its investments have allowed China to promote its own media agenda in Africa, using a formula of upbeat business and cultural stories and a deferential pro-government tone, while ignoring human-rights issues and the backlash against China’s own growing power.

The formula is a familiar one used widely in China’s domestic media. It leads to a tightly controlled pro-China message, according to journalists and ex-journalists at the Africa branch of CCTV, the Chinese state television monopoly that owns China International Television and launched a new headquarters in Nairobi last year.

“It was ‘our way or the highway,’” recalls a journalist who worked in Ethiopia for CCTV. He said he was ordered to focus primarily on diplomatic negotiations over Sudan, with his bosses citing “China’s interest in the region” – a reference to China’s state oil companies and their heavy investments in Sudan.

Other CCTV Africa journalists say they were told to provide positive news on China, to omit negative words such as “regime,” and to ignore countries such as Swaziland that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Chinese demand for ivory could not be mentioned in stories about Africa’s poaching crisis, one journalist said. Another recalled how human-rights questions had to be avoided in an interview with an authoritarian African leader. “I knew it would be cut out of my story, so I self-censored,” he said.

The journalists asked not to be named for fear of repercussions.

If there is an “information war” between China and the United States on an African battleground, as former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested at a Congressional committee hearing in 2011, it appears that China is beginning to win the war.

In South Africa, Chinese investors have teamed up with allies of the ruling African National Congress to purchase Independent News and Media, one of the most powerful media groups in the country, which owns daily newspapers in all of the major cities.

The deal was spearheaded by Iqbal Surve, a businessman with close African National Congress connections who says he wants the media to report more “positive aspects” of the country. Financing was provided by state investment groups from China and South Africa, along with Mr. Surve’s consortium. Top leaders of the ANC helped put together the Chinese investors with Mr. Surve’s group, analysts said.

Under the deal, China International Television and the China-Africa Development Fund, both controlled by Beijing, will end up with 20 per cent of the newspaper chain – a stake that will allow them to materially influence the company, according to South Africa’s Competition Commission.

Even though South Africa’s feisty journalists will push back against any attempt to censor them, China is still likely to end up with more power to shape the media in Africa’s wealthiest country.

“I do not think the Chinese authorities will crudely impose their views on our media, as they do on much of their own, but I do think that they are likely to try and influence it for a more sympathetic view of themselves and the ANC government,” said Anton Harber, a journalism professor at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, who has reported extensively on the Chinese investments.

“It is my view that the ANC is working with their Chinese allies – ruling party to ruling party, in the way the Chinese government so often works – to increase their influence in our local media and counter what they view as a hostile media sector.”

Meanwhile, other Chinese media investors are gaining a bigger foothold across Africa. A Chinese company, StarTimes, purchased a controlling stake in South African satellite television provider TopTV this year, adding to its presence in 13 other African countries. The state-run radio broadcaster, China Radio International, has FM stations in three East African cities, while its AM channel covers all of Kenya.

China’s leading English-language state newspaper, China Daily, created an Africa edition last December, published in Nairobi and distributed on Kenya Airways flights and other venues. China has also launched a monthly magazine, ChinAfrica, based in Johannesburg.

China’s state news agency, Xinhua, has nearly 30 bureaus in Africa, along with its own television channel. It provides news bulletins for 17-million Kenyan cellphones, while CCTV provides a mobile TV service called I Love Africa. African journalists and press officers are often invited on all-expenses-paid “training” sessions in Beijing, as part of Chinese aid programs that give short-term training to 30,000 Africans and full university scholarships to another 18,000.

In Zimbabwe, CCTV provided new equipment for the state television monopoly, allowing it to broadcast President Robert Mugabe’s campaign rallies for many hours during the July election campaign. China also supplied giant television screens for Zimbabwe’s main cities, so that government information could be broadcast on the streets.

The centrepiece of China’s media empire is its new CCTV hub in Nairobi and its flagship show, Africa Live. With its staff of about 100 people (about 40 of whom are Chinese), and correspondents in 14 bureaus, the show is intended to compete with BBC and CNN.

Top executives of CCTV in Nairobi declined requests for an interview. But speaking on condition of anonymity, their journalists said the Africa headquarters is extremely well-financed, with state-of-the-art equipment and salaries double the Kenyan norm.

Its content, however, is often simplistic and condescending. It produced a documentary, for example, called Glamorous Kenya that portrayed the country as “a land of mystery” and “kingdom of animals.” It gives consistently glowing coverage of Chinese trade and aid in Africa, including frequent stories about the two dozen Confucius Institutes that provide Chinese language training across Africa.

News scripts are carefully vetted by Chinese editors, the journalists say, and there are instructions to avoid any negative coverage of Chinese leaders at summits. Some journalists are docked pay if their reports are considered “poor.”

When a CCTV reporter quoted Zambian mine workers who were angry at their Chinese employer, his story was shelved. And when Muslims protested against the Ethiopian government, the CCTV correspondent wondered whether to cover the street protests. His bosses swiftly vetoed it. “No religion,” they said.


I see an interesting potential problem for China: its journalists must, in greater and greater numbers, learn how to function in freer and freer media markets - consider the "dust up" between People's Daily reporter Li Xue Jiang and Prime Minister Harper's media staff on the recent Northern tour - they will bring those habits back to China, into a system where the media are not expected to compete or to "dig" for information.
 
Speaking of China's fight against corruption...

The man described below is the one leading the fight against it in China and thus in the right position as the head of the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

The 2nd most powerful man in China next to Xi Jinping...

Perhaps the party may yet adapt (by stamping out corruption and adopting a system closer to Singapore) with men like him at the helm?

link

Mr Clean catches China's graft tigers by the tail
Reuters
By John Ruwitch

SHANGHAI (Reuters) - Behind China's aggressive drive to root out corruption is Wang Qishan, a historian-turned-economist who once felt so bad about getting free parking that he reportedly sent a colleague back to pay the fee.

President Xi Jinping launched the anti-corruption campaign after becoming Communist Party chief in November.

So far the party has announced the investigation or arrest of eight senior officials, including three from the 376-member elite Central Committee. Among them, former executives from oil giant PetroChina are being investigated in what appears to be the biggest graft probe into a state-run firm in years.

Wang, 65, heads the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and ranks sixth in the party hierarchy.
His power far exceeds this, said Cheng Li, a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington and an expert on Chinese politics.

"I would say that Wang Qishan is the second most powerful person next only to Xi Jinping," he said.

Given the secretive nature of China's Communist Party, there are few details on what Wang has done as its top graft-buster, a role he assumed when Xi became party chief.


Wang keeps a low profile and his public appearances and comments, like those of all top Chinese leaders, are usually scripted. He rarely gives interviews.

But observers said the fingerprints of the urbane former banker were visible in the anti-corruption campaign and in related efforts to force officials to behave less extravagantly.

"He is the lead actor in this," said Zhang Ming, a professor at Renmin University in Beijing.

IMMUNITY FOR ELITE REMOVED

For example, it was Wang who proposed the party scrap a decades-old unwritten rule that exempted incumbent and retired members of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, of which he belongs, from investigation for corruption, a source with direct knowledge of the matter said.


That landmark move was approved earlier this year by the Standing Committee, China's top political decision-making body, sources who have ties to the leadership or direct knowledge of the matter have told Reuters.

Wang has also reorganised parts of the discipline inspection commission and added two offices so the body can deepen its investigations into provincial leaders.

And one of the earliest initiatives Xi unveiled was a set of guidelines for officials that aimed to cut bureaucracy and formality.

"This came from the discipline commission," said Li of the Brookings Institution.

"He and Xi Jinping have a very, very good partnership."

To be sure, China has announced corruption crackdowns before that have met with little success. Experts say only deep and difficult political reforms will move the needle.

"If the anti-graft campaign is sustained and expanded, it could begin to challenge the party's systemic problems with corruption, but it's far too early to say that the government is committed to that," said Duncan Innes-Ker, senior China analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Like his predecessors, Xi says corruption threatens the party's very survival. He has said he wants to show he is serious by going after "tigers", or political heavyweights, not just "flies".

Some questioned the wisdom of moving Wang away from his role as a leading economic policymaker. A protege of former premier and economic reformer Zhu Rongji, he was even viewed as a dark-horse candidate for premier before the new leadership lineup was announced in November.

Now that the Chinese economy is showing signs of stability, the decision to deploy a man widely known as "the chief firefighter" to the corruption front might be a good call.

"They needed a person to deal with corruption who was strong and whose image and reputation were good, and he was that person. There was no one else they could have picked," said Jin Zhong, editor of Hong Kong's Open magazine, which follows elite Chinese politics.

Wang is under no illusions as to task ahead. Graft oils the wheels of government at almost every level in China, which ranked 80th out of 176 countries and territories on Transparency International's corruption perceptions index, where a higher ranking means a cleaner public sector.

"The war against corruption needs to be resolute and long-lasting, and it must be a battle to the death," the Xinhua news agency quoted Wang as saying in March.

Not everything has gone according to plan.

State media reported last week that Yu Qiyi, a 42-year-old engineer in the eastern city of Wenzhou, drowned after being repeatedly dunked in cold water while being interrogated by corruption investigators.
Six officials will soon stand trial.

NO TIME FOR NONSENSE

Wang made a name for himself in the late 1990s when he sorted out a debt crisis in booming southern Guangdong province.

He then ran the island province of Hainan as governor before moving to Beijing where he tackled the deadly SARS pandemic in 2003 as mayor after his predecessor was sacked for covering it up.

His most recent job was vice premier with responsibility for the economy.

As an undergraduate in the mid-1970s he studied history in Shaanxi province, where he had worked on a farm at the height of the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s Wang moved to Beijing and focused on rural policy, the forefront of China's market reforms. He later transitioned into banking.

Wang is a straight shooter, sources say. When being briefed by officials he has a habit of stopping them from reading from prepared statements and asking them questions.

"He does not have time for nonsense and demands direct answers," a source with ties to the leadership told Reuters.

The new administration has taken steps to introduce more transparency and adhere more closely to the rule of law in anti-corruption work, said Zhu Jiangnan, a professor at the University of Hong Kong who has researched corruption in China.


The discipline commission held its first news conference ever in January and launched a new website at the start of this month.

"I suspect some of those ideas are coming from Wang Qishan," Zhu said.

In May, Wang ordered disciplinary and supervisory cadres to give up club membership and VIP cards, apparently common gifts for officials, calling them "small objects (that) reflect a big problem in working style".

The son-in-law of late vice premier Yao Yilin, Wang has a reputation for modesty and honesty
.

In a late August cover story, the influential state-run magazine, Southern People Weekly, recounted an incident in which a parking attendant insisted on letting Wang, then mayor of Beijing, park for free.

"The car behind started to get impatient and honk so Wang had to drive away," it said. Wang later sent a staffer to pay the fee.

(Additional reporting by Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard in BEIJING. Editing by Dean Yates)
 
Wang Qishan is a pretty impressive politician. He came to real prominence as mayor of Beijing during the 2008 Olympics but his fame wasn't, really, about that ~ it was based on how, in a frank and honest way, he related to the people. I have mentioned before the (apparently) small incident of raising the entry fees on pretty much all "attractions" in Beijing: almost everyone agreed it was necessary to use "price" to control (over)use (the stone steps in some temples were being visibly word away by millions and millions of Chinese visitors) but the new fees were applied to even the small public parks that pensioners - almost only pensioners - use every day (because they have no backyards). That part provoked public outrage and even a really spontaneous, unapproved public demonstration. Wang Qishan apologized to the pensioners and removed the fees for them. He did so publicly, on TV and it was something of a watershed in Chinese politics. He later served as Vice premier for economic affairs ~ finance minister ~ for Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao and was a bit of a "star" in global economic circles. He is 65 years old.

4360836-3x4-700x933.jpg

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-08/wang-qishan/4360836
 
??? And I thought the proposed undersea tunnel between Pusan, South Korea and Japan was crazy enough...

While there are already many trade links between Taiwan and the mainland- (e.g. direct flights between Taipei and Shanghai, if I can recall correctly, without having to reroute through Hong Kong or Macau anymore as was in the past)- perhaps Beijing's planners are bit too optimistic if they're planning this type of infrastructure already???

China's Hopes for Bridging the Taiwan Strait

More than six decades after Taiwan's estrangement from mainland China, the Taiwan Strait still represents the most physically formidable and symbolically inaccessible barrier to Beijing's objective of eventual reunification with the island. Over the course of its history, Taiwan switched hands from colonial occupiers including the Europeans and Japanese before becoming the prospective battleground between China and Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century. In recent years, military tensions between China and Taiwan have eased, and Beijing hopes that enhanced economic integration and the physical infrastructure it wants to build one day across the Taiwan Strait could bring the country a step closer to fulfilling a core geopolitical imperative by reuniting with the island.

The South China Morning Post reported Aug. 5 that in its recently approved National Highway Network Plan for 2013-2030, the State Council included two highway projects linking Taiwan to the mainland. One involves the long-proposed Beijing-Taipei Expressway, which would start in Beijing and pass through Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang and Fujian's Fuzhou before crossing the strait and reaching Taipei. Another inland route would start in Chengdu and pass through Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian's Xiamen, and cross the Taipei-administered Kinmen archipelago before eventually ending at Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan.

The plan does not specify what kind of infrastructure -- a bridge or a tunnel, for example -- would be used to connect the mainland to Taiwan over the 180-kilometer (111-mile) strait, but since 1996, if not earlier, Beijing has publicly called for such infrastructure to be built. One proposal involved a 122-kilometer undersea tunnel, which was deemed preferable because of its relative seismic stability and its location in shallower water. This tunnel would connect Fujian province's Pingtan Island to Hsinchu in northern Taiwan -- a distance nearly three times that of Channel Tunnel, which connects the United Kingdom and France -- and would cost an estimated 400 billion-500 billion yuan ($65 billion-$81 billion) to build. Another proposal involves linking Taiwan's southern Chiayi county to the outlying island of Kinmen via tunnel or bridge, where it would connect with envisaged infrastructure that would eventually link it to Xiamen, Fujian province. 

China-Cross-Strait.jpg


Besides the massive economic costs associated with building a bridge or tunnel across the Taiwan Strait, security concerns, geologic vulnerabilities (due to earthquakes) and the sheer width of the strait present technical challenges to its construction. Even if the infrastructure were built, it is not clear that they would be economically justifiable given that airliners and ships are now allowed to travel across the strait frequently.

Full article:  Stratfor link

 
                                                      Shared with provisions of The Copyright Act

China 'Grabs' Control from U.S. of Massive TAPI Gas Pipeline(ABC.AZ, Azerbaijan)

"By gaining control over gas from the Galkynysh field, China has in fact grabbed control over TAPI, a development that the U.S. appears to have been ready for and doesn't mind. To some extent, as it was with the USSR in its day, it will be more convenient for Washington to have China mired in Afghanistan's mayhem."

From WorldMeets.US

September 11, 2013
Baku, Fineko: With a subtle "gesture of its hand" yesterday, China grabbed control over the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline project [TAPI] from the United States, becoming the chief overseer of Central and South Asian gas resources.

By means of a contract for the sale of 25 billion cubic meters of gas per year concluded between state-owned Turkmengas and China National Petroleum Corporation, the ideas and plans of others have been expropriated. The deal will increase the volume of gas Turkmengas supplies to China by up to 65 billion cubic meters. At the same time, the agreement highlights Turkmenistan's plan for boosting exports through new export routes, in this case, through a branch of the TAPI pipeline referred to as "Line D," which will run through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on its way to China.

Article continues at link.

info;
Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
*(History make for a good read)


 
Related update for PLA carrier aviation:

The Diplomat

China’s Carrier-Based J-15 Likely Enters Mass Production 
By Zachary Keck 
September 14, 2013 


A number of recent reports in Chinese state-run media indicate that the country’s carrier-based J-15 multirole fighter jets have entered mass production.

The Shenyang J-15 (also called Flying Shark) is China’s carrier-based fighter aircraft. It was reversed engineered from a Russian Sukhoi Su-33 that China acquired from Ukraine, although it reportedly is equipped with some indigenous weapons, avionics and other features that Beijing claims greatly enhances its capabilities. The J-15 is also powered by the Chinese-built Taihang (WS-10) turbofan engine.

A J-15 prototype conducted its first flight test in August 2009. In November last year it was announced that a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilot conducted the first take-off and landing from China’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning, using one of the J-15 tester jets. Throughout 2013 the PLAAF has continued holding take-off and landing exercises using the J-15 aircraft.

The People’s Daily Online carried a couple of reports this week on the J-15. Most of them begin by noting that “many keen military observers” have noted that the J-15s that have appeared on CCTV as of late have been painted gray with a People’s Republic of China flag on them, in contrast to the initial five J-15s that were painted yellow and were therefore marked as being intended solely for testing and development. The reports then note that the new paint job has led these “keen military observers” to speculate that the J-15 fighters have entered mass production.

One of the reports then asks Yin Zhuo, which it identifies only as a military analyst but who is also a former Rear Admiral in the PLA Navy (PLAN), to comment on this speculation. Admiral Yin begins by affirming that there has not been an official announcement yet on whether the J-15s have entered mass production, but nonetheless judges that the “navy paint finish on the J-15 indicates that it is now in formal service.”

He is then quoted as that online speculation about whether the aircraft has entered into mass production is “logical based on the facts that J-15 is already in service, and its technology is mature enough for mass production.” The rest of the article is devoted to Admiral Yin discussing what the implications will be if the J-15s have entered mass production, including the aircraft’s service life, which he estimates at 25-30 years.

“Once mass production is under way,” the People’s Daily paraphrases Admiral Yin as saying, “the aircraft design will be fixed other than in terms of possible changes to radar and electronic communication systems, or modernization of the engine after 10 to 15 years of service. However, the profile, basic finish, and performance standards of the aircraft have been established.”

Although hardly conclusive, the reports strongly suggest that mass production of the J-15 has begun, or at least that the Communist Party wants to create that impression.

Notably, the reports coincide with the Commander of PLAN, Admiral Wu Shengli, visiting the United States. The commander of the Liaoning carrier and the pilot who first landed on the carrier last November are accompanying Admiral Wu on the trip, according to Reuters.

“We have around 36 airplanes operating on board our ship,” Captain Zhang Zheng, the Liaoning commander told reporters in Washington this week, referring to aircraft carrier. “And we are still practicing and doing tests and experiments for the equipment and systems.”

Admiral Wu, on the other hand, told reporters that the Liaoning is just for training and experimentation and after a “final evaluation” the PLAN will decide on the development of a new aircraft carrier for the service.

Meanwhile, one of the other J-15 articles that appeared on the People’s Daily website compared it favorably relative to other countries’ carrier-based aircraft. Indeed, Admiral Yin, who was also quoted in that article, is paraphrased as saying that the J-15 “reaches a similar level to the U.S. F/A-18C/D Super Hornet” and is superior in terms of its air combat capability.

However, Want China Times flags a Xinhua report that quotes Sun Cong, the J-15s designer, noting that currently the aircraft cannot launch attacks against ships and ground targets when taking off from the Liaoning. That is because the aircraft carrier utilizes a ski-jump ramp and the J-15 would be too heavy to take off if it was carrying air-to-surface missiles and bombs. Thus, until the Navy acquires a Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested-Recovery (CATOBAR) carrier, the J-15, which is a multirole fighter, will be limited primarily to air superiority operations (and ship defense).

Notably, one of the People’s Daily reports observed that the J-15’s “front wheel is suitable for catapult launch similar to the carrier-based fighter of the U.S. Navy. The catapult launch was taken into consideration at the beginning of its design.”
 
I am guessing that Gen. Carlisle's comment- "We may not necessarily fight China, (but) we will fight their stuff"- refers to possible exports of newer Chinese aircraft to North Korea and Myanmar or other possible adversaries outside the Asia region who might use Chinese aircraft in the future.

Defense Tech

China On Pace to Challenge U.S. Airpower Edge: General

by Bryant Jordan on September 18, 2013

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — As China continues to enhance its military’s technology and equipment, the U.S. Air Forces Pacific Command needs to be able to respond – even if it’s not against China, the commander of PacAF said Wednesday.

“We may not necessarily fight China, we will fight their stuff,” Gen. Herbert Carlisle said during a presentation at the Air Force Association’s annual conference here.

Carlisle, who took over the Pacific theater command just over a year ago, said enemies and potential enemies have seen what American airpower can do “and their objective in many cases is to keep us as far as away as they possibly can.”

Carlisle was not alone in raising the specter of an emerging and growing China as a key challenge to the U.S.

On Tuesday, Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of Air Combat Command, told reporters that China is forging ahead with fifth generation fighters that will challenge American airpower in the region in about five years unless the U.S. is able to field the F-35 Lightning II as scheduled.

The Air Force is slated to buy 1,763 F-35s — barring budget cuts that reduce the number.
The plane was already behind schedule before the economy crashed in 2008 and began taking a toll on the Defense Department.

“If we keep slowing the ramp, we’ll never get to 1,763 because I’ll be ‘bone yarding’ the first ones before I get the last ones. It’s critical we get to that number,” Hostage said.

PacAF spelled out a year ago its need for the F-35, emphasizing in its annual strategic plan that it remained a priority for the theater.

“New threats and investment needs are not theoretical possibilities for the future; they are here now,” the plan stated.

Carlisle on Wednesday called China “the pacing threat” because it’s the most capable in the region. He also noted that Russia is developing more sophisticated capabilities and exporting them to other countries.

“These advance capabilities will be ubiquitous throughout the world just because they go to the highest bidder,” he said.

They’re using electronic attack systems able to operate in a spectrum that can wreak havoc on GPS and radar systems, Carlisle said. Potential adversaries wanting to keep the U.S. at a distance look to do that with advanced surface-to-air missiles land and anti-ship missiles.

Integrated air and missile defense will be one of the biggest challenges, he said, requiring continued capability in strike ops, active defense – including Patriot missiles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles – and passive defense capabilities such as flexible basing of launch and fuel assets, concealment and camouflage, and agile command and control capability.

The military’s emphasis on the Pacific region – dubbed the Pacific Pivot – is a response to the U.S. determination that national security strategy requires a more robust presence.

“This administration has said that by necessity we will refocus and rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region just because of [its] importance,” he said. “Thirty-six countries [and] 55 percent of gross domestic product of the world is in this region, and clearly the health and security and stability of the Asian-Pacific region is key to not only our country, but pretty much every country in the world.”
 
While "quantity has a quality all of its own", we also need to consider the training, logistics and even tactics and doctrine of the gaining air forces. It is quite possible that the ROK, Japanese, Taiwanese and other air forces equipped with smaller numbers of Western jet fighters will still have the qualitative edge due to superior pilot training or the other factors listed, and of course the USAF still has a large lead over the other air forces because of the ability to integrate a much larger package of logistical and support capabilities into her Air Force.

I detect a bit of special pleading and political posturing for domestic and budgetary reasons in Gen. Carlisle's comment.
 
China has not had to fight against an opponent rich with Electronic Warfare capabilities. Clearly they are working hard to close that gap.  :o

Freebeacon

The disclosure that China has the capability of jamming the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS, was revealed in a Chinese military technical article published in July.

JTIDS is part of a group of military communications systems called Link 16 that gives U.S. military forces jam-resistant communications, a key strategic advantage used in joint warfighting, a specialty of the American military.


(...)

 
Its an evolving system.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-wonders-of-link-16-for-less-midslvts-updated-02471/
 
Mongolia? As if the PRC province of Inner Mongolia wasn't enough that they have to bring the rest of the Mongolians under their control...

How China Could Conquer Asia with Six Wars Without Violating the U.N. Charter
Julian Ku

One possible silver lining in Russia and China's invocation of the UN Charter to block U.S. action in Syria is that both nations have bound themselves (at least in part) to the same norm.  But at least with respect to China, it is probably not bothered by the UN Charter's limitations on the use of force because any of the wars it is likely to contemplate would be (at least arguably) consistent with Article II's self defense obligations.

For instance, this astonishingly fierce article in Chinese, (translation here)  from a nationalistic website in China and republished in HK, lays out
"Six Wars China Must Fight in the Next Fifty Years."  Those wars would involve invasions of the following places in the next half-century:

1) Taiwan
2) The Spratly Islands and the South China Sea (kicking out Vietnam and the Philippines)
3) Southern Tibet (along the border with India)
4) Diaoyu Islands and Okinawa (kicking out Japan)
5) Mongolia
6) Siberia (Russia)


For every single one of these proposed wars, China would raise the banner of self-defense under Article 51 since it claims sovereignty over each of the territories it would be invading.  Sure, some of their territorial sovereignty claims are complete bunk (Siberia?!?).  But there are certainly plausible legal arguments behind the rest of them.

Now, this list of "six wars" is the stuff of Chinese nationalistic fantasies, although any of the first four conflicts could really happen in the next few years.  But from China's perspective, the UN Charter places almost no restraints on it since it does not restrict China from recovering territory lost to foreign powers in its past.  So China can talk as much as it likes about the sanctity of the U.N. Charter, because it will never feel serious constrained by it.

As a bonus for those readers intrigued by the New Chinese Imperialism, I highly recommend viewing this CG animation video of a joint China-Taiwan military campaign to invade and occupy the Diaoyu Islands, kicking out the Japanese as they do so.  It is like a video game, complete with a last scene with a disturbing depiction of a Chinese nuke used against Tokyo.  No wonder Japan is beefing up its military.

The larger point is that I have never understood why everyone thinks the UN Charter will constrain military action since almost all conceivable large-scale inter-state wars will involve territorial disputes where sovereignty is contested. That is certainly the case with China and it would be the case between Nicaragua and Colombia, or Chile and Bolivia, etc.  Perhaps the UN Charter constrains some countries, but I doubt it will constrain China if it ever embarks on these insane but not inconceivable plans for Asian domination.


Opinio Juris
 
I don't think China needs, much less wants, to fight any of those wars.

Taiwan is non-negotiable. It IS part of China. Reunificatuon will happen; China knows that, Taiwan knows that America knows that. No one wants anything except a peaceful reunification. It doesn't matter what anyone, other than Taiwan and China thinks about the matter or says about the matter. Japan, India, Russia and even America are all irrelevant. In my opinion that chance of a an accidental war due to political miscalculation, is slight, the chance of a Chinese war of aggression is even more slight.

The Spratly Islands and the South China Sea, Southern Tibet, the Diaoyu Islands, Mongolia and Siberia can be, and I suspect will be bought. China would rather share resources than fight anyone.

I have speculated, several times, about the potential for a Sino-Russian war over Eastern Siberia, noting that China regards everything East of the Yenisei River as being Asian and, therefore, within China's, not Russia's, domain, but I am 100% convinced that neither Russia nor China wants to fight over it. China wants the resources in all five areas and can and will pay for them.
 
The Russio Chinese "wars" happened in the 1960's, but petered out for various reasons, including a pretty horrible force to space correlation on either side, the inability to project power into Eastern Siberia by either side (the Russians essentially had a single rail line linking Siberia to the metropole west of the Urals, and the Chinese simply did not have the capabilities at that time) and the threat of American intervention on the side of the Chinese should things go nuclear (Nixon putting China under the American nuclear umbrella).

Edward points out that the Chinese are quite happy to buy what the want and need for the foreseeable future, and several recent books and articles by Robert Kaplan also expand on the theme of China as well as America moving to establishing relationships rather than bases as a means to project power in the future. The Chinese approach may be more of a hybrid one, since building deep water commercial ports in Siri Lanka and Pakistan as part of the "String of Pearls" does have obvious military implications.

An interesting chapter in "Imperial Grunts" follows the exploits of an American officer who seems intent on training and coopting the Mongolian military as a sort of "Gurka" force to assist the US in protecting or advancing their interests in Asia (tellingly far beyond the reach of the US Navy). The few Mongolian officers I have actually met have all been trained by the PLA, which suggests the American exercise in relationship building and coopting has probably run its course.
 
The notorious Bo Xilai's trial is now over and he has just been handed a life sentence. Perhaps the CCP is setting him up for an eventual return the same way Deng Xiaoping returned after being purged?

link


China's disgraced Bo Xilai given life term for corruption
Reuters

By Megha Rajagopalan

JINAN, China (Reuters) - A Chinese court sentenced ousted senior politician Bo Xilai to life in jail on Sunday after finding him guilty of corruption and abuse of power, a tough term that gives him little chance of staging any political comeback.

Bo was a rising star in China's leadership circles and cultivated a loyal following through his charisma and populist, quasi-Maoist policies, especially among those left out in the cold by China's anything-for-growth economic policies.

But his career was stopped short last year by a murder scandal in which his wife, Gu Kailai, was convicted of poisoning a British businessman, Neil Heywood, who had been a family friend.

While Bo has the right to appeal within 10 days from Monday, the sentence effectively puts an end to his political ambitions and the glamorous lifestyle he enjoyed as a member of China's ruling elite.


The court in the eastern city of Jinan, where Bo was tried, ordered that all his personal assets be seized, and deprived him of his political rights for life, according to a transcript released by the court's official microblog.

(...)
 
Bo thought he was above the Party.His wife was a murderer.I don't see him making a comeback.
 
My sense is that Bo is too old. He's 64, Xi Jinping is only 60 and he has just taken office. The next "slice" of leaders will be about that age when they assume power - that means they are, now, in their early 50s.

Even if his friends in high places decide, at some point in the next decade, to pardon him ~ and he does have powerful friends ~ it will be too late. He's lost too much; younger men are building even greater power bases. He's done and so, too, in my opinion, is the Maoist claptrap he spouted. Xi Jinping, like Hu Jintao before him, is an engineer, the next generation are likely to be managers with backgrounds in engineering and accounting and, shades of Stephen Harper, economics. Men (and women) who studied history (like Bo) or the Chinese classics (like a friend of mine who is also a low level Party leader) are less and less evident in the top tiers of the Party.
 
Rather curious about the business of leaders who are engineers and managers rather than historians or classical scholars.

In other posts you point out that the strength of Chinese culture has been due to the adherence to Confucian values over many thousands of years, and that the "One Child" policy had weakened these values. Now the top leadership and much of the high ranking members of the party apparatus (and presumably a lot of their technocratic power base) is also seemingly divorced from the cultural roots. While no one can argue against the importance of being skilled and knowledgable managers and technocrats to shape and run an industrial nation-state, I am starting to wonder if the Chinese have not set themselves up for a version of the "culture wars" like we did starting in the 1960's as our traditional values and "culture" was weakened and marginalized from within?
 
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