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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

Economist Dambisa Moyo takes a look at how China is shaping emerging markets and at the growing “schism” that is developing between developed and emerging markets in this article which is reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the CFA Institute:

http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/cfm.v24.n4.12
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New Frontiers
Investors ignore key trends in frontier markets "at their peril," says economist Dambisa Moyo

By Jonathan Barnes

CFA Institute Magazine July/August 2013

Chinese commodity investment and trade are reshaping frontier markets and emerging economies, but many investors are overlooking an even bigger story, according to Zambian-born economist Dambisa Moyo, author of Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What It Means for the World. Although China is a major theme in the story, its contribution is less significant than the growth of domestic demand in these markets. Investors who focus only on the commodity aspect stand to miss out on opportunities for alpha generation. Moreover, a structural “schism” is forming between developed and emerging markets, with profound implications for investors.

In this interview with CFA Institute Magazine, Moyo, who recently spoke at the 66th CFA Institute Annual Conference in May, discusses key developments and trends in frontier markets. As she explains, common misconceptions can lead investors into trouble, including the tendency to “conflate the idea of risk and uncertainty when they talk about emerging economies” and the misinformed notion that developing markets are highly illiquid. Moyo also highlights the danger of escalating conflicts over natural resources.

What story are you seeing in developing markets?

A lot of people are quite focused on private equity when thinking about emerging or frontier markets. But the most interesting story is really the public markets, because I think that’s where there is a blind spot for most investors. That’s where I think there is significant opportunity, and we’ve already started to see that some of the savviest investors are really putting money to work in these markets. There is a lot of opportunity to invest and generate superior, uncorrelated returns in a broader global portfolio.

Many frontier markets—just looking at the macroeconomic theme—have a solid capital base in terms of debt and deficits, strong labor dynamics (in terms of a young population), and a really compelling story around productivity. Those are three key ingredients that drive economic growth: capital, labor, and productivity.

What I’m suggesting is that in the public markets, trading of equities and fixed income is rapidly increasing. I think the returns in the macro story are reasonably well known, but where I see real change in the thinking is around risk management and liquidity. Those are the two key things.

What is changing in regard to risk management?

I think people traditionally conflate the idea of risk and uncertainty when they talk about emerging economies and frontier economies in particular. What we’re seeing with savvy investors is that there is a much clearer delineation between risk (which is measurable, which you can manage and hedge against) and uncertainty (which is obviously what is immeasurable—the whole idea of tail risk, of not being able to measure these outcomes). What has happened is that there has been a move away from this idea of uncertainty and toward the idea of there being significant opportunities in risk management and, therefore, the ability to put
money to work in these markets.

And with regard to liquidity?

In regard to liquidity, people have tended to think these are highly illiquid markets, where there is really no opportunity to write big checks or the opportunity to go both long and short.

Actually, we’ve seen a significant increase in the ability to trade large-ticket items. So, for example, it is not unheard of to be able to put US$10 million or US$20 million to work in a single name, in places like Nigeria or Kenya or the Philippines or Sri Lanka. Also, you can go short as well as long in these markets. There’s not much in terms of a developed knowledge base [of these areas]. It’s just something that people who are in the know are doing much more.

Are investors using new techniques to measure risk?

It’s actually age-old techniques being applied more thoroughly. If you’re going to invest in these markets, you need to have very good underground contacts—a network that can help you understand some of the evolutionary challenges these countries face as they go from largely state-owned countries to market-driven economies that are more democratic.

Investors who have the underground contacts—which is just good business in terms of risk management—will do better than those who don’t. You could ask, “Is that the new risk management?” No, it’s not. That’s how people do risk. They want to touch and feel, to look into the eyes of the people they’re doing business with. That is really where I think there have been leaps and bounds.

People now feel comfortable to travel to these places and spend time with the business owners and the business managers and get a better handle on what is going on. That traditionally was not the case, because these countries and these places were viewed as far too risky, far too uncertain, a “we don’t go there” kind of thing because “it’s too worrisome.” That story has changed quite considerably.

Also, to the extent that you’re getting much more market data, much more information and pricing information, then traditional model analysis, technical analysis, and fundamental analysis also become much more applicable.

How has Chinese investment impacted developing regions?

There are few countries that have not benefitted from China’s campaign—everyone from the United States to countries across Africa and South America have all benefitted from the Chinese campaign, whether it’s through investment in debt (as in the case of the U.S.) or investment in infrastructure. But there’s an impact also in some of the tradable markets. For instance, China’s Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bought 20% of South Africa’s Standard Bank, one of the largest banks in Africa, in 2007. I think you would be hard pressed to come up with a country that has not benefitted from China.

Are there other examples?

My book Winner Take All is littered with examples of Chinese investment in commodities. I talk about the purchase of Mount Toromocho in Peru, which is basically a copper investment that the Chinese made in 2007. I talk about the deals that have been struck in Brazil, with the Chinese investing in agriculture there, and in places like Africa. I also talk about swaps that the Chinese put on in Russia and Pakistan in return for access to oil and uranium, respectively, which are very specific investments that could be very helpful.

Having said that, is China a key piece of the story?

Yes, it is. Is it the only piece? No, it’s not, because many of these economies are also very quickly seeing an increase in domestic demand. Their own local populations are actually now getting a foothold on the economic ladder. A lot of the change we’re seeing is due to China, but more significant is the domestic-demand theme.

How compelling are uncorrelated returns in frontier markets?

One of the main stories is this whole idea of superior, uncorrelated returns that you can garner by investing in the emerging markets. If you were to characterize the situation in developed markets right now—using the lens of capital and productivity—we know that they are struggling under significant debts and deficits. They’ve got serious aging-population concerns, not just in terms of the quantity of labor but also the quality of labor. If you look at the OECD statistics, you can see that the quality of labor is deteriorating in many developed markets. Then there’s the issue of productivity. You have countries like Britain, where in the past decade they’ve seen a decline in productivity in every single sector.

If you look at the emerging market or frontier economy, the story is quite different. You see strong, solid dynamics, a very credible, positive upswing in labor, both in quality and quantity and in productivity. The democratic processes are including more transparency, less corruption, and countries are importing technology that can help them. So that in and of itself is a schism.

The correlation between the developed markets returns and the bigger emerging market returns is around 0.9 by some measures. The return correlation between developed markets and frontier markets is closer to 0.7, which obviously is still significant but it’s relatively small and obviously makes a compelling story from the diversification of a portfolio point of view.

Has China set an example in how to engage frontier economies?

Of the world’s population, 90% live in the emerging market. In many of these countries, up to 70% of the population is under the age of 25. It’s a very young population, and very, very impoverished. These countries need trade, they need investment, and they need job creation. The Chinese mode of engagement—where they are interested in forging a relationship of investment and trade, creating jobs, and building out infrastructure—is much more beneficial for longer-term development than an attitude or an approach that focuses much more on supporting these countries in the short-term through aid.

I don’t think it is rocket science. There is not a single country in the history of the world that has achieved economic growth and reduced poverty in a meaningful way by relying on aid to the extent that many emerging countries rely on aid today. So it is not a mystery to me that good trade and engagement, solid foreign direct investment, capital markets development, and so forth are key pillars of a strategy to create economic growth. That is really what many people are describing as China’s approach for engagement.

Do you see Western countries following China’s lead?

Yes, absolutely but obviously to a much lesser degree, because one key aspect of China’s approach is that it’s got deep pockets. But if you go across the emerging world, it is pretty clear that India, Turkey, and others have adopted the approach to some degree. Across Africa, you see a lot of Turkish, Lebanese, and Russian investment—what you would call South–South investment. It is a big piece of the economic development story that’s going on across the emerging world.

It is worth pointing out that the ongoing financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe means that many of the developed markets have been back-footed. But the hope is that if they were to remedy their problems, then they also would be part of this investment and trade story.

What’s the likelihood of China becoming a monopsony in commodities markets?

The idea of a monopsony is about China’s market power in publicly traded markets. It’s not necessarily about their impact on a frontier economy. Are they able to influence (inadvertently, I would say) the market price of different commodities? The answer is yes for both copper and coal, for example. Many market traders would argue that, even today, the Chinese influence on the ability to be price setters is quite significant.I think that the ability to be a price setter and to have pricing power in the broader markets is a piece of the puzzle, but I don’t think it has to do with China’s engagement with frontier economies per se. Australia is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment. And as we speak today, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is about to close its largest transaction ever in the commodity space with a US$15.1 billion dollar purchase of Canadian oil producer Nexen. Those are both nonfrontier economies, but the activity obviously will have significant implications for the markets.

What does the evolution of the BrIC markets tell us about the path for frontier markets?

One of the case studies I love is the story of Turkey. Turkey has quickly changed from what was arguably a frontier economy into a much more developed market economy. Within 7–10 years, Turkey went from an economy where the cost of funding to do a trade would be about 8% and the maximum size you could do in a transaction for one stock would be about US$5 million to one where the funding cost is about 0.5% or 1% and you can very easily write a ticket of up to US$200 million dollars to buy or sell into a particular stock in Turkey. That shows how much liquidity has become available.

To me, that transition (from being a relatively niche market, quite small, to becoming a market where you can actually put on massive trades for reasonably aggressive funding) is exactly the sort of path that I expect we will see amongst the frontier economies in the years to come.

What about specific investments in frontier markets?

One of the big misunderstandings about many emerging economies, particularly in Africa, is that people think it is a big commodity trade. That is completely wrong. Over 85% of the stocks that trade in Africa (there are about 20 stock exchanges and over 1000 stocks) are non-commodities.

There are stocks in banking, logistics, telecommunication, the retail sector, and consumer goods that have really captured the growth theme that we’ve talked about already. That’s my big point—you miss out if you think it’s just a commodity story.

The second point is I believe very strongly that you don’t want to just be going long in these markets. You also want to be able to short. Some of the worst performers last year were Mongolia and the Ukraine (on the back of the difficulties that they both had in their political environment). The markets are now mature enough to be able to put on positions that reflect those negative outcomes. Fortunately, you now are able to short the market for many but not all of the frontier economies.

I don’t like to be a stock picker, but I will say that in virtually all of these frontier economies there are two sectors that I like in particular. One of them is banks, which are the foundation of economic development. There is real significant upside around banking and insurance. If you think about some of the Nigerian banks, you can see the theme
being put to work as a practical example. The other area that I really like a lot is construction.

How prevalent are resource conflicts in these regions?

In the U.S., the National Security Agency (NSA) put out a report in February 2012, basically articulating concerns and real risks around commodity-based wars, particularly emanating from water scarcity. In Winner Take All, I have a couple of tables at the back [of the book] that look very specifically at which region and what countries are already engaged in skirmishes, civil wars, and so on around commodity scarcity.

Since 1990, there have been over 20 wars around commodity scarcity. If you look at some of the work by Michael Klare [professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and author of The Race for What’s Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources, there is a lot being done right now in forecasting where some of the big wars could come from in the years to come, borne out of scarcity of natural resources.

Am I worried about this being a big piece of the puzzle? Yes, I am worried about increased conflicts. It is already happening today, and it could escalate. Demand pressures, such as population, increases in wealth, and urbanization, are just not matching with the supply of water, arable land, minerals, and energy. This type of concern around natural-resource conflicts is one thing that we need to be concerned about. The other things emanating from this demand-and-supply imbalance are increases in prices and also in price volatility. Finally, an under-discussed concern is the real risk of resource nationalization in a world where commodities have become scarcer.

What form would resource nationalization take?

It could be a whole range. In Australia, they’ve increased the tax on mining and iron companies by over 30%. Nationalization could also be much more aggressive, as with expropriation, which you’ve seen in places like Argentina and Venezuela, where the government just takes full ownership of some assets. The discussion around natural-resource nationalization has become a big deal, everywhere from Mongolia to South Africa.

How do you see price volatility extrapolating in the future?

Weather concerns, political volatility, and political actions also exacerbate commodity price pressure, but I think the real driver is going to be the structural fundamental demand-and-supply challenges that I’ve already outlined.

If you look at the IMF forecast or the forecast from the U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], you can see that this concern about commodity price increases (and therefore the impact on our living standards) is very real. Both these agencies forecast, for example, that oil prices could be as high as US$200 dollars a barrel over the next decade.

What else would you want investors to know about the frontier?

Mainly two things. In terms of equities we’re talking about more than US$1 trillion in market cap, with 8,000 stocks that trade in that frontier market space. About US$200 billion of it is a free float, and I really believe that in terms of diversification, there is a real story for investors going back to basics of picking stocks based on micro fundamentals instead of this whole risk-on/risk-off phase, which is what we’ve been in for the past three years.

The fixed-income side is another place of real opportunity. Take Africa, for example. Today we’ve got almost 20 countries that have credit ratings. Just in the past eight months, we have seen at least four countries come to the market—Tanzania, Angola, Zambia, and Morocco. They’ve done big bond issues in the market, ranging from US$600 to US$750 million. We’re talking about bond issues that were 10 or 15 times oversubscribed in some cases and very aggressively priced. They are pricing more aggressively than Spain, Portugal, or Italy. So it is a real solid story. These countries now have credit ratings, which they are using to
issue debts, and the market loves that.

For people who are interested in opportunities for alpha generation, who want to get off their benchmark hugging, I think these markets are ignored at their own peril.

Jonathan Barnes is a financial journalist in the San Francisco Bay area


The techniques for doing business in emerging markets that Dr Moyo mentions early on in the article are the traditional Chinese ways of doing business so there is some comfort level for them in Africa, especially.

The danger of commodity based conflicts might merit a whole new thread, if one doesn't already exist.
 
Oh well. It's this type of model soldier that a state-run newspaper would typically go out of its way to emphasize... among dozens of other patriotic anecdotes.

A graduate's dream to defend the country

People's Daily Online, July 19, 2013

Chu Kewei, a college graduate-turned-commander, cherishes the dream to defend his country.

Chu gave up opportunities to work inside the higher-level offices of the army and Beijing scientific research institutions when he graduated in 2007 from the national defense class of Tsinghua University.

Instead, he joined the grassroots of the army as he believed it was the only road to take for a true soldier. Chu then went on to join China's prominent "Iron Army," the 54th Group Army of the 127th Light Mechanized Infantry Division under the Jinan Military Command of the People's Liberation Army.

Chu has been learning, practicing and undergoing tough training sessions with the regiment whose predecessor was the famous Ye Ting Independent Regiment, a pioneer in the Northern Expedition military campaign launched in 1926 to overthrow the rule of the Northern warlords.

Chu rapidly matured and the green hand's fast growth deeply impressed the veterans who had originally questioned his abilities.

He became his company's commander in 2010. He has won two second-class merits and one third-class merit and was a delegate to the 18th CPC National Congress.

(...)

Note the last line: political officer in training?

This rosy picture of that exemplary soldier above is a stark contrast from a negative image cast by the 'little emperors' in their ranks as stated by the articles below...

China's one-child policy creates wimpy military recruits, deserters

PLA thinned by sparse pickings of one-child 'royalty'
 
Notwithstanding the Party's propaganda, military service has not been "honoured" in China since the Spring and Autumn period (about 2,500 years ago). Lao Tzu barely mentions soldiers, * and the Confucian gentleman, his "superior man," is a scholar, not a soldier.**

_____
* He says, notably, “A skillful soldier is not violent, an able fighter does not rage, a mighty conqueror does not give battle, a great commander is a humble man,” and "Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death."

** Confucius, famously, says, "Good iron is not used for nails, good men are not used for soldiers." ( 好铁不打定,好汉不当兵 )
 
Not sure what to make of this since there's few details so far...

link

SHANGHAI (Reuters) - A loud explosion was heard in Beijing airport's Terminal 3 on Saturday evening, China's official Xinhua news agency reported, citing witnesses.

The Sina Weibo microblog of state broadcaster China Central Television said a man detonated a package of black gunpowder used to make firecrackers just outside the international arrivals exit.

(Reporting by John Ruwitch; Editing by Clarence Fernandez)

EDITED TO ADD:

It appears this was more related to an individual case and not related to any political dissident or ethnic separatist movements.

link


BEIJING (Reuters) - A man in a wheelchair detonated a home-made explosive in Beijing airport on Saturday, injuring himself and sending smoke billowing through the exit area of the international arrivals section of Terminal 3.
There were no other injuries and operations were normal after the blast, the airport said on its microblog.

China's official Xinhua news agency said the man, 34-year-old Ji Zhongxing from the eastern province of Shandong, had detonated the loud device after being prevented from handing out leaflets that drew attention to unspecified complaints.

Some Chinese activists and rights lawyers later posted online what they said was a letter of complaint that Ji had filed regarding a 2005 incident in which he claims to have been partially paralyzed after being beaten by police in Guangdong province's manufacturing hub of Dongguan.


It was not possible to independently verify the letter.

Individual Chinese unable to win redress for grievances have in the past resorted to extreme measures, including bombings, but such incidents are rare amid the tight security of airports.

The explosion took place just meters (feet) outside the door from which arriving international passengers depart after picking up their luggage.


An airport spokeswoman declined to speculate about the man's specific motive, saying airport police were still investigating. Police declined to comment. Officials said the bomber was being treated for his injuries.

A Reuters witness said business had returned to normal about 90 minutes after the blast and there were no signs of extra security.

Explosives are relatively easy to obtain in China, home to the world's largest mining and fireworks industries.
(Reporting by Ben Blanchard in BEIJING and John Ruwitch in SHANGHAI; Editing by Clarence Fernandez and Gareth Jones)

 
http://news.yahoo.com/japan-scrambles-jets-china-plane-flies-southern-islands-110905491.html

TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan scrambled fighter jets on Wednesday after a Chinese military aircraft flew for the first time through international airspace near its southern islands out over the Pacific, in a move seen by Japan as underlining China's maritime expansion.

Ties between China and Japan have been strained by a territorial dispute over uninhabited East China Sea islets and hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a decisive victory in upper house elections on Sunday.

Japan's Defense Ministry said a Chinese Y-8 airborne early warning plane flew through airspace between Okinawa prefecture's main island and the smaller Miyako island in southern Japan out over the Pacific at around noon and later took the same route back over the East China Sea.

"I believe this indicates China's move toward further maritime expansion," Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera told reporters, in comments carried on public broadcaster NHK.

Chinese government spokesmen were not immediately available for comment.

The waters around the disputed islands, called the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, and which are to the west of Okinawa's main island, are rich fishing grounds and the sea floor around them could hold big oil and gas reserves.

Tension between China and Japan escalated last September when Japan bought three of the disputed islands from a private Japanese owner.

Since then, patrol ships and aircraft from both countries have been shadowing each other in the sea and skies around the islets.
 
tomahawk6 said:
http://news.yahoo.com/japan-scrambles-jets-china-plane-flies-southern-islands-110905491.html

TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan scrambled fighter jets on Wednesday after a Chinese military aircraft flew for the first time through international airspace near its southern islands out over the Pacific, in a move seen by Japan as underlining China's maritime expansion.

Ties between China and Japan have been strained by a territorial dispute over uninhabited East China Sea islets and hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a decisive victory in upper house elections on Sunday.

Japan's Defense Ministry said a Chinese Y-8 airborne early warning plane flew through airspace between Okinawa prefecture's main island and the smaller Miyako island in southern Japan out over the Pacific at around noon and later took the same route back over the East China Sea.

"I believe this indicates China's move toward further maritime expansion," Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera told reporters, in comments carried on public broadcaster NHK.

Chinese government spokesmen were not immediately available for comment.

The waters around the disputed islands, called the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, and which are to the west of Okinawa's main island, are rich fishing grounds and the sea floor around them could hold big oil and gas reserves.

Tension between China and Japan escalated last September when Japan bought three of the disputed islands from a private Japanese owner.

Since then, patrol ships and aircraft from both countries have been shadowing each other in the sea and skies around the islets.


It's as if the Chinese want Shinzo Abe to return to his ulta-nationalist position, isn't it?

And maybe they do ...

The Chinese love to hate the Japanese, and with good reason, by the way, so whipping up Chinese nationalist fervor is always good politics. The Chinese are, already, chauvinistic and never more so than when the Japanese are concerned.

It may be that the Chinese are willing, even eager to engage Japan over the islands. A few shots, maybe even a downed aircraft or lost patrol boat, would certainly focus Chinese attention away from ongoing economic difficulties.

 
E.R. Campbell said:
It's as if the Chinese want Shinzo Abe to return to his ulta-nationalist position, isn't it?

And maybe they do ...

The Chinese love to hate the Japanese, and with good reason, by the way, so whipping up Chinese nationalist fervor is always good politics. The Chinese are, already, chauvinistic and never more so than when the Japanese are concerned.

It may be that the Chinese are willing, even eager to engage Japan over the islands. A few shots, maybe even a downed aircraft or lost patrol boat, would certainly focus Chinese attention away from ongoing economic and other social difficulties.

TFTFY

They are like Iran...everytime the populous get itchy, the government creates another crisis, usually involving some outrageous claim against the west...In this case different pile same poo....
 
The credit bubble in the news again...

China Hard Landing: Potential Catalysts for a Complete Collapse

ValueWalk, July 24, 2013

China’s policymakers are aggressively clamping down on what some experts are calling a credit bubble. This comes as China’s economy slows and incoming data continues to disappoint.

All of this has economists upping their odds of a hard economic landing, a scenario where growth slows to a point that causes unemployment to spike.

[edited]
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Cheeky buggers!  :D

Speaking of Chinese tourists now being allowed to visit the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea...

...and the propensity for the Chinese to eat almost everything...

;D  :pop:

(Photos courtesy of a Chinese forum)

Outrage over China divers' antics in disputed islands

BEIJING (AFP) - Chinese tourists diving off disputed islands in the South China Sea were pictured manhandling fish and other sea creatures, and described eating endangered giant clams, provoking online outrage Friday.

Photos posted on a Chinese internet forum showed the divers, said to be visiting the Paracel Islands, which China has occupied since 1974 but which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.

Members of the group scooped sea urchins from the bottom and one picture showed a spiky fish held between two hands - practices generally considered taboo by divers.

Several of the group held up blue starfish on their boat, and sea urchins were shown being cooked.

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091714cc22ctbi6m2rli8z.jpg


084708nnxq0cfgtlkxqfrt.jpg

084716s3vifmy6ozvs4zjy.jpg

(photos courtesy of a Chinese forum)

Straits Times link
 
An issue that has finally provoked an outcry on Weibo (Chinese twitter) and took it by storm for a while before the usual censors on Weibo took effect...

The issue is China's violent Chengguan (城管) who are more thugs than law enforcement officials.

Also please note prominent microblogger Li Chengpeng's social commentary in the rest of the Telegraph article.

Quote

Li Chengpeng, an author and social critic with over seven million followers on Sina Weibo, China’s leading micro-blogging site, was among several prominent opinion makers who spoke out this week over the sudden and shocking death of an impoverished 56-year-old watermelon salesman from Hunan province.

Deng Zhengjia died on Wednesday, after allegedly being severely beaten by government law enforcement officials known as “chengguan”.
Officials in Hunan’s Linwu county claimed Mr Deng died “suddenly” and inexplicably after falling to the ground during “quarrels with the chengguan”.
But in interviews with Chinese media witnesses described an horrific assault during which one of the officers allegedly slammed a measuring weight into Mr Deng’s skull.

(...)

Quote:

Letting a watermelon farmer die a violent death on the street shows a lack of respect to all the normal and sane people of this country,” wrote Yao Bo,

more from these articles:

Deng Zhengjia death

Meet the 'Chengguan': China's Violent, Hated Local Cops

Chengguan abuses from 2012
 
Take note that the China Marine Surveillance fleet (CMS) was one of the four Chinese civilian maritime agencies merged into the new unified Chinese Coast Guard, whose ships confronted Japanese vessels near the disputed Senkakus/Diaoyus last week, as reported below.

The CMS was the civilian agency whose ships had been showing the Chinese flag in the South China Sea until recently.

Globe and Mail

Chinese coast guard confronts Japanese vessels near disputed islands

China says ships from its newly formed coast guard confronted Japanese patrol vessels in waters surrounding disputed East China Sea islands on Friday.

The State Oceanic Administration that oversees the service says four of its ships “sternly declared” China’s sovereignty over the islands called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China, and demanded they leave the area. The uninhabited archipelago is controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing.

(...)


It was not clear if any action resulted from the Chinese declaration. Such sovereignty declarations are usually made by hailing Japanese boats by radio and loudspeaker, as well as flashing shipboard signs.

Ships from Chinese civilian agencies have maintained a steady presence in the area since tensions spiked in September following Japan’s purchase of some of the islands from their private owners.

Those vessels are being replaced by ships from the coast guard, which was formally inaugurated on Monday and merges the resources of four former agencies.
China says the move was intended to boost its ability to enforce its maritime claims, upping the stakes in an increasingly tense competition for marine territory and resources in waters off its eastern and southeastern coasts.

Chinese coast guard ships have also been spotted this week at Mischief Reef off the western Philippine coast, according to a confidential Philippine government report obtained by The Associated Press. China occupied the vast reef in 1995, sparking protests from rival claimant Manila.

China says virtually the entire South China Sea and its islands belong to it, a claim based on alleged historical precedents that are strongly contested by the Philippines, Vietnam and others.

While Beijing has mainly used civilian agencies to patrol its claims, the new coast guard gives it greater latitude to do so by centralizing operations in a single body. The body is nominally under civilian control, but closely co-ordinates with the increasingly formidable Chinese navy that recently added an aircraft carrier to its fleet.
(...)
 
China's "shadow banking" system. Like the author, I cannot fathom how this system is supposed to work, and looking at historical analogies I really can't find anything that seems comparable. The closest I'm getting is the collapse of credit bubbles (as per F.A Hayek) like the devolution of the South Sea bubble or the 1929 Crash that led to the Great Depression (or the 2008 crash), but while regulatory failure is the proximate cause of inflating the bubble, the growth and eventual "popping" of the bubble is due to market forces; the State is not on both sides of the equation in the manner deceived in the article.

We will have to see what happens:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-30/black-holes-at-china-s-shadow-banks.html

Black Holes at China's Shadow Banks
By Megan McArdle Jul 30, 2013 3:49 PM ET

When I speak of cracks in China’s institutional foundation, I’m thinking in large part of China’s banking system -- which as far as I can tell, isn’t really a banking system the way that we think of it.
Banks are controlled by the government, with interest rates for both deposits and loans set by fiat. The government also feels free to tell banks how much to lend, and to mandate that they buy government bonds at particular prices. When I went to China in 2010, one of the bankers there told us that a huge chunk of their Tier One capital consisted of special government bonds that couldn’t be sold and paid about 5 percent interest -- at a time when inflation was, according to most of the experts I talked to, well above that.

In a Western banking system, you’d expect this to lead to a crisis. But what would that even mean in China? Its currency isn’t convertible, and financial links to the outside world are tenuous. Maybe the government can just keep ordering banks to keep making loans at low interest rates, and declare by fiat that the loans are performing. That seems like a crazy thing to say, but it’s also hard to describe how a crisis would happen.
In the years since I visited China, I’ve asked various experts to explain its banking system to me in a way that makes sense. No one has been able to so far.

The fact that the mechanics of a crisis are hard to sketch out doesn’t mean that the system works well. You know those Chinese ghost cities, the eerie forests of apartment buildings and commercial complexes equipped with everything except people? Those homes are a major store of value for Chinese families. With bank account interest rates fixed, a fledgling stock market full of speculative issues, and few financial connections to the outside world, the Chinese have been forced to look into nonfinancial stores of value for their massive savings rate. Like us, they often choose real estate. But not to rent, because that would devalue the property; the Chinese place a high value on new. No, they buy the houses and keep them empty, as stores of value rather than places to live.

In recent years, China has moved to liberalize things slightly, since obviously it makes no sense to plunge so much of the nation’s investment capital into empty houses and similar “assets.” But this, too, creates issues, as a recent New York Times article on China’s shadow banking system illustrates:
"China’s regulators -- and a fair number of economists, policy makers and investors -- worry that legitimate banks are using lightly regulated wealth management products to repackage old loans and prop up risky companies and projects that might not otherwise be able to borrow money.

Analysts warn that shadow banking is helping drive the rapid growth of credit in a weakening economy, which could lead to -- in the worst situation -- a series of bank failures. “This is the biggest uncertainty I’ve seen in my 18 years following the China market,” Dong Tao, an economist at Credit Suisse, said of shadow banking. “You don’t know how banks are deploying capital. And you don’t know the credit risks.”

What banks are doing, analysts say, is pressing customers to shift money from the old, regulated part of their operations — savings deposits — into the new, less regulated part consisting of high-yielding wealth management products that can circumvent government interest rate controls and be used to finance high-interest loans to desperate customers."

The old system worked, in the sense that it was probably quite stable, but it caused wildly inefficient capital allocation. The new system may ease some of the inefficiencies, but at the price of instability. Apparently, shadow banking has created a credit boom that the government would like to choke off. But when they try, the resulting squeeze threatens the growth they need to maintain political peace.

If China wants to make the transition to an advanced economy, it will eventually need to regularize its banking system, dismantling a lot of its current controls and mandates and replacing them with a comprehensive regulatory and monetary regime. But can it do this before an economic slowdown creates a crisis?

We’ve never watched a transition like China’s before. What we can say is that there are a lot of institutional problems that will need to be fixed — and it would be better to fix them before the fixes are truly and desperately necessary.
 
While the aforementioned formation of the new Chinese Coast Guard may allow China to centralize their civilian maritime operations, as the piece below states, it also means that China will also increase enforcement actions over disputed areas such as the Diaoyus/Senkakus and the Nanshas/Spratleys...

No, China's Coast Guard Won't Reduce Tensions
By James R. Holmes
July 29, 2013


An international conference on marine safety descended on Beijing to mark the event. The organizer of the gathering, former deputy assistant secretary of state Susan Shirk, hailed the debut of a unified coast guard as a "positive development." Why? "It's good for China's neighbors and the United States," she opined, "because we know who is responsible and who we can hold responsible."


With admirable frankness the new agency's purpose is to "show the international community that China has undisputable jurisdiction over the waters." Repeating the standard line that China holds "indisputable sovereignty" over all sea areas and geographic features it claims. And sovereignty means a monopoly of force if it means anything. The coast guard will help impose that monopoly.

So in reality, the advent of the China Coast Guard furnishes little cause for cheer among Asian sea powers. In all likelihood the new agency will step up enforcement actions. If so, it will generate new frictions rather than smooth them out. It will prosecute Beijing's territorial claims more efficiently and effectively than the previous, motley crew of maritime enforcement services ever could.

(...)

The Diplomat link
 
But James Holmes seems to be suggesting (just hoping?) that the new Chinese Coast Guard should have some role other than to "prosecute Beijing's territorial claims more efficiently and effectively than the previous, motley crew of maritime enforcement services ever could." But why would it? Does the US Coast Guard do something other than to advance America's interests? (Yes, yes, yes, I know about SAR and all that - but that's not the topic of this article.)

I find his whole article to be off the mark.
 
Another development for Chinese naval aviation?

LinglongJ20.jpg


J-20 may be redesigned as carrier-based stealth fighter

link


After the J-15 fighter completed landing and take-off exercises from the deck of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, the PLA Navy reportedly felt this third-generation fighter would be unable to compete with US stealth fighters such as the F-35 and that the J-20, still in development, may become the model for the country's first stealth carrier-based fighter.

A source within the Chinese aviation industry said the J-20 may be modified into a carrier-based fighter with swept-forward wings like the Russian-built Su-47. If this suggestion is accepted by the PLA, the Linglong will probably become the first carrier-based fighter with such a design.


(...)
 
A PLA officer actually suggests that Taiwan buy mainland-made weapons in order to deter neighbours like Japan and the Philippines, who have conflicting claims with areas that both Taiwan and China also claim.

Unless Taiwan goes further into Beijing's orbit under a "One Country, Two Systems" arrangement like Hong Kong or Macau, I doubt the Guo Min Jun/Taiwan military will acquire weapons used by the PLA...

Inside China: PLA on Taiwan’s weapons
ANALYSIS/OPINION:

A People’s Liberation Army major general said recently that Taiwan should abandon the U.S. as its main weapons supplier and buy arms from Beijing instead.

Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, China’s most outspoken anti-U.S. military official, made the remarks at a defense forum in the city of Guangzhou that was attended by defense analysts from China and Taiwan.

Taiwan is the primary target of China’s short-range ballistic missiles, deployed 100 miles from Taiwan’s west coast. China has never given up the option to “liberate” or “reunite” Taiwan by force.

For decades, the U.S. has been Taiwan’s major weapons supplier, mainly through the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for guarantees that Taiwan’s defenses match Chinese offensive capabilities.

However, Beijing has protested weapons sales to Taiwan, and successive U.S. administrations have limited arms transfers to the island democracy.

Gen. Luo failed to mention what country Taiwan would target with Chinese-made weapons.


The implicit message seems to suggest that Taiwan should use Chinese-made weapons to fight Japan or the Philippines, which are disputing, along with China and Taiwan, ownership of a few tiny islands in the East Sea/Sea of Japan and the South China Sea.


(...)


Washington Times link


And here's other news from the same link: China's Vice President Li Yuanchao visits Pyongyang.

VICE PRESIDENT IN PYONGYANG

Vice President Li Yuanchao, the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since Kim Jong-un assumed power, led a large delegation to Pyongyang to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the armistice that ended fighting in the Korean War.

Mr. Li, a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, is believed to be a protege of President Xi Jinping. He carried with him a special message to Mr. Kim that stressed the “unbreakable friendship and camaraderie forged by our older generation of revolutionary leaders.” China sent more than 1 million soldiers into the Korean War.

Mr. Li was the most prominent foreign comrade to appear in photos alongside the internationally isolated Mr. Kim on the reviewing stand during a military parade in the North Korean capital.

China and North Korea have encountered a few troubled moments recently because of Mr. Kim’s banned missile and nuclear tests.

China warned North Korea not to proceed with its most recent nuclear test and later joined the U.N. Security Council in condemning February’s underground test blast.

The visit by Mr. Li’s delegation was widely seen as an effort to temporarily mollify North Korea’s leader. It also appeared to send a signal to the world that, no matter how Pyongyang behaves, the bond between the two communist nations remains strong...

(...)
 
Earlier this year, the US signed into law the right to a first nuclear strike option against China.

Whether this will provoke a change in Beijing's own "no nuclear first strike policy" remains to be seen.

Published on Jan 14, 2013 

The right to a preemptive nuclear strike against China is now part of US law - thanks to the National Defense Authorization Act. The Pentagon's also ordered a thorough review of when, and how, America could strike at the network of tunnels believed to hold Beijing's atomic arsenals.

Editor of a Japan-based news website James Corbett suggests ulterior motives in this decision of US government.

YouTube: Russia Today video link
 
S.M.A. said:
Earlier this year, the US signed into law the right to a first nuclear strike option against China.

Whether this will provoke a change in Beijing's own "no nuclear first strike policy" remains to be seen.


The Chinese have, already, reaped what little propaganda value there is in the 2013 NDAA, but, see this, for a better explanation of what the bill actually says.

The NDAA is important because it provides ~ in an omnibus sort of fashion ~ congressional authorization for the US defence budget. It also provides a platform for the congress to intrude into the conduct of US foreign policy.

Reports like the one on Moscow's RT are useful to China; they sensationalize a pretty mundane little blip injected by an inconsequential US legislator.

The Chinese, for their part, say that there will be no change to its own "no first use" nuclear policy.

On a strategic note: why on earth would any sane American plan a preemptive nuclear attack on China? Does anyone think that China plans a nuclear attack on America or on American bases in Asia? Why would China do that? What possible strategic objective might that accomplish? But, suppose an insane American is in charge: how could America follow up on a preemptive strike? With what? Can you imagine a US invasion of China? Just ponder the logistics of it all ...
 
E.R. Campbell said:
On a strategic note: why on earth would any sane American plan a preemptive nuclear attack on China? Does anyone think that China plans a nuclear attack on America or on American bases in Asia? Why would China do that? What possible strategic objective might that accomplish? But, suppose an insane American is in charge: how could America follow up on a preemptive strike? With what? Can you imagine a US invasion of China? Just ponder the logistics of it all ...

There was at least one American political commentator who did so.

In the 1960s, soon after China developed the atomic bomb and announced it to the world, American author and political commentator William F. Buckley strongly advocated that the US should indeed launch that first strike against China's nuclear arsenal because of the potential threat it posed to US interests in East Asia. Fortunately, what he advocated didn't come to pass.
 
S.M.A. said:
There was at least one American political commentator who did so.

In the 1960s, soon after China developed the atomic bomb and announced it to the world, American author and political commentator William F. Buckley strongly advocated that the US should indeed launch that first strike against China's nuclear arsenal because of the potential threat it posed to US interests in East Asia. Fortunately, what he advocated didn't come to pass.


Ah, yes, William F Buckley ~ I have expressed my disdain for Buckley a couple of times in the past. I suggested, and I still believe, he was an intellectually shallow extremist.
 
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