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CH47 Chinook
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Tail # 08-08048 made a hard landing today four injured but no fatalities.
Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers stand guard alongside an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Chinook helicopter which crashed in an eastern district of Kabul on July 26, 2010. An ISAF aircraft made a hard landing along the perimeter of a coalition force camp in Kabul province. Four aircraft passengers received minor injuries with the cause of the crash under investigation.
Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers stand guard alongside an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Chinook helicopter which crashed in an eastern district of Kabul on July 26, 2010. An ISAF aircraft made a hard landing along the perimeter of a coalition force camp in Kabul province. Four aircraft passengers received minor injuries with the cause of the crash under investigation.
GK .Dundas
Army.ca Veteran
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Zoomie said:
I can almost hear it now: Outraged homeowner :"what do you mean sorry ? You don't have any insurance and you're sorry !
Well we're all sorry !
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On a different note, weird that the aircraft has IRSS (infra-red suppression system) on it, but no EAPS (front particle separator).
Zoomie, I'm not sure if the wall wasn't originally dual height...but still, that's a heck of a hard landing. I'm surprised the blades appear to have not struck the cabin.
Cheers
G2G
Zoomie, I'm not sure if the wall wasn't originally dual height...but still, that's a heck of a hard landing. I'm surprised the blades appear to have not struck the cabin.
Cheers
G2G
Maybe the terminology has changed. I had always considered that a hard landing takes place when the aircraft contacts the surface of the intended landing spot with excessive vertical speed. In short--pounds it on too hard.
The pictures depict the aircraft with the port rear gear on one side of the stone wall and most of the aircraft on the other side of it.
Was the pilot really trying to land on both sides of the wall? If that was the intent she appears to have made a rather soft landing.
The pictures depict the aircraft with the port rear gear on one side of the stone wall and most of the aircraft on the other side of it.
Was the pilot really trying to land on both sides of the wall? If that was the intent she appears to have made a rather soft landing.
As strange as it sounds the term near miss is logical. This may not be the exact definition but it's close: "A situation where the potential for an accident existed but actions taken prevented it's full conclusion."
Example: Two aircraft were on converging paths but shortly before they would have collided someone realized what was about to happen and changed the course of one of them.
It's use isn't confined to aviation but that's where we see it used most often.
Do gunners use the term near hit?
Most likely the term hard landing was used incorrectly in this Chinook mishap possibly in an attempt to minimize the event or someone just looked at the pictures and noted that the aircraft was upright and relatively intact and they decided that it had landed which is obvious and added hard to explain the damage.
No doubt as in most mishaps there is a lot that the pictures don't tell. :-[
It looks as if they were about to land within the walls of a well established compound and something went wrong. They couldn't have had much forward speed or they would likely have gone past the wall rather than getting hung up on it. Pure speculation of course. 8)
Example: Two aircraft were on converging paths but shortly before they would have collided someone realized what was about to happen and changed the course of one of them.
It's use isn't confined to aviation but that's where we see it used most often.
Do gunners use the term near hit?
Most likely the term hard landing was used incorrectly in this Chinook mishap possibly in an attempt to minimize the event or someone just looked at the pictures and noted that the aircraft was upright and relatively intact and they decided that it had landed which is obvious and added hard to explain the damage.
No doubt as in most mishaps there is a lot that the pictures don't tell. :-[
It looks as if they were about to land within the walls of a well established compound and something went wrong. They couldn't have had much forward speed or they would likely have gone past the wall rather than getting hung up on it. Pure speculation of course. 8)
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I am not sure if this is the right spot to put this but I read this on CBC news site about the recent crash of a chinook not sure if its true but CBC is saying that it was brough down by small arms fire here is the link for the article
http://www.cbc.ca/cp/national/TG1420.html
http://www.cbc.ca/cp/national/TG1420.html
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karl28 said:
Thanks.
Perhaps you should read this: 5 Aug 10: Hard Landing for CAN Chinook in K'Har Province.
It could be that keeping a few of the old CH-113s would have been a good plan.Good2Golf said:
The Cormorants have had a few setbacks which should have been anticipated.
The first opportunity that I had to look over the Cormorant I got bad vibes just from looking at the tail rotor.
No doubt that has been taken care of by now.
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Beenthere, I think that is accurate - I believe the AW101 & variants' tail rotors are now metal alloy, not composite, and include a number of re-designs. I understand this was especially the case for the VH-71 Merlin VIP aircraft for the POTUS.
Regards
G2G
Regards
G2G
Probably should be on another thread, but this might be the last non chinook post here?? Cormorant 908 has a completely new tail rotor design, an AW139? main rotor hub turned on its side. So far so good. Flies a little smoother, the shudder thru transition is noticable reduced. Drivers and FE seem to like it.
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Gully, I think the t/r re-design for general fleet fitment is very similar to the VH-71's (US101) t/r design. It is a notable improvement over the numerous variants/mods of the original design. I hope this makes things work better for the fleet. :nod:
Regards
G2G
Regards
G2G
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This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§9) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is not good news for DND:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/auditor-slams-ottawas-helicopter-purchase-and-warns-of-fighter-jet-risk/article1773452/
I thought that the MND of the day did make a good, cogent case for a sole source Chinook procurement and, it appears to me, that Ms. Fraser does not dispute that. In fact her report recommends, on p. 25 (§6.64) that:
6.64 Recommendation. National Defence should review and apply the lessons learned with these helicopter acquisitions to ensure that, for future major capital equipment acquisitions, the degree of modifications and/or development involved is fully reflected in approval documents—in the assessment of risk, project timelines, and costs—and that procurement strategies are tailored to the complexity of the equipment being acquired.
And, at §6.74:
6.74 Recommendation. National Defence should start estimating full life-cycle costs in the options analysis phase of its project management process and present these costs to decision makers at subsequent steps in the process as the estimates evolve. The basis of cost estimations should be included in approvals documents. National Defence should start full life-cycle planning for the preferred option in the definition phase of its project management process. Preparation of plans should be started at the time of preliminary project approval.
Ms. Fraser does fault DND for the management of the advance contract award notice (ACAN) process but not, it should be noted, for using the process itself. It was, she says (§6.78, page 30) ”evident from the files that National Defence concluded very early in this acquisition process that the Chinook helicopter was the only one capable of meeting its needs. As early as the fall of 2005, National Defence was considering a sole-source procurement with Boeing.” She complains that the courtesy of direct, pre-contract talk was not accorded to another potential supplier. I cannot remember who the alternative supplier might have been.
I will not because I cannot comment on her suggestion that the only way to afford the Chinooks might be to restrict their use. It seems to me that she might be overstating the implications of life cycle costing - suggesting that one must be able to, accurately, forecast use and, consequentially, maintenance costs.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/auditor-slams-ottawas-helicopter-purchase-and-warns-of-fighter-jet-risk/article1773452/
I thought that the MND of the day did make a good, cogent case for a sole source Chinook procurement and, it appears to me, that Ms. Fraser does not dispute that. In fact her report recommends, on p. 25 (§6.64) that:
6.64 Recommendation. National Defence should review and apply the lessons learned with these helicopter acquisitions to ensure that, for future major capital equipment acquisitions, the degree of modifications and/or development involved is fully reflected in approval documents—in the assessment of risk, project timelines, and costs—and that procurement strategies are tailored to the complexity of the equipment being acquired.
And, at §6.74:
6.74 Recommendation. National Defence should start estimating full life-cycle costs in the options analysis phase of its project management process and present these costs to decision makers at subsequent steps in the process as the estimates evolve. The basis of cost estimations should be included in approvals documents. National Defence should start full life-cycle planning for the preferred option in the definition phase of its project management process. Preparation of plans should be started at the time of preliminary project approval.
Ms. Fraser does fault DND for the management of the advance contract award notice (ACAN) process but not, it should be noted, for using the process itself. It was, she says (§6.78, page 30) ”evident from the files that National Defence concluded very early in this acquisition process that the Chinook helicopter was the only one capable of meeting its needs. As early as the fall of 2005, National Defence was considering a sole-source procurement with Boeing.” She complains that the courtesy of direct, pre-contract talk was not accorded to another potential supplier. I cannot remember who the alternative supplier might have been.
I will not because I cannot comment on her suggestion that the only way to afford the Chinooks might be to restrict their use. It seems to me that she might be overstating the implications of life cycle costing - suggesting that one must be able to, accurately, forecast use and, consequentially, maintenance costs.
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I understand the need for determining costs of operation and maintenance. It gives one a sense of one machine/system stacks up against another and whether or not one can afford the capability one is buying.
While it is a reasonable method for comparing systems it is, in my opinion, a particularly poor method of determining a long term budget.
Donald Rumsfeld's "unknown unknowns" pile up far too high and too fast 5 years down the line, let alone 25 years down the line.
A budget can only be as good as the current information and that information is constantly changing.
Which raises another pet peeve of mine: How many Project Managers, Project Leaders and Stakeholders had their fingers in the pie between the time the primary need was identified and the contract was awarded?
PS I am not slagging the buy. The Chinooks are needed in the numbers purchased. No question.
While it is a reasonable method for comparing systems it is, in my opinion, a particularly poor method of determining a long term budget.
Donald Rumsfeld's "unknown unknowns" pile up far too high and too fast 5 years down the line, let alone 25 years down the line.
A budget can only be as good as the current information and that information is constantly changing.
Which raises another pet peeve of mine: How many Project Managers, Project Leaders and Stakeholders had their fingers in the pie between the time the primary need was identified and the contract was awarded?
PS I am not slagging the buy. The Chinooks are needed in the numbers purchased. No question.
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I have just finished reading the Auditor-General’s review of the Cyclone and Chinook purchases and some thoughts as a one-time Project Manager, but with no Defence connections (I work in the food industry) come to mind (beware – I am about to make a fool of myself again):
Auditors and accountants generally check performance against the rule book and not against real world requirement. If the rule book describes a flawed process, that is not their problem. Disregard that changing the rule book literally requires an Act of Parliament.
Next has to be noted that great store is set in having all the information set in detailed specs early on in the process and that they should not change throughout the process so as to permit a “fair and transparent process”. This is an unrealistic requirement.
Requirements change rapidly in a high tempo operational environment. Currently there are literally thousands of operational helicopters generating lessons learned daily and manufacturers are routinely producing new counters to new threats. Requirements must change, and thus so must specifications, otherwise the aircraft (item of any sort) will be heading to obsolescence before the first unit reaches Initial Operational Capability.
Time delays don’t improve this situation as manufacturers are constantly upgrading their catalogs and dropping old equipment for new lines. Options: Less expensive but less capable or more expensive but more capable. The sweet spot you were planning on is no longer available because vacuum tubes and the stoker’s shovel necessary are no longer manufactured. Do you want to go up or down?
It is not clear to me that anyone in the Auditor General’s department has a clear understanding of what it is to negotiate a contract. Of course there are minimum requirements – but there is also the art of getting the highest value at the lowest price. Consequently, during negotiation, it is usual to beat up the supplier and demand that that chrome plated gew gaw be included or else there is no deal. This contributes to the common practice of rewriting “final” contracts 6 or 7 times in the last 24 hours. Capabilities are traded for dollars. Such practices however, are inconsistent with the Auditor General’s requirement that you only buy what you asked for 24 years ago. That and that alone.
Additionally I am at a loss to see how it is possible to put the Chinook, even with extended range tanks, into the same developmental category as the Cyclone which was always a “paper” exercise with Sikorsky making promises. Of course the problem wasn’t helped by a the government of the day determining that they would do what was necessary to avoid further political embarrassment and mess with the specs and the competition to ensure that the only flying aircraft in the category, the EH101, was not acquired.
On the other hand, to my understanding (but here I am on very thin ice) the Chinook is flying with all the modifications that DND wanted, just not all in the same airframe. This does represent a developmental risk but not on the scale of the Cyclone with its untried powerplant, its revised gearbox and its fly-by-wire control system.
Finally, although the A-G headlines a 70% increase in airframe costs and a reduction in airframes from 16 to 15 the project at large seems to be coming in with about a 15% total capital overage (2.3 BCAD vs a projected capital cost of 2 BCAC). I’m used to working with about three less zeroes on my calculator but overall I don’t find the project to be that far out of spec.
As to estimating support and O&M costs......you can’t write a budget on the day you identify the requirement and the one you get when you sign the contract will be invalid the day after.
The one lesson that I have learned from doing projects is: Decide early and act fast. Tomorrow's decision is no better than today's for you will always be dealing with an environment that doesn't precisely match the one you planned for.
Auditors and accountants generally check performance against the rule book and not against real world requirement. If the rule book describes a flawed process, that is not their problem. Disregard that changing the rule book literally requires an Act of Parliament.
Next has to be noted that great store is set in having all the information set in detailed specs early on in the process and that they should not change throughout the process so as to permit a “fair and transparent process”. This is an unrealistic requirement.
Requirements change rapidly in a high tempo operational environment. Currently there are literally thousands of operational helicopters generating lessons learned daily and manufacturers are routinely producing new counters to new threats. Requirements must change, and thus so must specifications, otherwise the aircraft (item of any sort) will be heading to obsolescence before the first unit reaches Initial Operational Capability.
Time delays don’t improve this situation as manufacturers are constantly upgrading their catalogs and dropping old equipment for new lines. Options: Less expensive but less capable or more expensive but more capable. The sweet spot you were planning on is no longer available because vacuum tubes and the stoker’s shovel necessary are no longer manufactured. Do you want to go up or down?
It is not clear to me that anyone in the Auditor General’s department has a clear understanding of what it is to negotiate a contract. Of course there are minimum requirements – but there is also the art of getting the highest value at the lowest price. Consequently, during negotiation, it is usual to beat up the supplier and demand that that chrome plated gew gaw be included or else there is no deal. This contributes to the common practice of rewriting “final” contracts 6 or 7 times in the last 24 hours. Capabilities are traded for dollars. Such practices however, are inconsistent with the Auditor General’s requirement that you only buy what you asked for 24 years ago. That and that alone.
Additionally I am at a loss to see how it is possible to put the Chinook, even with extended range tanks, into the same developmental category as the Cyclone which was always a “paper” exercise with Sikorsky making promises. Of course the problem wasn’t helped by a the government of the day determining that they would do what was necessary to avoid further political embarrassment and mess with the specs and the competition to ensure that the only flying aircraft in the category, the EH101, was not acquired.
On the other hand, to my understanding (but here I am on very thin ice) the Chinook is flying with all the modifications that DND wanted, just not all in the same airframe. This does represent a developmental risk but not on the scale of the Cyclone with its untried powerplant, its revised gearbox and its fly-by-wire control system.
Finally, although the A-G headlines a 70% increase in airframe costs and a reduction in airframes from 16 to 15 the project at large seems to be coming in with about a 15% total capital overage (2.3 BCAD vs a projected capital cost of 2 BCAC). I’m used to working with about three less zeroes on my calculator but overall I don’t find the project to be that far out of spec.
As to estimating support and O&M costs......you can’t write a budget on the day you identify the requirement and the one you get when you sign the contract will be invalid the day after.
The one lesson that I have learned from doing projects is: Decide early and act fast. Tomorrow's decision is no better than today's for you will always be dealing with an environment that doesn't precisely match the one you planned for.
