My thoughts, for the few pennies they're worth:
In my opinion there are two critical dilemma's that need to be examined (there's a third, but I'll leave that to later). The first dilemma was a moral one – could Semrau face himself in the future with greater ease if he left the Taliban to die on his own, or would it ease his own mind to assist the Taliban over that inevitable divide?
We need to set aside the argument of “was he dead/was he not dead” at the moment those shots were fired. If the Taliban wasn't dead, why were the shots fired at all? The fact that second degree murder wasn't proved only established that there was no proof that the Taliban was alive at the time the shots were fired, this does not remove the detail that if the Taliban was known to be dead there was no reason to fire at all. For the purpose of discussion, let us assume the shots were fired because it was believed that action relieved him of pain before an inevitable death, because that has been used repeatedly to emphasize Semrau as a moral man deserving to be absolved of his alleged sins.
Regardless of the Taliban's actual state at the time of the shots being fired, it appears that Semrau chose the option he was more willing to live with, i.e., humane euthanasia rather than leaving a badly wounded man to die, a presumably unavoidable outcome. But he would also have known that this was also choosing an illegal act over a legal one.
Much has been made of Semrau taking that “humane” choice as “proof” of the moral and upstanding officer he has been consistently described to be, and of which there appears to be no dissenting opinions regarding his career to that point. So, in simplistic terms we are asked to believe that “the moral man made the humanitarian choice.”
The second dilemma is presented as a legalistic one – do you choose to not charge an allegedly moral man, for what is characterized as a humane act, for violating law even when the act may be clearly illegal if proven to be as alleged?; or do you let the legal system take its course to establish grounds to believe a chargeable action occurred, meet the requirement to prove it in court, and accept the ruling of guilt or innocence in a legal framework?
Much of the discussion, here and in the media has focused on the first dilemma (Semrau's moral choice) and attempted to say that the second dilemma (the military chain of command's legal choice) should have, somehow, taken the first path of not charging him on the grounds of his moral choice.
The problem, which we see confused in reporting of the Semrau case, is that the two described dilemmas are not co-dependent. Semrau's character is not an influencing factor in the chain of command's responsibility to act on allegations of wrong-doing. The chain of command responsibility to pursue the truth, and act upon it if it warrants legal action, even if only to ensure that names be cleared, would neither be greater nor less if Semrau had been less well thought of by those who now and have worked with him.
Semrau made a choice, and as he decided which choice of action he took would rest better in his heart, he would have known the possible outcome if the facts came to light, in full or in part, as they did.
When the alleged facts of the incident came to the attention of his chain of command, those officers had no choice. Their only course of action was to do what they did. There was no “higher moral ground” for them to claim and tacitly or openly approve of the alleged action. They were committed by their own responsibilities to the Law of Armed Conflict, and to the expectations placed on Canadian service members to follow up those rumours and accept where that path led. The fact that that path might lead to the court martial of a good officer, highly respected by those who knew him by published accounts, was not a factor that could let them choose not to do their duty.
Much has been made of Semrau's “humanitarianism” but that is not the question placed before the court, nor it is the “crime” for which he was punished. The “crime” is the alleged firing of those shots, the state of the Taliban, how close he was to death, isn't the central issue. That whether the Taliban was dead or alive at the time the shots were fired may have been the point on which he has been acquitted of his more serious charges, but that does not diminish the fact that he chose to fire those rounds, allegedly to relieve suffering even if that was not proven in court, it appears to be openly accepted as the case in point of Semrau as the “moral man.”
The court's responsibility to rule on his guilt or innocence is based on the legality of that choice – not on whether an accused has an entitlement to absolution because he is alleged to be a moral man. His commendable character may influence severity of punishment, but not degree of guilt for proven charges.
And that third dilemma, it was also Semrau's. As a moral man, described as one taking the ethically tough choice, the “humanitarian” choice contravening law – why did he not admit to it at the time and accept the consequences of his actions immediately? He chose to leave the details unreported, waiting until rumours and hints accumulated to the point that the chain of command needed to at least clear the air, leading to the investigative actions that led to the current court martial.
If some of those reporting in the media, or posting in subsequent comments, wish to emphasize Semrau's mortality and character, why do they not ask why he did not stand up and report his actions at the time they occurred?
Where is the line between committing an illegal act, ostensibly one of mercy, and being defended on the grounds of your personal moral framework, and failing to stand up for your actions at that moment of moral crisis, instead waiting until the chain of command was forced to collect and collate allegations of wrongdoing? Surely choosing to fire those rounds was a tougher choice than choosing to leave exposure of the incident, if it ever arose, to the work of rumour and innuendo.
I would be more impressed if he had stood up that same day, admitted his actions, and then fought the case fully from a personal bastion of morality and the humanitarian choice. Perhaps he would have done so even after the court martial was set into motion, but as we know legal defences are built by lawyers, and they seldom include admission and defence on personal principles rather than forcing the prosecution to work with an incomplete picture to prove guilt, and hoping for the best.
I believe myself to be a moral man, and I can respect Semrau's alleged choice of humanitarian despatch over leaving a man to a lingering and inevitable death (assuming those are the true facts of the event). It was undoubtedly a tough choice to make and carry out. I will make no claims to how I might have acted under similar circumstances, because I cannot comprehend the intensity of the dilemma he must have contemplated. To say I would act one way or another would be facile armchair quarterbacking and meaningless in light of the fact that he actually had to face that choice.
At the same time I cannot but uphold the responsibility of his chain of command to act upon the information they had, to determine if there was grounds for further action, and to take those actions as they have evolved. All of those senior officers would remember days when obfuscation was the order of the day (chain of command responsibilities regarding the Canadian Airborne Regiment?), when failing to take responsibility was headline news (Gen Boyle (CDS) – claiming the fault of “lack of moral fibre and integrity” among his staff, Aug 1996). Regardless of what they thought of Semrau as a man (moral or otherwise as they knew him), of Semrau's alleged actions (yet to be determined), or of the possible outcomes of investigations and court martial – they knew that not acting upon it would be a greater wrong, potentially causing great harm to the Canadian Forces as an institution. Without a shred of doubt, if the chain of command had taken the course promoted by so many and not charging Semrau, and then alleged facts had leaked, the collective invective over the suspicion that a murder had been buried and tacitly approved would ensure equally, or even more virulent, attacks on the morality of the Canadian Forces command structure. Those senior officers would have seen, during their careers, the results of such decisions being avoided and attempts to bury evidence of wrong-doing (where, oh where, is the Somalia War Diary?). They too had a tough moral choice, and they decided on maintaining the strength of the institution, to do otherwise would have been a failure, of command and of personal morality.
