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Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

JMCanada said:
Just compare with the USN FFG(X) programme in terms of costs and schedule by using actually existing platforms (let's admit that the type 26 has enhanced capabilities, but ...so much?) :
"We started closer to the $950 (million); we are trending to very close to the $800 now."
https://news.usni.org/2019/06/20/navy-issues-final-rfp-for-ffgx-next-generation-frigate#more-67364
That 800 million USD is 1.057 6 billion CAD.  And that 800 million USD probably does not include costs resulting from development, production, spare parts, ammunition, training, government program management, and upgrades to existing facilities which is included in the cost of the Canadian surface combatants.  And you may want to take cost estimates given by the US Navy with a grain of salt.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/us-navys-13-billion-supercarrier-just-got-even-more-expensive/
https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-90-84
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/12/21/government-watchdog-navys-new-missile-sub-cruising-for-cost-overruns/
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/forget-stealth-destroyers-turn-navys-new-warships-pocket-battleships-58577
https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-ship-cost-overrun-2017-3
 
Exact shipbuilding cost comparisons are not easy given different governments' accounting methods. But our build-in-Canada costs way out of line.

From 2013:

Just Announced New Canadian Coast Guard Vessels Overpriced by Factor of Five
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2013/10/09/mark-collin-just-announced-new-canadian-coast-guard-vessels-overpriced-by-factor-of-five/

More broadly (with a Euro agenda) from 2019:

The Hidden Cost of Canada’s Shipbuilding Ambitions: Double the Cost for Twice the Risk

tab2-11-06-19.jpg


http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/203273/canada%E2%80%99s-naval-shipbuilding%3A-double-the-cost-for-half-the-performance.html?fbclid=IwAR27DhSConemp0DVfvpy5gpl7FKzfffMjRYaoL6kFNgAr-LHmGCm4-1Z0LE

Sort of "Yikes!", I'd say.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
Exact shipbuilding cost comparisons are not easy given different governments' accounting methods. But our build-in-Canada costs way out of line.

From 2013:

More broadly (with a Euro agenda) from 2019:

Sort of "Yikes!", I'd say.

Mark
Ottawa

So what? Would you rather have that money shipped overseas?  Also, almost  every other country subsidizes it’s shipbuilding. We obviously put the real price  of things up front, not through back door subsides.
 
MarkOttawa said:
Exact shipbuilding cost comparisons are not easy given different governments' accounting methods. But our build-in-Canada costs way out of line.

From 2013:

More broadly (with a Euro agenda) from 2019:

Sort of "Yikes!", I'd say.

Mark
Ottawa

Even Asterix while cheaper compared to the Tide Class is expensive. Perhaps we should of just ordered four of them.
 
Chief Engineer said:
Even Asterix while cheaper compared to the Tide Class is expensive. Perhaps we should of just ordered four of them.

My impression is that the Berlin class AORs are more robust than the Asterix class. It depends how important that robustness is.  I agree, we should have bought four Asterix-class for normal navy.  Then Seaspan could have been focused on the Coast Guard.
 
MTShaw said:
My impression is that the Berlin class AORs are more robust than the Asterix class. It depends how important that robustness is.  I agree, we should have bought four Asterix-class for normal navy.  Then Seaspan could have been focused on the Coast Guard.

Oh they are, and its pretty important.
 
Uzlu said:
That 800 million USD is 1.057 6 billion CAD.  And that 800 million USD probably does not include costs resulting from development, production, spare parts, ammunition, training, government program management, and upgrades to existing facilities (...)  And you may want to take cost estimates given by the US Navy with a grain of salt.
From the rcinet.ca link above ...
"The new estimate released Friday pegs the total cost of the CSC program at $69.8 billion over 26 years, including $5.3 billion in pre-production costs; $53.2 billion in production costs; and $11.4 billion in project-wide costs, said the PBO report."
That throws about 3.5 billion CAD per ship (53.2 /15) just in production costs.
I agree, of course, on the difficulty to get equivalent figures to compare. It was not my intention to compare tit-for-tat, nor compare USD to CAD, nor a 5.000 ton frigate (ffg(x) ) vs  CSC's 8.000 tons. But a gross comparison does not put CSC on a nice place.

I also agree that some US programmes have been inefficient and seems obvious that reached excessive overcosts. Fortunately for the US taxpayer this new program seems to be on track an delivering on expectations as they are starting from an existing vessel.
 
JMCanada said:
Fortunately for the US taxpayer this new program seems to be on track an delivering on expectations as they are starting from an existing vessel.
You may not want to count your chickens before they are hatched.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28611/congresss-meddling-could-begin-to-sink-the-navys-frigate-program

JMCanada said:
That throws about 3.5 billion CAD per ship (53.2 /15) just in production costs.
Twenty frigates instead of fifteen surface combatants results in more savings per ship for those twenty frigates.  The more ships of one design that are built, the greater the savings.  The longer the program is extended, the higher the cost—another reason why the price for the frigates is going to be lower.  Because the rate of warship inflation is higher than the rate of inflation.  A bigger hull means more opportunity to pack that hull with more sensors, more weapons, more computers, and more additional equipment—again driving up cost.
How much will Canada's new frigates really cost? The navy is about to find out

'Requirements reconciliation' isn't exciting - but it could decide whether the navy gets the ship it wants

By the standards of most people, what's going on this week and over the next few months in the back rooms of the navy, and at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, is pretty boring.

Civilian bureaucrats and military planners call it "requirements reconciliation." And even hardened military observers and procurement geeks will have a tough time getting excited about this laborious line-by-line review of Lockheed Martin Canada/BAE Systems' bid to design the navy's new frigates.

What is important — the reason why taxpayers should be paying attention — is the fact that with the stroke of a pen, hundreds of millions of dollars could be added to, or subtracted from, the cost of Canada's next generation of 15 warships.

It's something we were all reminded of with Friday's release of the latest Parliamentary Budget Office report, which projects that the cost of the program over 26 years likely will top $69.8 billion. That's $8 billion more than the watchdog's last estimate in 2017.

The reconciliation phase is, from the navy's point of view, the crucial period when a designer's promises of performance and capability are (or are not) turned into engineering reality.

A last chance for Ottawa to pinch some pennies

It's also the time when sticker-shocked governments seek to put curbs on the amount of pricey equipment that gets bolted to the hulls.

Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux said that if he "were a betting man," he would expect costs to go up as a result of the work being carried out now.

But there's precedent for trade-offs that could reduce the cost, or limit price spikes — through buying different equipment or materials, for example, or even through purchasing fewer ships.

The decisions made in the coming weeks will affect at least one generation of sailors (possibly two) that will crew these warships.

"We have a fairly good understanding of the areas we are looking at," said Pat Finn, a retired rear admiral who heads the Department of National Defence's procurement section.

The vessel the Liberal government has selected as Canada's next frigate will be based on the British Type 26 design, a warship that has yet to enter service (steel on the first ship was only cut in July, 2018).

Finn said that in some cases, the Department of National Defence is "re-looking at some of the requirements" the navy set for its warship.

That's significant news on several different levels.

One of the companies that lost the design competition — Alion Science and Technology Corp., along with its subsidiary Alion Canada — is suing in Federal Court, claiming that, among other things, the Lockheed Martin Canada design does not meet the navy's requirements.

One of the arguments underlying their complaint is that the Type 26 will not be able to meet the fleet speed requirements set out in the tender.

Defence expert Dave Perry, of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said he doubts the decisions being made over the next few weeks will put the federal government in any legal jeopardy.

Will the navy get what it wants?

But Finn's remarks do raise the question of whether the navy — and, by extension, the country — will get the warship it needs.

In addition to the U.K. and Canada, Australia also is in line to buy and build the untested warship.

The line-by-line review will, among other things, look for common requirements and design points among the three nations, said Finn.

"It could trigger some changes, and in some cases it could trigger some changes that align more with what the U.K. and Australia (are) already doing, which means it reduces some complexity because it eliminates the need to make some changes to what we call the parent design," he said. "And we're being very careful on schedule and, quite frankly, cost."

The pressure to not make too many changes at this stage of the procurement process is enormous from a business perspective, because Irving Shipbuilding already is facing a production gap between the new frigates and the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, which continue to be churned out in Halifax.

The more frigate design changes there are, the more likely a gap in production becomes — along with layoffs among shipyard workers as a consequence. (The federal government recently announced it will build a sixth patrol ship for the navy and two additional vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard to mitigate that shortfall. How that affects the proposed gap is uncertain.)

The last time the navy went through this kind of reconciliation exercise for a warship design was for the construction of the Arctic patrol ships.

'Penny-wise, pound foolish'

Critics have argued that, because of cost restrictions, the capability of those patrol ships was watered down to the point where some defence analysts have questioned their usefulness.

Perry said he doesn't think that kind of dynamic is at play with the frigate program, but the temptation to be "penny-wise and pound foolish" is out there.

"We're trying to make smart decisions for long-term, recognizing the costs are enormous, no matter how you slice it," he said. "I think we're in the appropriate space to not save every nickel we could, whereas that has definitely happened in the past."

Asked directly whether the navy will get the warship it wants, Finn was categorical in his answer: "We will ensure the navy gets the ship that it needs and the navy is at table with us. The changes and the work we do is signed-off by them."
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigate-type26-navy-requirements-reconciliation-procurement-1.5185554
 
JMCanada: 

not my intention to compare tit-for-tat, nor compare USD to CAD, nor a 5.000 ton frigate (ffg(x) ) vs  CSC's 8.000 tons

Type 26 CSC 6,900t:
https://www.naval-technology.com/news/canadian-surface-combatants-design/

Fincantieri FREMM competing for FFG(X) 6,500t:
https://www.fincantieri.com/globalassets/prodotti-servizi/navi-militari/m-02-16_fremm_bergamini_f.pdf
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sas-2019/2019/05/video-fincantieri-unveils-fremm-ffgx-design/
Video-Fincantieri-Unveils-FREMM-FFGX-Design-2.jpg


Navantia F-100 for FFG(X) 5,800t:
https://news.usni.org/2019/01/22/40524
5347810.jpg


Mark
Ottawa
 
Fair point , Mark. It's not really the size difference that explains the price point difference.

However, if you read the USNI article, you will notice that there is an impressive list of equipment for those frigates that are provided by the US Navy - basically at it's own expense - so they are not part of the construction cost for the frigate - only part of the cost of installation. And these items include most of the combat systems, a large part of the weapons system (including the VLS launchers), most of the expensive sensors and a fair deal of the communication equipment. It's pretty normal as a difference since in Canada, we tend to buy the whole kit and caboodle every time we introduce a new type - as it is usually single class replacement as a whole for the next generation, while the US has multiple classes of ships simultaneously using the same standardised equipment. Their budgeting system - through NAVSEA - of equipment piece by piece purchased separately for the whole fleet then just installed in every class makes perfect sense. The whole makes for very difficult comparison of final price between the USN and the RCN, however. 

Add those in and I don't think that they will be far from the Canadian price, especially after you add 30% on top of the US price to account for relative monetary values of the two currencies.
 
Actually, both the Fremm and the F-100 offered for the FFG(x) are reduced versions. On the other hand, another bidder as the Independence class is about 3.100 tons. A weighted average, gross-made in my mind (without calculator) drops some 5.000 tons. Being accurate was not my point.

Hunter class (or type 26-A for Australian) will be 8.800 tons full load (yet she gets 27+ knots "only").
https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hunter-class-frigates/

Edited: this is not a fight on figures. At the end of the day my opinion is that while FFG(x) may have (grossly speaking) some 70-80% capability of the CSC, it seems to be about 1/3rd of the cost, in the same currency. There are some explanatory factors as inflation, the production drumbeat, and specially we lack the full info on which costs are or are not considered. But, even if combat systems are about 50% of the final cost of the ship and they are provided by the USN to the vessels (not fully sure) , still i think the FFG(x) compares favourably to the CSC regarding the value for money.

IMHO.
 
Oldgateboatdriver:

you will notice that there is an impressive list of equipment for those frigates that are provided by the US Navy - basically at it's own expense

Made that point myself at FFG(X) thread  ;):

note AEGIS, VLS, also "government-furnished equipment" which I believe is not included in the production cost estimates in the piece
https://milnet.ca/forums/threads/128231/post-1536991.html#msg1536991

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
But our build-in-Canada costs way out of line.
Overpriced by a factor of five?  Are you sure the Canadian shipbuilding industry is that bad?
PBO also estimated the cost saving of having the CSC built at the foreign shipyard that built the original ship design rather than in Canada. It was estimated that Canada would save $10.22 billion FY2017 of the total $39.94 billion FY2017 program budget, or 25 per cent.
Source: Please see PDF page 8: https://pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2017/CSC%20Costing/CSC_EN.pdf
 
Another aspect of our shipbuilding problem is that, because neither Irving nor Seaspan had yards capable of making the ships assigned to them in October 2011 ( https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/phases-eng.html#phase2 ), now almost eight years later none of those assigned vessels is yet in service.  The yards had to be completely redone, adding much time, and time is money what with shipbuilding inflation.

Consider what would have been saved, and how many RCN/CCG vessels of various sorts, might be operational today if we had just contracted abroad.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
Another aspect of our shipbuilding problem is that, because neither Irving nor Seaspan had yards capable of making the ships assigned to them in October 2011 ( https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/phases-eng.html#phase2 ), now almost eight years later none of those assigned vessels is yet in service.  The yards had to be completely redone, adding much time, and time is money what with shipbuilding inflation.

Consider what would have been saved, and how many RCN/CCG vessels of various sorts, might be operational today if we had just contracted abroad.

Mark
Ottawa

But then we wouldn't have Canadian shipyards capable of building our ships efficiently.  That's why it's a Strategy, as having capable shipyards was a strategic goal for Canada. It ties back into the Jenkins paper years ago with the 'Key Industrial Capabilities' so all of these programs are running into what is a 25 year plan to have capable shipyards here at home. These up front costs are investments to build that capability, and it's a long term plan to try and avoid the boom/bust that came after every other ship, which has cost us billions to date.

Canada (like most countries) has had a policy to build our own ships in country since the 60s (with some allowance for exceptions if it makes sense). Aside from the thousands of shipyard employees, this feeds into a huge supply chain, so every dollar spent in Canada has direct economic benefits across the country.  If you build it outside of Canada, you get no economic benefits.  Labour is a huge part of the cost, so it's a lot of money being pumped into the economy.

I agree we would probably have had the ships quicker and for less money expended, but there would be zero jobs created, and that assumes that they dropped all the 'Industrial Regional Benefits' and other requirements from the contract.  Both of those are political nightmares, and probably would have stalled CSC approval for at least as long as the lag to get NSS awarded and the yards to renovate.

Assuming we can not crap the bed, the long term cost savings for the future class of ships being (after JSS, CSC etc) built in Canada in the 30+year horizon should be pretty good as well.  These are all pretty nebulous, but should be considered as part of the overall context when talking about the CSC costs, and how the whole NSS program is partly a loss leader to develop a strategic capability that we don't have, so we can dictate our own ships get built if we need to.  That's something that we can't do in a foreign yard, and may be pretty important as global warming starts to have a major impact on the geopolitics in the future.
 
MarkOttawa said:
Consider what would have been saved, and how many RCN/CCG vessels of various sorts, might be operational today if we had just contracted abroad.
There are pros and cons to building overseas or building in Canada.  It appears that the Conservatives and the Liberals have both decided that it is best to build in Canada.  Building surface combatants for Canada overseas is not an option.
 
I would like to highlight how remarkable it is that at least part of our defenc policy (shipbuilding) is bi-partisan.
 
That sometimes happens when GDP is in play (and not Gross Foreign Production...) :nod:
 
JMCanada said:
At the end of the day my opinion is that while FFG(x) may have (grossly speaking) some 70-80% capability of the CSC, it seems to be about 1/3rd of the cost, in the same currency.
It looks like Oldgateboatdriver and MarkOttawa are correct.
At an expected purchase price of perhaps $800 million per hull (exclusive of equipment costs)
  https://finance.yahoo.com/news/5-things-investors-know-u-161000798.html

So if the FFG(X) ends up with, say, 70% of the capability of the Canadian Surface Combatant, the FFG(X) might very well end up costing about 70% of the price of the Canadian Surface Combatant.
 
So it's 70% of the cost of CSC with no weapons systems or other critical equipment included?  Normally that's a pretty significant chunk of the total costs, and our budgets also include infrastructure, spares, training, and a lot of other things aside from just the hull and equipment.
 
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