Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[AlexanderM]

Why wait until IndoDefence 2018 to release this, and not submit this for CSC?



https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/november-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6660-indodefence-2018-damen-unveils-6000-tons-omega-frigate.html


Glorious Sea Pyramid-looking.

You'd think the fact that it's based on an existing hull would have made it a design which could have been submitted.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I wonder if any damage control lessons from the latest Norwegian Frigate collision will be added to the design criteria? 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

What lesson would that be, Colin?

"Don't be tied alongside when tug boats maneuver large merchant ships in the Harbour?"

HMCS Winnipeg already learned that one for us all. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I was thinking about how the crew responded, is the crew numbers enough, did their drills and equipment work as intended? Did any of the design assumptions contribute to the flooding or did they work as intended?

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm thinking that no matter how many systems and bodies you have in place it doesn't really matter.

Just as any tank can be destroyed with a big enough mine so any ship can be sunk with a big enough hole.

 

[NavyShooter]

Looking at the hole that's visible on the images I've seen of the ship, well, they basically opened a LOT of compartments to the sea in very short order.  The only saving grace was how close they were to shore and how they ran the ship aground. 

Looks like a 4-ish foot gash that runs along the starboard quarter of the ship.  Heard they lost steering right away, and propulsion shortly after.  All power lost shortly after the grounding.  The fact that the whole crew is still alive is about the best thing that came of this in my opinion.

What could they change in design to make the ship more survivable?  Maybe returning to the days of a 6" armour belt?  Alas, that's pointless in today's missile age.  Damage control?  Nope this was, from the beginning a Survival Stations event, not a DC event.

NS

 

[Pelorus]

What lesson would that be, Colin?

"Don't be tied alongside when tug boats maneuver large merchant ships in the Harbour?"

HMCS Winnipeg already learned that one for us all. 

Right now this Norwegian website contains more details than any other public source, with a number of anonymous inputs from officials (local VTMS, etc.), and it is being cited by stories run by the BBC and other major news agencies:

https://www.aldrimer.no/fregatten-anropt-og-advart-gjentatte-ganger/

As in any other significant transportation disaster, the details will be sketchy and uncorroborated for some time until official investigations are done and press releases made.

Now I certainly don't speak any Norwegian, and Google Translate is struggling a bit with the text, but for any reader with a background in navigation and seamanship it seems pretty likely from this article's account that the incident resembles the Fitzgerald much more than Winnipeg, especially this section:

The frigate on its way south may have adjusted its course to the port to pass starboard to starboard. Unfortunately, it is practiced to some extent, the source says and adds: - The tanker on board has probably taken for granted that the frigate controlled the situation.

In light of this, given a full ship's company embarked, and a collision occurring at 0400 or so, I'd say it's a near miracle that they walked away from this with only a handful of injuries and no fatalities.

Although I've sailed extensively in company with the Royal Norwegian Navy, I don't know enough about their practices in Fjords near their home port to speculate as to whether they would have had SSD closed up, or if they were far enough away from home to still be in normal steaming watches. I'm very interested to learn the details as they become available.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Now I certainly don't speak any Norwegian, and Google Translate is struggling a bit with the text, but for any reader with a background in navigation and seamanship it seems pretty likely from this article's account that the incident resembles the Fitzgerald much more than Winnipeg, especially this section:

Quite right boot12.

I was going only based on the original report as it was presented in our own Milnet forums (Newsroom/Current Operations/Ex in Norway?) by Eye in the Sky on November 8 at 07:41 (reply #14).

The Press release he quotes said (and I quote from the press release): a Navy "frigate was rammed by a tanker while it was docked in a harbour on the country's west coast ..."

I see now that it is a different scenario, more akin to the Fitzgerald one.

Oh!, and BTW - I do have a bit of a background in navigation and seamanship according to the RCN when it decided it was OK to give me command of a few ships.    ;D

 

[Pelorus]

Quite right boot12.

I was going only based on the original report as it was presented in our own Milnet forums (Newsroom/Current Operations/Ex in Norway?) by Eye in the Sky on November 8 at 07:41 (reply #14).

The Press release he quotes said (and I quote from the press release): a Navy "frigate was rammed by a tanker while it was docked in a harbour on the country's west coast ..."

I see now that it is a different scenario, more akin to the Fitzgerald one.

Oh!, and BTW - I do have a bit of a background in navigation and seamanship according to the RCN when it decided it was OK to give me command of a few ships.    ;D

Apologies, that was intended as a general statement, certainly not directed towards you. I just meant that with the shoddy Google translation it may not be very clear unless one has the background to read between the lines a bit.

I haven't come across anything yet with the exact location of the incident, but it sounds like the tanker had a pilot embarked still, so I suspect that the initial reports of it being a berthing incident stem from a journalist's misinterpretation of the incident happening near a port.

 

[Underway]

It doesn't look like anyone else has posted about this yet -- on canadascombatshipteam.com there's an article about MDA's role in the project. Part way through they say: "Canada’s Combat Ship Team’s solution for CSC leverages components from the USN Aegis integrated naval weapons system to track and guide naval defensive measures to intercept enemy targets..." Could this be similar to what Australia's doing for their Hunter class by combining Aegis with their Saab combat system? If so, does this mean a big boost for the CSC's proposed AAW capabilities?

It's a bit misleading to say that.  It's like calling a function for a program you did years ago.  No need to reinvent the wheel, just cut in the old function to the new program.  Does that leverage components?  Yup.  There could be a single part or line of code taken from Aegis and Lockheed would call that "leveraging components" in their marketing.

 

[Underway]

Editorial from the Canadian Naval Review regarding the CSC program for those interested in a basic overview of the entire program so far.

 

[Underway]

Defence News take on the selection of Type 26 as the prefered bidder.  Article repeated below for the click impaired.

With Russia in its crosshairs, Canada moves to buy a sub hunter
By: David B. Larter     October 29

PARIS — The Royal Canadian Navy is moving toward Britain’s Type 26 frigate design, a multimission ship designed to cut through the water quietly, hunt submarines, and defend against hostile missiles and aircraft.

The Canadian government announced mid-October that a team led by Lockheed Martin Canada had been selected as the “preferred designer.” That team was offering up British defense firm BAE Systems’ Type 26 design.

To some, the selection of the Type 26 design was a surprise given that Britain only just began cutting steel for the first one last summer, and as with any new ship and design, there is a high potential for cost overruns and delays.

But the Arctic nation’s selection of a ship that is a purpose-built sub hunter could be a sign that it is willing to accept those risks because of the strategic threat Russia poses to Canada’s interests at the rapidly thawing top of the world.

“For the Canadians, anti-submarine warfare is a big deal,” said Bryan Clark, a retired U.S. submarine officer and analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “If you are worried about the Russian sub threat and the air threat, then, yeah, the Type 26 makes sense.”

Indeed, BAE executives here said a big part of Type 26 is its anti-submarine warfare-friendly design elements.

“That was a huge discriminator for us,” Anne Healey, a vice president with BAE Systems, told a roundtable of reporters at the Euronaval conference. “We are extremely quiet and we are probably the world’s most advanced frigate … and that’s a key element of what sets us apart and what’s valued by the Canadian Navy.”

The ASW features were also a big factor for Australia, which is locked in a standoff with China over its actions in the South and East China seas, vital sea lanes for the Pacific nation.

The shift toward ASW is part of an industry trend, said Gary Fudge, a vice president with Lockheed Martin Canada.

“For the last 15 years, most allied navies have put their efforts into anti-air warfare, whereas the threat that has emerged in the last 15 years is largely in submarine technologies,” Fudge said. "So we wake up 15 years later finding that the focus has gone into anti-air, but the real threat is in submarines.

“The number of submarines produced in the 15 years is phenomenal, and now the world has woken up and it doesn’t have the same ASW capability anymore and it hasn’t kept pace with the anti-air warfare technology. So Canada is very interested in getting back on track.”

All told, Canada wants to buy up to 15 frigates with a notional total program cost of $60 billion all in. And while the selection of Lockheed and BAE is a big win for the companies, the project could still fall through as the program enters an evaluation phase where Lockheed’s bid will be examined, and Canada’s requirements will be reviewed to ensure that Type 26 is the best bet.

The final decision should come some time over the winter, according to a report by the Canadian Broadcast Corporation.

But assuming the contract moves forward, it would mean three of the “Five Eyes” countries — the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada — will operate Type 26 frigates. (The United States — which passed on the Type 26 design during its frigate competition — and New Zealand are the other two counties in the intelligence sharing pact.)

Risk

Clark, the CSBA analyst, said the selection of Type 26 was in some ways surprising because of the potential for cost overruns.

“It’s not yet a proven ship, and you are taking a ship that is not even built yet and making it the basis of your frigate program,” Clark said. “It is a little surprising, especially for a country that might lack the wherewithal and the funding for potential cost and schedule overruns.”

But BAE thinks Canada will be in good shape because the British and Australian programs are underway, meaning Canada should be able to avoid early mistakes through shared lessons learned. Furthermore, not much in the way of design changes were needed to meet the Canadian requirement.

“The amount of design change that we are doing is only 10 percent, so it’s going to represent a very low risk in terms of the alterations that are being made,” Healey said.

By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy had to change about 40 percent of the design of its DDG Flight IIA to incorporate the new SPY-6 radar in Flight III.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I think now that they've developed anti ship missiles that the subs can fire, you need a swiss army knife for any ship.  If you don't have a solid ASW platform in the design stage you are pretty much hooped and not something you can recover from without fundamental changes from the keel up.  With AAW there are enough decent plug and play systems you can bolt on and upgrade over time that you can scale your capability to a certain extent over the life of the ship, and we're realistically never going to plan to be in any kind of intensive AAW threat area on our own, so makes sense to share that responsibility.

In any case, just will be glad we'll have ships that have more service time than the crew, and hopefully have a better chance at being supportable if we use common equipment with the other navies.

 

[Uzlu]

Shipbuilding work to stay in Halifax: Sajjan

There are also concerns of layoffs due to a forecasted 36-month gap between the end of the construction of the Harry DeWolf class Arctic offshore patrol ships (AOPS) and the beginning of the construction of the Canadian surface combatants, which the government says has now been reduced by 18 months due to a recent confirmation that the navy will buy a sixth Harry DeWolf-class vessel.

In terms of mitigating that gap, Sajjan said that’s the responsibility of both the federal government and Irving.

On the government’s end, Sajjan said, they’ve not only guaranteed five AOPS and announced the purchase of a sixth, but they’ve also fully funded the 15 ships scheduled as part of the Canadian surface combatant program.

“That gives Irving Shipyards the full confidence that they will actually have the 15 ships where in the past that was not the case. There wasn’t enough money when we formed government for 15 ships, in fact, I think there was only enough money for nine. We provide assurance to Irving shipyard that the funding is actually going to be there, which provides a lot of confidence to the workers as well,” he said.

Sajjan said DND is cognizant of the challenges an “up and down” workforce in shipbuilding can create like loss of experience and increased cost. But he said some of that responsibility falls on the shipyard.

“At the end of the day, this is a joint responsibility ... (they need to be) making sure that they keep those gaps small as possible for us to be able to work with the scheduling.”

On that front, things have been working quite well, Sajjan said.

https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/shipbuilding-work-to-stay-in-halifax-sajjan-259855/

 

[Underway]

I think now that they've developed anti ship missiles that the subs can fire, you need a swiss army knife for any ship.  If you don't have a solid ASW platform in the design stage you are pretty much hooped and not something you can recover from without fundamental changes from the keel up.  With AAW there are enough decent plug and play systems you can bolt on and upgrade over time that you can scale your capability to a certain extent over the life of the ship, and we're realistically never going to plan to be in any kind of intensive AAW threat area on our own, so makes sense to share that responsibility.

It depends I think.  There are certainly systems you can bolt on to improve your ASW.  Better towed arrays, hull mounted sonars and most importantly have a good ASW helicopter embarked. The subs are going to always know where you are before you know where they are, no matter the platform you are sailing on the surface.  Making a really quiet surface ship reduces that advantage which in turn reduces the strategic mobility of the sub as it might not detect you in time to maneuver into attack range.  But it's not the end of the world.

Keel up design advantages are really nimbleness, high tactical speed, and lack of importance as a target.  Not being the main target is a sub hunters best friend!

 

[Uzlu]

Failed warship bidder sues to scuttle deal

Alion Canada, one of the firms involved in the $60-billion dollar procurement of Canada’s new fleet of warships, has launched a Federal Court appeal to overturn a recent decision to select Lockheed Martin as the preferred bidder.

According to an application for judicial review filed in Ottawa on Friday, Alion Canada, a Nova Scotia-based wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. parent company, is asking the court to prohibit the federal government and Irving Shipbuilding from entering into a contract with Lockheed Martin Canada on the grounds that Lockheed’s bid was noncompliant.

Last month, Public Services and Procurement Canada announced that after a lengthy, and sensitive competition, Lockheed Martin Canada was selected as the preferred bidder to design replacements for the navy’s frigate and destroyer fleets, beating out two other bids: Alion Canada, which offered up Dutch De Zeven Provinciën Class air defence and command frigate, and Navantia/SAAB’s design based on the F-105 anti-submarine frigate design for the Spanish navy.

But now Alion is alleging that the BAE Systems Type 26 Global Combat Ship design offered by Lockheed, which is currently also being constructed for the U.K. and Australian navies, is incapable of meeting three critical and mandatory requirements of the Request for Proposals that the firms crafted their bids around: two requirements concern the vessels’ speed, and one deals with the number of crew berths.

“The RFP required (Public Services and Procurement Canada) and Irving to reject Lockheed’s bid because of its non-compliance,” the application reads.

Instead, the document says, the federal government and Halifax-based Irving Shipbuilding announced Lockheed as the preferred bidder and has entered into the conditions precedent period. This is the step immediately prior to awarding the definition subcontract between Irving, the prime contractor and shipbuilder, and Lockheed, the warship designer.

“(Alion) submitted a fully-compliant and conforming bid, at enormous expense, (and) expected that their bid, and the entire procurement process, would be administered in accordance with the terms and conditions in the RFP,” Alion says in the document.

“This was not the case and the applicants have been denied the fair treatment they were owed.”

As such, Alion is asking a federal court to set aside the decision to select Lockheed as the preferred bidder, and to prohibit the government from issuing the necessary approvals to award the Canadian Surface Combatant definition subcontract to Lockheed.

The respondents named in Alion’s application include Irving Shipbuilding, Lockheed Martin Canada, Navantia, SAAB Australia, and the Attorney General of Canada.

Alion’s legal actions come after months of rumblings and speculation from industry about bid-rigging: that the Type 26 was always the preferred ship of the Royal Canadian Navy, and that a number of amendments were made to the RFP to tailor it to Lockheed’s bid. These concerns centered around changes to the RFP that allowed Lockheed to offer a “paper” design that had not yet been in the water, even though Ottawa announced it was streamlining the National Shipbuilding Strategy back in 2016, axing plans for a fully Canadian designed ship and opting instead for a proven, off-the-shelf design to cut costs and mitigate risks.

These amendments, 88 in total, are referenced in Alion’s federal court application.

“While the RFP originally set out a requirement for a relatively mature and proven vessel platform, the amendments to the RFP effectively diluted the requirements and resulted in (PSPC) and Irving being able to accept an increasingly unproven vessel platform, like the one offered by Lockheed,” it reads.

The other parties named in Alion’s application have yet to publicly responded to the proceedings.

https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/failed-warship-bidder-sues-to-scuttle-deal-261443/

Earlier in this thread, I predicted that there would have to be a major modification of the Type 26 to meet the Royal Canadian Navy’s requirement for 28+ knots.  https://army.ca/forums/threads/120223/post-1552778.html#msg1552778

 

[Underway]

So the article has been updated...

Alion Canada, one of the firms involved in the $60-billion dollar procurement of Canada’s new fleet of warships, has launched a Federal Court appeal to overturn a recent decision to select Lockheed Martin as the preferred bidder.

According to an application for judicial review filed in Ottawa on Friday, Alion Canada, a Nova Scotia-based wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. parent company, is asking the court to prohibit the federal government and Irving Shipbuilding from entering into a contract with Lockheed Martin Canada on the grounds that Lockheed’s bid was non-compliant.

Last month, Public Services and Procurement Canada announced that after a lengthy, and sensitive competition, Lockheed Martin Canada was selected as the preferred bidder to design replacements for the navy’s frigate and destroyer fleets, beating out two other bids: Alion Canada, which offered up Dutch De Zeven Provinciën Class air defence and command frigate, and Navantia/SAAB’s design based on the F-105 anti-submarine frigate design for the Spanish navy.

But now Alion is alleging that the BAE Systems Type 26 Global Combat Ship design offered by Lockheed, which is currently also being constructed for the U.K. and Australian navies, is incapable of meeting three critical and mandatory requirements of the request for proposals that the firms crafted their bids around: two requirements concern the vessels’ speed, and one deals with the number of crew berths.

But now Alion is alleging that the BAE Systems Type 26 Global Combat Ship design offered by Lockheed, which is currently also being constructed for the U.K. and Australian navies, is incapable of meeting three critical and mandatory requirements of the request for proposals that the firms crafted their bids around: two requirements concern the vessels’ speed, and one deals with the number of crew berths.

“The RFP required (Public Services and Procurement Canada) and Irving to reject Lockheed’s bid because of its non-compliance,” the application reads.

Instead, the document says, the federal government and Halifax-based Irving Shipbuilding announced Lockheed as the preferred bidder and has entered into the conditions precedent period. This is the step immediately prior to awarding the definition subcontract between Irving, the prime contractor and shipbuilder, and Lockheed, the warship designer.

“(Alion) submitted a fully-compliant and conforming bid, at enormous expense, (and) expected that their bid, and the entire procurement process, would be administered in accordance with the terms and conditions in the RFP,” Alion says in the document.

“This was not the case and the applicants have been denied the fair treatment they were owed.”

As such, Alion is asking a federal court to set aside the decision to select Lockheed as the preferred bidder, and to prohibit the government from issuing the necessary approvals to award the Canadian Surface Combatant definition subcontract to Lockheed.

The respondents named in Alion’s application include Irving Shipbuilding, Lockheed Martin Canada, Navantia, SAAB Australia, and the Attorney General of Canada.

Alion’s legal actions come after months of rumblings and speculation from industry about bid-rigging: that the Type 26 was always the preferred ship of the Royal Canadian Navy, and that a number of amendments were made to the RFP to tailor it to Lockheed’s bid. These concerns centred around changes to the RFP that allowed Lockheed to offer a “paper” design that had not yet been in the water, even though Ottawa announced it was streamlining the National Shipbuilding Strategy back in 2016, axing plans for a fully Canadian designed ship and opting instead for a proven, off-the-shelf design to cut costs and mitigate risks.

The amendments, 88 in total, are referenced in Alion’s federal court application.

“While the RFP originally set out a requirement for a relatively mature and proven vessel platform, the amendments to the RFP effectively diluted the requirements and resulted in (PSPC) and Irving being able to accept an increasingly unproven vessel platform, like the one offered by Lockheed,” it reads.

David Perry, senior analyst with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, told The Chronicle Herald he’s not surprised in the slightest that one of the other bidders is challenging the process in court.

“I mean there’s just far too much money and potential opportunity at stake for it not to be worth anyone’s while to at least try,” he said.

But, Perry said, he does find the premise of Alion’s appeal somewhat strange.

“(Alion) is basically saying that they know what (Lockheed) was able to substantiate better than either than the government/Irving did,” Perry said.

Large military procurements are a very technical and comprehensive process, and Perry said all requirements would have been laid out very clearly in the RFP. Bidders would have had to prove quite clearly to the teams evaluating the bids that they’re able to adequately meet all the requirements.

“Just to get to the point where Lockheed is right now they had to prove that they could do what Alion is saying they couldn’t,” he said.

Furthermore, Perry said it’s highly unlikely that anyone from Alion has managed to get their hands on a full copy of Lockheed’s bid. Because of the money on the line and the amount of incredibly sensitive corporate intelligence contained within a bid like this, Lockheed — one of the world’s biggest defence companies — would have guarded that information pretty closely.

“People in industry talk to each other a lot (and) have a good general idea of what others are doing, but as for if they have seen the bid, I would be astounded if that was the case.”

The Chronicle Herald reached out to Alion, Irving Shipbuilding Lockheed Martin Canada and and Public Services and Procurement Canada and all declined comment while the matter is before the courts.

Lockheed has responded to rumblings that it doesn’t meet all the RFP requirements in the past. In September, before they were announced as the preferred bidder, the Twitter account for the Lockheed/BAE team posted: “BAE System’s Type 26 meets all requirements in the CSC proposal, including speed.”

Both Irving and Public Services and Procurement Canada have expressed numerous times in response to concerns about the Canadian Surface Combatant competition that they are committed to a fair, open and transparent procurement process.

I've been following the Type 26 program development for years.  The tonnage has varied from between 5000 to 8000 tons depending on when you read the information and how outdated the website is.  The number of missiles has varied.  The crew complement has varied.  And that is just for the UK version of the ship.  The Hunter Class (Australian version) goes 27+, and is 8800 tons.  So its heavier (by 1900 tons!) and goes faster than the UK version.  There is no reason that the 26+ or 27+ can't be more than 28 knots.  And as far as crew complement goes the navy wants a minimum of 190 pers.  The Type 26 can take up to 208.  And I'm sure the flex deck can add more.

I don't see this going anywhere.

 

[CBH99]

Underway,

Question.  You state that the Navy wants a minimum of 190 personnel to man the ships??

I'm assuming that is for damage control & redundancy purposes?  I'd have thought the fewer personnel the better, to an extent (keeping damage control capabilities in mind) -- so to assist the Navy in manning it's platforms?

 

[FSTO]

Underway,

Question.  You state that the Navy wants a minimum of 190 personnel to man the ships??

I'm assuming that is for damage control & redundancy purposes?  I'd have thought the fewer personnel the better, to an extent (keeping damage control capabilities in mind) -- so to assist the Navy in manning it's platforms?

The whole reduced manning of ships idea is an unattainable panacea. As proven by the USN LCS debacle there is a delta where crew fatigue and ship's overall maintenance at sea suffers if there is not the requisite personnel onboard to do the jobs required.

 

[Uzlu]

Alion added that its own proposed design, which was based on a Dutch frigate, met all of the navy’s requirements. It also said that it has received no information about why Lockheed’s bid was selected over its own, despite requests for answers.

https://globalnews.ca/news/4686905/legal-challenge-canadian-warships/