Having obtained a suitably upgraded organic air capability, the Canadian Task Group came close to having to do without it. This situation arose in late October, over the issue of replacement of the Task Group. The decision reached by NDHQ was that the cost of refitting three more ships and five additional helicopters would be prohibitive, and crews would be rotated instead. This had profound operational implications, quite aside from the obvious withdrawal of each of the ships from patrol in sequence while the changeovers were affected. Unlike the air task group in Doha, which frequently rotated CF18s from the Canadian bases in Germany, 423 Squadron had no practical way to transport replacement aircraft to the Gulf without a relieving task group. On top of that, back in August, even as the upgrades were being undertaken at Shearwater, MAGHQ had predicted that, with the projected flying rate (proven in actual operations), “[a]ircraft technical requirements in terms of maintainability/sustainability [would be] problematic ... [and] there will be a requirement for one in-theatre periodic inspection per aircraft during a possible six-month deployment." Although direction had been requested from DMAEM, none had arrived.
Now, the problem of diminishing aircraft flying hours reached a crisis, and the investment made in the augmentation of the air maintenance detachment aboard PROTECTEUR reaped its dividend. In the short term, the afloat technicians had proven equal to the task of routine maintenance, keeping all of the aging and temperamental Sea Kings on the ready roster for an astounding 98 per cent availability, but the necessity for periodic inspections presented a longer-term problem. A regular 20‑day-long maintenance routine was required for flight safety reasons on all aircraft every 500 flying hours, and this was a major undertaking involving specialist technical support. Significantly, one had never before been conducted away from home base, let alone on a ship at sea. Together, the five task group helicopters were averaging 12 hours flying per day, or over 350 hours per month. The pace had been determined in part by the intention that the Task Group would return to Halifax in the early months of 1991. At the beginning of November, the total hours remaining were just over 1,250, sufficient to carry through to mid-February at the present rate, which in wartime was expected to rise.
Knowing now that there would be no replacement of the ships or their embarked aircraft until the summer of 1991 at the earliest, the initial reaction of Lieutenant-Colonel McWha was to order a drastic reduction in the hours flown by the air detachments. Henceforth, they were to fly only when necessary and otherwise remain at alert status, but that was only postponing the inevitable. Other than waiving the periodic inspection requirement, there was no alternative to in-theatre inspections. The situation was forced on 5 November when an airframe crack was discovered on one of the aircraft, “grounding” it aboard PROTECTEUR until a specialist metal technician from Shearwater could arrive to effect the repairs. Urgent communications passed from the task group ships at sea to the Canadian theatre headquarters in Manamah and thence to Shearwater and Ottawa, resulting in the decision to take this opportunity simultaneously to begin the 20‑day routine on the stricken helicopter immediately.
The only outstanding issue was where to undertake it. Both the US and Royal Navies also operated Sea Kings in the Gulf, but they were attached mostly to shore units, and there were sufficient differences between the models that making use of their facilities was not a viable option. In fact, PROTECTEUR’s facilities surpassed anything readily available elsewhere in the Gulf for the Sea Kings, and the embarked maintenance team was quickly set to the task. With their effective confinement on board because of the patrol schedule, the first inspection took only 15 days, and subsequent ones were reduced to 12 days. A sequence was worked out to have the remaining aircraft completed by February, which, with judicious scheduling and barring the outbreak of hostilities, would leave the five aircraft sufficient flying hours to resume the accustomed rate and support task group operations well into 1992.
