...
While it might be comforting to believe that the CSC program is basically on track and moving briskly to build and introduce a world-class multi-purpose frigate to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), in the numbers and at the cost projected, few informed observers would agree that this is the case. Even after years of work to ameliorate the program, and on the cusp of the first bids being submitted in mid-August, the impenetrable complexity of the process, ongoing industry wrangling, and ever-expanding price tag all suggest that staying the current course seems most likely to deliver less capability than the RCN needs, later than it is needed, and at a cost that will ultimately prove shocking to Canadian taxpayers.
It has been suggested that the sign of a good compromise is one which dissatisfies all participants equally, but this is surely a poor metric for success for a multi-billion dollar weapon system which will be in service for decades, is intended to remake the face of Canadian Naval industry, and which will carry Canada’s sailors into harm’s way in service of the country. Instead, would it not be better to leverage the considerable competencies of our most important economic and military ally, share our valuable operational and design knowledge in an area where we have world-class industry, and explore the possibility of collaborating to solve a common problem?
If the Government, procurement officials, the RCN, and Canadian industry can work together with a sense of urgency and boldness to formulate, propose, and ultimately execute on a collaborative Bi-National Frigate Strategy with the United States, it could lead to an elegant, win-win outcome that resets two highly problematic programs, in a manner that would greatly benefit both countries, their respective Navies, and industry as well.
In considering such an approach, the initial step is to quickly establish whether there is sufficient alignment between the operational needs of the two Navies to make a joint program feasible.
Fortunately, Canada has already produced a very solid CSC requirements document, which includes extensive technical specifications based on decades of multi-purpose frigate operations. This could form an immediate starting point for a foundational capability discussion with the USN. While the CSC mission set is not an exact analogue, there is significant overlap between it and many of the systems, sensors, weapons, and warfighting capabilities needed in the FFG(X). Like Canada, the USN needs a survivable, multi-role vessel that has the equipment, speed, range, and seakeeping ability to operate independently in hostile waters, and work in concert with other nations. It requires advanced anti-submarine and electronic warfare capabilities, and a highly capable long-range radar system able to direct modern air to surface missiles in self-protection, area air defence, and perhaps even theatre ballistic missile defence roles [emphasis added]. It needs a conventional naval gun, smaller systems for close-in self-defence, and the ability to operate a medium-sized maritime helicopter in parallel with a range of airborne, surface, and possibly subsurface autonomous vehicles. Finally, it requires an advanced suite of integrated combat management and automated ship control systems, to enable high-end warfighting operations and battle-damage tolerance, even with a reduced crew footprint.
On a purely military level, a harmonized requirements set has much to recommend it. Although the two Navies train and operate differently, a strong baseline of procedural interoperability already exists, and would only be reinforced by commonality of equipment. Canada could benefit from US advances in platform-level cyber protection, and would gain easier access to an expanded range of operational capabilities that might otherwise be unachievable due to CSC cost and technical obstacles. For its part, the USN would have a unique avenue to draw upon Canadian key industrial competencies already proven in the Halifax-class frigate, and under active development in anticipation of CSC. These might include anti-submarine warfare sensors and processing, advanced sensor and system integration approaches, novel schemes for on-board automation, shipboard helicopter integration, and operation of unmanned air, surface, and sub-surface vehicles from medium-sized vessels.
Such collaboration would reduce manufacturing and technical risk not only in the design and build phases, but also as the complex weapon system is sustained over its lifetime...
This would not be a small undertaking, but if alignment were possible, it could dramatically enhance both the cost-effectiveness as well as the industrial attractiveness of the CSC program. Already, some observers have suggested that a change in direction on LCS might cause CSC bidders to shift their focus to the more lucrative USN market. Given the greater predictability of the US procurement processes, less onerous intellectual property (IP) requirements, and a more conventional distribution of labour between warship designers, system integrators, and shipyards, the possibility that major industrial players might reconsider their commitment to submit CSC bids is a real danger. At the very least, a significantly reduced number of bidders could damage the quality of CSC competition, result in fewer options for Canada, and potentially create new cost and quality pressures on the program.
With a larger Bi-National program, however, the increased number of ships (at least 20 for the USN, and a further 12-15 ships for the RCN) will likely result in mutual cost and capability benefits due to the increased scale of manufacture, and greater scope for industry to recoup its investments over the service life of the fleet...
Jeff Tasseron is a Naval Aviator and the former Commanding Officer of 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron. His 26-year career in the Canadian Forces included more than 15 years of operational flying in the Sea King helicopter community, numerous deployments, and staff roles as the Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff (General Walt Natynczyk) and the Director of Joint C4ISR in Chief of Force Development. Following his retirement, he worked in the Air & Naval business unit of General Dynamics Mission Systems Canada, among other defence industry positions. He currently provides independent consulting services on a wide range of defence and security issues, including procurement, the function of the civil /military interface, and industry positioning and strategy. As he is genetically incapable of confining his prose to 140 character run-on sentences , his first blog can be found at https://avernica.wordpress.com/ – proving that even a retired RCAF Colonel can learn new tricks. When not working or writing, he can be found playing squash.
http://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2017/08/04/united-states-navy-seeks-nice-canadian-warship-for-sunset-cruises-visits-to-the-beach/#.WYSSCemQzwo
rly:
