Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[Navy_Pete]

Missile shoots only excite the Navy because the vast majority of it has never actually engaged in combat and done the job for real. Cool guys don't look at explosions.

Given the state of our ships, and the relative priority given to QoL items over basic capabilities or maintenance, as well as general non-compliance to safety standards, that's probably a good thing. We've eroded the recoverability of the CPFs significantly, and people are more worried if little Jimmy can grow a cool goatee or pretend to be a Viking then if they can respond to a fire.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Given the state of our ships, and the relative priority given to QoL items over basic capabilities or maintenance, as well as general non-compliance to safety standards, that's probably a good thing. We've eroded the recoverability of the CPFs significantly, and people are more worried if little Jimmy can grow a cool goatee or pretend to be a Viking then if they can respond to a fire.

You'll get no argument from me. We will have some bloody lessons to learn the next time our triremes engage again.

I'm looking at our training and W&SB. We do not train hard enough, nor do we stress the W&SB enough.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

W&SB ?

 

[Halifax Tar]

W&SB ?

Watch and Station Bill

Its what directs every member of the crew to what what role they fill in the various occurrences at sea and sets the watch rotation.

The ships ability to float, fight and move 100% depends on it.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Watch and Station Bill

Its what directs every member of the crew to what what role they fill in the various occurrences at sea and sets the watch rotation.

Thanks, I thought that would be an absolute given as everyone needs to know where and what to do.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Thanks, I thought that would be an absolute given as everyone needs to know where and what to do.

Each Chief of Department (CPO2) is responsible to ensure their department's W&SB is filled and all assigned roles are covered.

 

[Grimey]

Given the state of our ships, and the relative priority given to QoL items over basic capabilities or maintenance, as well as general non-compliance to safety standards, that's probably a good thing. We've eroded the recoverability of the CPFs significantly, and people are more worried if little Jimmy can grow a cool goatee or pretend to be a Viking then if they can respond to a fire.

We had our ERA’s party at the Esquimalt C&POs last Friday. The number of serving members who show up in uniform keeps dropping as more and more Martechs have no relation to prior training standards, certification boards etc or ever being referred to as an artificer. Now, i’m not one for linking dress/deportment with one’s ability to perform under duress as a stoker, but If the state of half of those who showed up is indicative of the professional attitude in the branch today, it’s no surprise that the branch is in the state it is. As to cool goatee/pretend Viking, one of those who showed up (a LCDR) was well on his way with a ZZ Top beard and stud earrings as well as carrying 40 lbs of extra weight above his belt.

 

[Halifax Tar]

We had our ERA’s party at the Esquimalt C&POs last Friday. The number of serving members who show up in uniform keeps dropping as more and more Martechs have no relation to prior training standards, certification boards etc or ever being referred to as an artificer. Now, i’m not one for linking dress/deportment with one’s ability to perform under duress as a stoker, but If the state of half of those who showed up is indicative of the professional attitude in the branch today, it’s no surprise that the branch is in the state it is. As to cool goatee/pretend Viking, one of those who showed up (a LCDR) was well on his way with a ZZ Top beard and stud earrings as well as carrying 40 lbs of extra weight above his belt.

CERAs and ERAs are a thing of the past.

 

[Grimey]

CERAs and ERAs are a thing of the past.

They are. From the horror stories I’m hearing from peers who are still serving, so is technical aptitude.

 

[Halifax Tar]

They are. From the horror stories I’m hearing from peers who are still serving, so is technical aptitude.

I am not in the Engineering branch, but a close relative as the Stokers and Storesmen are always hand in hand. Anyways, from the outside it defiantly looks like the amalgamation of the trades in the Eng Br is not going as planned.

 

[Grimey]

I am not in the Engineering branch, but a close relative as the Stokers and Storesmen are always hand in hand. Anyways, from the outside it defiantly looks like the amalgamation of the trades in the Eng Br is not going as planned.

There’s talk of certain aspects of amalgamation being rolled back, but the train has been rolling down the single set of rails for so long that the remaining brain trust is flummoxed as to a COA.

 

[Halifax Tar]

There’s talk of certain aspects of amalgamation being rolled back, but the train has been rolling down the single set of rails for so long that the remaining brain trust is flummoxed as to a COA.

A lot of knowledge has already and continues to walk away. No doubt rolling back will come with its own challenges now.

 

[NavyShooter]

Interestingly, a POC at NFS(P) reached out to me earlier in the year and asked if I still had copies of old lesson plans for the NET(A) training courses....because....y'know....I keep everything. And strangely, yes I did have them. An interesting discussion ensued about training standards and such.

The old CANTASS dry end course was a 6 week task in Ottawa at CDC for the Factory course, which was condensed to a 22 day training syllabus for the old QL5 level.

That didn't include the ~3 week training for the NWT's on the wet end in NAD.

The W Eng training for both wet and dry ends was chopped to 12 days total for both. With little exposure to the real gear and a focus on Computer Based simulation training.

So....yeah....there's a long road to hew to get back to where the Navy once was in terms of training and expertise.

(This is just one example of many...the 6 month CIWS course that was chopped to less than 6 weeks...etc.)

 

[Lumber]

Thanks, I thought that would be an absolute given as everyone needs to know where and what to do.

Interestingly, a POC at NFS(P) reached out to me earlier in the year and asked if I still had copies of old lesson plans for the NET(A) training courses....because....y'know....I keep everything. And strangely, yes I did have them. An interesting discussion ensued about training standards and such.

The old CANTASS dry end course was a 6 week task in Ottawa at CDC for the Factory course, which was condensed to a 22 day training syllabus for the old QL5 level.

That didn't include the ~3 week training for the NWT's on the wet end in NAD.

The W Eng training for both wet and dry ends was chopped to 12 days total for both. With little exposure to the real gear and a focus on Computer Based simulation training.

So....yeah....there's a long road to hew to get back to where the Navy once was in terms of training and expertise.

(This is just one example of many...the 6 month CIWS course that was chopped to less than 6 weeks...etc.)

The air force won't let ships band their torpedoes anymore... well, technically they will "let" ships, but they always seem to redo it. Why? Because the Weng Techs either get very little or no training on banding torpedoes, so the air force always has to redo it (because they do get training on it).

 

[Navy_Pete]

They are. From the horror stories I’m hearing from peers who are still serving, so is technical aptitude.

That happens when you cut training, reduce the numbers on a ship so people struggle to do maintenance, and then get promoted a lot faster than previously so they spend less time as maintainers or working supervisors.

If the Navy wants everyone to be sailors first, and most sailors are working 745-1545 alongside, the Navy shouldn't do surprised pikachu faces when martechs also don't want to come in early or stay late to do extra work, and be able to do things like exercise during the work day like everyone else. This is an entirely self inflicted wound where the operators wanted to break up the 'stoker mafia' and broke the MSE department structure that was keeping the duct tape and bondo in place to get things working anyway.

Most ships would simply not sail if we had to get class certifications with actual authority to stop sailing (it's a voluntary compliance that we can ignore with a 'risk assessment'), but combat ships should really meet basic SOLAS before deploying, let alone actual combatant requirements.

 

[Navy_Pete]

A lot of knowledge has already and continues to walk away. No doubt rolling back will come with its own challenges now.

That's the problem; the legacy HTs are retiring or moving on, and it will be another 7-10 years to get a 'structures' specialization back in place. A lot of what was experience based is gone forever, and we don't even have things like the periodic engineering letters to write down those lessons learned.

 

[Lumber]

Thanks, I thought that would be an absolute given as everyone needs to know where and what to do.

It's a lot more complicated than you think.

There are multiple different W&S bills, and a lot of positions aren't necessarily tied to a qualification. For example, "Rescue stations" is an event where we launch one of our boats to rescue someone who's fallen over the side. One of the required positions for this is "stern-fast", which is a person who's job it is to hold a rope tied to the back of the zodiac to keep it from swinging around as the crane lifts it over the side. No real qualification is required for this, and by convention the role has been given to the sensors division (NESOPs). So, the Ops Chief and the Snr NESOP have to pick someone from the sensors division and add their name to the watch and station bill for that evolution.

Now, if you're on watch, it's pretty simple, you tend to stay on watch, but if you are off watch when something happens (like a fire), there might be multiple places that you could go. If there was a fire, there are 4 x "section bases" aboard ship (places with damage control gear where people congregate and form teams to fight fires and floods). We also have (usually) 6-8 bridge watch keepers (BWKs) aboard (to maintain a 1-in-4 watch rotation on the bridge). At any one time, we only need 2 BWKs on the bridge, so if we go to emergency stations, the W&S bill tells those off-watch BWKs which section base to go to (and we will change it from time to time to balance out the total number or number of people with specific quals at each section base).

 

[Grimey]

This is an entirely self inflicted wound where the operators wanted to break up the 'stoker mafia' and broke the MSE department structure that was keeping the duct tape and bondo in place to get things working anyway.

There’s argument to be had that the ‘stoker mafia’ disappeared when the last fire was pulled on a Y-100 plant and the MSE dept ceased being more than a third of the crew, and I don’t think the mafia ever made it past the water front. If a name is mentioned as to who put in the last kick to the head, it’s Ron Lloyd.

 

[dapaterson]

 

[Navy_Pete]

There’s argument to be had that the ‘stoker mafia’ disappeared when the last fire was pulled on a Y-100 plant and the MSE dept ceased being more than a third of the crew, and I don’t think the mafia ever made it past the water front. If a name is mentioned as to who put in the last kick to the head, it’s Ron Lloyd.

It definitely went out with the 280s, and never really was a thing on the CPFs.

But at the same token, the Moustache club shouldn't expect to be able to run the ships the same way and be able to fix the same things they used to (especially when some items aren't designed to be repaired). They seem to want the whole wedding cake for the price of a no-name bag of cookies and have 20 people do the same job as 60, then wonder why things aren't as good as they used to be and people are quitting.