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And he or she votes.The average commenter is dumb as hell...
And he or she votes.The average commenter is dumb as hell...
I wonder if there is a chance that we can start on the first CSC after the 6th AOPS instead of waiting for the 2 CCGMeanwhile the UK starts on the third hull of their Type 26 build
Construction starts on third Type 26 Frigate HMS Belfast
Prince William today started construction on the UK's third of eight Type 26 Frigate, HMS Belfast.ukdefencejournal.org.uk
SoNo chance. Design work still needs to be finished. There are too many risks to the project to head to build early. Better to take your time and set up for success with as thorough and complete design as possible.
"The construction of the first CSC vessel is expected to begin in 2023/2024."So
Frédérick Rolette 2021
Robert Hampton Gray 2022
CCGAOPS1 2023
CCGAOPS2 2024
CSC1 2025?
Rather different perspectives.In this new episode of Defence Deconstructed, David Perry is joined by Troy Crosby and Alan Williams to explore the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project in details.
Defence Deconstructed is brought to you by Irving Shipbuilding. A strategic partner of the federal government’s National Shipbuilding Strategy, providing skilled, well-paying jobs that support Canada’s economic recovery.
Defence Deconstructed is also brought to you by Boeing
I understand the feeling but short-term pain for long-term gain here.Personally, so am I. I just wish that the government would do something about getting more shipyards involved so we could get hulls into the water faster; not just the Type 26s but the AOPS, the JSS and everything else.
There needs to be a balance between getting ships to the fleet, and stable work for a decade or two on each coast.Personally, so am I. I just wish that the government would do something about getting more shipyards involved so we could get hulls into the water faster; not just the Type 26s but the AOPS, the JSS and everything else.
I understand the feeling but short-term pain for long-term gain here.
Brining both Vancouver Shipyards and Irving up from basically zero to where they are now was (and continues to be) a huge challenge for them, the government, and the PMO's. Also, the RCN can only handle accepting so many ships at a time and needs to build out the infrastructure to do so. An example is A and B jetty revitalization, ammo jetty replacement on the West Coast, and NJ jetty on the East Coast.
The other issue is the sustainability of the yards. A consistent build schedule will keep the shipyards building. It's interesting to note that as of right now the RCN has as many yards building ships for the RCN as the US does for their surface fleet.
Twenty years of continuous shipbuilding for Irving and Seaspan is not good enough. The government of Canada and all the major political parties should already have a plan for long-term shipbuilding—e.g., twenty-five-year plans for Irving, Seaspan, and Davie and another group of three twenty-five-year plans to immediately follow the first group.There needs to be a balance between getting ships to the fleet, and stable work for a decade or two on each coast.
For context, took about 12 years of slow lobbying to get the current NSS plan approved (with a big push for the last 3-4 years). We almost have to start as the CSCs are cutting steel to get approval to keep going with NSS in time to have more ship projects approved in time to do all the design etc required (and might have already missed the window).Twenty years of continuous shipbuilding for Irving and Seaspan is not good enough. The government of Canada and all the major political parties should already have a plan for long-term shipbuilding—e.g., twenty-five-year plans for Irving, Seaspan, and Davie and another group of three twenty-five-year plans to immediately follow the first group.
I would argue against the mid-life refit part. Once a warship gets past 20-25 years, the maintenance curve goes through the roof.I agree with Underway. Let's all remember that the AIM of this process had little to do with warships or the RCN. It was, still is, all about restoring and maintaining a useful, effective, profitable shipbuilding Industry in Canada. The team of DMs who thought this up advocated a long, relatively slow, process of building ships, one-after-another, in batches of three or four, each batch being a slight upgrade from the first. The reason we are building for the RCN and the Coast Guard is that international trade law (the WTO/GATT and all that really, really important stuff (unlike the defence of Canada) allows us to subsidize projects for national security reasons. We could not put this kind of taxpayers' money in to Davie, Irving and Seaspan if they were building commercial ships ~ other countries would be allowed to impose huge sanctions on Canadian trade in retaliation.
In a perfect world ~ as seen by those senior bureaucrats ~ the RCN would get one new major combatant a year for three years, then a year long gap, then three more in batch two, and so on until 15 major warships had been built. Then the first would go into mid-life refit. Ditto for a bunch of Coast Guard ships and so on. Meanwhile the companies (Davie, Irving and Seaspan ~ would be using their government funded upgrades to compete for and win business on the global, commercial (and government) market.
With the project lifespan we could almost just slow down the drumbeat of delivery and have them keep building new blocks of CSCs.I would argue against the mid-life refit part. Once a warship gets past 20-25 years, the maintenance curve goes through the roof.
replace them at that point with new build and either deconstruct the old hull or sell it on the secondary market.
I know. Boy, do I know.With the project lifespan we could almost just slow down the drumbeat of delivery and have them keep building new blocks of CSCs.
FELEX was really only about the sexy combat systems and didn't do any baseline mechanical systems; it's killing us on the primary and auxiliary mechanical systems, and we have thousands of obsolete items that are trying to be processed for replacement, with very little LCMM/procurement resources.