Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[Cloud Cover]

I can’t wait for the RCN response on this 240 billion dollar cost. Hoping they will explain and set the record straight.

I do however agree with Weinie about the shipyard contractors. The Irving’s are so grossly enriched by government contracts that it is obscene. It is graft on a Putin scale or worse because these contracts are essentially an invitation to larceny.

And from what I understand from a few people, the big money on labour costs is not in the shipyard but instead it is in corporate head office.

 

[Weinie]

Weine I have to challenge you on that, the AOPs is much bigger, twice the range, higher ice class, has a hanger. The only place it falls short in is armament.

Yup. Why does that cost more than twice as much?

NoCGV Svalbard - Wikipedia

 

[Stoker]

I can’t wait for the RCN response on this 240 billion dollar cost. Hoping they will explain and set the record straight.

I do however agree with Weinie about the shipyard contractors. The Irving’s are so grossly enriched by government contracts that it is obscene. It is graft on a Putin scale or worse because these contracts are essentially an invitation to larceny.

And from what I understand from a few people, the big money on labour costs is not in the shipyard but instead it is in corporate head office.

Yup. Why does that cost more than twice as much?

NoCGV Svalbard - Wikipedia

I have some experience with both classes of ships having both operated with and toured them.

Kund Rasmussan Class

-Less ice breaking capability as HDW
-One trick pony, only operates in the Arctic not capable of warm water deployments
-One shaft line verses the HDW's two
-Flight deck, no hanger
-Can only operate up to a 3 weeks at a time at sea and heavily dependent on shore support, HDW capable of operating with minimal support for up to 4 months away.

NoCGV Svalbard
-69M according to Wikipedia if you can believe that because that's the only place on the internet where its mentioned, there is a note saying that the price doesn't include a helo or a radar. If you are to believe the figure in todays dollars with exchange about 128M Cdn a ship. Again does that include two jetties,( one in Esquimalt, one in Halifax(, a naval refueling jetty in the Arctic, training the crews, Intellectual property rights, initial spares, maintenance for X years, and sales tax. like HDW?
-HDW has a higher ice rating than Svalbard
-Svalbard other than the hull is a pretty bare bones ship designed to carry out many of the duties the CCG and fisheries. HDW brings many other capabilities and is a nicer ship.
-So yes the HDW is more expensive, but really its a very different ship internally.

 

[Stoker]

I can’t wait for the RCN response on this 240 billion dollar cost. Hoping they will explain and set the record straight.

I do however agree with Weinie about the shipyard contractors. The Irving’s are so grossly enriched by government contracts that it is obscene. It is graft on a Putin scale or worse because these contracts are essentially an invitation to larceny.

And from what I understand from a few people, the big money on labour costs is not in the shipyard but instead it is in corporate head office.

Irving like any other shipyard was guaranteed a certain amount of profits. The money and where it goes is tracked by the government if I'm not mistaken. Its not like they're stealing it.

 

[Weinie]

Irving like any other shipyard was guaranteed a certain amount of profits. The money and where it goes is tracked by the government if I'm not mistaken. Its not like they're stealing it.

Don't know your source for this, but do you not see a problem here?

 

[Underway]

Most G20 nations do not buy their ships domestically, AFAIK, only the UK has a legislated buy in the UK mandate. US recently bought FREMM variant for latest frigates.

Incorrect. UK just did exactly what we did. Bought a Danish design and are building it in their own yards. US just bought a French design and are building it in their own yards. We bought a UK design and are building in our own yards. Australia same thing. Of the G20 nations the ones that build most (if not all) of their ships domestically are Canada, China, US, UK, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Germany, UK, France, Turkey, Australia, South Korea, Italy, and India.

The only countries that don't are Brazil (which builds some small ones), Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and maybe South Africa (don't actually know on this one).

European Union is considered a G20 nation as well which is odd. Of the EU the Danes, Dutch, Polish, Romanians, Spanish, Greeks, Sweeds and Belgians build their own ships.

So by my calculation, that's at a minimum 3/4 of the G20 build their own warships. And if you count the EU and Brazil as partials then even more.

Why do they do this when almost all of them could outsource? Votes and... Strategic Capability.

No, it is not a Goc Strategic project. There is no strategic capability derived here. Irving and Saint John Shipyard are a permanent fixture only because they have been supported for the last 40 years, without GoC support, the penny-pinchers at Irving would have shut them down a long time ago.

The strategic capability derived here is that we have the expertise to build our own ships. In a conflict, we can replace and repair our losses. We can keep fighting even if we lose ships. Which to use your bold text is a strategic capability. And a critical one at that!

Without that capability, we would be in a come as you are situation until we learned how to build ships again. We've all seen with COVID the issues of learning as you go and not having the correct infrastructure in place for production. It's easier to ramp up than it is to start from scratch.

Having the technical expertise not just inherent within the shipyards but in the entire naval infrastructure with all the ancillary companies that support the shipyards (such as with equipment designed and made in Canada) means that any contractors we hire are from Canada, providing an increased availability rate for the ships. This is a strategic capability. Increased availability means we can keep ships repaired and maintained, and then of course on the water doing what they are supposed to do.

It's so important the government is willing to spend political capital to ensure it exists. There are few votes to be gotten in a small regional area here. As a matter of fact, there may be more votes to be lost (see Davie being frozen out).

Well Danish Rasmussen class cost considerably less, and is considerably more capable than AOPS. Apples to Audi maybe

I think other posts here have thoroughly debunked this statement already.

 

[Weinie]

Most G20 nations do not buy their ships domestically, AFAIK, only the UK has a legislated buy in the UK mandate. US recently bought FREMM variant for latest frigates.

Incorrect. (You might want to re-read the key word in my post) UK just did exactly what we did. Bought a Danish design and are building it in their own yards. US just bought a French design and are building it in their own yards. We bought a UK design and are building in our own yards. Australia same thing. Of the G20 nations the ones that build most (if not all) of their ships domestically are Canada, China, (steal IP, then build domestically, frowned upon in diplomatic circles, but very strategic) US, UK, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Germany, UK, France, Turkey, Australia, South Korea, Italy, and India.

The only countries that don't are Brazil (which builds some small ones), Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and maybe South Africa (don't actually know on this one).

European Union is considered a G20 nation as well which is odd. Of the EU the Danes, Dutch, Polish, Romanians, Spanish, Greeks, Sweeds and Belgians build their own ships.

So by my calculation, that's at a minimum 3/4 of the G20 build their own warships. And if you count the EU and Brazil as partials then even more.

Why do they do this when almost all of them could outsource? Votes and... Strategic Capability.


The strategic capability derived here is that we have the expertise to build our own ships. In a conflict, we can replace and repair our losses. (At the current projected rate of delivery of 1.5 ships per year , how will this replace any predicted losses.....do you expect an adversary to wait while we build new ones?) We can keep fighting even if we lose ships. (Until we run out of ships.) Which to use your bold text is a strategic capability. And a critical one at that! (see my last comment)

Without that capability, we would be in a come as you are situation until we learned how to build ships again. (No, we buy offshore) We've all seen with COVID the issues of learning as you go and not having the correct infrastructure in place for production. It's easier to ramp up than it is to start from scratch.

Having the technical expertise not just inherent within the shipyards but in the entire naval infrastructure with all the ancillary companies that support the shipyards (such as with equipment designed and made in Canada) means that any contractors we hire are from Canada, providing an increased availability rate for the ships. This is a strategic capability. No, it is a make work project under the guise of a strategic capability. Increased availability means we can keep ships repaired and maintained, and then of course on the water doing what they are supposed to do.

It's so important the government is willing to spend political capital to ensure it exists. There are few votes to be gotten in a small regional area here. As a matter of fact, there may be more votes to be lost (see Davie being frozen out). (Really? Did you see the last voter distribution from the 2019 election? Davie was never a player in the Quebec vote, the NDP suffered massive losses that allowed the BQ to become resurgent. In Irvings' Atlantic Canada, where pork barreling has become the preferred lifestyle for most, (and I say this with both disgust and some degree of authority because I am from there), the Liberals scored big, allowing them to form a minority government.)



I think other posts here have thoroughly debunked this statement already. (Did we get twice the capability for more than twice the money? If not, money was poorly spent.)

Being strategic involves more than inward looking vote-chasing navel gazing.

 

[Stoker]

Don't know your source for this, but do you not see a problem here?

Well all the yards brought on to the NSS is not going to do it for free as they are profit oriented businesses. If anything the actions by the government to give more work and money to the yards due to delays ensure they will make a profit.

 

[Uzlu]

Most G20 nations do not buy their ships domestically, AFAIK, only the UK has a legislated buy in the UK mandate. US recently bought FREMM variant for latest frigates.

Which G20 nations do not buy their ships domestically? Which G20 nations do not buy their frigates domestically? Egypt and Morocco bought FREMM frigates. Are you perhaps suggesting that the United States, like Egypt and Morocco, also bought FREMM frigates? Or did the United States only pay for the right to use the FREMM hull and propulsion machinery and have American companies supply the weapons, sensors, electronics, computers, software, etc. and have the frigates—unlike Egypt and Morocco—built domestically in the United States instead of in France or Italy?

Being strategic involves more than inward looking vote-chasing navel gazing.

The Cambridge Dictionary defines strategic as helping to achieve a plan, for example in business or politics.

“The National Shipbuilding Strategy is a long-term project to renew Canada's federal fleet of combat and non-combat vessels. We formed partnerships with 2 Canadian shipyards to deliver much-needed vessels to the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. The strategy provides economic benefits to Canadians and rebuilds our country’s shipbuilding industry.”

If being strategic involves more than inward looking vote-chasing navel gazing, what, specifically, does it involve?

 

[Weinie]

Which G20 nations do not buy their ships domestically? Which G20 nations do not buy their frigates domestically? Egypt and Morocco bought FREMM frigates. Are you perhaps suggesting that the United States, like Egypt and Morocco, also bought FREMM frigates? Or did the United States only pay for the right to use the FREMM hull and propulsion machinery and have American companies supply the weapons, sensors, electronics, computers, software, etc. and have the frigates—unlike Egypt and Morocco—built domestically in the United States instead of in France or Italy?

The Cambridge Dictionary defines strategic as helping to achieve a plan, for example in business or politics.

“The National Shipbuilding Strategy is a long-term project to renew Canada's federal fleet of combat and non-combat vessels. We formed partnerships with 2 Canadian shipyards to deliver much-needed vessels to the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. The strategy provides economic benefits to Canadians and rebuilds our country’s shipbuilding industry.”

If being strategic involves more than inward looking vote-chasing navel gazing, what, specifically, does it involve?

Strategic thinking competencies​

1. Systems perspective, refers to being able to understand implications of strategic actions. "A strategic thinker has a mental model of the complete end-to-end system of value creation, his or her role within it, and an understanding of the competencies it contains."
2. Intent focused which means more determined and less distractible than rivals in the marketplace. "the focus that allows individuals within an organization to marshal and leverage their energy, to focus attention, to resist distraction, and to concentrate for as long as it takes to achieve a goal."
3. Thinking in time means being able to hold past, present and future in mind at the same time to create better decision making and speed implementation. "Strategy is not driven by future intent alone. It is the gap between today’s reality and intent for the future that is critical." Scenario planning is a practical application for incorporating "thinking in time" into strategy making.
4. Hypothesis driven, ensuring that both creative and critical thinking are incorporated into strategy making. This competency explicitly incorporates the scientific method into strategic thinking.
5. Intelligent opportunism, which means being responsive to good opportunities. "The dilemma involved in using a well-articulated strategy to channel organisational efforts effectively and efficiently must always be balanced against the risks of losing sight of alternative strategies better suited to a changing environment."

 

[Navy_Pete]

So a few things, I said most of the G20 has a domestic shipbuilding industry; not sure why you are limiting that to just who 'buys' the design internally. For clarity, a lot of the G20 is currently licensing a design for frigate/destroyer projects, then generally has a designer working on it to customize it to their needs and do the system integration, but they are still doing the majority of the actual ship building activities in country. And in some cases, they are still doing a lot of the design for other ships in country (or in the case of Egypt, actually does the design and build for some small boats and ships in their own Navy yard). Subs are the exception, with very few countries actually building them, and most buying them from someone else.

Secondly, expecting the politicians at the front end to be doing strategic thinking is naive. But had the privilege of spending a while talking to the people responsible for the NSPS, and it was definitely done with the specific intent of having two competent shipyards able to supply domestic needs to have a long term capability of Canada being able to actually build it's own ships. It took about 10 years and JSS failed procurement before they got enough of the mandarins onside, but strategic planning within the government happens within organizations, not from the top down.

That's why there was insistence that the shipyards modernized bot the facilities as well as the design and build processes (ie Target State) in an effort to 'future proof' things so they would have comparable facilities and be doing the same kind of modular build and design processes that other leading yards are (with an assumption that the processes and whatnot are continued to be incrementally improved over time). Basically, NSS starts out as a big step change, which is why both yards had a few years of facility renos and adopted a lot of the 3D design, updated software, modular build and similar (over the old build from the keel up method, or build in a few mega blocks).

Future work wasn't part of it, but CCG is pretty rusted out, so lots of work there, and might make more sense to sell off the first flight of CSCs and build new then do a midlife (or maybe a different class that uses some kind of propulsion that doesn't run on diesel; who knows where we'll be in 2040?)

Wrt cost comparison, the link to the PBO one for AOPS is below. The hard part is that no one includes the same things in their cost, and it's pretty typical for other governments to only include the cost of the hull (for example, the USN projects typically don't include any combat gear as that's all GSM, so they are usually billions less). The huge numbers you see in the papers has the build costs, spares, design, infrastructure, training and a few other things, plus contingency planning all all sorts of other things that no one else includes in press releases.

We knew going into NSS that there would be a learning curve in the design/build, which we see when you compare the actual work hours between ships (see fig 4-2 in the PBO report for an example). Over the long term, will see the same thing for things like running trials, designing ships etc, but honestly we'll probably take about a decade of actual building and multiple ships delivered before you can really make a fair comparison, and if you really want to do that, you need to get the actual data from a comparable countries shipbuilding project (maybe RAN?) and also understand the contract clauses to match the context. For example, we may have a whack of overhead related to government reporting requirements that you wouldn't see elsewhere, and that should be teased out as something specific to GoC procurement (and not a shipyard efficiency issue).

http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/files/files/AOPS_EN.pdf

 

[Navy_Pete]

Irving like any other shipyard was guaranteed a certain amount of profits. The money and where it goes is tracked by the government if I'm not mistaken. Its not like they're stealing it.

Not really; both shipyards were guaranteed the scope of work in the combat/non-combat packages respectively. They were required to upgrade the shipyards on their own dime, so they wanted guarantees that if the GoC did something like cancel a ship project or cut down the number of ships, the work would either get replaced with something of equivalent value, or pay back a prorated portion of what they were out of pocket for the hundreds of millions in infrastructure upgrades. Because the NSS covered multiple projects, it's just a form of cancellation penalties as part of the agreement.

For profits, there was no guarantee. They built in whatever they thought was a reasonable profit in the initial bid during the competition. After that, there is a whole process for every new phase where they propose and we review. We bring in some outside consultants to review the level of effort to make sure that's reasonable. Typically we have profit margin caps (but not a floor). So if we both agree that something will take 20 hours at an agreed rate, and they can find some efficiencies and get it done in 16, then they can keep the extra. If it takes them 24 hours, then they eat the difference. Bit of a simplification, but that's generally how it works (in most contracts generally).

Not a fan of Irving in general, but honestly the shipbuilding division isn't anywhere near as bad as the refit side (totally different management and approach). A lot of the stupidity is on our side as well as a customer, so not really the fault of Irving or Seaspan if there are project delays or cost increases if we are late defining requirements, do last minute changes, and otherwise impact the schedule. For context, there are something like four or five different departments in the key group of NSS executives with multiple levels of decision via committees with no one single department responsible, so we do a lot of stuff to ourselves.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think for the NSPS to be successful in the long run is for for both the RCN and the CCG to not hold onto ships for as long, I suspect there are some good numbers out there as to when a ship reaches a point where the maintenance costs starts to outweigh the value. Having a replacement coming on line before it gets to that point, means we may be able to sell the ship to a friendly nation to recover some costs or mothball the ship as a spare in case of loss or parts needed.
So perhaps the CSC spends 15 years active duty, 2 years hot layup with a team trying to sell it, then mothball for 5 years. It's replacement is started at the 14 year mark coming online as it predecessor sits in hot layup in case of delays. Between the two fleets, that means both yards will be in almost continuous build mode, abet a a slow rate.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I think the hard part for us would be figuring out any IP/security transfer. Probably easier to another NATO country, but we'd have to get permission from the US state department for any ITAR item, plus navigate the same for another other countries gear so would probably be a 5+year process to sell them off. Probably would make sense to strip a bunch of gear off but some stuff would be pretty hard to do.

Think after CSC probably would be a gap for combatants, but there is enough CCG stuff to keep all the yards busy for a while. Even though they aren't as complex, would keep the bulk of the workers employed. I'll be long retired by then though, so figure that's someone else's problem to figure out. Who knows what things will look like then?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Had the NSPS started 20 years ago, it would be paying off now, except we have to many ships currently that desperately need replacing all at once. We almost lost a buoy tender due to flooding caused by hull corrosion.

 

[FJAG]

I've been quietly following this thread for a while and, not being a sailor, have no particular dog in the hunt but make the following observations:

1. The price per ship seems a bit high but not so high that I'm offended by it. That's one of the downside of doing the build locally but at the same time it keeps the much of the money circulating in Canada;
2. I think having shipyards capable of building naval craft domestically is critical to Canada's defence capabilities as others have argued above. Wish it wasn't the Irvings but that also is the price of doing business in Canada because the options are limited;
3. The downstream $240 billion is also a bit of a misdirecting number (like it was/is for the F35). The amount might be true once you add in all the crew cost and other general operations and maintenance cost but that's not a great delta from what we would pay if we kept the same number of CPFs operating for the next 40 years (if that's even technically possible). Basically it's probably the largest part of the overall cost for the entire Navy. For me the issue is how much of that $240 billion is the year to year difference between the current Navy and the proposed Navy and why is there a difference, if any. Let's face it, $240 billion over 40 years is $5.1 billion per year averaged out (but I expect low running to very high in the final years) which is not an unreasonable cost for these ships. Now the subs on the other hand - someone is going to have to explain to me why we keep those tubs at all;
4. IMHO much of the operating cost is based on full-time crew and shore support salaries. How can we reduce those? I note that there is often a difference from frigate to frigate as to the manning required from a low as 120 to over 200. How much can the systems be tuned to be more automated and thus requiring less manning and therefore less expensive to operate (and yes, I do know that they operate 24/7 (I can still recite the watches and bells from my days at CFOCS Venture );
5. Does every ship need to be crewed by full-time crews or can we keep a few (let's say four) to be crewed by a hybrid full-time / part-time crew (Those would be needed only for short periods for training and therefore could be cycled through with the full-time crewed ones for maintenance. As far as I can see we have only one hard full-time commitment (Op Reassurance) and a number of more minor and discretionary ones that seem doable during training exercises or by other vessels than a fully-staffed CSC (such as fisheries, drugs, international exercises/visits, etc). Essentially, if we reduce the number of ships needed to be fully manned and deployed at any given time we reduce crew fatigue, improve cyclical maintenance and reduce large downstream operations costs.; and
6. If we're having problems manning the ships we have now, maybe we should give point 5 above some really, really serious thought

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Some hard lessons have been learned about damage control, that's why they need a fair sized crew for when thing go wrong, like the Norwegians found out. Even BC Ferries runs a larger crew than their Washington State counterparts mainly to operate the life saving equipment and fire fighting.

 

[Stoker]

Not really; both shipyards were guaranteed the scope of work in the combat/non-combat packages respectively. They were required to upgrade the shipyards on their own dime, so they wanted guarantees that if the GoC did something like cancel a ship project or cut down the number of ships, the work would either get replaced with something of equivalent value, or pay back a prorated portion of what they were out of pocket for the hundreds of millions in infrastructure upgrades. Because the NSS covered multiple projects, it's just a form of cancellation penalties as part of the agreement.

For profits, there was no guarantee. They built in whatever they thought was a reasonable profit in the initial bid during the competition. After that, there is a whole process for every new phase where they propose and we review. We bring in some outside consultants to review the level of effort to make sure that's reasonable. Typically we have profit margin caps (but not a floor). So if we both agree that something will take 20 hours at an agreed rate, and they can find some efficiencies and get it done in 16, then they can keep the extra. If it takes them 24 hours, then they eat the difference. Bit of a simplification, but that's generally how it works (in most contracts generally).

Not a fan of Irving in general, but honestly the shipbuilding division isn't anywhere near as bad as the refit side (totally different management and approach). A lot of the stupidity is on our side as well as a customer, so not really the fault of Irving or Seaspan if there are project delays or cost increases if we are late defining requirements, do last minute changes, and otherwise impact the schedule. For context, there are something like four or five different departments in the key group of NSS executives with multiple levels of decision via committees with no one single department responsible, so we do a lot of stuff to ourselves.

Thank you for the clarification, kind of sick of all the comments suggesting Irving is somehow driving truckloads of money out back at midnight for these builds.

 

[FSTO]

I've been quietly following this thread for a while and, not being a sailor, have no particular dog in the hunt but make the following observations:

1. The price per ship seems a bit high but not so high that I'm offended by it. That's one of the downside of doing the build locally but at the same time it keeps the much of the money circulating in Canada;

The price is really not bad after you spread it out over the year. We should be easily able to calculate the yearly cost of running a Halifax Class Frigate and give the public a real sense of how much the Navy costs to run.

2. I think having shipyards capable of building naval craft domestically is critical to Canada's defence capabilities as others have argued above. Wish it wasn't the Irvings but that also is the price of doing business in Canada because the options are limited;

The US is having the same issue with the lack of repair and shipbuilding yards which is impacting their ability to conduct proper PM on their ships .

3. The downstream $240 billion is also a bit of a misdirecting number (like it was/is for the F35). The amount might be true once you add in all the crew cost and other general operations and maintenance cost but that's not a great delta from what we would pay if we kept the same number of CPFs operating for the next 40 years (if that's even technically possible). Basically it's probably the largest part of the overall cost for the entire Navy. For me the issue is how much of that $240 billion is the year to year difference between the current Navy and the proposed Navy and why is there a difference, if any. Let's face it, $240 billion over 40 years is $5.1 billion per year averaged out (but I expect low running to very high in the final years) which is not an unreasonable cost for these ships.

Agree

4. Now the subs on the other hand - someone is going to have to explain to me why we keep those tubs at all;

The submarines are a massive force multiplier, yes they have been a millstone but once we lose the capability we'll never get it back. We just need to be smarter when we get the replacements.

5. IMHO much of the operating cost is based on full-time crew and shore support salaries. How can we reduce those? I note that there is often a difference from frigate to frigate as to the manning required from a low as 120 to over 200. How much can the systems be tuned to be more automated and thus requiring less manning and therefore less expensive to operate (and yes, I do know that they operate 24/7 (I can still recite the watches and bells from my days at CFOCS Venture );

We've (and other Navies) have all tried to find the holy grail of Minimum Manned Ships. The latest case is the USN LCS fiasco. We've pretty much reached peak efficiency for a warship (merchant ships may be a different matter) especially in regards to Damage Control that can happen at any time of peace as well as at war. Just ask any sailor from HMS Nottingham if they would have survived without the number of crew they had onboard. https://www.professionalmariner.com...y heavy-lift ship back to Britain for repairs.

6. Does every ship need to be crewed by full-time crews or can we keep a few (let's say four) to be crewed by a hybrid full-time / part-time crew (Those would be needed only for short periods for training and therefore could be cycled through with the full-time crewed ones for maintenance. As far as I can see we have only one hard full-time commitment (Op Reassurance) and a number of more minor and discretionary ones that seem doable during training exercises or by other vessels than a fully-staffed CSC (such as fisheries, drugs, international exercises/visits, etc). Essentially, if we reduce the number of ships needed to be fully manned and deployed at any given time we reduce crew fatigue, improve cyclical maintenance and reduce large downstream operations costs.;

We already do this with ships in low-readiness and while in refit. There is no real savings there except maybe in fuel and food. Planned Maintenance (PM) still has to happen. Also don't forget Artemis, Neon, Carribbe, Nanook, fish pats, sovpats, etc.

7. If we're having problems manning the ships we have now, maybe we should give point 5 above some really, really serious thought

There is some interesting reading in the RCN P&T SharePoint regarding manning, recruiting, retention and the abuse of TCATS. Maybe a form of National Service is in order, I found out New Years Eve that the Norwegians still have National Service for their military. One thing is that they have a pretty good culling system to get the deadwood out before they even get close to signing up.

 

[Good2Golf]

FJAG and FSTO, I’m pretty much in your camp, re: what actually is reasonable and what the (PBO) numbers do, or likely do represent. Canada typically cost in everything...everything...so it makes a good target for “oh my gosh, it’s so much more expensive doing it here than elsewhere” analyses. I’ve been directly involved in programs where the PBO numbers for sure were notably higher than the reality that was borne out in program implementation, but the fact that Canada costs high, versus low, is actually reassuring to some degree. People love to quote open-source costs to justify why Canada is so much more costly and for lesser value, but as several have noted, it’s often an apple to toasters comparison, unit prices being conveniently peeled out of greater programmatic costs amd them simply multiplied in a facile arithmetical manner. Life doesn’t work that way, certainly not in defence procurement unless you have the luxury of being able to negotiate a firm, fixed-price no additional costs contract. Unicorns carrying gold-carrying leprechauns are more plentiful than such contracts as these.

As well, one doesn’t have to be a fan of Maynard Keynes to appreciate the concept of Expenditure Multiplication, in short, money spent inside an economy will tend to recycle within that economy with a certain loss rate (Keynes used Marginal Propensity to Save, MPS and its inverse Marginal Propensity to Consume, MPC) to explain how an investment by a government into the GDP would have a notably larger effect on GDP than just a unitary augmentation. Depending on MOs (or MPC), the effect could result in many times more benefit to the country’s GDP than the initial/first-order investment. Money spent offshore doesn’t even provide a first-order contribution to a nation’s own GDP.

All to say, this or 40-50B for F-35s for 25-30 years is money I’d be quite happy to have my taxes go towards. In the same period as CSC has been costed, Canada will spend over $1,716B on direct payments to Canadians for EI, CPP and OAS and the like (based on 25-years of DESD expenditures extrapolated from the GoC’s 2020/2021 Main Estimates). Heck, in the same period, we’ll have spent $198.5B on administering the Canadian Revenue Agency...more to bring in taxes than provide the core maritime capability of the nation’s defences.

So I’m happy to have our money stay in Canada and be spent in a manner that ensures the GDP value of recursive cash flow also remains primarily in Canada, and that compare to other Govermnent expenditures over the same period, is actually rather decent value IMO.




regards
G2G