Of the equipment, doctrinal and formation failures in the Ukraine war, using para and air mobile units (as para or airmobile units) are probably top 2. All the air mobile units from both sides are being rerolled into proper mechanized formations. Para should be reserved for SOF and that's it. Because air mobile units are dead before arrival in that kind of air denial environment.
The Canadian Arctic enters the chatNeither Russia nor Ukraine has a history of effective use of either of those.
While for LSCO’s in high threat areas they definitely need to operate on the periphery, the mobility and flexibility they do offer is hard to beat.
More importantly for areas of low AD threat especially in the competition arena before conflict the ability to insert forces with speed and shock that other means do not.
Yes! Airborne tanks!Sorry for my last two posts.
Didn't mean to feed an ongoing highjack of a thread about tanks with paras.
Back to your regular tank programming.
Why? Para is a nice change from the thread being highjacked for an Army Organization discussion!Sorry for my last two posts.
Didn't mean to feed an ongoing highjack of a thread about tanks with paras.
Back to your regular tank programming.
I keep getting confused as to why all these Reserve Restructuring threads get given such strange names...Why? Para is a nice change from the thread being highjacked for an Army Organization discussion!
Maybe it's because any advancements in just about anything "army," needs a restructuring of the "army."I keep getting confused as to why all these Reserve Restructuring threads get given such strange names...
2 bde would also make sense since the QoR is our only ARes jump infantry which could act as a feeder unit of augmentee's to a jump battalion. Benefit to is the QoR is the highest strength ARes unit in the country and is capable of a large amount of support to a reg force jump unit.
This tells the story
paratroops – The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada Regimental Museum and Archive
Posts about paratroops written by J.M. Stephensqormuseum.org
We haven’t even gotten around to toques, gloves, helmets and raincoats.I love there's been three or four attempts to get it back to tanks but everyone just keeps talking about restructuring and paratroopers lol. Army.ca as fuck.
Or SheepWe haven’t even gotten around to toques, gloves, helmets and raincoats.
Baaa !Or Sheep
Spot on-Maybe it's because any advancements in just about anything "army," needs a restructuring of the "army."
Not just "army reserve restructuring" - that's been proven a path to failure for over 70 years - but "army restructuring."
Back to "Canada's tanks."
Your numbers and general assessment seem accurate. I'm actually not too sure if that A4 number is including the few we sent to Ukraine so it could be even less. The only reason (from my understanding and what I've heard) they went 15 in Latvia was lack of tanks and the need for a full squadron at home for training - they need to Squadron level training to validate - especially for the OCs. Dire straits lately.Spot on-
Status quo Canada Tanks discussion @PrairieFella please correct me where wrong
We've got 74 tanks
- 20 A4M's- basically bastardized A7's with modern electronics, M armour package, but the L44 gun and a notch in the turret wedge armour module to allow for the old A4 sight placement
- 20 A6M's- have the L55 gun, no turrent notch, but a half generation behind electronically
- 34 A4's- obsolescent electronics/FCS, obsolescent hydraulic turret drive, maintenance hogs that we can't get parts for and leave crews needing conversion training to be current on the deployable tanks.
From which
We've got 15 A4M's deployed to Latvia- weird number, makes one think it was chosen due to hardware or crewing constraints, not a doctrinally justified number
20 A6M's undergoing (soon to be done?) an overhaul cycle
The domestic fleet being pulled apart with
- 3 (one of each variant) set aside for technical reference
- 3 (one of each variant) at Borden for the RCEME school
- ~12 (2x A4M, 2xA6m, 8A4 )at the armour school
the remainder (assuming A6's are back, 24 A4's, 1 A4M, 16 A6M with LdSH to try and generate rotational (1/2 with spare tanks? 3/4?) squadrons for Lativa
With no prospect of funding for meaningful change. No new tanks are coming, and if restructuring is out as a topic than the roto system is a lock. Not much to talk about.
Maybe some armchair quarterbacking about rearranging the deck chairs. Based on the information as I understand it, my deck chair rearranging would be: (once the A6M are out of overhaul)
Fin. Critics may proceed.
- to go to a full hybrid squadron to Latvia 10x A4M and 10A6M (need a spare or two)
- leave the 6 Tech Ref/RCEME tanks where they are
- collocate all remaining tanks to create a training pool of 32x A4, 8x A4M, 8xA6M
- organize all 3 Armoured Regiments as 1x LAV LRSS "Cavalry" Sqn, 2x Tank Squadron
- Give each Regiment 2x Squadrons of TAPV as ersatz tank trainers to play with at home
- Remaining 16 combat tanks (+2 A4's as place holders) used to work up the next rotational Latvia squadron
- 30 Remaining A4's shared on a schedule (fly in as necessary) between the remaining 4 squadrons to retain basic sub-unit tank proficiency
- Limp along in the this very suboptimal setup, building the case that we have 6x tank squadrons and should buy enough tanks to equip them when the time comes
I'm gullible and easily led astray.I love there's been three or four attempts to get it back to tanks but everyone just keeps talking about restructuring and paratroopers lol. Army.ca as fuck.
That, or is it just a reflection of a more fundamental problem facing the CA vs the RCAF/RCN...?I'm gullible and easily led astray.
Only weird by Brit/Cdn standards. Lots of countries (read America) have a 14 tank coy - three platoons of four each and a coy HQ of two. That said, I think your reasoning for not having a "full" squadron are probably correct. While I acknowledge that more is most often better and we compromise organizational principles far too often for fiscal reasons - the four gun M777 battery enters the chat - I think this is a good opportunity to review our tank squadron org and TTPs with the aim of having less tanks per squadron but more squadrons per brigade. Taking a troop out of each of three squadrons would, as an example form a squadron for a small brigade cavalry regiment or, provide for two tank heavy and two infantry heavy battle groups, etc.We've got 15 A4M's deployed to Latvia- weird number, makes one think it was chosen due to hardware or crewing constraints, not a doctrinally justified number
Others might disagree, but I think that there is a lot of truth in that.That, or is it just a reflection of a more fundamental problem facing the CA vs the RCAF/RCN...?
To understand we need to go back to the early Cold War - namely Suez. The cold war recce squadron was born out the passive surveillance tasks that came about in peacekeeping. Light armament, picket/bypass, lots of OPs, etc. The problem was this was a relic of Cold War peacekeeping, it's just too darned passive, especially when you consider a recce squadron had dozens of AFVs and over a hundred combat arms crewmen picketing and bypassing sections in the open.Sooo what does Cavalry do that Recce does not? I mean doctrinally. I'm just trying to understand this tank/armour role here.