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Canada's tanks

To what extent will commonality/ease of conversion play a role in shaping that "Medium capability/?" The thing that come to mind for me is the weapons system and it's relationship with crew complement / overall manning. How much additional training is there to convert from say an autocannon and ATGM set up to a traditional large bore gun, and how important will it be to maintain the 4 man crew? Would it be viable for the reserve augmentee system to provide the 19 loaders to a squadron converting for a tank deployment?

Also, while certainly no ringing endorsement these posts seem to be more open to the concept of an M10 type "light tank" in the medium slot relative to our conversation earlier in the year. Can I ask what's prompting that change? From your and McG's comments in August I was working on the assumption that an AFV in the weight band between LAV 6 and MBT was somewhat of a non-starter.
There will always be a training requirement when moving between platforms. At a minimum there are the individual training (courses) aspects related to actually operating the equipment. Then there are the individual training aspects related to tactics/employment. There can also be collective training aspects, especially when an entire element is converting between platforms.

I was initially trained on Cougars, using tank tactics. Over the summer of training and then ARes exercises I felt comfortable with "tank tactics." When I transferred to the Regular Force I went down in rank and had to take certain aspects of officer training again to learn the Leopard side. I did have some bad/unhelpful habits from Cougar days but I certainly felt well-prepared by those previous courses and exercises with respect to tactics.

As a Leopard C1 Troop Leader I had been trained at the Armour School on gunnery and tactics. I arrived at the Regiment "fully trained", although of course there was still lots of learning to be done. I was posted from the Sqn and when I returned as Battle Captain we had already converted to the Leopard C2. The gunnery aspects were sufficiently different to require me (and some other crew commanders) to take a fairly conversion course. While the improvement in gunnery was noticeable (amazing TI and much better accuracy on the move), this did not require a whole-sale revision of my tactics training. Our existing Collective Training cycle enabled me (and the other returning crew commanders) to acquire the nuances on the go.

I was the OC of a Recce Sqn that was going to convert to Leopard. My SSM and I were reading the battle and started to lay the groundwork two years out. None of the crew commanders or troop leaders had any tank training, so we started sneaking people on the Leopard Crew Commander Course at the School (we were in Gagetown). One year out we started getting all the CCs qualified to enable the conduct of our own courses. This process was deliberate and gradual. The crews could leverage some of their recce and Coyote training, but there was much work to be done.

To take a soldier from an ARes unit and train them for a tank position is absolutely possible (why wouldn't it be), and may be required as we start rolling rotations. It will take lead-time to allow for the conduct of courses followed by participation in the crew/troop/squadron training in Canada before they deploy.

The advantage of the Armoured Cavalry concept in the doctrine note is that the tactics training that leadership would have received in their career path would be common. This would not completely remove the requirement for tactics training going from say, a sqn equipped with LAV to a sqn equipped with Leopard 2, but it would flatten it to some extent. It certainly would be easier to drop in a few new CCs from a light squadron to a "heavy" squadron than to convert wholesale.

I am not sure how the concept of medium AFVs will pan out. I worry that medium can have the disadvantages of both without enough advantages. My preference would be to just have three more squadrons of tanks than have an additional family of vehicles. We'll just have to see.
 
Something better ;)

That I can use day or night without an active laser, so no intercept/detection possibility, and plugs directly into my comms.

But you probably won’t like the cost.

PLRFs aren’t CAT2.

There will always be a training requirement when moving between platforms. At a minimum there are the individual training (courses) aspects related to actually operating the equipment. Then there are the individual training aspects related to tactics/employment. There can also be collective training aspects, especially when an entire element is converting between platforms.

I was initially trained on Cougars, using tank tactics. Over the summer of training and then ARes exercises I felt comfortable with "tank tactics." When I transferred to the Regular Force I went down in rank and had to take certain aspects of officer training again to learn the Leopard side. I did have some bad/unhelpful habits from Cougar days but I certainly felt well-prepared by those previous courses and exercises with respect to tactics.

As a Leopard C1 Troop Leader I had been trained at the Armour School on gunnery and tactics. I arrived at the Regiment "fully trained", although of course there was still lots of learning to be done. I was posted from the Sqn and when I returned as Battle Captain we had already converted to the Leopard C2. The gunnery aspects were sufficiently different to require me (and some other crew commanders) to take a fairly conversion course. While the improvement in gunnery was noticeable (amazing TI and much better accuracy on the move), this did not require a whole-sale revision of my tactics training. Our existing Collective Training cycle enabled me (and the other returning crew commanders) to acquire the nuances on the go.

I was the OC of a Recce Sqn that was going to convert to Leopard. My SSM and I were reading the battle and started to lay the groundwork two years out. None of the crew commanders or troop leaders had any tank training, so we started sneaking people on the Leopard Crew Commander Course at the School (we were in Gagetown). One year out we started getting all the CCs qualified to enable the conduct of our own courses. This process was deliberate and gradual. The crews could leverage some of their recce and Coyote training, but there was much work to be done.

To take a soldier from an ARes unit and train them for a tank position is absolutely possible (why wouldn't it be), and may be required as we start rolling rotations. It will take lead-time to allow for the conduct of courses followed by participation in the crew/troop/squadron training in Canada before they deploy.

The advantage of the Armoured Cavalry concept in the doctrine note is that the tactics training that leadership would have received in their career path would be common. This would not completely remove the requirement for tactics training going from say, a sqn equipped with LAV to a sqn equipped with Leopard 2, but it would flatten it to some extent. It certainly would be easier to drop in a few new CCs from a light squadron to a "heavy" squadron than to convert wholesale.

I am not sure how the concept of medium AFVs will pan out. I worry that medium can have the disadvantages of both without enough advantages. My preference would be to just have three more squadrons of tanks than have an additional family of vehicles. We'll just have to see.

I was reading this and was wondering what your thoughts, having been a reservists and now employed in the training side, as to the viability of re rolling reserve units in close proximity to the tanks to “crew augmentation” regiments with a heavy emphasis on using the existing sims, and falling in on tanks already in the field on exercise. I’d see something like during Steele Sabre the LdSH take a Saturday and Sunday off while a reserve Tp or two take over their tanks. On parade nights the reservists simply show up and use the Sim or conduct some maintenance (much like elves helping out a cobbler).
 
PLRFs aren’t CAT2.
If you ever come to VA I have a toy to show you ;)


I was reading this and was wondering what your thoughts, having been a reservists and now employed in the training side, as to the viability of re rolling reserve units in close proximity to the tanks to “crew augmentation” regiments with a heavy emphasis on using the existing sims, and falling in on tanks already in the field on exercise. I’d see something like during Steele Sabre the LdSH take a Saturday and Sunday off while a reserve Tp or two take over their tanks. On parade nights the reservists simply show up and use the Sim or conduct some maintenance (much like elves helping out a cobbler).
Most of the NG Armor unit have simulator banks at the local armories. The tanks are stored at the Camp/Ft that the unit is ‘based’ out of, but outside active drill periods aren’t really used by the units, and maintenance is conducted by Active Guard personnel and Contractors.

I personally don’t see the point of training Armourer Reservists - unless Canada is willing to actually get those units (at least some) tanks.
 
PLRFs aren’t CAT2.



I was reading this and was wondering what your thoughts, having been a reservists and now employed in the training side, as to the viability of re rolling reserve units in close proximity to the tanks to “crew augmentation” regiments with a heavy emphasis on using the existing sims, and falling in on tanks already in the field on exercise. I’d see something like during Steele Sabre the LdSH take a Saturday and Sunday off while a reserve Tp or two take over their tanks. On parade nights the reservists simply show up and use the Sim or conduct some maintenance (much like elves helping out a cobbler).
I think there is something to be said for rolling any ARes units into Reg F units that are geo-located with them.
 
I am not sure how the concept of medium AFVs will pan out. I worry that medium can have the disadvantages of both without enough advantages. My preference would be to just have three more squadrons of tanks than have an additional family of vehicles. We'll just have to see.
Thank-you very much for taking the time to respond in detail.

Let's say that there's a hard cap on 3 squadrons in tanks. Gun to head, somewhat blank cheque, free hand to choose the vehicle(s) - 6 squadrons of a new light AFV (what is it), or three squadrons of the same light vehicle and 3 squadrons of medium (what is it)?
 
If you ever come to VA I have a toy to show you ;)

JIMCompact? They’re purchased already for us. The rest of the CAF is in the Stone Age but we’re like mid bronze at least.

Most of the NG Armor unit have simulator banks at the local armories. The tanks are stored at the Camp/Ft that the unit is ‘based’ out of, but outside active drill periods aren’t really used by the units, and maintenance is conducted by Active Guard personnel and Contractors.

I personally don’t see the point of training Armourer Reservists - unless Canada is willing to actually get those units (at least some) tanks.

My end goal would be to sell the armouries in Edmonton and have them work out of the base all the time. But that takes us to the dark reserve restructure place.

I think there is something to be said for rolling any ARes units into Reg F units that are geo-located with them.

I would agree, and directly tasking to support can have some good relationship building so the augmentee isn’t “that reservist” it’s “the guy I worked with last month.” Edmonton and Val are uniquely suited for that I think.
 
Thank-you very much for taking the time to respond in detail.

Let's say that there's a hard cap on 3 squadrons in tanks. Gun to head, somewhat blank cheque, free hand to choose the vehicle(s) - 6 squadrons of a new light AFV (what is it), or three squadrons of the same light vehicle and 3 squadrons of medium (what is it)?
An interesting thought exercise. I think I would only want the three fleets if the light and medium were the same chassis with the same powertrain etc. Which might be a non-starter.

Would I take nine squadrons of M10s instead of three squadrons of Leo2s and six squadrons of LAV Recce/LRSS? I don't think so, but some of my colleagues would likely disagree with me on that.
 
If one has a tool to passively get a 16 fig grid ref for a target and relay it directly, that’s significantly better than a guy with a Vector23 LRF linked to gps sending direction and distance, which is vastly better than someone trying to distill a 6figure grid and then spending time and ammo adjusting.
Until freqs blocked.
 
I think there is something to be said for rolling any ARes units into Reg F units that are geo-located with them.
Was tried in Ont. Several London based units supposidly melded with 1RCR. Lasted about 5 mos, then ignored.
 
An interesting thought exercise. I think I would only want the three fleets if the light and medium were the same chassis with the same powertrain etc. Which might be a non-starter.
What would that look like, something like LAV Recce with baseline armour for light, LAV 105/ 35+ATGM fully uparmoured for medium?

Would I take nine squadrons of M10s instead of three squadrons of Leo2s and six squadrons of LAV Recce/LRSS? I don't think so, but some of my colleagues would likely disagree with me on that.
Could I take that to mean that my whole "walks like a tank, talks like a tank, probably a better tank than the C2, without all of the logistical/infrastructure challenges of full MBT weight" line of thought is not unique to me?

Continuation of the exercise with option 3- the hypothetical 9 squadrons of M10's are downgraded to 9 squadrons of LAV-105/ Canadianized type 16 MCV (~30 tonne, 4 man turret w/ 105mm high velocity, STANAG 6 protection), but you get 2+ squadrons worth of MBT in Europe (1 rotationally deployed, 1 fly over, +~10 war stock/ replacements) and one squadrons worth for work up in Canada. Better?
 
Just as a matter of interest, what ranges in Canada are currently capable of handling the live firing of the Leopard (including with target practice rounds)?

:unsure:
 
Just as a matter of interest, what ranges in Canada are currently capable of handling the live firing of the Leopard (including with target practice rounds)?

:unsure:
Off memory:

Suffield
Wainwright
Shilo
Petawawa
Gagetown

Valcartier- I am not sure about.
Dundurn would be theoretically possible with TPT, but pretty limited.
 
Was tried in Ont. Several London based units supposidly melded with 1RCR. Lasted about 5 mos, then ignored.
Likely they wanted everything to work right away, did not adapt at all to the schedule the Reservist have to follow. Doing this is a long term commitment and development thing. Something that will have to last beyond one persons posting. Also the Reserve unit needs to equipped better than the average unit and that equipment needs to be prioritized for their Ops tasking and not a pool for the Brigade to steal from. I suspect neither the Reg side or the Res side put the time and effort in to make it work. Someone who is smart and does not have a horse in the race needs to lay down the rules to both sides to make this work. Other nations do this on a regular basis. Once you have a working system, then the Reserve side starts to increase it's contribution by opening slots to the rest of the Brigade and then to other units across the country to provide bodies.
 
Was tried in Ont. Several London based units supposidly melded with 1RCR. Lasted about 5 mos, then ignored.
I joined the ARes in London in 1989. There was something called "Strike Company", which I thought was a WWF tag-team but was actually a grouping of Militia folks from a number of units around London that tried to train on AVGP provided by 1 RCR. They were not part of 1 RCR - but were rather meant to be a "ready reserve" taking advantage of proximity to a Reg F unit. Like many well-intentioned ideas there was some success but it fell by the wayside.

What I was thinking of was simply rolling the Edmonton/Calgary-based armoured militia units into the LdSH. 21 EW Regt in Kingston is something like that and while there are always issues it is also a successful model to think about. Difference with 21 EW, though, is that the ARes component grew organically without the baggage of history/guidons/etc.

Anyhoo.
 
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