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Or, form various committees, develop options, set up project offices, study, post new people in, study, post new people in........
C3 Howitzer Replacement
- Thread starter MattGotts
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Loch Sloy!
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https://www.janes.com/article/85098/brazilian-army-looks-to-replace-its-105-mm-towed-howitzers
Colin Parkinson
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If we were smart, we would equip the Reserves with M119, this would make them an excellent training tool for Reserve gunners as it uses the same fire control as the reg force M777. In fact the School could also use them for the basic gunnery course. We are sadly not smart.
From Wiki
L119
The L119 variant has a different barrel (a slightly shorter L20 ordnance with a percussion firing mechanism) for firing the ubiquitous US M1 type ammunition (UK 105 mm How), giving the gun a max range of 11,400 metres (12,500 yd).[7] In British service, the L119 was used only for training at the Royal School of Artillery while stocks of 105 mm How lasted, and the last British L119s were retired in 2005. However, the L119 is popular with many export customers who still rely on M1 ammunition.
M119
Main article: M119 howitzer
The L119 was further modified and produced under licence for the United States Army. The most recent version is the M119A3 introduced in 2013 with a digital fire-control system and GPS-aided inertial navigation unit using software derived from the M777A2.
From Wiki
L119
The L119 variant has a different barrel (a slightly shorter L20 ordnance with a percussion firing mechanism) for firing the ubiquitous US M1 type ammunition (UK 105 mm How), giving the gun a max range of 11,400 metres (12,500 yd).[7] In British service, the L119 was used only for training at the Royal School of Artillery while stocks of 105 mm How lasted, and the last British L119s were retired in 2005. However, the L119 is popular with many export customers who still rely on M1 ammunition.
M119
Main article: M119 howitzer
The L119 was further modified and produced under licence for the United States Army. The most recent version is the M119A3 introduced in 2013 with a digital fire-control system and GPS-aided inertial navigation unit using software derived from the M777A2.
FJAG
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This M119 would be one of several options if Canada actually had a plan to make use of the reserves as an expansion of our combat capability rather than as mere "hole-fillers" in existing regular force units. It doesn't. The mere fact that the fire control system would ensure our reservists are more capable of transitioning to M777's isn't enough to justify the cost for our bean counters.
We have for many decades now spent untold wealth in building a vast bureaucracy to merely administer ourselves rather than building a more lethal force. I don't see that changing. I hope we never have a need to use the little that we have in earnest against the more capable enemies that we have already identified. :brickwall:
:cheers:
We have for many decades now spent untold wealth in building a vast bureaucracy to merely administer ourselves rather than building a more lethal force. I don't see that changing. I hope we never have a need to use the little that we have in earnest against the more capable enemies that we have already identified. :brickwall:
:cheers:
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Not sure if 119 shrinks the training gap to 777. The common ground is (as you say) FCS, but that essentially boils down to the user interface and software/firmware. If we did get the 119, we would probably get and develop our own FCS (similar to 777). Even with our C3 and LG1s, you can train this by running an ethernet cable CP to gun and use the current software. This is pretty much the minimum standard at RCAS currently. I believe 84th, 1Fd and 3Fd have done it also. If the situation permits, adding ethernet could be seen as simply improving your position.
As blasphemous as it may sound coming from an Arty guy, I lean toward the 120, mostly because of growth potential in armour protection and ammo.
As blasphemous as it may sound coming from an Arty guy, I lean toward the 120, mostly because of growth potential in armour protection and ammo.
FJAG
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I'm working a bit off what Colin P said about the similarity of the M777 and M119 fire control systems and also, perhaps much more so, the fact that at present there are no roles for deploying C3s in any shape or form.
The M119 currently forms the backbone of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams in the US Army (both Active and National Guard) which shows that it's a war-ready gun used by our closest ally. Here's an interesting article that discusses the upgunning of the 1-160th FA which is part of the 45th IBCT which is a Oklahoma National Guard formation.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/294685/160th-field-artillery-live-fire-new-artillery-systems
In short the 1-160th which previously had 3 x 105mm M119A2 batteries will now have 2 x M119A3 batteries and 1 x M777A2 battery which essentially use much of the same fire control systems. You might recall that back in the days of the large artillery, our regiments all had 3 x 105mm batteries and 1 x 155mm battery. We got rid of that structure when we changed to M109 medium equipped regiments and L5 light equipped regiments. The theory, however, of mixing shorter range, faster rate of fire guns with longer range, slower rate of fire guns to better cover a brigades frontage and depth is still valid.
Right now, no one in their right mind would augment a regular force M777 regiment with C3s to increase the number of batteries. We'd either go short guns or steal additional batteries from another non deploying regular force regiment.
If, however, our reserves had L119A3s which had compatible fire control systems to their bigger brothers, we could easily consider augmenting a deploying regular force M777 regiment with several M119 batteries manned primarily by reservists who already knew how to employ that weapon (and would additionally also be easier to convert "hole fillers" in the M777 batteries). (and yes I do know that American Stryker BCT's are equipped solely with M777s but then SBCTs aren't shackled with the burden of having one of their battalions as being a non LAV equipped light one nor of having no mobile gun systems nor 120mm mortars like our Regular Force brigade groups are - we seem to do everything on the cheap with no practical/tactical reason for doing so - adding a battery or two of reserve manned M119s would be highly advisable)
My biggest complaint about how Canada uses reservists has to do with the "hole filler" concept. I'm a strong advocate of providing reservists with both the equipment and a role to ensure that our Army has a greater capability than just what is present in our regular force formations and units. I'm a strong advocate of Mattis's view that the Army (albeit the US Army) needs to have more lethality at a more affordable price. Giving reservists guns that they can go to war with does both.
:worms:
The M119 currently forms the backbone of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams in the US Army (both Active and National Guard) which shows that it's a war-ready gun used by our closest ally. Here's an interesting article that discusses the upgunning of the 1-160th FA which is part of the 45th IBCT which is a Oklahoma National Guard formation.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/294685/160th-field-artillery-live-fire-new-artillery-systems
In short the 1-160th which previously had 3 x 105mm M119A2 batteries will now have 2 x M119A3 batteries and 1 x M777A2 battery which essentially use much of the same fire control systems. You might recall that back in the days of the large artillery, our regiments all had 3 x 105mm batteries and 1 x 155mm battery. We got rid of that structure when we changed to M109 medium equipped regiments and L5 light equipped regiments. The theory, however, of mixing shorter range, faster rate of fire guns with longer range, slower rate of fire guns to better cover a brigades frontage and depth is still valid.
Right now, no one in their right mind would augment a regular force M777 regiment with C3s to increase the number of batteries. We'd either go short guns or steal additional batteries from another non deploying regular force regiment.
If, however, our reserves had L119A3s which had compatible fire control systems to their bigger brothers, we could easily consider augmenting a deploying regular force M777 regiment with several M119 batteries manned primarily by reservists who already knew how to employ that weapon (and would additionally also be easier to convert "hole fillers" in the M777 batteries). (and yes I do know that American Stryker BCT's are equipped solely with M777s but then SBCTs aren't shackled with the burden of having one of their battalions as being a non LAV equipped light one nor of having no mobile gun systems nor 120mm mortars like our Regular Force brigade groups are - we seem to do everything on the cheap with no practical/tactical reason for doing so - adding a battery or two of reserve manned M119s would be highly advisable)
My biggest complaint about how Canada uses reservists has to do with the "hole filler" concept. I'm a strong advocate of providing reservists with both the equipment and a role to ensure that our Army has a greater capability than just what is present in our regular force formations and units. I'm a strong advocate of Mattis's view that the Army (albeit the US Army) needs to have more lethality at a more affordable price. Giving reservists guns that they can go to war with does both.
:worms:
There are reasons why, at present, it is not very practical for Primary Reserves to essentially mobilize entire sub-units for deployment, right now even being tasked to force generate individuals can be a hit or miss affair. Even so, each Reg Force Regt 2nd gun Bty is supposed to be filled largely by Reservists, as needed. The ability, and frequency, that can happen I think certainly varies. I certainly agree with you that there is clear benefit to the Reserves training on equipment that minimizes the work up time if they go with a deploying unit. Some efforts were considered to mitigate this, then abandoned, and there is a history of improvising solutions that seems to result in some considering it a low priority to replace or improve the Reserves equipment situation.
Incidentally, as the Afghanistan missions began to increase in scope, the army found itself in a quandary in regards to artillery training. Short shortsightedly all the M109's have been withdrawn without replacement, the LG1s were limited in training value due to barrel cracking, and there were only 2 M777 for training at the start. So Batteries going into high readiness training ended up using the C3 for the bulk of the training, getting minimal exposure to all the bells and whistles of the M777 before going over seas. It took awhile for the powers that be to finally bend enough to get more M777, and that happened only incrementally, but rightly or wrongly it also led to the M777 being the in service gun for the Regular Force. No wonder the deployed gunners were found frequently at fault for mistakes with the gun; they were quite often learning its quirks in battle as opposed to the training area
In so far as the equipment goes now, I'd say there are so many competing needs for the limited funding, especially that for sustaining equipment and ammo, that I'd say it's unlikely we'll see anything replacing the C3 soon; my guess is it's not seen as a priority
Yet another short lived project I was PD for was called Light Indirect Fire Digitization. The intent was to put something like the LINAPS, the digital gun aiming system used on the M777 and the M119, onto the LG1's and possibly the C3's as well. The LG1's were the priority because they are the main guns used for training in Gagetown, and there is a (very) remote possibility they could be operationally deployed again. One of the other features of the project was to have tablets in the CP and on the gun line to send and receive fire orders, that way the pattern of activity would be similar to that of an M777 unit using DGMS. The tablets would work off of a contracted civilian service provider's network, with control measures to prohibit "bad" internet surfing, but still able to receive things like Met messages, tgt lists etc. Unfortunately, like so many things artillery-wise, it was deemed not a priority and cancelled.
Some local efforts have been going on now for the past few years to deal with such shortcomings. I know 2 RCHA has been particularly pro-active in getting reservists on M777 training, and some on STA courses as well, all of which helps minimize that training delta you're talking about
Incidentally, as the Afghanistan missions began to increase in scope, the army found itself in a quandary in regards to artillery training. Short shortsightedly all the M109's have been withdrawn without replacement, the LG1s were limited in training value due to barrel cracking, and there were only 2 M777 for training at the start. So Batteries going into high readiness training ended up using the C3 for the bulk of the training, getting minimal exposure to all the bells and whistles of the M777 before going over seas. It took awhile for the powers that be to finally bend enough to get more M777, and that happened only incrementally, but rightly or wrongly it also led to the M777 being the in service gun for the Regular Force. No wonder the deployed gunners were found frequently at fault for mistakes with the gun; they were quite often learning its quirks in battle as opposed to the training area
In so far as the equipment goes now, I'd say there are so many competing needs for the limited funding, especially that for sustaining equipment and ammo, that I'd say it's unlikely we'll see anything replacing the C3 soon; my guess is it's not seen as a priority
Yet another short lived project I was PD for was called Light Indirect Fire Digitization. The intent was to put something like the LINAPS, the digital gun aiming system used on the M777 and the M119, onto the LG1's and possibly the C3's as well. The LG1's were the priority because they are the main guns used for training in Gagetown, and there is a (very) remote possibility they could be operationally deployed again. One of the other features of the project was to have tablets in the CP and on the gun line to send and receive fire orders, that way the pattern of activity would be similar to that of an M777 unit using DGMS. The tablets would work off of a contracted civilian service provider's network, with control measures to prohibit "bad" internet surfing, but still able to receive things like Met messages, tgt lists etc. Unfortunately, like so many things artillery-wise, it was deemed not a priority and cancelled.
Some local efforts have been going on now for the past few years to deal with such shortcomings. I know 2 RCHA has been particularly pro-active in getting reservists on M777 training, and some on STA courses as well, all of which helps minimize that training delta you're talking about
FJAG
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Petard said:
This is entirely a long standing internal problem. The law provides for compulsorily calling reserve individuals or subunits or units to active service. We do not use it because we have systematically destroyed the reserve's ability to train or deploy in any reasonable fashion. It's essentially a self-inflicted wound
Petard said:
Shortsighted indeed. In any civilian industry the people responsible would have been fired.
Petard said:
I agree that it is not seen as a priority. Some day in the future we will also be able to say that this was shortsighted.
Petard said:
We have a 25 billion dollar budget slated to rise into the 30 billion range. Our priorities are cr@p. Look at the other threads here to see what essential equipment and skills we have abandoned or set aside because of lack of funding. Where is all the money going? (don't bother answering; it's a rhetorical question.)
Petard said:
I appreciate the local efforts. Back in the 1970s when I came from 3 RCHA to 2 RCHA it was quite obvious that 2 RCHA had a much better plan and system for developing the then Central Militai Area artillery units. I'm very glad to see they still have their hand in it.
Don't get me wrong Petard. It's not that I don't understand some of the problems that are there. It's much easier to sit on the outside and criticize but, quite frankly, the shortcomings that I see are ones that have to be laid at the feet of our senior leadership. When I spent my time on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council I tried numerous times to push towards a reserve restructure that provided for a more effective reserve that the Army could count on. It's not that I lost the debate, the matter was never seriously debated because of the excuse that "the grownups" would never go for that. Funny thing was at the time I thought I was sitting at the grownups table.
I know that we are our worst enemy. I don't blame the government. It doesn't know any better. Our senior leaders, however, have been misspending the defence budget for many decades. That's why we have a reserve force of 20,000 some odd people who, as a collective entity, are as useless as t***s on a boar; because we made them that way.
That's why I can't stop myself from continuously criticising what so obviously is a negligent way of running an Armed Forces. If I could figure out a way to lay a s 124 charge against every member of the Armed Forces council I would love to do so. The particulars would read: In that he/she on every day of the year at Ottawa, Ontario while acting as Chief of the Defence Staff (or as the case may be) failed to ensure, as it was his duty to do, that the Canadian Armed Forces was properly manned, equipped and trained to be an effective fighting force. ;D
:cheers:
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Petard said:
2 RCHA is fairly well positioned to do this. There are 6 PRes units within a days travel. 42 Field and 30 Field are regularly in the Petawawa training area anyways. Luckily, 7 Tor as one of the STA tasks and it's just a matter of TD to put 2 instructors in a vehicle with a LCMR for a few days in Toronto (not a bad day go either). As for Guelph and Brantford, they are close enough to be able to run courses with each other. 49 Fd is somewhat on their own geographically.
I'm not sure it's fully appreciated what a tremendous effort is required though to export courses. There are only so many Det Comds in a Regt of 8 guns so taking 2 or 3 of them to Guelph is just one more task to add to the task list. 2 RCHA gets his will all the generic Sgt/MBdr tasks that everyone else does, has to conduct its own training, support collective training and run PCF. It's frankly amazing that 2 RCHA has been able to run ANY courses for the PRes in the last few years and speaks to the impact that Command can have on supporting these sort of events. That being said, I think that the best example that I saw in 8 years at 2 RCHA of PRes integration was on Ex Stalwart Guardian 15. 2 x firing units formed from the 6 x Ontario Fd Regts supported by 2 RCHA STA and a full deployed C/S 8 right in the tactical environment. 2 RCHA provided 0/95 as well. The perfect scenario in my mind would have been to grab 30 or so gunners from Meaford a few weeks earlier and run them through M777 conversion or LCMR depending on their stream to be confirmed on Ex SG.
The issue of funding has been mentioned a few times above.
It's been my understanding that each year, the CF/DND has to return a good chunk of money to Treasury Board that hasn't been spent.
I understand there are rules/regulations regarding the spending of money, the need for running competitions to procure equipment, etc etc. However, I do not understand how some of these things can be 'funding related' when we are returning funds each year? (Slightly off thread, I know. Just curious about it pertains to this particular issue, sorry.)
It's been my understanding that each year, the CF/DND has to return a good chunk of money to Treasury Board that hasn't been spent.
I understand there are rules/regulations regarding the spending of money, the need for running competitions to procure equipment, etc etc. However, I do not understand how some of these things can be 'funding related' when we are returning funds each year? (Slightly off thread, I know. Just curious about it pertains to this particular issue, sorry.)
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FJAG:
Or, as David Stirling, quoted in Rogue Heroes, stated " layer upon layer of fossilized sh-t"
Or, as David Stirling, quoted in Rogue Heroes, stated " layer upon layer of fossilized sh-t"
CBH99 said:
Considering this thread is about replacing the C3, that's not really off topic. I don't know what background you might have about this, so I'll pitch this in kind of a crude way that hopefully doesn't sound condescending
I suppose what it comes down to is whether or not the C3 is meeting the need or not, the short answer is it does, but with risk. Despite that, I think the C3 should have a digital aiming system added, and a 120mm mortar system procured for the majority of Reserve Artillery units
There are essentially two types of funding related to this, one is for capitol expenditures (to actually buy something), and the other to sustain it (the overhead and maintenance costs, that also includes wages, ammunition etc). The subject of how convoluted and byzantine the military procurement system is, is discussed at length elsewhere on this site, but as it relates to this subject the funds you're talking about getting returned are largely (but not entirely) those identified for capitol expenditures for one reason or another (project delays, change of scope..the list is long). Far as I know, a case hasn't even been made to replace the C3 anytime soon. I believe one should be made, and it deserves to have a higher priority; it relates to the risk of using such an old gun. Another reason is to address some of the issues FJAG is getting at, albeit in a limited way
Right now the need appears to be met, since the purpose is to provide minimal training to Primary Reservists who might later go on task with a Regular Force artillery unit. The idea is that Reservists would show up with a deploying unit with at least some basic skills, and this would minimize the duration to get them fully trained for deployment. It is a cost saving measure; rather than keep Reg Force units fully manned, and the associated costs especially wages for that, gaps or holes are left that are to be filled by reservists as needed.
Reg Force Artillery Regt's have two gun batteries, with three troops in each battery, the third troop is supposed to be largely covered off by Reservists. In theory, if a Reg Force Regt had to deploy a gun Bty, for the first roto the third troop would most likely come from the 2nd Gun Bty's Reg Force personnel. Reserve units would then be tasked to find volunteers to flesh out the second gun battery for subsequent roto's.
There is a valid point being made here, that the skill those Reservists are showing up with is too limited. More to the point, in a worst case scenario where there are significant losses experienced overseas, there's no real depth to the Reserves to quickly be mobilized, with relevant equipment to fill in. I would say the reason this isn't addressed in regards to equipping the reserves for operational deployment, largely goes to the limited risk and size of deployments our government tends to accept. It is also a cost saving measure. Consequently the role seen for the Reserves remains limited to only filling in spots in one of those gun Troops on an individual basis, rather than a Reserve unit stand up say an entire Troop itself with its own equipment and deploy (which by the way many other nations do operate that way)
Reserve units are hamstrung by the number of days their personnel can parade, and adding additional training, say to learn how to operate a digital gun aiming system, can exceed the time given right now to pay reservists. I think the problem could be addressed by cyclic training, that is one year you start with the basics, the subsequent year the more advance training with say the digital stuff. For now it appears the pattern will be to limit training to IBTS (basic soldier skills), and very limited basic trade training.
So with such a limited requirement, to permit basic artillery training, it looks like the C3 gets the job done, and it doesn't cost much to sustain. Where the risk is, is that with such an old gun if a significant problem occurs then even the basic training is next to impossible to achieve.
In the spring of 2011, a W Bty C3 in Gagetown literally snapped in two, and nobody knew why. About the same time, significant corrosion issues were identified in the trail legs of some guns. All training with the gun had to stop, and at the time not all Reserve units had mortars to fall back on. For a short while it did look like a capitol project would be needed to replace the C3. The cause of the gun snapping in two was resolved, and so was the matter of corrosion. Some consideration was given to continue with a project to replace the C3, but it would take time to get going, as a stop gap measure all reserve units were given 81mm mortars.
As time went on it seemed like the need wasn't that urgent, and I'm not sure what the timeline is to replace the C3 is. but I would hazard a guess it is more than decade away because it appears everything is ok to some. I would argue things have changed to the point that thinking should be challenged
Mortars are going back to infantry units, and I think that's a good thing, but that now means we're back to the risk of no back up if the whole C3 fleet is grounded again. The more recent problem is C3 barrel cracking near the muzzle, and I don't know if they've solved it. Oddly enough the problem could be easily solved by replacing the barrels used on the M119, but I'm not involved with that kind of thing anymore so I don't know if it's being pursued or not. I think they should mount the M119's ordnance on the C3 carriage, and the LINAPS used on the M777. The training time that used to be given for the mortar in Reserve units could be used towards learning how to use digital gun aiming. The occupation drills alone are so significantly different, that it really should be part of basic training, and the old optic sight method only retained for emergency all fails purposes.
Better yet, I wish we'd see Reserve artillery units not at a saluting base (Ottawa and provincial capitals), get towed 120mm mortars with digital aiming systems. Their back up would be 81mm mortars. These units would be tasked to Force Generate individuals, and if need be complete Troops, to Reg Force infantry Battalions. The C3's withdrawn from those units equipped with 120 mortars can be used to sustain the remaining C3's. Replace the C3 barrels with those from the M119 for the units at the saluting bases, fit them with LINAPS, and they would be the ones tasked to Force generate individuals to the Reg Force gun troops. They would then show up with more relavent skills, and the army would have more depth to deal with the unknowns especially for the PBI
But if wished were horses..
FJAG
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There are a lot of truth in much of what you say. Quite frankly I can't argue with the truth of those things, I can only argue that I wish they weren't true. Let me touch on a couple of things you mention.
It's true that budgets are limited but that doesn't mean units can't use our budgets better or more selectively. I spent two years in RSS and can attest to the fact that a good 1/3 of our budget was blown on useless activities. Just as an example, a half day training is anything under six hours. Weekday sessions are usually three hours but usually only about two spent training actively. That's wasted money. Weekends are much more productive and we should end mid week parading completely.
The youngsters reaching us as recruits these days live in a digital world. Learning to use digital equipment is not that difficult for them if taught right.
The big issue that I have, however, is cyclical training as you propose. I fully agree with cyclical training for team skills. Learn to be a troop one year, a battery the next. For individual training, however, we should condense all the skills to be a gun number into one phase so that all gun numbers are trained to service the piece fully from square one.
I do note that in the US artillery these days the MOS 13B teaches the soldier as a crewmember with all skills except the digital data system whereas the operation of the automated data systems are specialists designated MOS 13D. This is similar to the US Infantry's division of infantryman and mortarman as two separate MOSs. Maybe that could be the idea; divide your recruit intake class into two groups train 3 out of 4 recruits as crewmembers and 1 out of 4 as digital specialists. I'm not too fond of this for the obvious battle casualty reasons.
This, unfortunately, is typical of our leadership; to think reactively rather than proactively. We wait until the problem gob-smacks us. We really do need to get ahead of the curve and decide how to make our force more lethal and then move in that direction by deciding what weapons we need and how to properly train our people on it.
We should not try McGyver a roughly seventy-five year-old weapon system. (that's right, the first M1 variant was developed at Rock Island in the early 1920s and was fielded as the redesignated M2 in 1934 and entered service as the M2A1 in 1940)
Sorry. I'm dead against 120mm mortars (especially with 81mm backups) It's not that I don't think we should have 120s (I do think we should) nor that I think that mortars are somehow beneath the artillery (they aren't - Russians who in my view are the unrivalled experts in artillery have 120mm as an artillery weapon system)
My reasoning is that we have already emasculated the regular force artillery by limiting how few firing units we have. Before we start handing 120s to reserve gunner units we should first ensure that there are sufficient reservists allocated and trained to fully man properly organized reg force regiments (and 2 batteries of six guns is NOT enough for a three manoeuvre battalion brigade) and that we provide a proper long range artillery capability with rockets.
I saw the artillery locating and missile skills disappear in the 1960s. If we continue to have gunners man what are basically battalion weapons we will never achieve the firepower we need on the battlefield. By all means buy 120s for the infantry but not the artillery. We'll never get the skills back.
I've moved this comment out of order and saved it for last because I think that while the statement is mostly true it's the crux of our problem as a force. I've said this before and believe it to be the God's honest truth. It's not the politicians that are behind our low risk limited operational deployments, it's our military leadership who is telling them that is all we are capable of doing.
Look at Strong, Secure and Engaged. While it recognizes the fact that Russia and China are our biggest potential "near peer" enemies (and "near peer" gives us much more credibility and lethality than we deserve) it nonetheless envisions missions which in essence are a single battle group in size. Yet we maintain a regular force army of three mechanized brigades, a half a$$ed Combat Support Brigade and a divisional headquarters which is tasked to generate nothing more than two battle groups simultaneously.
That is fundamentally ridiculous. I see nothing wrong with the idea of having a mission to supply such limited forces from time to time as may be needed, but if we identify two major and sophisticated enemies as our biggest threat then surely to God we should have an ultimate role to generate the full force and have a capability to support it and replace battle casualties. If all we're prepared to send is a battle group or two then why have 22,000 regulars and 20,000 reservists in the first place? The government has allocated the manpower and enough serious equipment to field a division (although some essential pieces are missing). It's the military's job to make it a viable fighting force. We are failing our government every day.
:cheers:
Petard said:
It's true that budgets are limited but that doesn't mean units can't use our budgets better or more selectively. I spent two years in RSS and can attest to the fact that a good 1/3 of our budget was blown on useless activities. Just as an example, a half day training is anything under six hours. Weekday sessions are usually three hours but usually only about two spent training actively. That's wasted money. Weekends are much more productive and we should end mid week parading completely.
The youngsters reaching us as recruits these days live in a digital world. Learning to use digital equipment is not that difficult for them if taught right.
The big issue that I have, however, is cyclical training as you propose. I fully agree with cyclical training for team skills. Learn to be a troop one year, a battery the next. For individual training, however, we should condense all the skills to be a gun number into one phase so that all gun numbers are trained to service the piece fully from square one.
I do note that in the US artillery these days the MOS 13B teaches the soldier as a crewmember with all skills except the digital data system whereas the operation of the automated data systems are specialists designated MOS 13D. This is similar to the US Infantry's division of infantryman and mortarman as two separate MOSs. Maybe that could be the idea; divide your recruit intake class into two groups train 3 out of 4 recruits as crewmembers and 1 out of 4 as digital specialists. I'm not too fond of this for the obvious battle casualty reasons.
Petard said:
This, unfortunately, is typical of our leadership; to think reactively rather than proactively. We wait until the problem gob-smacks us. We really do need to get ahead of the curve and decide how to make our force more lethal and then move in that direction by deciding what weapons we need and how to properly train our people on it.
Petard said:
We should not try McGyver a roughly seventy-five year-old weapon system. (that's right, the first M1 variant was developed at Rock Island in the early 1920s and was fielded as the redesignated M2 in 1934 and entered service as the M2A1 in 1940)
Petard said:
Sorry. I'm dead against 120mm mortars (especially with 81mm backups) It's not that I don't think we should have 120s (I do think we should) nor that I think that mortars are somehow beneath the artillery (they aren't - Russians who in my view are the unrivalled experts in artillery have 120mm as an artillery weapon system)
My reasoning is that we have already emasculated the regular force artillery by limiting how few firing units we have. Before we start handing 120s to reserve gunner units we should first ensure that there are sufficient reservists allocated and trained to fully man properly organized reg force regiments (and 2 batteries of six guns is NOT enough for a three manoeuvre battalion brigade) and that we provide a proper long range artillery capability with rockets.
I saw the artillery locating and missile skills disappear in the 1960s. If we continue to have gunners man what are basically battalion weapons we will never achieve the firepower we need on the battlefield. By all means buy 120s for the infantry but not the artillery. We'll never get the skills back.
Petard said:
I've moved this comment out of order and saved it for last because I think that while the statement is mostly true it's the crux of our problem as a force. I've said this before and believe it to be the God's honest truth. It's not the politicians that are behind our low risk limited operational deployments, it's our military leadership who is telling them that is all we are capable of doing.
Look at Strong, Secure and Engaged. While it recognizes the fact that Russia and China are our biggest potential "near peer" enemies (and "near peer" gives us much more credibility and lethality than we deserve) it nonetheless envisions missions which in essence are a single battle group in size. Yet we maintain a regular force army of three mechanized brigades, a half a$$ed Combat Support Brigade and a divisional headquarters which is tasked to generate nothing more than two battle groups simultaneously.
That is fundamentally ridiculous. I see nothing wrong with the idea of having a mission to supply such limited forces from time to time as may be needed, but if we identify two major and sophisticated enemies as our biggest threat then surely to God we should have an ultimate role to generate the full force and have a capability to support it and replace battle casualties. If all we're prepared to send is a battle group or two then why have 22,000 regulars and 20,000 reservists in the first place? The government has allocated the manpower and enough serious equipment to field a division (although some essential pieces are missing). It's the military's job to make it a viable fighting force. We are failing our government every day.
:cheers:
- Reaction score
- 27,182
- Points
- 1,090
Canada's problems lie in both personnel and equipment. We lack modern equipment for more than a reinforced battlegroup.
Thus, any solution space requires equipment for training, equipment for operations, and soldiers to train and operate them.
My 30 second assessment:
1. The Army needs an inexpensive indirect fire platform that is common to both components that can be used both for training and deployed - a towed 105mm meets that need;
2. That platform needs to be integrated into the fire control system so there is common training on necessary supporting tools;
3. The Army Reserve needs to revisit its structures and construct viable units, even if that means a loss of command positions (this is not a problem unique to the Artillery). This may also mean a need to invest more Regular Force positions into units to enable an increased force output - whether at the individual, sub-sub or sub-unit or unit level;
4. Long, hard thought is needed to decide what is wanted out of a part-time force, and what level of time and commitment is viable to require; and
5. A commitment to modernizing indirect fire in the CAF (regardless of component) is needed - now. With the current fleet of 105mm guns nearing collapse, and the 155mm fleet being well below the critical size to sustain anything beyond two batteries deployed, there needs to be a dedicated effort to modernize and expand the Army's capabilities (HIMARS anybody?)
Thus, any solution space requires equipment for training, equipment for operations, and soldiers to train and operate them.
My 30 second assessment:
1. The Army needs an inexpensive indirect fire platform that is common to both components that can be used both for training and deployed - a towed 105mm meets that need;
2. That platform needs to be integrated into the fire control system so there is common training on necessary supporting tools;
3. The Army Reserve needs to revisit its structures and construct viable units, even if that means a loss of command positions (this is not a problem unique to the Artillery). This may also mean a need to invest more Regular Force positions into units to enable an increased force output - whether at the individual, sub-sub or sub-unit or unit level;
4. Long, hard thought is needed to decide what is wanted out of a part-time force, and what level of time and commitment is viable to require; and
5. A commitment to modernizing indirect fire in the CAF (regardless of component) is needed - now. With the current fleet of 105mm guns nearing collapse, and the 155mm fleet being well below the critical size to sustain anything beyond two batteries deployed, there needs to be a dedicated effort to modernize and expand the Army's capabilities (HIMARS anybody?)
FormerHorseGuard
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 437
- Points
- 760
I spoke with a now retired RSM about the lack of replacement parts and spare parts for the C3 105mm gun.
I did not understand everything he told me but here was the basics of the conversation
I said to him with life span of the 105mm running out and lack of spare guns I thought the Res units who did the salutes and other special events would end up with the best of the guns available, so they could retain the taskings and the skill sets to do those events as required. Meaning 7 Toronto and 30 RCA would get the guns in Ontario. Everyone else would be doing dry training and very little live fires to extend gun life. That was my opinion.
He replied in a typical RSM fashion and a quick education and lesson on the guns and replacement programs.
Another country ( not naming it, it was from South America) was going thru the process of manufacturing a new version of the 105mm , very close if not exact copy of the C3 used by the Canadian Forces. He said there was talk at higher levels of command about purchasing some guns from that country's manufacturer but then the Treasury Board and others got involved, no Canadian content, no deal would be made.
just a chat over a drink in the mess.
just some thoughts and opinions
I did not understand everything he told me but here was the basics of the conversation
I said to him with life span of the 105mm running out and lack of spare guns I thought the Res units who did the salutes and other special events would end up with the best of the guns available, so they could retain the taskings and the skill sets to do those events as required. Meaning 7 Toronto and 30 RCA would get the guns in Ontario. Everyone else would be doing dry training and very little live fires to extend gun life. That was my opinion.
He replied in a typical RSM fashion and a quick education and lesson on the guns and replacement programs.
Another country ( not naming it, it was from South America) was going thru the process of manufacturing a new version of the 105mm , very close if not exact copy of the C3 used by the Canadian Forces. He said there was talk at higher levels of command about purchasing some guns from that country's manufacturer but then the Treasury Board and others got involved, no Canadian content, no deal would be made.
just a chat over a drink in the mess.
just some thoughts and opinions
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
- Reaction score
- 11,757
- Points
- 1,160
We used to parade 1.5 days a week plus a variety of exercises and a gun camp. The evening parade was mostly administrative with some training. The full days were normally devoted to training course, such as gunnery, sigs, tech and drivers. We were supported by generally excellent RSS staff (1 officer, 1 WO and one M/BDR) and about 3 Class B (office staff, vehicle tech and QM). This ensured a lot of the admin tasks were done, kit was procured, repaired and readied for the Saturday courses or exercises. I remember on Class B, exercising the recoil systems of the C2's as per the manual with the supplied kit on a regular basis.
Somehow we managed to maintain a 6 gun battery, tractors, 2x ammo trucks, 2x CP's, 2x FOO parties, Flying kitchen, ambulance, REME truck. (We did a lot of our own vehicle repairs as well).
Somehow we managed to maintain a 6 gun battery, tractors, 2x ammo trucks, 2x CP's, 2x FOO parties, Flying kitchen, ambulance, REME truck. (We did a lot of our own vehicle repairs as well).
quadrapiper
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 460
- Points
- 810
Wonder, on a tangent, if the loss of that sort of low-level "real" activity might have something to do with retention issues?Colin P said:
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
- Reaction score
- 11,757
- Points
- 1,160
There was real satisfaction in resolving issues and we kept our 3 tonner stake truck running for several more years, when the powers above us would have taken her away and not replaced her. Considering we used the Stake truck for administrative truck every week instead of driving the Deuces, getting rid of it and wearing out the hard to replace trucks just shows the stupidity that went on. In general there was a lot of "ownership" of kit and responsibility to maintain it. The various local units QM's and RSS staff helped each other out and loaned equipment, on the expectation that it was taken care of. The steady reduction in vehicles and kit really hurt, basically ever new vehicle was issued on a scale of 3 or 2 old for 1 new. So vehicle wear goes up, there is no slack for making sure you have enough working vehicles, no ability to support other units on a combined exercise.
The only plan is that there is no plan, it's all reaction and bandaid applying.
The only plan is that there is no plan, it's all reaction and bandaid applying.
