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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Our doctrine is to keep all 81mm mortars in the bn's mortar platoon. We gave up the 60mm years ago in favour of the C16 grenade launcher in our famous "you gotta give up something to get something" acquisition program.
I was somewhat amused that a relatively inexpensive man portable weapon was ditched in favor of a behemoth that from what I understand takes three men and a good sized boy to crew. Plus it needed targeting software to make it work. Not impressed.
 
Aside from the fact that it's an overpriced piece of junk and it can't actually do the job of the weapon it replaced.
What exactly do you have against the C 16 in all its death spewing awesomeness ? ( I always loved that phrase !)😜
 
Honestly the HK GMG is a fantastic piece of kit, even without a good FCS. It just gets range (or effective engagement range) limited with a good FCS and LRF.

It isn’t a 60mm Mortar though (and I’m not the biggest fan of those personally).

The issue is that while it makes sense to replace gear with newer equipment, it doesn’t make any sense to replace something with a different system that doesn’t fill the role the other had. Common sense should dictate that a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher is primarily a direct fire weapon, with low trajectory indirect fire possible in some circumstances.

I mean this isn’t a novel new concept, AGL’s came to be in Vietnam, and no one ran out and dumped mortars for those.

The same stupidity saw the Mortar platoons cut from the Infantry and assigned to the Artillery without any PY increase.

I don’t think anyone is going to argue that a 81mm Mortar isn’t a 105mm or 155mm Howitzer. But that is exactly what the Army did with the Mortars, as if a gun Det has a gun and a mortar, they can’t use both…
 
The issue is that while it makes sense to replace gear with newer equipment, it doesn’t make any sense to replace something with a different system that doesn’t fill the role the other had. Common sense should dictate that a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher is primarily a direct fire weapon, with low trajectory indirect fire possible in some circumstances.
Unfortunately the role provided is only one of the issues under considerations. There are numerous organizational to fiscal considerations that come into play - everything from PY allocations and need to LCMM workload to shelf space for ammunition in ammo dumps. I've looked at a number of communications and divestment plans now for the Afghan era timeframe and there is a constant push - originating from DCDS at the L1s and from there downward - to make decisions on how to keep a status quo balance in all the other factors when trying to introduce a new capability.
The same stupidity saw the Mortar platoons cut from the Infantry and assigned to the Artillery without any PY increase.
Not wishing to sound smart here, but it was a whole different type and level of stupidity.

IMHO it starts with the group of operational functions (command, sense, act ...) That leads to categorizing army components into categories - this does "act", that does "sense" etc. That leads to the evaluation (in tight fiscal situations) of trying to see where there is overlap that can be rationalized by combining. The whole thing was then topped off by a major PY need for CMTC and some other roles, the current operational roles (Bosnia with a high rifle platoon, low arty and tank requirement). Before you knew it you had folks trying to carve out a role to stay relevant - tankers as "THE" direct fire bunch - combining MGS, ADATS and TOW UA; engrs as the construction guys for everything; arty as "ALL Things" indirect fire; and a logistics system unleashed as national support elements working out of FOBs. On the side you can throw in the attempts to get every sense function grouped under ISTAR and All-source intelligence centres.

You then bring in the concept of "building blocks" of a little act here, and a little sense there, and a slice of command over there. Before you know it you are building "tactical self sufficient units" (which morph into the "optimized battle group" - a set of preassembled building blocks) and JIMP brigades.

Like I said - a whole different level.

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Unfortunately the role provided is only one of the issues under considerations. There are numerous organizational to fiscal considerations that come into play - everything from PY allocations and need to LCMM workload to shelf space for ammunition in ammo dumps. I've looked at a number of communications and divestment plans now for the Afghan era timeframe and there is a constant push - originating from DCDS at the L1s and from there downward - to make decisions on how to keep a status quo balance in all the other factors when trying to introduce a new capability.
So what replaced Eryx ;)
As it got removed without replacement. A better solution would have been to get a new 60mm Mortar, get the C-16 as a new vehicle mounted fire support capability, and if really needed fill the missing Erxy gap with the C-16 (which is also stupid - but better than what occurred with the Infantry in a 2:1 net loss (albeit Eryx wasn’t really anything other than a paper capability)

Not wishing to sound smart here, but it was a whole different type and level of stupidity.
Yup.
IMHO it starts with the group of operational functions (command, sense, act ...) That leads to categorizing army components into categories - this does "act", that does "sense" etc. That leads to the evaluation (in tight fiscal situations) of trying to see where there is overlap that can be rationalized by combining. The whole thing was then topped off by a major PY need for CMTC and some other roles, the current operational roles (Bosnia with a high rifle platoon, low arty and tank requirement). Before you knew it you had folks trying to carve out a role to stay relevant - tankers as "THE" direct fire bunch - combining MGS, ADATS and TOW UA; engrs as the construction guys for everything; arty as "ALL Things" indirect fire; and a logistics system unleashed as national support elements working out of FOBs. On the side you can throw in the attempts to get every sense function grouped under ISTAR and All-source intelligence centres.

You then bring in the concept of "building blocks" of a little act here, and a little sense there, and a slice of command over there. Before you know it you are building "tactical self sufficient units" (which morph into the "optimized battle group" - a set of preassembled building blocks) and JIMP brigades.

Like I said - a whole different level.

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Not a lot of adulting going on during that period.

IMHO if the CA couldn’t spare the PY for the required roles, they needed to go to the mountain to get more, or cut some of the excess units (like an Armoured Reg’t that isn’t Armoured, and some Infantry BN’s)
 
So what replaced Eryx ;)
As it got removed without replacement. A better solution would have been to get a new 60mm Mortar, get the C-16 as a new vehicle mounted fire support capability, and if really needed fill the missing Erxy gap with the C-16 (which is also stupid - but better than what occurred with the Infantry in a 2:1 net loss (albeit Eryx wasn’t really anything other than a paper capability)
Don't mistake the concept of "to get something new you have to give up something old" with the concept of "When you give up something old we'll give you something new." The two are not synonymous.
Not a lot of adulting going on during that period.
I don't go that far and I'm cynical as hell. I think a lot of folks were doing the best they could for the tribe they were with under very difficult circumstances. That. however, doesn't take the decision out from under being shortsighted and narrowly focused.

I think Canada has been in the rut of focusing on today's defined problems at the expense of preparedness for the vague possibilities of the future. IMHO, that is the wrong approach for a defence force, especially when the vague future problems become more defined and probable day by day.
IMHO if the CA couldn’t spare the PY for the required roles, they needed to go to the mountain to get more, or cut some of the excess units (like an Armoured Reg’t that isn’t Armoured, and some Infantry BN’s)
PYs are the currency of government. It's how the length of your d*ck gets measured. IMHO we tend to put many of those PYs into the wrong places - like Ottawa. You need admin staff to run programs. The question is how much are some of these programs needed. Dollars will get you donuts that when we talk PY cuts the PYs in the halls of Ottawa are protected and fought over harder than the ones a hundred, or a thousand, kilometres away. I always thought that the infantry should have given up a rifle coy instead of mortars and ATGMs but I wasn't there to watch the arguments. My guess is that there was some gunner and black hat support if it meant absorbing some of those responsibilities kept cuts from happening in their own camps. Gunners gave up over half of their guns for more and better FSCCs, FOOs, FACs, and STA in order to balance PYs.

Pay and major equipment come out of separate defined purses. The problem is that in negotiating funds with the government, the need and quantification of pay packets is much easier than the costs associated with capability acquisition and lifetime support. The first is a simple and mathematical exercise that most politicians do understand. The second requires a comprehension of the military and how it functions which they do not.

Always remember that the defence budget is the single biggest discretionary budget that the government has to work with. They may hesitate to fire ten thousand people in DND but they won't hesitate to spout "I'll take one piece of paper, I'll take my pen, and I will write zero helicopters" or "We will not buy the F-35 fighter jet."

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Don't mistake the concept of "to get something new you have to give up something old" with the concept of "When you give up something old we'll give you something new." The two are not synonymous.
Unfortunately true.

I don't go that far and I'm cynical as hell. I think a lot of folks were doing the best they could for the tribe they were with under very difficult circumstances. That. however, doesn't take the decision out from under being shortsighted and narrowly focused.

I think Canada has been in the rut of focusing on today's defined problems at the expense of preparedness for the vague possibilities of the future. IMHO, that is the wrong approach for a defence force, especially when the vague future problems become more defined and probable day by day.
Agreed
PYs are the currency of government. It's how the length of your d*ck gets measured. IMHO we tend to put many of those PYs into the wrong places - like Ottawa. You need admin staff to run programs. The question is how much are some of these programs needed. Dollars will get you donuts that when we talk PY cuts the PYs in the halls of Ottawa are protected and fought over harder than the ones a hundred, or a thousand, kilometres away. I always thought that the infantry should have given up a rifle coy instead of mortars and ATGMs but I wasn't there to watch the arguments. My guess is that there was some gunner and black hat support if it meant absorbing some of those responsibilities kept cuts from happening in their own camps. Gunners gave up over half of their guns for more and better FSCCs, FOOs, FACs, and STA in order to balance PYs.
I think you are 110% there -- given the fact that a Rifle Company is the easiest Company to replace, the Infantry Corps should have (IMHO) said Roger that - cut a Rifle Coy, and come up with a 70/30 plan to fill that Coy with the PRes. Cutting Combat Support Coy Platoons was incredibly dumb - and frankly if not needed immediately TOW/ADP, Mortars and Pioneers could all form a Rifle Coy if needed in a pinch if Cbt Spt roles where not immediately required. Heck Gunners and others have filled in for Rifle Coy's in the past...

The Guns should have done the same to come up with extra guns/troops from the PRes instead of accepting the massive loss of tubes.




Pay and major equipment come out of separate defined purses. The problem is that in negotiating funds with the government, the need and quantification of pay packets is much easier than the costs associated with capability acquisition and lifetime support. The first is a simple and mathematical exercise that most politicians do understand. The second requires a comprehension of the military and how it functions which they do not.
At the end of the day I blame CCA and staff of the CA for the abject failure to sell the NEEDS of an Army to the rest of the CAF, DND and the Cdn Politicians.
Always remember that the defence budget is the single biggest discretionary budget that the government has to work with. They may hesitate to fire ten thousand people in DND but they won't hesitate to spout "I'll take one piece of paper, I'll take my pen, and I will write zero helicopters" or "We will not buy the F-35 fighter jet."

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Yup.
 
Yes and Maybe!

I say yes, because there is no doubt in my mind that there is a need for at least one artillery battery per brigade tasked as a UCAV launcher battery. Their role would be to arm and launch UCAVs that are too large for easy handling or logistic resupply by forward units. Forward control of such systems can be by any combination of handoff to troops in contact with appropriate control devices; forward artillery observers, MFCs or JTACs; ISTAR UAV assets; or ground control stations with the launcher battery under the management of FSCCs.

I say maybe, because I think that for smaller systems that are not a logistics burden on forward units should be organically held, launched and controlled from within battalions itself. IMHO either double tasking bn mortar platoons dets as UCAV launchers or having dedicated launcher dets who prepare and launch the munitions is the way to go. Control can be by rifle platoons, MFCs or even a control centre at the baseplate CP.

And another maybe is even higher and heavier level of UCAV assets that should properly be an RCAF assets managed/coordinated through the appropriate level of TACP/JTAC.

I'm quite a bit weapon system agnostic as to who should deal with what because the technology is changing daily. That's perhaps why I use the logistics burden as the dividing line. That's both a function of weapon size and expected usage rate. If there aren't already teams and workshops to work out the "rules" I'd like to know why. I expect we can just wing it with UORs when the time comes.

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I never got much past basic arithmetic. Trig has its uses. Calculus is simply showing off.

Apparently this Field Artillery relic from the era of steam gunnery has drawn the same conclusions as me. I am sure @FJAG will agree with his fellow gunner. 😁



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And @dimsum ... for you

Bureaucratic inertia is a thing. Acquisition programs are in motion now, were set in motion years prior, and will continue in years to come to deliver systems for the Army of 2030 and beyond. The problem with our acquisitions process is that it holds the future hostage to the present. Decisions are being taken now by those who will not be around to be held accountable for their decisions, much less subject to the ramifications of their decisions. This is a problem. And it is a huge problem because those who will suffer the consequences of those decisions will be our children and their children. Throwing our hands up in the air and saying we cannot do anything about the Defense Department’s institutional inertia because we believe ourselves hostage to the vicissitudes of Congress and its funding cycles or the rigidity of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process is the shabby excuse of defeatism. Mostly, we are just trapped in our own biases and by our intuitions, and hostage to the mindsets they produce. We owe it to our kids to be as forward looking as humanly possible. We owe generations of soldiers to come (again, our kids) to give them the best tools possible to do the job. In this case, to fight and win our nation’s wars. Nothing is more serious in its consequences than war. This is why I write so poignantly. The time for being gentle is long past. The powers-that-be are not listening or do not get it or both. This is how, at least, it looks from my perspective as a mere cog in the DoD machine. Policymakers and military leaders must pull in the reins. They must halt the institutional inertia on sunset capabilities like howitzers. It is not at all obvious that we are on the right path for future success. A comprehensive reevaluation of systems and programs is necessary for the Army. If this means the production of howitzers must stop immediately and the ones we have get mothballed, then so be it. Turning the Titanic around is far preferable to hitting the iceberg. Look how that turned out.

The heretic.

L. Lance Boothe
L. Lance Boothe is a senior Concepts Developer for Field Artillery in the Concepts Development Division of the Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is a retired Field Artillery Officer and veteran of Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, and Bosnia.
 
I never got much past basic arithmetic. Trig has its uses. Calculus is simply showing off.

Apparently this Field Artillery relic from the era of steam gunnery has drawn the same conclusions as me. I am sure @FJAG will agree with his fellow gunner. 😁



....


And @dimsum ... for you



The heretic.
I mean, calculus is great if you want to know how much soup you can really fit in a bowl 😏
 
Apparently this Field Artillery relic from the era of steam gunnery has drawn the same conclusions as me. I am sure @FJAG will agree with his fellow gunner. 😁
I actually don't agree entirely with him.

I fully agree on math. Artillery lives and dies on trigonometry. I've mentioned before that I never understood it in high school but during my second phase of basic arty offr trg the lightbulb went on and I started to ace trig and log tables and slide rules - you name it. It suddenly all made sense.

I never understood why the Americans adopted or stayed with the azimuth system when the bearing system is so much simpler to implement. True story, the M777 works on the azimuth system but Canada adopted the British LINAPS -based digital gun management system to digitize the gun thus staying with the bearing system. The Aussies opted for the American digital fire control system and consequently were forced to change from a half century of using the bearing system to the azimuth system.

That leads me to part three about math - math is garbage in and garbage out. There's There are many parts of the equation that he doesn't go into - cost per round is one.

A critical one is survivability and redundancy. If one HIMARS pod lays down the fire of a canon battalion 1 Rd FFE then if you lose one HIMARS, you lose a battalion's worth of support. Basically the "all eggs in one basket" problem. So at its most basic it would be silly to replace a cannon battery with just one HIMARS - you'd need several.

Then there's the basic load he talks about but let's simply look at each gun's in-turret ammo - say 30 to 40 rounds. Once a HIMARS fires its pod, it's out of action and needs to bugger off for a reload which takes time. A canon battalion can fire the equivalent of a HIMARS pod (give or take based on his figures) but then it can fire another and another and another (you get the point) for up to 30 or 40 times. If like the US it has M992 then there are another 93 ready rounds at hand. Yes - you probably want to move the guns as well but with 18 guns you can move some while you keep others in action providing continuous support - a single HIMARS can't do that.

Then there are ammo types. I have yet to see a HIMARS illuminating or smoke round. Interestingly, to lay a linear smoke screen or multi-pattern illumination mission you need several guns and while its technically feasible to create these ammunitions for HIMARS and maybe even work out the technical solution to ripple out the pattern required, no one has done it yet.

I'm far from being the dinosaur who wants to keep horses, which he seems to relegate gunners who disagree with him to, I'm a firm believer that you need to do a lot more math then he has done. There is not only room for, but a necessity to have a broad mix of mortars, guns, rockets and UCAVs as part of the indirect fire mix. Add in missiles and lasers and EW for air defence and UAVs and radars and even audio sensors for STA.

Incidentally at the RCAS, they do teach meatball, handraulic indirect fire calculation for when the electronic stuff goes down, but there are some trades - like the old surveyor and survey offrs course I took - that're no longer in the mix. That makes it tricky to do some of the higher order work needed to couple multiple batteries and regiments together if we lose GPS and the like. Not impossible - just hard.

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