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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Pool what guns are left after the Ceremonial Units are kitted out with guns able to fire blank rounds.
Non Repairable guns are left in the Armouries to be used as training aids and for dry fire training on the parade square or what ever.
Working guns are pooled at Petawawa or Meaford with a service crew to maintain them made of Reg and Res Force members.

Units close to Petawawa or get funding to send troops from outside the area to work with 2Horse to learn how the M777 works and train to be part of the gun crew on their exercises so the troops are trained and deployable if the guns are ever needed to be forward deployed again.

The same can be done at Gagetown, Wainwright, and at Shilo.
Much of that is going on already. Unfortunately the maintenance program is severely handicapped by an inability to get parts. I'm not sure how much ability the Materiel manager has in this matter to get foreign parts (like Korea's) but one of the complications is that many of the issues with the gun relate to unique components created when the bankrupt company in Europe converted our C1s to C3s. You can only do so much through in-service maintenance management. This thing needs a project which folks at the centre do not seem prepared to throw any money at.

I'm going to throw this out there. All the talk of guns, cannons and howitzers is this not a case of "fighting the last war" or in this instant the one going on now? Is tube artillery really going to be as big as it looks right now?
yes the Russian and Ukrainians are using a ton on it. But is that a case of that is what they have not of what they would like? (yes there will always be a need for tube artillery) But would not investing in different fires not be the away to go? MLRS etc?
Guns remain a key component of a balanced force, in part costs of the projectile is far cheaper than a guided system, in part because once fired , there are, as yet, very few things to stop the bullet, and in part because sometimes you need a mass of fire or illumination or smoke or a whole variety of things done better and more cheaply by guns.

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Contract SK to rebuild 150 of their M101's and send to us, so at least the Gunners have something. Update the FCS to the same as the M777, for training purposes, leave the barrel alone. Meanwhile go shopping for better guns/mortars both 155 and 105/120mm. Plus MRLS, gun based AD systems.
 
Honestly @Colin Parkinson I wouldn’t waste any time on the M101/C1 at this point.

I suspect any efforts there would take about as long as a rapid buy of M119A3’s
While I’m not sold on 105mm viability, you could get them fairly quickly and replace the C3 and LG at the same time, and have 1 standard 105mm howitzer for the CA.

The other advantage to the M119 is you can tow it with a Hummer, not a 5ton plus cargo truck.
 
Thank you, @Spencer100 and @KevinB

So (and I've got absolutely zero background in this) it sounds like for something around $200 million you could have a plant, and for perhaps $2+ million per year fill it with people. Set up licensing to make barrels for whatever the CAF is operating, and pursue, with whatever flex capacity is left over, contracts with those same companies to act as part of their manufacturing chain. Probably some good (not DND's problem, but Industry or someone else) opportunities for partnerships with whatever training bodies handle machinists and so on.

In the lists of government expenditures, this sounds not terribly pricey: a not particularly helpful highway interchange just down the road set the province back something like $90 million, so a federal expenditure of something over twice (or even three, with the usual overruns, unexpecteds, and padding) that for a domestic niche industrial capacity doesn't seem excessive.. Ditto a few million a year on well-paying manufacturing jobs.
 
Thank you, @Spencer100 and @KevinB

So (and I've got absolutely zero background in this) it sounds like for something around $200 million you could have a plant, and for perhaps $2+ million per year fill it with people. Set up licensing to make barrels for whatever the CAF is operating, and pursue, with whatever flex capacity is left over, contracts with those same companies to act as part of their manufacturing chain. Probably some good (not DND's problem, but Industry or someone else) opportunities for partnerships with whatever training bodies handle machinists and so on.

In the lists of government expenditures, this sounds not terribly pricey: a not particularly helpful highway interchange just down the road set the province back something like $90 million, so a federal expenditure of something over twice (or even three, with the usual overruns, unexpecteds, and padding) that for a domestic niche industrial capacity doesn't seem excessive.. Ditto a few million a year on well-paying manufacturing jobs.
That is just some machining and assembly of the barrels. There are tons of other things required. Material, the major subassemblies, like wheels, hydraulics, many parts etc etc.

Add now the license fees. Some else here said it would be able to machine other barrels for the tanks and Navy etc. Well that would take Leonardo, Rheinmetall, Nexter and BAE to all pay nice together. Never happen. Looking at the Colt Canada model and even with Canada as a guarantee you can't get major competitors to play nice. cough cough pistol buy.

Million in training for the skilled labour force needed. Highly specialized.

In the end if we got a howitzer for under $10 million per unit (and not CDN full lifetime cost) I would be surprised.

Plus looking again today......(because I waste time on this than real work! urgh.....) I think you would be over 500 million in capital. Looking back at the LEO 2 Maintenace and upgrade RFP The floor requirements were a small fortune. The leadtime on ordering this manufacturing equipment type is now running out years. The tube boring equipment alone would buy you a fleet of green trucks. Millions for the 10 ton (you may get away with 5 ton but I would not try) craneway plus leadtime is running long on these too.
 
I think we can all accept that it would be POSSIBLE to set up our our manufacturing line here in Canada but the question is "is it worth it"?

For the expense and effort (including political expense and effort which quite frankly just doesn't exist) to set up this facility what is the opportunity cost? What else could we do with those defence dollars? The same money that we'd pump into gaining the capacity to machine our limited number of gun barrels (even if you managed to set it up to do artillery, tank and naval gun barrels) could be put into so many other requirements like AD systems, loitering munitions, ATGMs, radios, UAV/UGV/USV/UUV's, etc.

Get the artillery cheaper from an existing OEM and use the savings to put into other capabilities. I'm sure there are other, more financially viable partnerships with defence contractors to onshore production of important weapons/systems/components than setting up our own gun barrel facility for our tiny national requirement.
 
OEMs are overwhelmed right now, lacking capacity to take on new business. Marx may have been correct about the need to control the means of production.
 
Honestly @Colin Parkinson I wouldn’t waste any time on the M101/C1 at this point.

I suspect any efforts there would take about as long as a rapid buy of M119A3’s
While I’m not sold on 105mm viability, you could get them fairly quickly and replace the C3 and LG at the same time, and have 1 standard 105mm howitzer for the CA.

The other advantage to the M119 is you can tow it with a Hummer, not a 5ton plus cargo truck.
At this point we should be as desperate as a crack whore needing their next fix, but the last one still hasn't worn off completely. I would take anything.
 
That is just some machining and assembly of the barrels. There are tons of other things required. Material, the major subassemblies, like wheels, hydraulics, many parts etc etc.

Add now the license fees. Some else here said it would be able to machine other barrels for the tanks and Navy etc. Well that would take Leonardo, Rheinmetall, Nexter and BAE to all pay nice together. Never happen. Looking at the Colt Canada model and even with Canada as a guarantee you can't get major competitors to play nice. cough cough pistol buy.

Million in training for the skilled labour force needed. Highly specialized.

In the end if we got a howitzer for under $10 million per unit (and not CDN full lifetime cost) I would be surprised.

Plus looking again today......(because I waste time on this than real work! urgh.....) I think you would be over 500 million in capital. Looking back at the LEO 2 Maintenace and upgrade RFP The floor requirements were a small fortune. The leadtime on ordering this manufacturing equipment type is now running out years. The tube boring equipment alone would buy you a fleet of green trucks. Millions for the 10 ton (you may get away with 5 ton but I would not try) craneway plus leadtime is running long on these too.
Honestly IF you had an OEM willing partner, I think you could do it for significantly less.
But, frankly I don’t see the likelihood of that occurring, as Canada’s ‘needs’ (or willing acquisition may be a better word) are infinitesimally small compared to most G7 or G20 Nations.

Elsewhere @FJAG had postulated that 160 tube artillery is probably Canada’s max need at current numbers, that’s basically 8 Artillery Reg’t with 3x6 gun batteries, a few training guns and spares.

If we project that number and expect 5 years (probably very low end for Canada’s typical annual expenditure of Arty rounds) / tube that works out to around 32 barrels a year, no OEM is going to agree to a license for 32 barrel a year.
Now they’d probably agree to a license with the CoG, so a Crown Corp to me is the only way this sort of domestic production method would fly.
If done correctly that entity could also make LAV 25mm barrels —> 155mm barrels and cover what’s in between. Which would probably offset the annual operating costs somewhat that buying direct from a foreign OEM, but the only real rational is for in case of war that Canada has domestic production capacity and that would require a massive stock of the various ordnance alloys use in the various barrels, which requires resolve to be prepared.

None of which I see anywhere in Canadian Politics in any party, or their followers.
 
  • In 1940, the Honourable C.D. Howe became the Minister of the newly-created Department of Munitions and Supply. This government department controlled and coordinated all aspects of war production.
  • This department was, in a sense, one of the biggest businesses in the world. It coordinated all purchases made in Canada by British and other Allied governments for things like military transport vehicles, tanks, cargo and military ships, aircraft, guns and small arms, ammunition as well as uniforms, minesweeping equipment, parachutes, firefighting equipment, and hospital supplies. It also created 28 Crown corporations to produce everything from rifles to synthetic rubber.
  • For example, the Canadian Cycle and Motor Co. Ltd. of Weston, Ontario, which had made bicycles and hockey skates before the war, took over the manufacture of armaments including gun parts, tripods for Bren guns, and cradles and pivots for anti-tank guns.
  • There were spin off industries born of wartime conditions. For example, Industrial Engineering Ltd. of Vancouver produced a much-improved chainsaw. This development increased the efficiency of lumberjacks and also allowed some people to cut wood who otherwise would not be physically able to do the job. In these ways, the new chainsaw helped fill the gap created by the lumber industry's loss of personnel to military service.
  • Liquid Carbonic Canadian Corporation, a Quebec company, had a soda fountain division which was turned over to building tank parts.
  • the contract to produce 1,100 Mosquito fighter-bombers was awarded to De Havilland, but they only did the final assembly. General Motors made the fuselages, Massey Ferguson made the wings, Boeing made the tailplanes, the flaps were made by Canadian Power Boat Company, and the undercarriages were built by Otaco. Numerous other smaller companies were also involved in producing other parts for this aircraft as well.
  • Inglis was a Canadian company that made a huge proportion of the Bren guns used during WWII, as well as other munitions. At its peak, Inglis employed 17,800 workers…and yet in 1937 the company was bankrupt and in receivership, employing all of three maintenance caretakers. (Washing machines and machine guns)
Conversion of existing plant.
 
Just for comparison, the M777s bought in 2008, including support, cost us just under $3,000,000 apiece for 25 of them.

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Heidi Klum Wow GIF by Lifetime
 
  • In 1940, the Honourable C.D. Howe became the Minister of the newly-created Department of Munitions and Supply. This government department controlled and coordinated all aspects of war production.
  • This department was, in a sense, one of the biggest businesses in the world. It coordinated all purchases made in Canada by British and other Allied governments for things like military transport vehicles, tanks, cargo and military ships, aircraft, guns and small arms, ammunition as well as uniforms, minesweeping equipment, parachutes, firefighting equipment, and hospital supplies. It also created 28 Crown corporations to produce everything from rifles to synthetic rubber.
  • For example, the Canadian Cycle and Motor Co. Ltd. of Weston, Ontario, which had made bicycles and hockey skates before the war, took over the manufacture of armaments including gun parts, tripods for Bren guns, and cradles and pivots for anti-tank guns.
  • There were spin off industries born of wartime conditions. For example, Industrial Engineering Ltd. of Vancouver produced a much-improved chainsaw. This development increased the efficiency of lumberjacks and also allowed some people to cut wood who otherwise would not be physically able to do the job. In these ways, the new chainsaw helped fill the gap created by the lumber industry's loss of personnel to military service.
  • Liquid Carbonic Canadian Corporation, a Quebec company, had a soda fountain division which was turned over to building tank parts.
  • the contract to produce 1,100 Mosquito fighter-bombers was awarded to De Havilland, but they only did the final assembly. General Motors made the fuselages, Massey Ferguson made the wings, Boeing made the tailplanes, the flaps were made by Canadian Power Boat Company, and the undercarriages were built by Otaco. Numerous other smaller companies were also involved in producing other parts for this aircraft as well.
  • Inglis was a Canadian company that made a huge proportion of the Bren guns used during WWII, as well as other munitions. At its peak, Inglis employed 17,800 workers…and yet in 1937 the company was bankrupt and in receivership, employing all of three maintenance caretakers. (Washing machines and machine guns)
Conversion of existing plant.
Full mobilization of the country during a global war is not in any way comparable to making a few boutique systems for the tiny CAF we have now.

There is no doubt Canada could in theory make pretty much anything we wanted to make for the CAF, the problem with the theory is that the reality of our situation makes it impractical/impossible. I don't see the culture of the entire country shifting to allow even a partial mobilization of industry so the CAF can have Made in Canada kit.

If we want to replace the C3 sometime in our lifetimes, we should likely set more attainable goals...
 
Full mobilization of the country during a global war is not in any way comparable to making a few boutique systems for the tiny CAF we have now.

There is no doubt Canada could in theory make pretty much anything we wanted to make for the CAF, the problem with the theory is that the reality of our situation makes it impractical/impossible. I don't see the culture of the entire country shifting to allow even a partial mobilization of industry so the CAF can have Made in Canada kit.

If we want to replace the C3 sometime in our lifetimes, we should likely set more attainable goals...
One does not preclude the other. Part of the problem with these "Logical equations" is that most of the West is doing the same calculations, hoping someone else will shoulder the burden. I don't think it's lost on China that the West could not currently conduct two long term peer to peer conflicts simultaneously. I would buy whatever we can get our hands on to keep our current generation of gunners engaged.
At the same time, I suspect that if Canada created a Defence related Crown Corp, and slowly started to add specialised industrial capabilities, that eventual it will get contracts overseas, particularly if it focused on niches that are lacking elsewhere. In essence this is a strategic reserve of industrial capacity, for us and the West.
 
Full mobilization of the country during a global war is not in any way comparable to making a few boutique systems for the tiny CAF we have now.

There is no doubt Canada could in theory make pretty much anything we wanted to make for the CAF, the problem with the theory is that the reality of our situation makes it impractical/impossible. I don't see the culture of the entire country shifting to allow even a partial mobilization of industry so the CAF can have Made in Canada kit.

If we want to replace the C3 sometime in our lifetimes, we should likely set more attainable goals...
I think that you are right there. Determining what an attainable goal is, however, means determining the extent to which a Canadian government will be prepared to commit in a singular major crisis, then perhaps multiple moderate crises, then routine day-to-day minor crisis. In each case that has to be determined in face of the political benefits accrued with participation as an actual threat to the country is limited.

I think our major domestic threat is some form of military challenge to our territorial limits for resource exploitation - whether minerals in the Arctic or fish stocks off our coasts. In that case we want to ensure that we have enough political capital so that our NATO allies assist with concrete support. The only way I see that happening is if we are seen to be contributing to their collective defence as well and showing that we are serious about our own defence. I'll gloss over actually showing ourselves as having a credible deterrence structure.

Considering our resource base and our GDP, I think we would be seen as lacking political and military credibility amongst our allies and our enemies if we had anything less than the ability to commit a divisional headquarters with two manoeuvre brigades, one sustainment brigade and a portion of an artillery brigade with the ability to sustain that. To me that means domestically we need six manoeuvre and probably three support brigades made up of both RegF and ResF components. (I think our planned Navy is adequate if we would arm our AOPS and Kingston class better (or at all) with both anti-ship and air defence weapon systems. The Air Force plans are barely adequate. We need much better unmanned strike capability)

All that to say the numbers are achievable within the current manpower envelope and I say that knowing that it's just a few less manoeuvre brigades than the British have with a considerably larger army, but their brigades for the most part have well over twice the manoeuvre units in them as we or the Americans have and the Brits and Americans have considerably more support brigades.

Interesting aside when we talk about the C3 as a "training gun". I asked the question of a very senior Army officer from the time when the C1s were upgraded to C3s as to why we bothered doing that for a "training gun" where range really didn't matter. His answer was that the C3 was never considered as a "training gun" but as an in-service "operational gun". We would have deployed them in the right circumstances. I'm not sure that I buy that, but I definitely buy the sentiment. We should never, ever buy a weapon system or other equipment that is a "training thing". Sure buy simulators and sub calibre devices etc but as to the weapon systems themselves they need to be ones with a clear operational use.

That brings me back to "attainable goals". Before we do anything else, the country needs to clearly define just what it is that the Army wants to be when it grows up. That means what type of singular major, no-fail, crisis do we need to be prepared for? What level of political clout do we, as a country, wish to carry? Basically, the other moderate and minor crises will just be a day-to-day subset of that. What we have to stop doing is puttering along with only an ability to spin out the odd battle group here or there. It makes us look weak and powerless at the table. That's something in the long run that we cannot afford.

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BAE went and made an Archer variant on the HEMTT for the US Army. Debuting at AUSA on October.
Part of the feedback from the Wheeled Artillery program (the US Army wasn’t going to entertain yet another shelled vehicle in inventory at this point).

IF Canada had HEMTT’s (and that’s another issue by itself) I’d say the HEMTT-Archer would probably be a great vehicle for LAV Bde’s, and allow the 777 to be focused towards a Light Bde.
 
US has already sent M119A3 105mm gun to the Ukraine, they are taking advantage of the gun and ammo.

It still has its place, but CAF needs updated gun platform or a truck load of spare parts
 
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