Best Base/Training Area for Tanks/Combined Arms

[FJAG]

Yes but what would Bde Parades and other silliness do without them

Most of my parades in 2 and 3 RCHA were without bands.

For anything big you can always have a couple of Class A bandsmen from the brigade's Res F units play.

The Ceremonial Guard in Ottawa each summer are reservists. Value for money.

 

[GR66]

The one thing that you have to remember about anything that I say is that, as a precondition, the reserves need to be reformed. The fact that they have not been strikes me as the greatest failure by our leadership in the effective management of DND's human resources.

That said, and other than Federal employment legislation, only a few matters require legislative change. The vast bulk of the change is regulatory, orders and directives, and a major change in attitude, all within DND's power to make and enforce.

That's actually 3 x Combined arms battalion HQ (the Cal H bn has a 10% Reg F leadership component) with 2 x tank squadrons and 3 x rifle companies

You're essentially right although you are missing out on a reduction (and corresponding ability to reassign) of other trades from signals to service support and medical.

The premise here was to maximize the use of the Wainwright and Suffield ranges. The organization I proposed has the following objectives:

a) to recognize that heavy armoured forces is both a necessary skill level we need to maintain and at the same time is the one we are least likely to use in the future;.

b) to reduce the annual personnel costs for the ABCT by making the force appx 40% reservists allowing the reallocation of scarce Reg F PYs (2 and 3 PPCLI and various support trades) to higher priority roles and missions;

c) to maintain a sufficient core of Reg F PYs to maintain a high level of expertise in the field of heavy armoured warfare and to be able to meet possible roto 0 and 1 missions if required in OOTW scenarios;

c) to be able to generate a full ABCT if required;

d) to concentrate all heavy armour to maximize use of Wainwright and Suffield (when available) and to simplify heavy armour maintenance; and

e) to do all of the above in an infrastructure neutral, equipment neutral scenario.

As an aside if one chose to exercise the option to combine 2 and 3 PPCLI (now in Shilo) with two light battlegroups in BC and MB/SK using all of the RSS, CBG staff, and various support units, you would essentially double the number of equipped and trained brigades in western Canada with little or no change in infrastructure or personnel levels while having removed two unnecessary CBG headquarters. Again, this IBCT would have roto 0 and 1 capabilities and a mobilization capability (this time with the ability to focus on amphibious, mountain and open terrain capabilities which could be oriented to the Pacific theatre. This force, could with time be reformed into something in the nature of an MDTF - the ranges in Shilo and the rest of the West would be very suitable for both LRPR and AD firing and practice; the vast distances between facilities somewhat mimic the distances in the Pacific.

Just as another aside, I'm not changing any guns at all. 1 RCHA's gun battery in Shilo will still have M777s and 20 Fd and 20 Ind Bty still have their C3s. The artillery equipment problem can't be solved with a reorganization. Hopefully, with a formal reorganization into a proper ABCT, an artillery re-equipping program will follow and all the M777s will be reassigned into IBCTs while the C3s are given a well-earned retirement (or sold to Bolivia)


Another bonus is the Artillery band can be demobilized and the PYs traded in for an anti-armour platoon.

GR66. I quite like doing these mental paper napkin exercises because I can stretch them to test the possibilities and the weaknesses of maximizing all the people available to the Army. I've seen a number of Reg F folks on this forum participate in them and my hope is that one of these days the concept will hit a high enough rank level where it will stick and real reform will happen. It's too late for my generation - we blew it in the eighties when all our leadership was firmly mired in the NATO forces-in-being mythology and completely ignoring the US Army's reserve forces model.

I think these mental exercises are extremely valuable as well. One of the things I enjoy most about this site is that ideas can be thrown out for discussion...even if they are not yet fully formed...and you get thoughtful, reasoned feedback from people with a wide range of experiences and different points of view. Sometimes that will lead you to say "damn, I never thought of that" and drop the idea as a dead end and other times it might lead you to say "great point...so what if we approached it this way instead?".

With that spirit of constructive criticism in mind, I'd make the following comments.

Firstly, as I've stated before, I'm not one of those that believes that a direct conventional conflict with Russia in Europe is our greatest (or even a likely) military threat. That being said, I'm also not one of those that believes that this by extension means that we can/should then abandon our heavy capabilities (such that they are) in favour of an all light force. With regard to our tanks in particular, to quote Monty Python "I'm not dead yet!".

Secondly, while I understand that having dedicated combined arms battalions would provide the benefit of gaining real experience in tank-infantry cooperation, I also feel that in effect splitting off approx. 1/3 of your infantry force (even if heavily augmented by Reservists) you are in effect dedicating a large portion of your capability into what is probably the least likely element of the Army to be deployed. Added to this is the fact that that the LAV as a vehicle is not really suited to the ABCT role. Without any real prospect of Canada procuring an actual IFV then you are in effect creating a force structure which doesn't have the equipment available to actually allow it to fulfill its supposed doctrinal role...come to think of it, maybe that's what would make it the perfect Canadian Army solution!

The other issue I have with combined arms battalions is that I feel like it would worsen, rather than improve the split that already exists between the Reg Force infantry and the Reserve infantry. Already we have the problem of the Reserve infantry not being able to provide unit/sub-unit augmentation to the Reg Force LAV battalions due to their not having LAVs, the ability to support having LAVs and the training/proficiency to man the LAVs (and no plans in place to every supply them with LAVs). Add tanks to the Battalions and this situation becomes even worse. In your proposal you had just two Reserve infantry Regiments (out of a total of 51 Army-wide) with a LAV infantry role. It comes across as more of a piecemeal solution to a specific problem rather than a "total force" type of approach.

Personally, I'd prefer to look at options that can hopefully maintain (and expand) our current quasi-heavy capabilities, maintain as much flexibility as possible and at the same time provide for as much opportunity to better integrate the Reserves into an overall force structure. I'd try to do this in a way that takes into account our current equipment constraints but at the same time would allow for future capability expansion without the need to again change the force structure in order to integrate those capabilities.

Simple, right?

 

[daftandbarmy]

The British seem similarly confused about what to do with their heavy armour... and Suffield.

Maybe we can take over Suffield from the British and turn it into our 'heavy centre of gravity'.

British Army decides to upgrade tanks, but Suffield fate unknown until later this year​

The British Army will upgrade rather than scrap its heavy tank divisions, the U.K. House of Commons was told this week, but will scale back the number of units and will make decisions on a worldwide network of training facilities, like CFB Suffield, later this year.

That comes after debate about the need for armour on the battlefield of the future and local worry about an exit of the British Army Training Unit Suffield from the sprawling base west of Medicine Hat.

“Army Transformation, as it affects existing units, including BATUS, will be developed through spring and early summer 2021 (with) more detailed announcements are expected by the autumn,” reads a statement from BATUS through communications with Canadian Department of National Defence.

“Activity (at CFB Suffield) will resume from 2022 onwards. Detail on the scale and type of training activities has yet to be confirmed and will be agreed in collaboration with our Canadian allies.”

This week, the full implications of an Integrated Review of defence priorities returned to the U.K. House of Commons.

It calls for major increases in naval and air power, a huge shipbuilding program, as well as emerging technologies like drones, robotics and cyber security.

The Army itself faces a reduction of 9,000 troops among major budget adjustments, but will move ahead with spending an estimated 750-million pounds to modernize 150 Challenger 2 tanks, reducing the active fleet by one third.

Canadian officials told the News they are working in close contact with British Army officials through the process.

“We recognize BATUS’ importance to the Canadian Armed Forces, the local community and the Province of Alberta,” a statement reads. “We have, and will continue to, express these crucial points during our discussions with United Kingdom.”

The Integrated Review also calls on the army to take on a greater role in partnerships in NATO and with allies, especially in special operations, and will include major investments in ground-based air defence, and an “accelerated procurement of an enhanced armoured infantry fighting vehicle.”

“In an era of robotics and artificial intelligence, we will need to stop thinking about the strength of the Army simply in terms of numbers but focus on how best it can achieve what we ask of it,” read the BATUS statement.

“The Army will be more balanced, and ultimately more effectively matched to the threat, now and in the future. This transformation will be about keeping people, supported by technology, at the heart of our capability.”

The Challenger 2 has been the main battle tank of the British Army for decades and was last updated in the mid-1990s. Going forward new “Challenger 3” tanks will number 150, compared to 227 in service currently. The remainder will be mothballed.

That value of maintaining heavy armour at all was debated over the summer, considering the relative size, and whether money would be better spent in other areas to maintain required contributions to NATO.

That threw into question the need for maintaining a presence at CFB Suffield, which hosted battlegroups and armoured divisions under agreement since 1972.

Local training was cancelled in 2020 as troops redeployed in the United Kingdom to help maintain supply chains and bolster the national Health Service during the early pandemic.

Last summer the decision was made to train domestically in 2021 considering lingering doubts about travel.

About two dozen Challenger 2s maintained at CFB Suffield were shipped to England, along with about 1,000 other vehicles set to be decommissioned.

British Army decides to upgrade tanks, but Suffield fate unknown until later this year - Medicine Hat News

cgallant@medicinehatnews.com@CollinGallant The British Army will upgrade rather than scrap its heavy tank divisions, the U.K. House of Commons was told this week, but will scale back the number of units and will make decisions on a worldwide network of training facilities, like CFB Suffield...

medicinehatnews.com

 

[GR66]

The British seem similarly confused about what to do with their heavy armour... and Suffield.

I think the confusion partially comes from a single minded focus on tanks and their role in Maneuver warfare in open terrain. The proliferation of ATGMs, precision guided munitions, UAVs and loitering munitions, etc. does raise some questions about the survivability of tanks moving in open terrain. I'm sure there will continue to be back and forth shifts between the effectiveness of AT weapons and the defensive measures to counter them, but at this moment in time the balance appears to be shifting somewhat away from tanks.

On the other hand, I think the one place where heavy armour still remains an absolute necessity is in urban warfare. Especially if movement in the open becomes more restricted in future conflicts (due to the factors noted above), then the combatants will naturally take cover in built up areas where precision and long range weapons/sensors have reduced capability. I think the need for and importance of tanks is actually likely to increase in the future rather than be eliminated. The primary role however might be different.

 

[Kirkhill]

The demise of the tank has been predicted since, at least, 1967?

Since then thousands of tanks have been built. And hundreds destroyed in battle. And they are still here. And they still perform good service.

But the one trend is a reduction in the numbers of tanks built, fielded and upgraded. Many tanks are being sold off, or indeed given away, from existing stocks. I believe that speaks to a diminishing utility.

Not with a bang but a whimper?

 

[FJAG]

Firstly, as I've stated before, I'm not one of those that believes that a direct conventional conflict with Russia in Europe is our greatest (or even a likely) military threat. That being said, I'm also not one of those that believes that this by extension means that we can/should then abandon our heavy capabilities (such that they are) in favour of an all light force. With regard to our tanks in particular, to quote Monty Python "I'm not dead yet!".

The "all light force" is where we differ. My belief is in multiple capabilities with the majority of the Reg F in the light and medium categories.

Secondly, while I understand that having dedicated combined arms battalions would provide the benefit of gaining real experience in tank-infantry cooperation, I also feel that in effect splitting off approx. 1/3 of your infantry force (even if heavily augmented by Reservists) you are in effect dedicating a large portion of your capability into what is probably the least likely element of the Army to be deployed. Added to this is the fact that that the LAV as a vehicle is not really suited to the ABCT role. Without any real prospect of Canada procuring an actual IFV then you are in effect creating a force structure which doesn't have the equipment available to actually allow it to fulfill its supposed doctrinal role...come to think of it, maybe that's what would make it the perfect Canadian Army solution!

That needs a small correction. We have nine Reg F battalions and I'm dedicating just one (1 PPCLI notionally) to the ABCT so only 1/9th of the Reg F infantry is dedicated to the heavy brigade. There is a slightly heavier armour component--two of nine squadrons--to the tanks and artillery component --1/2 of 3 Reg F HQ btys, 1 of six gun batteries and 1 of three FOO batteries.

The fact that the equivalent of two bns of LAVs go to the heavy ABCT should be irrelevant to your position because you advocate and all light force while the LAVs are a medium component. That leaves the Reg F with 4 medium LAV infantry bns and 4 light battalions which greatly favours your vision of the force. Not to mention that all of the Maritimes', Quebec's and Ontario's Res F infantry units remain light as well.

The LAV isn't my ideal for an ABCT's IFV either but in the words of Rumsfeld "its the Army we have". It will do for training and has been made to work in operations in Afghanistan and is doing it in Latvia as we speak.

The other issue I have with combined arms battalions is that I feel like it would worsen, rather than improve the split that already exists between the Reg Force infantry and the Reserve infantry. Already we have the problem of the Reserve infantry not being able to provide unit/sub-unit augmentation to the Reg Force LAV battalions due to their not having LAVs, the ability to support having LAVs and the training/proficiency to man the LAVs (and no plans in place to every supply them with LAVs). Add tanks to the Battalions and this situation becomes even worse. In your proposal you had just two Reserve infantry Regiments (out of a total of 51 Army-wide) with a LAV infantry role. It comes across as more of a piecemeal solution to a specific problem rather than a "total force" type of approach.

I don't follow that. All the Reg F and Res F units in 1 ABCT have the same equipment and doctrine while those for the rest of the Army focus on light and medium equipment and doctrine. There is nothing to prevent assigning other Res F units in other regions to an ABCT augmentation role by providing them some training equipment and having them do annual training exercises with 1 ABCT. That should be unifying to a total force. (As an example, 1 ABCT's Reg F units do their training in Wainwright during the spring months as they do now while all Res F 1 ABCT designated units go to Wainwright in the summer for individual heavy equipment training and a two to three week exercise - 1 ABCT plans and controls all training)

Personally, I'd prefer to look at options that can hopefully maintain (and expand) our current quasi-heavy capabilities, maintain as much flexibility as possible and at the same time provide for as much opportunity to better integrate the Reserves into an overall force structure. I'd try to do this in a way that takes into account our current equipment constraints but at the same time would allow for future capability expansion without the need to again change the force structure in order to integrate those capabilities.

Simple, right?

I tend to believe that unless we do something concrete we will continue down the road we're on.

In many ways, creating a smaller and hybrid ABCT, also gives us the opportunity to greatly develop our IBCT and MBCT AND CS and CSS capabilities. I think that the current symmetric mixed capability CMBGs are the greatest impediment in progressing to a new level ability. We continue to be more fixated on form and equality between regiments than seeking solutions to how to fight in modern conflicts. Yes, there will be a difference as between ABCT Reg F and Res F units on the one hand and IBCT/MBCT Reg F and Res F units on the other but that's because they are inherently different.

In any reasonable Army we would be looking how to build on ideas like MDTFs and the delivery of long range strike capabilities. With respect, that's not your Mark 1 No 1 rifleman. Yes, we will still need them but not in the numbers that we currently have. If out of the eight remaining infantry battalions we reduce the numbers to six with a light brigade and a medium brigade of three each that would provide a thousand Reg F PYs to put into new CS capabilities. Plus leave another battalion of LAVs to distribute to Res F medium battalions for training and augmentation. Many of those CS capabilities are also Res F friendly which stretches the capability pool even wider once we can afford the necessary equipment.

 

[GR66]

I want to make a HUGE clarification to my position. I am NOT in favour of going to an all Light force:

Firstly, as I've stated before, I'm not one of those that believes that a direct conventional conflict with Russia in Europe is our greatest (or even a likely) military threat. That being said, I'm also NOT one of those that believes that this by extension means that we can/should then abandon our heavy capabilities (such that they are) in favour of an all light force. With regard to our tanks in particular, to quote Monty Python "I'm not dead yet!".

I most definitely and strongly believe that we need to maintain a heavy capability. We may disagree as to where it might be most likely to be used, but we probably both agree that it could be largely a Reserve capability.

 

[FJAG]

I want to make a HUGE clarification to my position. I am NOT in favour of going to an all Light force:

Okay. That's my bad. I obviously misread that the first time through. Sorry about that.

I most definitely and strongly believe that we need to maintain a heavy capability. We may disagree as to where it might be most likely to be used, but we probably both agree that it could be largely a Reserve capability.

So we're good then?

Now all we have to do is convince the Reg F that giving big, but old, toys to the Res F with an appropriate maintenance capability would not anger the gods so as to visit the country with a pestilence.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Okay. That's my bad. I obviously misread that the first time through. Sorry about that.


So we're good then?

Now all we have to do is convince the Reg F that giving big, but old, toys to the Res F with an appropriate maintenance capability would not anger the gods so as to visit the country with a pestilence.

Sadly, the Reserves are so inconsistent that we're more of a liability than and asset right now.

Ironically, IMHO, because of the efforts of the Reserve senior leadership to make themselves look like a viable 'shadow Army' instead of a backup for the full time team.

 

[FJAG]

Sadly, the Reserves are so inconsistent that we're more of a liability than and asset right now.

Ironically, IMHO, because of the efforts of the Reserve senior leadership to make themselves look like a viable 'shadow Army' instead of a backup for the full time team.

Inconsistent is a good word for it because there are some units that manage to do very well with the opportunities that they are given while others fail to thrive.

It's the same for Reg F support which varies both amongst RSS staff as well as the regional Reg F units which could provide support. I remember back in 1973, F Bty being an "unofficial battery" of 2 RCHA at the time had to borrow equipment from across all of Central Area's Res F units. In exchange we provided all of those units with a completely equipped battery and DS and safety staff every weekend they came to exercise in Petawawa. It worked extremely well for all parties but no other Reg F regiment had a similar agreement. 2 RCHA still seems to support 4 Div better than most others. Long story short, the Army lives in two very distinct worlds until it deploys on operations, trains up the reserves and finally work together with them in fairly large numbers.

I think you are right about senior leadership. For the eight odd years I spent on C Res & Cdts Council I dealt with all the heads of the various Res F components. Most were good folks. Some ran good organizations (the Meds and Sigs Res (still separate at the time) while other were Class B "careerists" or Reg F retreads (both good and bad). The Army Res was a particular problem because the head Army Res F guy doesn't run anything - he's a staff weinie and my feeling was that none of the Army Res F BGens had any particular influence. That said, for the most part I think they were better than the average Army Res F LCol/Col because the gene pool for the BGen was bigger than for each of the lower ranks.

Throughout my tenure there were numerous worthwhile projects in the system - the Res F pension being one albeit it took almost a decade to get it through. There were several airy-fairy attempts to get more performance out of the Res F which showed quite clearly that the Reg F hierarchy didn't understand what they had. One was that every reservist's career path had to include an operational deployment every four years. This was, of course, at the height of transformation as the Army was stressing out with Bosnia and Afghanistan.

I got slapped upside the head a few times for criticizing our inability to mobilize. "Mobilize" was and continues to be a dirty word. At the time it was based on the transformation process and our managed readiness system that effectively said we would never deploy anything more than a battlegroup overwatched by a brigade headquarters. With nine Reg F battlegroup hqs (12 if you count armoured regiments) the Army had more than enough to meet the limited goals it had set for ourselves - if augmented by individuals. At the time, Reg F regiments were told point blank by the Army that they would not required as force employers but merely as force generators of single batteries to support battlegroups.

When the Army's leadership thinks in those terms then it's no wonder it doesn't want to spend a nickel to improve the Res F. It's better to spend Res F funds to seat several thousand full-time Class B's in cubicles in Ottawa. And incidentally, those Class B's is what the leadership in Ottawa sees as the face of the Res F - the what are you doing for me today folks; the I've got a full-time job, I'm okay folks - not the dutiful Class A rifleman and trooper and gunner who is trying to balance his civilian work, family and military life and who will be where our operational augmentees actually come from.

We have far too many Res F units and accordingly far too many leaders for the small pool of troops and officers that the Army Res F has. Most often the CO and RSM are not the best there is but rather they're the only ones left in the unit that are promotable. The gene pool is tiny and getting a good one is more serendipity than the result of good planning. On top of that the leadership education and experience process in the Res F Army inadequate to say the least. If we were to keep the size of the force the same but reduce the numbers of units to be commensurate size of the Army Res F then the gene pool would increase significantly. But that's exactly what the Res F is fighting. Reserves 2000 keeps arguing that the answer is to increase the size of the gene pool by 10,000 or so. But that's patently ridiculous. I have yet to see what the figure of 29-30,000 is based on other than some vague auditor general's report that says this is the number that National Defence gave him. But even then, 29,000 spread over 128 units still only works out to an average of 226 people per unit rather than the current 156 per unit or 101 trained people per unit now. 20,000 reservists constitute four brigades, not ten. 20,000 reservists constitutes 30 units, not 128. If we are not "mobilizing" then we do not need a mobilization core.

I think the term "Shadow Army" is being kind because it suggests that there is some form of organization there. The Res F still adds value as it can generate individual augmentees, but it is utterly incapable of generating units with which to expand the Reg F Army's footprint. To me that's a massively expensive missed opportunity.

I totally blame the Reg F leadership because it allows the Res F leadership be what it is and basically fails, for the most part, to set conditions which would allow the Res F leadership to become effective and successful at developing units that add value to the Total Force. Quite frankly with the conditions the way that they are, even a good Res F CO would have trouble generating anything other than 50-80 fully-effective individual soldiers and even one effective sub-unit.

 

[GR66]

Going to throw this out there as a possible model of how the Armoured could look in a Force 2025 scenario.

This assumes we go to a 2 Division Model with 3 Div in the West (1 Brigade, a Reserve 3 Brigade from Ontario less Petawawa and an Artillery Brigade) and 2 Division in the East (2 Brigade, 5 Brigade and the Combat Support Brigade).

Using the three existing Reg Force Armoured Regiments with the equivalent of 9 Squadrons we could create the equivalent of two Armoured Regiments per maneuver Brigade, each with one Reg Force Squadron and two Reserve Squadons.

The 2nd Regiment in each Brigade would be tasked with generating the Brigade Recce Squadron. The Reg Force Squadron would be equipped with LAV Recce vehicles and the Reserve Squadrons with TAPV Recce Vehicles.

The 1st Regiment in each Brigade would be tasked with the evolving Anti-Armour role. Starting with 1 Brigade in the West, the Strathconas would be the initial Tank Regiment with one Reg Force Squadron and two Reserve Squadrons.

The long-term goal would be to transition the 1st Regiment in each of the other three Brigades to an Anti-Armour role as well. Ideally I'd like to see that through the purchase of additional tanks (M1's from US stocks might be the cheapest route), but if the purchase of additional tanks is off the table, then I'd move to equipping these Regiments with AT missiles instead. This could probably be done fairly cheaply by equipping the existing vehicles for each squadron (LAVs for the Reg Force Squadrons and TAPVs for the Reserve Squadrons) with remote weapon stations mounting ATGMs. That would give each Brigade both an Armoured Recce capability and an integral Anti-Armour capability.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I totally blame the Reg F leadership because it allows the Res F leadership be what it is and basically fails, for the most part, to set conditions which would allow the Res F leadership to become effective and successful at developing units that add value to the Total Force. Quite frankly with the conditions the way that they are, even a good Res F CO would have trouble generating anything other than 50-80 fully-effective individual soldiers and even one effective sub-unit.

We do it to ourselves too, IMHO by trying to pretend we are leading some kind of 'Shadow Army' and not a force in support of the Reg F.

 

[KevinB]

We do it to ourselves too, IMHO by trying to pretend we are leading some kind of 'Shadow Army' and not a force in support of the Reg F.

Chicken or the Egg?
I think its hard for the Army Reserves at least to do much without a Reg lead change.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The wide variation in full-time staff (attitude, engagement, industriousness) was almost as damaging as the wide variation in senior leadership competence. Has that changed?

 

[childs56]

We do it to ourselves too, IMHO by trying to pretend we are leading some kind of 'Shadow Army' and not a force in support of the Reg F.

You can not be a force in support without the support, and equipment. It is time to see more units like 2RCHA and taking responsibility for their support reserves in the area. That will spur the local Reserve Commanders to do their part. Until they see a vested interest in their role we wont see anything change.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The wide variation in full-time staff (attitude, engagement, industriousness) was almost as damaging as the wide variation in senior leadership competence. Has that changed?

Over the past 30 years or so I would say that about 10-20% of the full time staff posted to the reserve units I was working with were people who I would characterize as high performing to the extent that they would be considered an asset in any unit, Regular or Reserve.

About 10-20% should have been put up against the wall with their choice of cigarette, for the good of the species of course.

The rest were merely chair warmers, usually dumped on the reserves in an Island of Misfit Toys kind of way because the Regs didn't want them for some reason. Usually it had something to do with 'compassionate' issues or, IMHO, a 'room temperature IQ' thing.

 

[Brad Sallows]

How the Res F is supplied with full-time staff has to be part of any reform. Some simply have to be there and be competent, and, within reasonable bounds, even-tempered and cooperative - clerks, supply techs, maintainers if we had them. The ones occupying "hub" slots (adjt, ops/trg officer and NCO) have to be able to find that magic spot between fitting in and nudging the unit along in whichever direction it should be going. Three years of a person with character shortcomings in one of those positions can do a lot of damage.

 

[daftandbarmy]

How the Res F is supplied with full-time staff has to be part of any reform. Some simply have to be there and be competent, and, within reasonable bounds, even-tempered and cooperative - clerks, supply techs, maintainers if we had them. The ones occupying "hub" slots (adjt, ops/trg officer and NCO) have to be able to find that magic spot between fitting in and nudging the unit along in whichever direction it should be going. Three years of a person with character shortcomings in one of those positions can do a lot of damage.

You mean like the Reg F RSSO who went on a ride along with a policeman buddy and used the car's CPIC to stalk a woman he was interested in?

Or the Adjt bully who lasted for too long, probably because he 'had something' on the CO?

Or the MWO who forced Class A soldiers to help him move house, amongst a host of other clear indiscretions, and about whom nothing was ever done?

There are many scary stories lurking within the 100+ year old armoury walls....

 

[dapaterson]

So "leaders" unwilling to address toxic behaviours in their units?

 

[Brad Sallows]

Do you mean the Res F leaders, or the prior employing Reg F leaders and managers who allowed toxic people to be dumped in amongst part-timers who had (and have) fewer resources?