GR66 said:
The idea of fully deployable Reserve Brigades (or Battle Groups at the least) I think makes sense for many of the reasons that FJAG and others have mentioned. A smaller, ready Regular Force for the types of deployments you see on a more regular basis and a larger, cheaper to maintain, Reserve Force for times when you have to face the rarer, larger military threats. The US ANG is one model that shows this could be done.
However, I think we're a very long way from the current structure of a multitude of individual Reserve Regiments and a focus on individual augmentation of the Regular Force to the kind of Reserve Force being suggested. Add in the fact that in the current economic situation there is no way I see an influx of new equipment and support for the Reserves in the near future and I think it would be best to focus on incremental steps toward the final goal.
One possible first step would be to officially recognize that Reserve "Regiments" are actually Company/Squadron/Battery-sized sub-units and structure and group them together as such. This would create the basic framework to build upon for fully deployable units and each Company/Squadron/Battery-sized sub-unit could have an objective of being able to immediately force generate a complete Platoon/Troop/Gun-sized sub-sub-unit to either augment the Regular Force or be grouped together with other units within their Reserve Brigade for form Companies/Squadrons or even complete Battle Groups. On full mobilization they should eventually be able to form the Brigades originally envisioned.
I've attached images of the existing Reserve Force structure and one possible model for how it could be re-organized. This is obviously just a rough idea of how an initial re-organization could take place and there are obviously many different variations/modifications or evolutions that could work as well or better. The basic idea though is to start by building the organizational framework for an effective Army Reserve and then begin adding in the other required elements (changes to training, new equipment, CS and CSS elements, etc.) as they become feasible.
You're on point. The amalgamation is the only real option for us based on the size of the force we have. 4 to 6 brigades is all that one could reasonably construct out of an establishment of under 25,000.
I only have one issue with what you propose. We desperately need support brigades more than extra manoeuvre brigades which is what drew me to create an establishment of two reserve heavy manoeuvre brigades, one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade.
I'll concede that your establishment would be easier to find acceptance within the reserve communities because there are fewer requirements to convert existing "combat" units into "sustainment" or "manoeuvre enhancement" units. (the artillery brigade is easily do-able). At some point, however, we need to face the question of: what should the Army have to be more lethal and credible rather than how do we maintain every cap badge, band and regimental museum that we have now. If we do have the need and opportunity to "mobilize" in the traditional sense, we can always bring units back from the Supp Order of Battle.
I actually ran the exercise of doing just that and it was a gut wrenching task to strike out famous regiments willy nilly just on paper. It's going to take a cold hearted bugger to do what actually needs to be done in real life.
dapaterson said:
The intent of a Reserve Force is not a "Reg F on the cheap" - lower cost full time permanent augmentation. It is an "in case of emergency, break glass" type thing.
Bingo!
dapaterson said:
NavRes as noted above was nearly completely broken by the MCDVs, and resulted in major clefts between the full-time and part-time elements of the force.
RCAF Res is already running full tilt with little ability to surge, and does virtually no ab initio entry (partly because the RCAF has mismanaged its individual training system for at least three decades).
If you look at my posting history, I have been an advocate for fundamental restructure of the Army Reserve. There are valid lessons to learn from the RCN , RCAF and from other international partners. But to claim the RCN and RCAF are free from problems (some foundational) in their generation and maintenance of their forces, both Reg and Res, is to wear terrible, wilful blinders.
Bingo again!
With the "break glass" analogy my thoughts have been along this line: If a significant portion of the Army reserve is oriented towards the extreme but more hostile European theatre then:
a) the Navy reserve should be oriented to the "break glass" possibility of moving and sustaining large armoured forces by sea to Europe, the maintenance of sea lanes and counter area denial strategies, and
b) the Air Force reserve should be oriented towards the more "break glass" needs such as medical evacuation, armed UAVs, attack helicopter, and forming a deployable air wing headquarters with air field engineering and defence and an aviation maintenance squadron. (many of those in hybrid Reg/Res elements and I tend to think of it as a deployable aviation brigade that can be tailored with additional helicopter transportation squadrons if and as needed)
A man can dream. 8)
:cheers:
