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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

They too many other tasks for that to ever work, but three on the West Coast would likely make it easier to sustain having a ship up there more frequently.

Sorry. But the fleet was commissioned by the government of the day for one task. Arctic Presence. Assign those ships to the job they were built for. 25% of the Arctic is Canadian?

Not my problem if the Navy needs more boats for tropical waters. There is a separate need for a southern fleet of OPVs or MCDVs or Corvettes.
 
Sorry. But the fleet was commissioned by the government of the day for one task. Arctic Presence. Assign those ships to the job they were built for. 25% of the Arctic is Canadian?

Not my problem if the Navy needs more boats for tropical waters. There is a separate need for a southern fleet of OPVs or MCDVs or Corvettes.
A is only part of what they were designed for hence the OPV after the A.

It is your problem if the navy needs more ships, because you are a Canadian and the navy is funded based on how much voters want the navy to be funded. Don't blame the RCN because the people of Canada refuse to pay enough for defence spending.
 
A is only part of what they were designed for hence the OPV after the A.

It is your problem if the navy needs more ships, because you are a Canadian and the navy is funded based on how much voters want the navy to be funded. Don't blame the RCN because the people of Canada refuse to pay enough for defence spending.

The original plan was for a vessel that would Patrol the Arctic Offshore and maybe the Labrador. Trips to the Bahamas were not in the original Statement of Requirement or ConOps.

WRT the other ships ...

I'll split the difference. Canadians don't want to pay for the ships the Navy wants to sail. The money that Canadians vote to support the RCN could buy more boats if they were smaller, with smaller crews and did less.

The Navy insists on using the available funds according to its sense of priorities. Not uniquely a Navy problem.
 
Too bad we decided it was more important to have 4 AOPVS on the East Coast and only two on the West Coast...
The WC can only support one AOPS currently, even then we send personnel out to augment them. Entirely possible that Hampton Grey may have issues with crewing. The other reason its a considerable shorter distance from Halifax to the Arctic than from Esquimalt to the Arctic.
 
The other reason its a considerable shorter distance from Halifax to the Arctic than from Esquimalt to the Arctic.

At least to the Canadian Arctic, which is usually what Kirkhill seems to care about.

Also, there was never a plan to get 8 AOPS for the RCN. The last three, going to the Coast Guard, were added because Irving couldn't get its act together on ramping up to produce the CSC's and pressured the government to produce more AOPS as a "stop gap" measure to avoid having to lay off highly trained personnel. The Navy rightly said NO! I don't need any more of those things ... so the government forced the Coast Guard to get them.
 
The WC can only support one AOPS currently, even then we send personnel out to augment them. Entirely possible that Hampton Grey may have issues with crewing. The other reason its a considerable shorter distance from Halifax to the Arctic than from Esquimalt to the Arctic.
It's not that much of a sail to Dutch Harbour then Point Barrow and then you are in the Western Arctic.
 
The original plan was for a vessel that would Patrol the Arctic Offshore and maybe the Labrador. Trips to the Bahamas were not in the original Statement of Requirement or ConOps.
You got a copy of those documents? I'd love to see the part where they specify no operations anywhere but the arctic.

The WC can only support one AOPS currently, even then we send personnel out to augment them. Entirely possible that Hampton Grey may have issues with crewing. The other reason its a considerable shorter distance from Halifax to the Arctic than from Esquimalt to the Arctic.
In fairness, the East Coast is sending people because they already have three of their four AOPVs, and have had one for about 4 years. They had time to FG people to sail in them...

Also, they spend a lot of time moving people around from ship to ship just to get ships off the wall. Part of my job is managing the people in my trade that are bouncing around to keep things running.
 


Backgrounder
Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships

BG–07.023 - July 10, 2007

In the current and future security environment, the Government of Canada must have effective tools for exercising control of Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs, or 200 nautical mile limit) in all three oceans, particularly the Arctic. This Government recognizes that an increased Canadian Forces (CF) presence in the Arctic is essential to achieving our goals in this region, which is critical to our national interest and sense of identity.

Currently, the Canadian Navy can patrol the coastal waters of Canada’s East and West Coasts, but it does not have the capability to effectively patrol all three oceans. The Navy can only operate in northern waters for a short period of time, and only when there is no ice.

While the Navy can effectively patrol our close coastal waters in the Atlantic and Pacific with its Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs), these ships cannot be used effectively out to the limits of Canada’s EEZs. They have limited ability to operate in the open ocean, limited speed, limited capacity to support boarding operations and lack the ability to support a helicopter. The Navy must use its large combatant vessels – destroyers and frigates, which are expensive to operate and already over-tasked - to patrol the open ocean.

To fill this capability gap, the Navy will acquire up to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS). The estimated cost of acquiring these ships is $3.1 billion, with approximately $4.3 billion provided for operations and maintenance over the 25-year lifespan of the ship.

The multi-purpose, ice-capable offshore patrol ship will enhance Canada’s ability to enforce its right, under international law, to be notified when foreign ships enter Canadian waters. The primary tasks of the A/OPS would be to conduct sea-borne surveillance operations in Canada’s EEZs, including the Arctic; provide cross-governmental situation awareness of activities and events in the regions; and cooperate with other elements of the CF and other federal government departments to assert and enforce Canadian sovereignty, when and where necessary.

These ships will also provide the flexibility for the Navy to operate in both the Arctic and offshore environments, allowing them to be used year-round in a variety of roles, including domestic surveillance, search and rescue and support to other government departments.

The Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship offers the best blend of capabilities in one platform; however, a ship with these capabilities does not currently exist and would have to be designed to meet a series of high-level requirements:

Seakeeping: The A/OPSs must be able to operate independently and effectively in Canada’s EEZs, including such diverse environments as the Canadian Arctic, the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and the Northwest Coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The ship must also be capable of navigating the St. Lawrence River year-round and berthing at Quebec City.

Ice Capability: The hull of the A/OPS must be ice strengthened to operate in medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions - old ice that is denser and may strike the hull of the ship. This ice capability is exclusively for the ships’ own mobility, not to provide icebreaking services to other ships.

Endurance/Range: The ship must have the ability to sustain operations for up to four months and must have a range of at least 6,000 nautical miles.

Command and Control: The ship’s electronic equipment must have the ability to ensure safety of navigation and flight, as well as sufficient command, control and communications capability to provide and receive real-time information to and from the CF Common Operating Picture.

Speed: The ship must be able to maintain an economical speed of 14 knots and attain a maximum speed of at least 20 knots.

Armament: The ship must have gun armament to assert Canadian sovereignty.

Boat Operations: The ship’s crew must be able to conduct boat operations in up to sea state four, support operations ashore via landing craft and support naval boarding parties.

Class Life: The ships should remain operational for 25 years.

The ship may also be designed to embark and operate an on-board helicopter, as well as house one flying crew and one maintenance crew.
Procurement Strategy

The two-phased process of procuring the A/OPS will be an innovative, fair and transparent means of guaranteeing the requirements of the CF are met in a timely manner, while ensuring value for Canadians’ tax dollars and maximizing opportunities for Canadian industry. Industrial and regional benefits totalling 100 per cent of the contract value would be sought for the implementation contract.

A project definition phase of 24 months will be needed to develop the functional design, refine the high-level statement of operational requirements (SORs), complete and issue the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the implementation phase of the project and evaluate responses. A competitive process will be used to select a Definition, Engineering, Logistics and Management Support (DELMS) contractor, who will develop the design used to refine the requirements and provide input into the RFP. During this time, consulting engineering contractors will also deliver a functional design for the infrastructure needed to support the A/OPS.

Throughout the project definition phase, industry will be kept engaged and informed of progress and design work. Interest from industry will be sought through a Letter of Interest to allow potential bidders to self-identify, and qualified teams will be invited to comment on the draft project implementation (PI) RFP. The definition phase of the procurement process would end with the release and evaluation of this RFP.

The implementation phase of the process would involve the successful contractor completing a detailed design of the ships, followed by construction and the provision of integrated logistics support, and initial in-service support. Delivery of the first Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship is expected in 2013.

The procurement strategy would conform to the Canadian Shipbuilding Policy Framework, which provides that the federal government will continue to procure, repair and refit vessels in Canada, subject to operational requirements and the continued existence of a competitive domestic marketplace.

This acquisition will create long-term industrial development for Canadians. The Government's policy requires that prime contractors on defence procurements undertake business activities in Canada, usually in an amount equal to the value of the contract they have won. This helps Canadian companies maintain globally competitive operations in the country and effectively support future national security requirements.

The acquisition of these ships will deliver maximum high-quality industrial benefits to Canadians and the Canadian shipbuilding industry is well positioned to play a significant role as this project proceeds.
 
What you got there, Kirkhill, is basically the feel good press release. That's what a backgrounder is.

You may have noted it spoke of "up to 8" - not "8" exactly, and for cost of $3.1 B. Well that went out the window.

I could be wrong but I think the price of the 6 RCN ones is now over $4.8 B. So you can't believe the backgrounder.

Second point: The backgrounder is put out by the civilian side of DND, usually to make it sound like we are defending Canada.

CONOPS, or "Concept of Operation" is an internal RCN document that lists and explain exactly how, where and for what purpose a given ship's type is going to be used by the RCN operationally. This document provides the guidance for planning purposes in both employment and deployment of a given class of ship. It is therefore both the starting point of any operational planning relating to a given ship's type and the document that defines the boundaries within which such ship will be employed.

To give but an example of CONOPS in action, think about all the discussions in these fora where we (the sailors) keep telling you that AOPS will not face "XYZ" because they are constabulary, then you (landlubbers) argue that if "ABC" happens we would be sent anyway, and then we (sailors again) disagree. That's because we know that the AOPS CONOPS does not include employment in circumstances "ABC" and therefore, we know that any plan to use them in such circumstances (ABC) would be prevented by the CONOPS.
 
Regardless of what is written/planned, never say never. At the end of the day the navy can be ordered to sail X ship to Y and the army sent somewhere with something they don't like or know how to use or with very little, because....
 
As we lawyers say" "anything is possible".

But the only two people who can override CONOPS are CRCN and CDS. As CO, if I get orders that exceed CONOPS, they better carry one of those two signature - and I mean a bona fide original signature from either - otherwise I ain't going there.
 
In my world Intent is everything.

Anything else is a fail.
 
As we lawyers say" "anything is possible".

But the only two people who can override CONOPS are CRCN and CDS. As CO, if I get orders that exceed CONOPS, they better carry one of those two signature - and I mean a bona fide original signature from either - otherwise I ain't going there.
Curious - Does this requirement for a signed order still stand during a state of war?
 
Interesting question.

Of course, the orders at issue here are not of the same nature as an order given a soldier in the field or a tactical order in action within a group of ships. They are in the nature of OPORDS and SAILORDS. An actual state of war does not change who has the authority to override CONOPS. It would remain with CRCN or the CDS. Of course in war time, there would be a greatly increased number of OPORDS and SAILORDS issued under the authority of CRCN but it is doubtful that he/she would be familiar with their contents. More likely, he would have been briefed on the overall plan, approved it and let staff write the orders.

So I think I would probably still ask for a signed order from CRCN. I suspect that receipt of such a request from a ship's CO would cause CRCN to actually call for a copy of the order and his/her reviewing it to figure out the reason for the request. If CRCN found that it was a planning mistake and CONOPS should be adhered to, I then expect the order would be rescinded/corrected. Otherwise, I would expect that CRCN would confirm the order by means that would demonstrate it came from him. At that point, IIRC, I am to "use my utmost exertion" (I still remember those words from QR&O's) to bring my ship into action against the enemy.
 
Trips to the Bahamas were not in the original Statement of Requirement or ConOps.
As I was housemates with the guy who wrote those you are correct. The Bahamas were not in the CONOPS.

Only operations in tropical to arctic waters was stated in the CONOPS. ;)

Also to avoid confusion:

CONOPS - concept of operations. Document written by the RCN and given to ADMMAT to develop the specific engineering/contract requirements that industry needs to meet. Its also a guiding document on what the RCN expects the platform to do and how its expected to operate.
- they aren't orders, they are guidelines and inform what the ship is actually capable of, planning should be done to ensure that they aren't used outside these so that you don't put the ship in a situation where it is impossible to succeed.
 
Interesting question.

Of course, the orders at issue here are not of the same nature as an order given a soldier in the field or a tactical order in action within a group of ships. They are in the nature of OPORDS and SAILORDS. An actual state of war does not change who has the authority to override CONOPS. It would remain with CRCN or the CDS. Of course in war time, there would be a greatly increased number of OPORDS and SAILORDS issued under the authority of CRCN but it is doubtful that he/she would be familiar with their contents. More likely, he would have been briefed on the overall plan, approved it and let staff write the orders.

So I think I would probably still ask for a signed order from CRCN. I suspect that receipt of such a request from a ship's CO would cause CRCN to actually call for a copy of the order and his/her reviewing it to figure out the reason for the request. If CRCN found that it was a planning mistake and CONOPS should be adhered to, I then expect the order would be rescinded/corrected. Otherwise, I would expect that CRCN would confirm the order by means that would demonstrate it came from him. At that point, IIRC, I am to "use my utmost exertion" (I still remember those words from QR&O's) to bring my ship into action against the enemy.

That's pretty clear ;)

Figure It Out What GIF by CBC
 
As we lawyers say" "anything is possible".

But the only two people who can override CONOPS are CRCN and CDS. As CO, if I get orders that exceed CONOPS, they better carry one of those two signature - and I mean a bona fide original signature from either - otherwise I ain't going there.
I see the problem being Cabinet saying to the CDS "We need a ship to go to X location to support a mission with a political objective" CDS says "We can't send a CFP/ We can send a CFP" The politicians say; "That does not fit the optics of this mission, send something less aggressive/ The UN does not want a full fledged warship there, send something else"

Unless someone plans to fall on their sword, that would force the CDS to send a ship into a mission it is not equipped for. Very similar to what the UN did to the army and which the politicians accepted.
 
The first "large"UN peacekeeping mission: UNEF in 1956, was based on the same "tripwire" theory that Eisenhower advocated for the infant NATO circa 1949. The notion was that the belligerents would be unwilling to pay the political/military price that attacking a very lightly armed. UN force would call up.

(In 1949 Ike suggested that while the Soviets would, most likely, station millions of Red Army conscripts up against the inner-German border they should NOT face millions of American, British, Canadian and French conscripts. The millions of young πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡ΈπŸ‡¬πŸ‡§ etc men should be at home, Eisenhower, suggested, "winning the war" by growing food, building new houses and cars and refrigerators and so on. If the Soviet Union dared attack across his "tripwire" they would pay a price because πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έwould use its nuclear weapons.)
 
I think the only place the UN tripwire worked was in the Golan (prior to the civil war) the Sinai and Cypress . Lightly armed UN forces seemed generally doomed to failure and abuse. But I also don't believe the lessons of the past will stick and politicians will want to repeat the mistakes in the future.
 
The first "large"UN peacekeeping mission: UNEF in 1956, was based on the same "tripwire" theory that Eisenhower advocated for the infant NATO circa 1949. The notion was that the belligerents would be unwilling to pay the political/military price that attacking a very lightly armed. UN force would call up.

(In 1949 Ike suggested that while the Soviets would, most likely, station millions of Red Army conscripts up against the inner-German border they should NOT face millions of American, British, Canadian and French conscripts. The millions of young πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡ΈπŸ‡¬πŸ‡§ etc men should be at home, Eisenhower, suggested, "winning the war" by growing food, building new houses and cars and refrigerators and so on. If the Soviet Union dared attack across his "tripwire" they would pay a price because πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έwould use its nuclear weapons.)
The issue is that went to hell when the Russians got nukes - and the whole tripwire aspect became a little fuzzy.
UN forces have generally only been successful when they either have overwhelming forces, or against Governments that generally accept the UN.
UN failures in Rwanda, and FYR show that the UN cannot do jack or shit without a Big Stick to enforce it.
 
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