AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Haletown: They can easily be designed to operate in the Arctic during the standard navigation period. They only need a double hull, which they will be getting anyway and perhaps a reinforced band around the flotation line, like the ones you find on merchant ships that can operate in, say, the St-Lawrence River in winter. These ships are common: Montreal Harbour is open year round to cargo, tankers and container ships and they come in troves.

It would be impossible to make them into more than that  (they would become heavy icebreakers otherwise) but there is no requirement for them to be up there in winter when the navigation season is closed. 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

BUT THERE IS NO MONEY---esp. with the F-35. and the planned Canadian Surface Combatant:
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ad-ad.nsf/eng/ad03884.html
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296901

Mark
Ottawa

Why does everything have to be linked with the F35 with you?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Its called an unhealthy obsession. Personnaly I think Mark in Ottawa is just itchin' to bum a ride on the first Canadian F-35 we get .

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

There isn't going to be a whole lot of money left in the capital budget after the F-35's are paid for, even with accrual accounting.

 

[RC]

Haletown: They can easily be designed to operate in the Arctic during the standard navigation period. They only need a double hull, which they will be getting anyway and perhaps a reinforced band around the flotation line, like the ones you find on merchant ships that can operate in, say, the St-Lawrence River in winter. These ships are common: Montreal Harbour is open year round to cargo, tankers and container ships and they come in troves.

It would be impossible to make them into more than that  (they would become heavy icebreakers otherwise) but there is no requirement for them to be up there in winter when the navigation season is closed.

A Polar Class 6 or 7 rating (what you are describing as common) would require an ice belt, plus reinforced rudder, propeller, shaft, and gearbox.  That's ~30 tonnes of extra steel, modified structure with double transverse framing in way of the ice belt, and somewhere around a 30% mark up on the shaftline and steering.

For PC7, in a Canadian yard, you'd be looking at about $550k for the steel and steelwork and maybe $750k to beef up the driveline, so $1.3 million total in materials and labour and maybe $1.5 mil total.

That would do for tooling around the St. Lawrence in winter and going a bit north in the summer and shoulder periods.  For actual Arctic operations, you'd have to consider changes to the communications suite as well, since it gets difficult and thus expensive for a ship to communicate up there.  You have also to think about the effects of icing on stability and of the temperature on your HVAC system and deck equipment.  You can probably double the given number to account for that (assuming the designs can accomodate the stability hit without major modification).

Double it again for the study and analysis the government will commission from some hack to tell you what I just did in a lot more words and you get around $6 million to make it Arctic capable in broken first year ice during summer and shoulder seasons.

Still not really a huge amount for the added capability it brings.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Thanks for the particulars, RC.

I am just a dumb MARS boat driver, not a Naval Architect, but I knew that this was possible fairly cheaply for most merchant ships design, and AOR's are fundamentally merchant ships. Even at he price you quote, what's six millions over the cost of a ship that will set you back 350 to 500 millions to start with?

 

[MarkOttawa]

If we go for the Berlin, surely our ships (2? 3?) should be the Kitchener class ;D.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[dapaterson]

If we go for the Berlin, surely our ships (2? 3?) should be the Kitchener class ;D.

Mark
Ottawa

Normally, I would suggest the two ships of the class be named HMCS KITCHENER and HMCS WATERLOO, but then we'd encounter the old complaints of being too focussed on central Canada.

 

[Privateer]

How about HMCS SWASTIKA, for Swastika, Ontario?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swastika,_Ontario

 

[MarkOttawa]

Privateer: Now, now, now, S.M.S Berlin spent its service in the Kaiserliche Marine

and the Reichsmarine:
http://www.deutsche-schutzgebiete.de/sms_berlin.htm

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Haletown]

well if it is a naming coantest . .

HMCS Better Very Late Than Never

HMCS Broken Procurement System

 

[RC]

I think we should take bets on which of the major NSPS procurements will hit the water first.  JSS (or AOR or whatever they are calling it now) has been around the longest.  AOPS has the most complete design.  The OFSV is the smallest.  OOSV looks like the dark horse of the contracts that are on the street, but my source on the inside says they are riding with the lightest jockey.

I think JSS is going to remain mired in studies, options analyses, and modifications and will be both the first out and the last in.  They need to drop some of the deadweight or they will just keep hemorrhaging time and I don't think shopping a foreign design that will inevitably be modified is going to do that.

I'm going to go with OFSV in third place just on a hunch.  I think it will be slow on approval.

AOPS in second because it is going to have a long construction schedule for the first ship.  I'm betting on first steel cut, but not first in the water.

And I'm calling the winner as the OOSV just because I like an underdog.  Last out, first in, big success!

The JSS makes me sad.  I just don't see it pulling up, even with the new strategy.  On the other hand, it's going to be an exciting race where anything might happen.  I'm a little bitter that I'm stuck on the sidelines.

 

[MarkOttawa]

At least the CCG has got already a contract to build Dutch-designed MSPVs, no installed weapons

(to continue the acronyms):
http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX/2009sep00032.html

And if one seeks a really, really aging fleet (sorry about the bad table transfer, check the links):
http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/e0004253

...
Table 4: Age of CCG Vessels in 2007-2008 Vessels Current Number Vessels Over 25 Years Old Vessels 15 to 24 Years Old Vessels Under 14 Years Old
LARGE VESSEL FLEET
Large Ships (over 88m)
Design Life - 30 years 7 5 2 0
Medium Ships (48 to 87m)
Design Life - 30 years 27 12 15 0
Smaller Ships (33 to 47m)
Design Life - 15 to 20 years 6 5 1 0
TOTAL Large Fleet 40 22 18 0

Mark
Ottawa

 

[RC]

The MSPV's aren't really in the same weight class, but more importantly, I can't seriously consider a vessel that only meets a bare handful of the original spec requirements and was bought, seemingly, out of desperation to get something/anything in the water.

While I'm glad that they are bringing some work into Canadian yards and some much needed assets to the CCG, I'm ranking that smoldering wreckage of a project as a Did Not Qualify.

 

[MarkOttawa]

From a round-up article in Defense Industry Daily (usual copyright disclaimer):
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-issues-rfp-for-cdn-29b-joint-support-ship-project-updated-02392/

    As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class  oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

    This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. This article describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications. Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem. Will a second go-round in 2012-13 help any?..

    …July 2010 saw the JSS program’s re-start announcement, this time at C$ 2.6 billion instead of $2.9 billion. With the Canadian dollar close to par with the US dollar, currency shifts made up some of that difference. The other difference involved cutting the planned order to just 2 ships instead of 3, after previous program experience that said it wasn’t possible to buy 3 ships to do all of the things that Canada wanted, for the money it was prepared to spend [emphasis added].

    October 2010 saw the final piece of the puzzle fall into place. A dysfunctional political and procurement system has led Canada’s government to use ACAN buys for big defense purchases, almost all of which have been organized as rigged sole-source decisions instead of competitions. The JSS program might be an exception, as it looked to pick one of 2 existing designs that were already in service with NATO allies…

    Contender #1 is ThyssenKrupp Marine’s 20,240t Berlin Class, with 3 examples serving in the Germany Navy. These ships are mostly conventional oiler and replenishment ships, with storage for 9,330t of fuel oil, aviation fuel and fresh water, and 550t of mixed cargo. They can carry light armament and up to 2 medium helicopters, with an on-board hospital that can handle up to 43 patients.

    Contender #2 is Navantia S.A.’s Cantabria Class. The Cantabria is an enlarged 19,500t version of the Patino Class replenishment ship. Cargo specifications for the smaller Patino are 8,480t fuel capacity (6,820t diesel and 1,660t aviation), and 500t of mixed cargo. The Cantabria carries a crew medical center with 10 beds, including a operating facilities equipped for telemedicine by videoconference, an X-ray room, dental surgery, sterilization laboratory, medical surgery and gas containment center.

    Discussions will be held with each firm concerning Canada-specific modifications to their designs, and the terms under which they’d be willing to hand over their designs to a designated Canadian shipbuilder. While each of these ships has some minor capabilities beyond the basic fleet replenishment mission, the most striking thing about these choices is their signal that Canada has effectively abandoned its attempt to make the JSS a multi-role amphibious operations ship [emphasis added]…

All that took this government four and three quarter years. And still no contract. What a lot of political hoo-hah. Plus dreaming on the part of the Navy.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Lex Parsimoniae]

Plus dreaming on the part of the Navy.

I don't think JSS came from the navy...

 

[RC]

In my opinion, it's not fundamentally the government's fault that this program hasn't worked.  They come to the table with a wish list and a budget, but they don't have any idea whether their budget will fit their wish list.  How can they?  Shipbuilding and ship design is not their business.

So they did what people normally do when they want something but don't know how to do it themselves.  They hired an expert to help.  On the JSS, the expert's assessment should have taken about 10 minutes to do and a few months to prove.

We will probably never know whether the experts were incompetent or whether they simply failed to convince the government that it couldn't afford what it wanted.  My personal opinion is that it was a combination of both.
Either way, the failure lies squarely on the shoulders of the consulting experts, as they failed to do the job they were hired to do by the government. 

The JSS should never have come out to public tender in the form that it did.

Next, I'm certain that the groups that put designs together at $10 mil a piece knew right from the outset that the experts had messed up and that they wouldn't be able to submit an offer within budget.  Did any of them have the moral courage to stand up and say "Look, this isn't even going to be close to working.  You are just wasting time."?  I don't think they did.  So the government continued to operate under the assumption that everything was ok until they were hit with a $20 million bill and offers that weren't worth the paper they were printed on.

In my assessment, the government's only real fault was hiring "experts" who were either charlatans or were in way way over their heads.  A fault to be sure, but not worthy of the primary blame for the program failure and wasted time thus far.

However, from here on out, the problems will be entirely the government's fault since as far as I'm aware, they haven't made an effort to replace their advising experts.  And I'm quite sure they are going to continue to have problems.  Buying a design and adapting it to your needs comes with its own set of difficulties and traps.  If the past is any indication, the future is not a great deal brighter for JSS.

 

[Kirkhill]

.......We will probably never know whether the experts were incompetent or whether they simply failed to convince the government that it couldn't afford what it wanted.  My personal opinion is that it was a combination of both.

Either way, the failure lies squarely on the shoulders of the consulting experts, as they failed to do the job they were hired to do by the government. 

The JSS should never have come out to public tender in the form that it did.

.....government continued to operate under the assumption that everything was ok until they were hit with a $20 million bill and offers that weren't worth the paper they were printed on.

I see everything you say RC, and can understand and agree with it.

I wonder though, if  there isn't also another factor here though: the tendencies of juniors being reluctant to tell their seniors that the seniors haven't got a clue.

The Minister asks if such and such is possible.  The DM asssigns a junior to determine the cost.  Will the junior, who now thinks his career depends on it, tell the DM that what the Minister "wants" is impossible?  Wouldn't the junior be inclined to think that his failure to find a suitable solution would be a personal and career damaging failure.  Whereas what the Minister wanted in the first place was an assessment of the possible and a clear statement of the impossible would have better served the needs of the Minister and the country.

 

[RC]

I see everything you say RC, and can understand and agree with it.

I wonder though, if  there isn't also another factor here though: the tendencies of juniors being reluctant to tell their seniors that the seniors haven't got a clue.

The Minister asks if such and such is possible.  The DM asssigns a junior to determine the cost.  Will the junior, who now thinks his career depends on it, tell the DM that what the Minister "wants" is impossible?  Wouldn't the junior be inclined to think that his failure to find a suitable solution would be a personal and career damaging failure.  Whereas what the Minister wanted in the first place was an assessment of the possible and a clear statement of the impossible would have better served the needs of the Minister and the country.

That does seem entirely possible Kirkhill, but should have been trumped by the hiring of an independent industrial expert.  A junior presenting the conclusions of an expert would have nothing to fear from his superiors even if the expert's conclusion was that it was impossible.  Furthermore, the role of the expert should have been to say "You can't afford this, but let's find a solution that you can afford.", which would give the junior a solution to present.  An expert should have been able to quickly assess the major cost drivers in the project, as well as which ones were outside normal bounds and should be brought in line to make budget.

You've hit on a good argument as to why government should not try to do these things on their own and should consult outside help, but I don't think it answers why the process failed so badly in this case.

 

[Kirkhill]

That rather begs the question of how do you find an "expert consultant" that you can trust and that knows his stuff and that communicate clearly with the client.....

My own view is that unless the client is extraordinarily skilled and current they are better served to put out slim document stating their broader goals and then invent all comers to offer solutions.  They will likely get some cautious responses offering to do business in a traditional fashion at an outrageous cost, some outrageous solutions also at an outrageous cost and finally some novel variants that could be turned into something practical.  And the competitive process, as potential vendors beat up on the competitors' solutions, gives the client to learn about the industry, the suppliers and the possibilities.

The worst thing a client can do, IMHO, particularly one that is green, is to create a massive laundry list of specifications at the outset.  The laundry list should be reserved for the final contract.