Altenative Ideas on "I see a Role for MGS"

[George Wallace]

We can talk about the role that the MGS may have found in the WoT and in Afghanistan, but we also have other options to the MGS and who should employ/crew it.  I don't believe it is an Armour role to crew and deploy the MGS if its' main role in life will be to support the Infantry in mostly a Defensive role.  I can not see it being used by Armour in the Advance as an option in Tank on Tank scenarios.  I look at it as being an Infantry Wpn, much the same as the TOW, Assault Gun, and Anti-Tank Gun were in the past.  The use of it in Convoy Escort, does not automatically make it an Armour role, just as a Section or Platoon of Infantry in the Escort does not make them Armour.  The MGS is more in line of what the TOW was to the Infantry Bn than what a Tank was to an Armd Regt. 

Currently there is a Turreted 120mm Mortar version of the LAV III.  It has a very high profile, and perhaps serious 'roll-over' concerns.  What is to say we can't have a 120mm Mortar version, without turret, along the same lines as our former 81mm Mortar Bisons?  With the improved munitions for the 120 mm Mortar, it has become a very versatile tool.  It could offer more to an Infantry Bn, and in fact an Armour Regt, than the MGS ever could.  They would be just as deadly, if not more so, than the MGS in a Convoy Escort in Afghanistan.  They would be able to drop rounds in behind the enemy in the hills.  They would be able to provide "Guided" Munitions to troops equipped with Laser Designators.  They offer good Range.  They could provide illumination, both White Light and IR, at night.  All things that the MGS is incapable of doing effectively.

In the end, are we creating a role for a piece of kit that could easily be replaced by better kit, and crewed by more appropriate troops?

 

[orange.paint]

Holy cow george if I didnt know yah I would think you were pro patria all the way ;D.
I've come to the realisation that we are not getting any tank while I am still in the corp.I also realise that we will waste soldiers careers and training time employing them as Leo crews (or as I was last week a Interim MGS crew).

Im not a huge fan of the MGS and believe we should looking towards the piranna 10x10 with the 105 turret if were going to go light and lav.Having said that I want to be the battlefield rockstar again.You know as well as the rest of us the look cool factor of the leo to the rest of the combat arms,at least with the MGS the other combat regiments would not be able to say "Im qualified that".

Right now we still have a stigma of being the fat guys on Leo's when were trying to be recce.And with our role now any other combat arm excluding arty can preform RAPZ op's etc just as well as us.The infantry also have recce troops who are very well trained in upclose dismounted recce,a skill I believe is lost in our younger troops.So where does that leave us if the new MGS or what ever we purchase goes to the infantry?

We are losing guys in mass ammounts since the loss of the tank,some of the best troops I have ever met.Young guys don't join to sit in a surv op hole and look at a green screen,they join for panzers blasing up the trace hitting mud holes etc.Really why would a young man join the armoured corp when he could go infantry and get lav 3 qualified,cool recce courses,sniper,jump,etc?At least with a lav 3 with a 105 we can say hey look at our "look cool factor" and "we still pump hesh into sh*t".

I don't believe we should be focusing on the cold war "advance" as were fighting a war in a sand box right now.Lets face it we aint getting no 120mm mortar,or a leo 2,or a valentine for that matter.Lets embrace the MGS for what it is...a super cougar.Employ it in our armoured role based on it's limitations.

Just my view from this side of the generation.
p.s I pounded track pads thursday,so don't think I'm not a panzer guy...god I miss it.

 

[karl28]

First off just want to say that I am not an expert on this at all . What I was wondering is why cant we buy new tanks for the armoured corps ? I imagine there a very usefull piece of equipment to have . I am not saying git rid of the MGS maybe the armour corps can use them as a anti armour kit just a thought

 

[Armymatters]

First off just want to say that I am not an expert on this at all . What I was wondering is why cant we buy new tanks for the armoured corps ? I imagine there a very usefull piece of equipment to have . I am not saying git rid of the MGS maybe the armour corps can use them as a anti armour kit just a thought

The principal justifications offered by the Minister and Hiller were threefold for purchasing MGS and getting rid of tanks.  First off, according to both, the Leopard’s weight made it too heavy for easy transport to overseas crisis areas, while its size prevented it from manoeuvring in tight quarters, such as the streets of Kabul, where Canadian troops are currently deployed. Further, Hiller noted that the army was not deriving good value from a vehicle that had been deployed to an operational theatre only once (Kosovo, 1999) since the end of the Cold War.

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies did a commentary about the decision a while back. I'll link to it here:
http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_ArmyMGS.pdf
Their refute to the claims are as follows, using the fair use provision of the Copyright Act:

From an operational standpoint, it is an open question whether the mobility claims made by LGen Hillier justify the faith placed in the MGS. The CLS noted that the vehicle can be flown aboard the C-130 Hercules. In reality, this capability has never been proven; only the infantry carrier version of the Stryker has been flown in the Herc. Not until the weight of the MGS is lowered by at least two tons (at the expense of armour protection?) will it be so deployable. But even assuming this goal can be realized – meaning that detachable armour panels would be transported separately - Canada’s Hercules fleet is not sufficiently serviceable to move the MGS in any reasonable quantity over a tactically or operationally useful distance.

From a strategic lift standpoint, the MGS is no more likely to arrive in theatre any sooner than would a tank. When the Canadian Army deploys overseas it will be required to move an entire formation of vehicles – not just the MGS. Since the most cost-effective way of doing so is by sea, the LAV-based formation will not be transiting the ocean any faster than would a traditional mechanized formation. It makes no difference to a cargo vessel if the vehicles it is carrying weigh 20 tons or 50. The ship is still going to travel at only 15-18 knots.

The Minister’s preference of relying on chartered strategic airlift may not be an issue if rapid deployment is not essential to mission success. But reliance on the open market carries with it certain risks. Due to their popularity with cost-conscious Western governments, Russian and Ukranian airlifters are being chartered with greater frequency. But there is little sign that they will be replaced when their rapidly ageing airframes wear out.  This will surely limit the MGS’s deployment options in future crises deemed relevant to Canada’s security. In such cases the demand for airlift will increase while diminishing capacity will be monopolized by the highest bidder(s). Will Canada be able to secure sufficient airlift in a timely fashion? Unlikely. Experience has shown that Canadian governments are never in a hurry to commit forces to major crises.

As for the CLS’s argument that the Leopard has not demonstrated sufficient relevance, this is not the fault of the tank. When missions requiring heavier armour have come about (ie. Gulf Wars 1 and 2) the Government of Canada has kept the army on the sidelines. In Bosnia and Somalia, Canada did not follow its allies’ example and deploy tanks to shore up shaky ‘peace’ agreements.

As the army adjusts its doctrine to one focussing on operations in complex terrain, doubts about the efficacy of the MGS may arise. Urban operations require vehicles to surmount rubble and man-made obstacles – a task for which tracked vehicles hold a clear advantage. And due to limited fields of view – especially in urban areas - vehicle crews cannot always neutralize threats before they are fired upon. Thus the rationale for having sufficient armour protection to survive a hit and continue the mission. Furthermore, a vehicle cannot always expect to engage targets only from stand-off ranges; it should be able to manoeuvre under fire, close with the adversary and, if necessary, fight through an objective – often without the support of air power or artillery. In view of these requirements, the lightly-armoured MGS runs up the risk compared to the tank.

As for its relevance to peace support operations, the MGS may, as LGen Hiller suggested, be more appropriate a platform when trying to calm or earn the trust of the local population. But if the army needs ‘politically correct’ direct fire support in a non-combat setting, why bother purchasing the MGS at all? Why not rely on the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle, which is already in service?

And while the tank may indeed be too bulky for use in the narrow streets of Kabul, this is hardly the place for the MGS either. The discharge of the low-pressure gun – which, unlike the tank’s main gun, vents the pressure wave to the sides as well as the front - would cause significant collateral damage. If the requirement is for routine patrolling, it is best left to light infantry units and special forces.

 

[karl28]

Armymatters  thank you for the info .I found it a very interesting read I still wish we could keep the tanks around I just personally feel that its to important to get rid of . I know its extremely hard for the military to move around still just fill that its a good piece of equipment and would hate to see it go but thanks again for the info .

 

[orange.paint]

Armymatters  thank you for the info .I found it a very interesting read I still wish we could keep the tanks around I just personally feel that its to important to get rid of . I know its extremely hard for the military to move around still just fill that its a good piece of equipment and would hate to see it go but thanks again for the info .

Pointless.The tanks are phased out IIRC 2012.They wont be deployed only troops wasting their time training on them.In a perfect world we would have tanks but a tank for tankers just doesn't seem important to the country.Sort of like saying the c7 isn't really important to infantry and buying them red Ryder BB guns as a replacement.Believe me I miss the tanks ALOT!

But alas lets face it.They are way too cool and scary for a contry like Canada to posses and we will not have them until the next bubble goes up with a major superpower possessing far superior ground forces than our own.

Until then myself and my son will have to look forward to the MGS coming on line and using this piece of equipment to separate us from the rest and actually have a armoured corp that is offering something.

In my opinion nothing would say camp security like a troop of leopards to fly out the gates to run up positions and lay 20 hesh rounds down on someone.

but alas I'm a dreamer.

 

[Armymatters]

Pointless.The tanks are phased out IIRC 2012.They wont be deployed only troops wasting their time training on them.In a perfect world we would have tanks but a tank for tankers just doesn't seem important to the country.Sort of like saying the c7 isn't really important to infantry and buying them red Ryder BB guns as a replacement.Believe me I miss the tanks ALOT!

But alas lets face it.They are way too cool and scary for a contry like Canada to posses and we will not have them until the next bubble goes up with a major superpower possessing far superior ground forces than our own.

Until then myself and my son will have to look forward to the MGS coming on line and using this piece of equipment to separate us from the rest and actually have a armoured corp that is offering something.

In my opinion nothing would say camp security like a troop of leopards to fly out the gates to run up positions and lay 20 hesh rounds down on someone.

but alas I'm a dreamer.

The good news is that one of our NATO allies, Germany, wants to offload their entire fleet of Leopard 2A4's off onto friendly allies fast. They already offloaded some to Spain, Turkey, Greece, Poland, etc. The fire sale of Leopard 2 A4's is still ongoing, as they want to get down to 350 MBT's, mainly Leopard 2 A5's and A6's. Might want to hurry if our new political masters want to buy new tanks for the CF, as our NATO allies are snapping them up fast. The Germans will probally give us a good price as well, as this article is saying that they are pretty much in short, giving them away. 183 Leopard 2A4s and 150 Leopard 1A5's from the Bundeswehr reserves to Greece in 2005 for an estimated $324 Million USD? Damn, the Greeks scored a good deal.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/08/greece-signs-contracts-for-183-leopard-2s-150-leopard-1s/index.php
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/09/spain-finalizes-buy-of-108-leopard-2a4-tanks/index.php

 

[Michael OLeary]

183 Leopard 2A4s and 150 Leopard 1A5's from the Bundeswehr reserves to Greece in 2005 for an estimated $324 Million USD? Damn, the Greeks scored a good deal.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/09/spain-finalizes-buy-of-108-leopard-2a4-tanks/index.php

And what will they be spending on maintenance over the long term?  I believe the point has been made in a few threads that we focus on at life cycle costs, not just the "used car sticker price."

 

[Armymatters]

And what will they be spending on maintenance over the long term?  I believe the point has been made in a few threads that we focus on at life cycle costs, not just the "used car sticker price."

According to the article, part of that deal involved $185 million USD going to the manufacturer, KMW, for repair and technical modification of the Leopard 2A4 MBTs and for supply of special tools. In addition, KMW has been contracted to provide repair capabilities for Leopard 2A4 MBTs in Greece from 2006 on. The Turks, when they purchased their Leopard 2's from Germany also purchased 15,000 rounds of 120 mm KE ammunition (the DM 63, including practice ammunition), for around 46 million Euros (the same can apply to us as we have no 120mm ammunition) from.

According to other sources, that sticker price the Greeks got actually includes maintenance and other supplementary costs.  For how long that contract is, if it is true, I got no clue.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1228941&C=europe

 

[Eland]

The good news is that one of our NATO allies, Germany, wants to offload their entire fleet of Leopard 2A4's off onto friendly allies fast. They already offloaded some to Spain, Turkey, Greece, Poland, etc. The fire sale of Leopard 2 A4's is still ongoing, as they want to get down to 350 MBT's, mainly Leopard 2 A5's and A6's. Might want to hurry if our new political masters want to buy new tanks for the CF, as our NATO allies are snapping them up fast. The Germans will probally give us a good price as well, as this article is saying that they are pretty much in short, giving them away. 183 Leopard 2A4s and 150 Leopard 1A5's from the Bundeswehr reserves to Greece in 2005 for an estimated $324 Million USD? Damn, the Greeks scored a good deal.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/08/greece-signs-contracts-for-183-leopard-2s-150-leopard-1s/index.php
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/09/spain-finalizes-buy-of-108-leopard-2a4-tanks/index.php

The beauty of a tank buy like this is that even the older 2A4's can be easily upgraded to 2A5/A6 standard - at least as far as the add-on armour is concerned. I have trouble believing that Canada has no use for tanks, considering that every G7 country out there will have them when Canada finally retires its Leopards.

So what if the tanks aren't readily air-transportable? Neither is the MGS, unless you have access to C17's or An-124 transports. We'd be fools not to get in on this one. The cost of the tanks, with parts, spares, training, maintenance and ammo, will still be substantially less than  the same package involving new tanks.

 

[karl28]

So  rcac_011  we are still keeping them till 2012.Maybe the new Gov will change there minds on tanks it would be great if we could keep some .  I have always liked the Leo  maybe the gov will see this deal from Germany and will perhaps quietly except this as a better solution. But I am probably dreaming on that point

 

[orange.paint]

with mgs we get:

A 105 back on the battle field.
A role for armoured troops and only armoured troops
A little sense of pride in something to distinguish us from them.
105 HESH
with out we have

25mm (who doesn't now?)
A role performed by infanteer recce troops (i.e Africa)
25mm hesh that I have never fired and RCR gunners have.

So basically it all comes down to a green screen and a telescopic pole.Lets embrace the MGS and have a little pride in the corp.

If they cancel it and say were getting tanks, I will be the happiest man in NATO.But it ain't happening.

 

[George Wallace]

With MGS we get:

A 105 back on the battle field Hard Standing (Parking Lots, Paved Roadways).
A role for Armoured troops and Infantry Anti-Tank troops.
A little sense of pride in something to distinguish us from them is questionable when it may be a POS.
14 to 18 rounds of 105mm HESH (?).

Without we have:

25mm (who doesn't now?)
A role performed by infanteer recce troops (i.e Africa)
25mm hesh FRANG, SABOT, HEI.

Lets embrace the MGS and have a little pride in the Death of the Corps.

If they cancel it and say we're getting tanks, I will be the happiest man in NATO.  But it ain't happening(?).

;D

The MGS is not the 'Salvation' of the Armour Corps.  It is a poor replacement for a multitude of cutbacks.  It, like the Cougar 'Tank Trainer', is a poor substitute for a Fighting Vehicle.  It will mean the loss of necessary Skill Sets and Knowledge, should we ever need a Tank in the future.  Training is never 'wasted', but poor lessons learned on the wrong kit are.  (Don't get me started on the Cougar being a good platform to train Tankers.)  The necessity to learn lessons, previously lost, in Battle means unnecessary loss of life and equipment.  The reasons for purchase the MGS, have not been met.  Just because it has a 105mm L7 cannon does not mean any skills relevant to Tanks will really be maintained.  Nor does it provide a viable weapon in a modern conflict.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Is Afghanistan not a modern conflict?

 

[DG-41]

How well did Cougar perform in theatre?

Did any ever fire a main gun round in anger?

Did any ever take enemy fire, and how well did it perform?

What was the maintainence downtime/uptime ratio?

Did it ever fail (or fail to undertake) a mission due to lack of mobility?

Does MGS improve on any or all of these areas?

DG

 

[George Wallace]

Cougar Trials in Germany in 1982-3, saw the Cougar fail miserably.  I spent a large part of Fall Ex pulling the Cougars in our 'mixed' Troop (60) out of some of the most amazing spots.  I pulled a Cougar out of a field that was eight inch tall grass covered with morning dew.  I returned to my Trace, only to be called back to pull out the same Cougar which had on leaving that field and turning onto the Black Track, had turned too wide and dropped it's front right wheel into the ditch that was approx 18" deep and across.  He tried to drive out and lost his whole right side into the ditch, which was becoming deeper the further he advanced.  There was also a full Troop of Cougars doing the Trials as a Recce Troop.  End concensus was: FAIL.

The Cougar had a very good little Turret and Gunnery.  It was great for teaching the Basics of Tank Gunnery, and usually a Cougar Gunner would really shine on a Leo Gunner Crse.  It had a half decent hull, with good road speed and was also amphibious.  Unfortunately, mixing the two wasn't all that great.

In Suffield during RV 85, all the Canadian Armour Regiments passed their Cougar Trained people through our C Sqn Tanks for a Live Fire Ex.  They had done Leo Dvr and Gnry Courses and now had the opportunity to put those skills to work.  They had all of Suffield to spread out and do the Trace, but most insisted on parking bumper to bumper to each othe in the advance, keeping a frontage of about 250 m max instead of 2.5 km as they could easily have done.  They also had problems with judging distances in their shoots and taking very short bounds, closing the Ranges to Tgts to much less than they required.  They picked up a lot of bad habits on the Cougars.  They also did not have the feel for where a Track could go and where Wheels shouldn't go.

 

[George Wallace]

Is Afghanistan not a modern conflict?

Yes. 

Will the MGS be a viable platform there?  Or would we be better off with Mortars or TOW?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

TOW, not so much, although there are better rounds these days with increased anti-personnel effects.

We have mortars, although not turreted ones.  The (assumably) improved direct fire potential of the MGS, however, is why I see it filling a role here.

The mobility of the MGS would be same as that of the LAV IIIs, Coyotes, Bisons, HLVWs, RG-31s and LUVWs that it would work with.  That mobility is suprising good here, as we're not in Germany.

2B

 

[aesop081]

According to the article, part of that deal involved $185 million USD going to the manufacturer, KMW, for repair and technical modification of the Leopard 2A4 MBTs and for supply of special tools. In addition, KMW has been contracted to provide repair capabilities for Leopard 2A4 MBTs in Greece from 2006 on. The Turks, when they purchased their Leopard 2's from Germany also purchased 15,000 rounds of 120 mm KE ammunition (the DM 63, including practice ammunition), for around 46 million Euros (the same can apply to us as we have no 120mm ammunition) from.

According to other sources, that sticker price the Greeks got actually includes maintenance and other supplementary costs.  For how long that contract is, if it is true, I got no clue.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1228941&C=europe

You realy dont have any opinion of your own do you ?  If you saw an article on the internet that said that buying 120 MIG-15s would be a good deal for Canada, you would be on this site pitching it as if life depended on it.  I love how you are unable to relate anything you read to practical/personal/operational experience.  I guess that with you "if its written it ust be so".  You should work for CASR/DND101  :

 

[a_majoor]

Stepping way back.

The MGS is a technical solution to the need for direct supporting fire by American Infantrymen in a SCBT. It is not the only way to do so (there are lots of gunplatforms out there), but the design was constrained by various other factors, including cost, logistics, the theoretical ability to be carried by a C-130, politics and so on.

IF we agree that there is a need for some sort of mobile fire platform capable of moving with a LAV III based and equipped unit and able to deal with hard targets at extended ranges (which I am sure we all do), then it is an argument based on how we see battles being fought. I believe there is a need to engage at all ranges and aspects with a rapid fire weapon, since the enemy can and will discover means of degrading and defeating our sensor and ISTAR techniques, but we will equally be working to extend and refine them. If things work for us, we can engage at extended ranges, if things work for them, we need to shoot our way out of an ambush at point blank range. This seems to be best provided by a DF gun platform like the CV_CT. Hypervelocity and Smart missiles are the next best choice having longer reach but slower rates of fire, while mortars (even using smart rounds) would come off third best [turreted mortars would be too top heavy and poor ability to engage moving targets with their low velocity rounds, while traditional mortars would have difficulty providing fire against targets aat point blank range].

Of course, no system by itself is capable of overcoming all threats and contingencies, so a troika built around a capable gun platform, capable missile carrier and capable mortar carrier seems the best approach. Given the desire for a vehicle with a low profile and potential air portability, (and with a nod to Kirkhill and George Wallace), the mortar and missile variants should be built on a "Bison" like platform, the missile carrier armed with a vertical launch cell for FOG-M or Netfire missiles, and the mortar carrier packing a 120.