Air Mobile Army

[Good2Golf]

It's only 14.7 flight hours from CYWA to CYLT, or two hops, with a fuel stop at CYIO or CYCY.  Two crews could get a Hook up to Alert in less than 24 hours if push came to shove.


Overall in the North, the Hook would be one capability within a "system of systems", including as others have noted, 130Js, 17s, AOps vessels, etc...


Regards
G2G

 

[a_majoor]

Given the financial meltdown in Europe, we should consider picking up a few used ones and stationing them in Resolute Bay or some other northern location so we don't have to worry about pushing helicopters north in an emergency.

Solves our issue and some European nation gets a bit of cash to pay down the debt...

 

[Kirkhill]

As I see it, it isn't difficult to get men and material into the North (including ground transport).

Journeyman has the answer to that problem.  We've been able to do that since Arnhem.  Just let gravity do its thing.

The problem, in my mind, is getting them back out again.  Or relocating them if the target and point of aim fail to coincide.
Then you need an anti-gravity device.

Knowing that a Hook is 12 hours behind me would be a lot more comforting for me than having to wait for Brian Horrocks to bring XXX Corps along to get me out of the situation in which I find myself.

 

[Jammer]

It isn't too difficult to get men an materiel into the North....provided you take into account the following factors:

Weather, time of season, suitable airstrips for whatever you're planning to use for A/C, fuel.....the list goes on.

No, no problem at all. Now that you've managed to get them there in one piece you have to sustain them....takingin to account the following factors

Weather, time of season, suitable airstips for whatever you're planning to use for A/C, fuel....the list goes on.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Getting there from remote bases like Trenton or Edmonton reqires the range and speed of fixed wing aircraft; another squadron of C-130j's or C-17's and enough infrastructure to at least land, offload and fly out.

The Chinooks would be a great addition to existing formations/bases already in the arctic, and to provide tactical and operational mobility to units operating in theater, but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.

I wasn't suggesting that they deploy from 'below 60'. It's far enough from Iqaluit to Pangnirtung, Qikitarjuuaq or Tanqueray Fjord!

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Given the financial meltdown in Europe, we should consider picking up a few used ones and stationing them in Resolute Bay or some other northern location so we don't have to worry about pushing helicopters north in an emergency.

Solves our issue and some European nation gets a bit of cash to pay down the debt...

If we were smart, buy up all of the Chinooks, leopard 2's, Challengers tanks, CV-90s, ship them for storage to Nevada and resell them later at higher prices when they realize they cut to deeply.  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

If we were smart, buy up all of the Chinooks, leopard 2's, Challengers tanks, CV-90s, ship them for storage to Nevada and resell them later at higher prices when they realize they cut to deeply.  ;D

Now there's a plan  ;D

Just need to hold on a wee whiles longer.  The Euro is just starting to fall.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Now there's a plan  ;D

Just need to hold on a wee whiles longer.  The Euro is just starting to fall.

Be careful what you wish for... Europe provided us with the subs (and De Chastelaine)

 

[Kirkhill]

Aye but Colin's plan says nothing about the CF (beggin' yer pardon zur - the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) actually using this stuff: just buying it low in depreciating Euros and selling it back to them at a higher Canadian Dollar price.

And if they don't want it I am sure Pakistan is always on the look out for a deal.....

 

[daftandbarmy]

Aye but Colin's plan says nothing about the CF (beggin' yer pardon zur - the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) actually using this stuff: just buying it low in depreciating Euros and selling it back to them at a higher Canadian Dollar price.

And if they don't want it I am sure Pakistan is always on the look out for a deal.....

I sense a thrifty Scot may be lurking somewhere behind this calculated act of commerce. :dileas:

 

[a_majoor]

If we follow that plan all the way we could fulfill virtually all of our "wish list" of new(er) equipment as well;

Leopard 2 tanks (for example Greece has a pressing cash problem and 353 Leopard 2 tanks in stock), and CV-90s of various descriptions for the CCV and CCV family of vehicles
Ships of virtually every description from Frigates to tankers.
Aircraft: We would want Chinooks and C-130's for our first choices, but surplus fighters can be had (we would be getting F-16's from most of the European Air Forces, rather than Hornets or CF-35's, but they will do in a pinch). I'd also be on the lookout for cash strapped air forces that use the C-17...

The biggest follow on costs would be translating all the manuals and training materials  , and of course in the real world we also have to incorporate the ongoing O&M costs, but I'm willing to bet even with those costs we would be saving billions of dollars and years of time to eliminate the rust out of the forces.

Someone should be thinking about this in a serious manner.

 

[a_majoor]

An interesting article in NBF on personal flying vehicles. This is a civilian counterpart to the LAMV idea; an air vehicle which can be flown by people with minimal training rather than highly skilled pilots. For an airmobile force, having vehicles which can be flown by troops rather than pilots removes a lot of manning bottlenecks, and frees up pilots for tasks which really do require higher levels of skill and training.

An important caviet remains; LAMV or PAVs need to be much cheaper to buy and operate than helicopters or fixed wing aircraft in order for this concept to make sense. Still, even if this becomes the equivalent to a MLVW rather than a LAV, it still provides a huge benefit to the force. MSR's are freed of traffic; resupply can happen far faster and since the echelon can move without reference to terrain (if needed) then it becomes much more difficult to interrupt the resupply system. I would like to see the concept extended to actual fighting vehicles. This would take us in the direction of the main battle air vehicle concept: The main battle air vehicle uses ground tactically without relying on it for mobility. Once we can get to that level, the commander can use the ground or avoid it to suit his own tactical plan.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2012/08/eu-mycopter-project-to-develop-personal.html

EU Mycopter project to develop a personal air transportation system


The myCopter project aims to pave the way for PAVs to be used by the general public within the context of a personal air transport system (PATS)

PAVs will be designed and implemented on unmanned aerial vehicles, motion simulators, and a manned helicopter. In addition, an investigation into the human capability of flying a PAV will be conducted, resulting in a user-centred design of a suitable human-machine interface (HMI). Furthermore, the project will introduce new automation technologies for obstacle avoidance, path planning and formation flying, which also have excellent potential for other aerospace applications. This project is a unique integration of technological advancements and social investigations that are necessary to move public transportation into the third dimension.

The myCopterproject will investigate
* User-centered design of human-machine interface for PAVs
* Novel training techniques for the inexperienced 3D driver (PAV pilots)
* New technologies for vehicle automation and control
* Social and technological impact of a PATS

Automation of aerial vehicles
Some automation will be required for the average human to fly a PAV

Approach
*Control and navigation of a single PAV (ETH)
*Vision-aided localization and navigation
*Vision-aided automatic take-off and landing
*Navigation in the air (EPFL)
*Mid-air collision avoidance
*Vision-based relative positioning
*Formation flying
*Evaluation of automation and HMI on FHS (DLR)


Social and economic impact (KIT)
PAVs have been discussed already for many years, but the impact on society and the social expectations have not yet been evaluated

Main questions
*How can PAVS be integrated into existing global transportation systems
*Requirements on infrastructure and transport
*Adaptation of the legal framework
*What degree of autonomy needs to be developed
*How does automation interact with the HMI
*What are the perspectives and expectations of a PAV user (Questionnaires and Interviews)

Posted by brian wang at 8/08/2012

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The concept is pretty much that of the "Glider Regiments", except with the ability to return.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glider_Pilot_Regiment

 

[Kirkhill]

Let's see:

Paratrooper:  Skilled pilot of a single manned glider.
Buddy drop:  Paratrooper piloting a single manned glider with a screaming 250 lb pay load strapped to him
JPADS drop: Computer pilots single unmanned glider with a suspended pod of screaming 250 pounders to a precision landing somewhere in the general vicinity of the assigned target.  Vehicles dropped somewhere else
Helicopter: Anti-gravity device to recover the pieces

How many steps to Dropships?.

 

[a_majoor]

Glider regiments are more akin to paratroops than airmobile forces, since they are essentially "light" infantry once they disembark from the glider, with all the limitations that implies. They are able to carry somewhat more than paratroopers, and gliders allow sticks of troops to land together with minimal dispersion (so long as the glider actually makes a safe landing on the target zone), but gliders are a supplement to paratroops, not a replacement.

Air vehicles like the LAMV or helicopters provide mobility in three dimensions, and helicopters (and the presumptive Main Battle Air Vehicle) can also act as fighting platforms in their own right to support the troops on the ground. Soviet (and now Russian) helicopters like the Hip and Hind were designed with this sort of fighting in mind, and we are familiar with various Western gunships to escort our transport helicopters and soldiers. As far as airmobility goes we still are not quite there yet; the troops on the ground need to be able to move and fight under protection which is only possible now by using an airplane or helicopter to carry a lightweight vehicle for the troops to ride in (the BMD, Wiesel, and Viking are three current representatives of this type of machine).

You could make a case for unprotected mobility, landing troops with ATV's or Jeeps (as was done in the past) to assist in carrying the load, providing extended mobility and acting as gun platforms in a pinch. There are lots of lightweight vehicles and even specially designed vehicles for this purpose, and some interesting arguments could be made for protected vs unprotected mobility in both airborn and airmobile forces. The full evolution of airmobility (in my mind anyway) will come when the troops can move and fight in three dimensions from the same platform.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I would have to say that gliders were the only technology available to address the realized shortcomings of paratroopers. They were able to deliver jeeps, comms vehicles,  AT guns and even light tanks to provide the Airborne with some ability to resist armoured counter attacks and as you mentioned increased mobility and supplies. In German hands Gliders morphed into the roles now carried out by the Herc.

To me the shortcomings of airborne forces has not really changed, they have better AT weapons, but still their ability to hold is totally dependent on the ability to resupply and to relieve in a timely fashion. What has changed in their favour is the ability to call in supporting fire and to receive timely intelligence in their local area from other sources.

The strength of Airborne/airmobile forces today seems to be an ability to act like a rapid response expeditionary force, to allow politicians to act quickly to respond to a situation which likely they should have responded to much earlier. The danger is to see airborne forces as a self sufficient force in itself to hold key areas without further reinforcement. I think most military planners understand this, not sure the political leadership does.

 

[Good2Golf]

The strength of Airborne/airmobile forces today seems to be an ability to act like a rapid response expeditionary force, to allow politicians to act quickly to respond to a situation which likely they should have responded to much earlier. The danger is to see airborne forces as a self sufficient force in itself to hold key areas without further reinforcement. I think most military planners understand this, not sure the political leadership does.

:nod:

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps the Air Mobile types might want to offer the politicians (and Foreign Affairs) a copy of Saint-George Saunders's book.

There could be an accompanying reccomendation on how not to do things (Primasole and Arnhem), what's possible (Bruneval and Tunisia) and the effects of keeping Light Troops in the field for too long (Tunisia). 

As a follow up they might also want to consider Wilson's "Cordon and Search" and reflect on the invidious effects of the  application of "Airborne Initiative" on the availability of ground transport in accompanying battalions if Light Fingered Troops find themselves lacking in goods they consider critical.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Read a book.....Seriously?

If it's longer than a Briefing Note, not in point format and the right font, they aren't going to read it. They are to busy responding to their blackberries. It not that they are stupid, but they believe they are far to important and have to little time to stop and weigh the price of their decisions.