Air Mobile Army

[dapaterson]

Hellooooooo... I'm right heeerrreee....

Good concept, flawed execution, should try it again and get it right this time.

I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

When 15th Fd was a tasked unit back in the 80's they airlifted the unit, guns and vehicles to Shilo for an exercise. Forget how many flights it took but 2 hercs were tasked if I recall correctly, at the time we were a 6 gun battery and I think the move was mainly prepped by our attached Reg force staff and about 5 of us Reservists, plus of course the local AMU. It was a great exercise and we learned a lot from it, not the least being the fact we were in support of the German's battle run and fired off far more ammo than we were accustomed to.

 

[Gramps]

Anything by C-17 would be strategic lift

CC-177s can do tactical and strat airlift. Just a point of interest, not really what this thread is about.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Were there any Canadian paratrooper drops in Afghanistan, even for practice?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.

As always, if these things are properly supported they work well. We had minimal to zero support from 2 Cdo, yet still managed to do the jump and hump. Of course we could have done better, but I won't go into what I saw at the CAR that made me think twice about going back  there!

I recall being envious of 10 PARA back when I was in 1 PARA. The TA Abn Bn would rock up on a Friday night with 400 bods, emplane, lob into Germany that night, work hard for two days then jump back in the UK and then head home for tea and medals on Sunday night. They got more jumping than we did (we being a tad busy in places like NI etc). That was a good example of how a well supported reserve unit could make the airborne thing work well.

 

[a_majoor]

I'll respectfully disagree.  There's not enough time in a Reserve training year to maintain proficiency.  Nor is there YFR to support it.  Nor is there a defined capability requirement, other than keeping maroon beret makers flush with cash.

I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place" for details)

As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.

 

[FoverF]

... defined requirement...

Augmenting understrength airborne units?

 

[aesop081]

That was a good example of how a well supported reserve unit could make the airborne thing work well.

It was also at a time where the RAF could support things like that. These days...not so much. The RCAF's transport fleet is small and busy and would, IMHO, also be hard-pressed to support any increase in demand for parachuting by either the RegF or Pres.

 

[dapaterson]

Augmenting understrength airborne units?

Haven't defined that requirement other than "we've done it for so long, let's keep on doing it".

 

[daftandbarmy]

I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place for details)

As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.

I have to agree there. We have ample time to build a pretty good 'mission focused' reserve force. Call me crazy, but it might even help with recruiting and retention.

 

[a_majoor]

There should be no argument that building an Air Mobile Army is impossible (it is clearly is very possible, and the CAR Battlegroup of the 1970's proves that even we can muster the resources and manpower to do so, if we want); rather the discussion should be on why we should build such a thing, or why not?

There are plenty of arguments for an Airborne/Airmobile capability in the Canadian Forces, including time and space (distances inside Canada would be considered strategic in most other places in the world), sovereignty (how else could we get to the far North quickly and with a wide variety of capabilities), doctrine (airmobility is the epitome of manoeuvre warfare) and force projection (everywhere we have been told to go in the past two decades is halfway around the world).

There are also plenty of arguments against, including cost, diversion of resources from other worthy causes and the amount of "effects" an airborn/airmobile force can actually generate on its own once on the ground. The history of airborne and airmobile operations is mixed, with plenty of examples of spectacular victories and defeats to choose from.

 

[Good2Golf]

Canada's Army has for the last century or so, been an airmobile army. 

It never ceased conducting airmobile operation training, but it certainly was constrained by available air and aviation resources and training opportunities for both Army and Aviation/Air Force personnel, particularly in the early-90's to the late 2000's.  Sometimes a bit too much is read into what constitutes airmobility or airborne, so a the following definitions are provided to confirm the conceptual simplicity of airmobile operations and airborne forces.  These are the official terms that Canada has endorsed/ratified as a NATO member (the AAP-6 is NATO's Glossary of Definitions) and that are contained within applicable current Canadian Army and RCAF doctrine.

Airborne - An adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out operations, either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement.  (NATO AAP-6, 2001-10-01)

Airmobile operation - An operation in which combat forces and their equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6, 1992-11-01)

Airmobility - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)

Air movement - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)


The Commander of the Army has described the plan  by which the emphasis on airmobile operations and the use of airborne forces will be developed within the Army.  It will be the product of capabilities that have been developed, both technical/materiel and personnel as well as the training and maintenance of proficiency that would facilitate the use of such capability sets.

Appropriately, such capabilities should include not just the F-echelon, but appropriate portions of other echelons to ensure that the capability can be employed and sustained as necessary.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

 

[McG]

... force projection (everywhere we have been told to go in the past two decades is halfway around the world).

If you are talking airmobile, then we will not be getting the improvements to strategic reach that you suggest - even if we go with exotic  tilt-rotor aircraft instead of helicopters ... at least, not unless we want to develop a whole new aircraft to do this.

 

[dapaterson]

We need air-transportable forces.  Which can be sustained.  A Bridge Too Far is an excellent example of the fundamental problem with airborne drops - resupply.

 

[a_majoor]

Airborne force projection was demonstrated by the US 82nd Airborne division when it flew a battalion directly from Fort Benning Georgia to the Ukraine for a drop using air to air refuelling, the longest direct deployment in history. (this is recounted in Homer-Dixon's The Ingenuity Gap). While probably not the best way to do things, it demonstrates what is and is not possible, given the right resources.

Airmobile forces are tactical and operational, and despite decades of development are still in a relatively primitive state (once separated from their aircraft they are light infantry with limited mobility and organic firepower). *We* need to develop General Senger und Etterlin’s main battle air vehicle concept: The main battle air vehicle uses ground tactically without relying on it for mobility for airmobile forces to reach the next level of usefulness. For sustainment we need to develop something along the lines of the LAMV concept (Light Air Mobile Vehicle); essentially a flying machine that can be flown by ordinary soldiers rather than highly trained pilots (with the option to fly autonomously or by remote control), a flying supply truck.

WRT what is and is not possible, Canadian troops could probably be trained and equipped to be Airborne much more quickly and will have a much greater ability to carry out the orders of the GoC than Airmobile forces, the sticking point is the purchase of sufficient strategic airlifters to carry the troops and sustain them. Airmobile forces would need both the organic air vehicles (helicopters currently) to move and fight, as well as a means of deploying the troops and helicopters strategic distances (an LHD would be ideal in this case). Strategic airlift can be used for other purposes such as disaster relief, so there will be less resistance to going that route if planed and sold properly.

 

[Good2Golf]

Thucydides, I don't disagree with you that airborne forces could potentially be generated more quickly than airmobile forces at the moment; however, I believe that airborne forces could potentially be more susceptible to sustainment dependencies than would airmobile forces. 

Current (and increasing) focus on heliborne airmobile forces provides a significant opportunity to ensure provision of combat enablers and ongoing sustainment of the deployed airmobile forces until partial or complete link-up with associated ground forces can be accomplished.


Regards
G2G

 

[Old Sweat]

The limiting factor in providing airborne or air mobile forces is the ability of the RCAF to generate aircraft with qualified crews to drop or deliver the troops and equipment and then to resupply and/or extract them. When last I had anything to do with this sort of thing, planning for airborne forces was based on the use of 12 CC130s, which could drop what was called a Commando Group with its slice of support weapons, gunners, sappers and logistics. This force could hold an airhead and construct an airfield for the fly in of follow on forces. That pretty well was the concept of ops for much of the Defence of Canada operations, which were based on a hollow threat that had not existed since perhaps the 1950s.

I think we could generate a small power projection capability using either airborne or air mobile forces, but to do so means cutting back on other tasks for the aircraft we would use. Still, it's possible and for a given scenario, any competent staff officer should be able to come up with an estimate and plan for a viable solution. 

As for cramming troops into airplanes, if you want to do a mass bare arse drop, you can lift a whole bunch of jumpers, but all they can do is form up in three ranks with their personal weapons on the DZ. Similarly for a heliborne display, you can cram a bunch of troops into the aircraft, but they are kitless.

 

[Good2Golf]

...Similarly for a heliborne display, you can cram a bunch of troops into the aircraft, but they are kitless.

OS, my note earlier regarding heliborne forces was an assessment of potential near-term development based on incoming capabilities (heavy lift and slightly further, possibly rationalized armed recce capabilities) to support sustainable airmobile ops within a BG-level with certainty and Bde-level with reasonable likelihood of success.  As with airmobile ops conducted in AFG (albeit a relatively small AO), the appreciation and acknowledgement of the need to include enablers and sustainability within an airmobile operation has been captured and messaged to Army leadership, aligning closely with the CLS' stated intent for airmobility within the larger Army force development context.


Regards,
G2G

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I will disagree about the time; US ANG units only parade one weekend a month, and various European reserve forces only muster once a year for training exercises, so Canadian reserve troops parade much more often and more regularly than many of their counterparts. The Americans and Europeans operate much more complex equipment (our armoured use G wagons while their Armored use M1 or Leopard 2 tanks, for example) despite the shorter training cycle. Being a paratrooper or air assaulter is possible with the time constraints given (French support troops were dropped into Điện Biên Phủ with very minimal training, often measured in hours or days, yet were able to jump in with the same success rate and taking the same % casualties due to jump accidents as the Para's; see Bernard Fall's "Hell in a very small place" for details)

As for YFR and defined requirement, agree there.

Their tank units, etc are staffed with an exceedingly large full time staff that does the maint and everyday stuff needed to support a once a month crew, including maintenance that we have to ship our stuff off for months at a time to get done. Their day staff numbers often equate to our part time numbers. Their equipment also stays at the unit. It doesn't get dragged off to a place like Meaford, Gagetown, etc for pooling, where it spends 2/3 of the year that the Unit can't use it. They also don't spend all of their time trying to fulfill stuff like IBTS only to complete it in time to start again. Let's quit trying to equate what they do and what we do. It's two different worlds.

 

[dapaterson]

It's also worthwhile to look at the work-up training done prior to deployment - not only our own, but that of other allies.  PRacticing skills =- good.  Needing 18 months work-up to deploy?  There are problems in the system.