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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Terry Glavin reflects on his recent time in the country, and why the fight is worth it. A long piece in the National Post, well worth reading:
http://www.nationalpost.com/todays_paper/story.html?id=1080173&p=1

In Afghanistan, an air of hope

Terry Glavin relates a tale of two Kabuls: A city terrorized by jihadist intimidation, a population fuelled by determination. The overwhelming message from Afghans to the West: Please stay


Among the many things that are likely to surprise a visitor to this city is the Dari version of Marilyn Manson's Personal Jesus that's playing on the radio these days. There is also the exuberant courtesy, solicitousness and friendliness of the place, and the fact that at least four million people live here now. That's about 10 times the population of 30 years ago. The city's motor registry department adds 8,000 new vehicles to its rolls every month.

I have no excuse to be surprised. I'm well-travelled, I've made Afghanistan a bit of a personal study over the past few years, I'm a co-founder of the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee,
http://afghanistan-canada-solidarity.org/
and among my committee colleagues I count several Kabuli emigres and activists who have spent a great deal of time here.

Still, nothing quite prepares a visitor for certain things, not least the spectacular contrast between the cosseted little universe inhabited by Kabul's "international community" overclass and the gritty, raucous reality of everyday life among Kabul's rambunctious masses. It's as though there are two completely different Kabuls in the world. There's the city that routinely shows up in English-language dailies -- a miniature, Central Asian version of Stalingrad during the siege -- and then there's the one you never hear about, a bustling, heartbreakingly poor but hopeful and splendid city.

The Kabul known to the outside world is the city the Sunday Telegraph judged "as dangerous as Baghdad at its worst" shortly after I arrived here.
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2008/11/wandering-around-this-great-city.html
This is the Kabul you can see from the verandahs of the city's justifiably jittery foreign diplomats, aid-agency bureaucrats and journalists. It's the one with helicopters always flying overhead, and rapid-fire text messages on everyone's fancy cellphones containing intelligence bulletins about the latest assassination attempts and kidnappings.

Another city entirely is the Kabul I came to know during three weeks of interviews with human rights lawyers, polio victims, almond sellers, seamstresses, football players, cab drivers, teachers and beggars. This the Kabul of the souks and bazaars, the bus stops and back alleys; and no matter what you read in the headlines, its citizens are among the most welcoming, happily boisterous and hospitable people on Earth...

More at his blog, e.g.:
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2008/10/mayhem-on-froshgah-street-more.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Mr Glavin expands at his blog:
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2008/12/in-todays-national-post-in-afghanistan.html

...
[The Post article]...is a slightly abbreviated version of my essay in Democratiya, here.
http://www.democratiya.com/review.asp?reviews_id=206

The National Post version is accompanied by an editorial, "Our Mission in Afghanistan,"
http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=1080101
with which there is much to agree, but which is also partly wrong, in two important ways.

Firstly, ". . .were we not to remain firm on our target withdrawal date, the Afghan government would not take seriously its need to bring its army and police up to the levels needed to maintain national and local security once we and other NATO nations are gone." Secondly, the editorial asserts that the Afghan people "have little taste for such Western preoccupations as feminism, free speech, due process, religious pluralism, literacy and even democracy itself. Our Canadian presumption that ordinary Afghans want the same sort of society we have, with the same sort of freedoms, turned out to be an act of psychological projection. . ."

On the first point, we don't need a firm target date to force the Afghan government to take more seriously the need to build up a competent and effective army and police force. ISAF and the U.S. have been taking this objective less seriously than the Afghan government has, and indeed NATO's laggardly approach to these challenges has been one of the prime causes of disaffection between Hamid Karzai and Britain's Gordon Brown.

More importantly, this business about Afghan disinterest in "Western preoccupations" such as women's rights, free speech, democracy and so on, is simply groundless and wrong. First, these values are not "western," and secondly, the vast majority of Afghans do want their version of "the same sort of freedoms" Canadians enjoy - including the right of women to work, to go to school, and to run for office - and they have said so, time and again, in poll after poll after poll...

Lots of links to examples follow.

Mark
Ottawa
 
A couple of pieces:

Year of the Afghan mission
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081216.wcoafghan17/BNStory/specialComment/home
...
For Canada...2009 may be crucial. Although 2011 seems far off, we'll soon have to decide whether to continue our Afghan engagement, and in what form if we do. NATO is already planning for the arrival of new U.S. forces in Kandahar. If we wish to carve out specific responsibilities for ourselves, we'll need to make a claim to them, probably before 2010.

Such decisions, however, presuppose serious public debate in Canada over the next year [emphasis added--see this post, "Afstan and Canadian public discourse"], informed by the evolving circumstances of the mission.

Apart from withdrawing our 2,700-strong contingent or simply continuing the existing deployment, four other options should be examined:

1. Move Canadian troops to safer parts of Afghanistan (although this is not where NATO forces are most needed).

2. Focus our military mission on Kandahar city and the strategically important districts of Panjwai and Zhari (which may be possible with a reduced force of about 1,800 soldiers, including support elements).

3. Keep only a garrison in Kandahar city to provide security for residents and Canadian development officials (requiring a few hundred soldiers, including support elements).

4. Shift entirely to a training mission for Afghan army and police units (the risks should not be underestimated, since trainers typically accompany their units on operations).

But first, we must decide whether it's in Canada's interest to remain in Afghanistan at all. We have no obligation to make further sacrifices, particularly if the mission's prospects do not improve. But the costs of allowing Afghanistan to collapse back into civil war would be enormous – for regional security (the stability of nuclear-armed Pakistan is at stake), for our own security (as we learned in the 1990s when al-Qaeda used Afghanistan as a base for global attacks), and not least for ordinary Afghans, who have suffered through decades of war.

Roland Paris is director of the Centre for International Policy Studies and associate professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.

And from Rosie DiManno in the Toronto Star:
http://www.thestar.com/News/Columnist/article/555117
It is understandable that Canadians, mourning six soldiers killed in two roadside explosions only a week apart, think of Afghanistan as a tragedy almost uniquely our own, these losses most vividly felt and purportedly to little avail.

That is a perspective born of unforgivable ignorance, manipulated by a faction that has no shame in exploiting private grief.

Here is something else that happened in Afghanistan last weekend: A 13-year-old suicide bomber blew himself up in Sangin, Helmand province, killing three British Marines...

The Taliban know that our humanity – which can never be forsaken – weakens us. Our despair over casualties weakens us. Our combat fatigue weakens us.

And they respond by recruiting more children from madrassas, preying particularly on the mentally and physically disabled, tutoring the most vulnerable suicide-proxies – young in age or young in mental capacity – in the splendour of martyrdom. Many of these conscripts clearly do not understand what they're doing.

Dr. Yusef Yadgari, an Afghan pathologist, last year studied the remains of 100 suicide bombers. Eighty per cent had some kind of physical or mental disability, or a major illness such as leprosy.

This is the regime fighting to reclaim power in Kabul while we – Canada – declare two more years and out.

If anyone wants to understand why the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting – without deadlines imposed for reasons of domestic politics – it is vital to look beyond narrow interests such as the sacrifices of an individual nation contributing troops to the NATO mission.

We cannot just "do our part" and then bolt, with nothing resolved, the threat far from neutralized, or perhaps accepting a less risky assignment farther from harm's way.

I can tell you that no Canadian soldier would take any pride in that.

Mark
Ottawa
 
A point of view that deserves some consideration. The idea the war is directed and financed in a large part by "outside" agencies should arouse little controversy. Some of the other ideas are a bit "out there" but there are nuggets of truth:

http://mesopotamiawest.blogspot.com/2008/12/war-in-wrong-country.html

A War in the Wrong Country?

Is the War in Afghanistan a war in the wrong country? Are we trying to win a proxy war in which the principals, the money and the recruits are based elsewhere? I ask this question because I am concerned and angry at the way our soldiers appear to be sitting ducks for a well-planned, campaign of attrition waged by a foreign state; Pakistan.

As I've said before, I can't see a strategy for winning the war. I have yet to even read a proposed strategy for winning it. What I know is what doesn't work.

  1. Maintaining hard surface supply lines in the face of a guerrilla war failed for the Turks in Arabia in the First World War, failed for the French in Indo-China and are failing us today in Afghanistan. (interpolation: we still have freedom of movement so the situation isn't as critical as the blogger suggests)
  2. Fighting a war in which the source of the weapons lies elsewhere failed in Korea and failed in Vietnam. That's what we're doing today in Afghanistan.
  3. Fighting a war in which our manpower is less than three times that of the enemy has always been doomed to failure. Big numbers win battles; little numbers loose them.(interpolation. the real question is how efficiently the manpower is being used. ISAF has thousands of soldiers who are sitting out the fight, while the Anglosphere troops are covering areas far beyond what the raw numbers might suggest by leveraging their superior training and technology

What was the overall manpower of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan when it was up against the same people? A lot more than we have.

So what would I suggest to turn this around? All the ideas involve the so-called 'civilian' population:

  1. Move the civilian population into concentration camps and kill the military-age men outside the wire. This is the Boer War solution.
  2. Move the civilian population out of the cities. Clean up the cities, and move them back in with a wire around the cities. This is the Iraqi solution.
  3. Bomb one of the larger Afghan cities to rubble. This is the Chechen solution. You don't hear much about that war any more.
(interpolation: this analysis seems to ignore the Malaysian solution or the more general tache d' hule strategy).
And on the geopolitical level; there are two other possibilities.

  1. Cut all ties with Pakistan and support India in a war against its breakaway Muslim areas (Pakistan and Bangladesh). When the dust clears, join with the Indian army in imposing a peaceful life on Afghanistan. India has the numbers; with us helping them, Pakistan is doomed, bombs or no bombs.
  2. Make a deal with Russia and China to take over Afghanistan; to divide it between them. Why not, they both want more strategic depth and they both have the numbers.

The one person who makes sense on this file is, I hate to say it, the President Elect of the United States. When Obama said he would bomb Pakistan under certain circumstances everyone was aghast.

Obama was right on this issue as far as he went, but we need more strategic thinking and we need it now!
 
A post by Terry Glavin (several links in original):

The Pashtun Peace Forum: Indispensable To Understanding The Afghan Struggle
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/01/pashtun-peace-forum-indispensable-to.html

A couple of days ago I found myself wondering what life for the Palestinians would be like right now if they had been able to count on a proper anti-war movement these past few years instead of the pseudo-left dog's breakfast we're stuck with. It's a thought that usually occurs to me in the context of Afghanistan, where the contrast between what Afghan progressives say and what the so-called anti-war movement demands is so stark as to defy easy description.

A common troops-out line, if I can paraphrase, goes something like this: The Afghans are not like us, they are irredeemably backward, hopelessly tribal and warlike, we shouldn't be trying to impose our values on them, you can't bring democracy to people at the barrel of a gun, they hate foreigners, the mission is doomed, just look at what happened to the Russians.

It's like a counterculture version of some really bad Rudyard Kipling poem. The bigotry embedded in it derives from a perverse characterization of all Afghans as Pashtuns, and a caricature of all Pashtuns as incorrigibly chauvinist religious fanatics.

Here's the latest edition of the bimonthly journal of the Pashtun Peace Forum, Ideas.

Some of my favourite bits. . .

From the editorial, Stand Up And Be Counted: "A militant approach to resolving issues was never part of the Pashtun culture. Many argue that this was because of the Pashtun traditions of egalitarianism, respect, dignity, and fear of triggering an escalating cycle of generational feuds. However, the media seems to have developed and perpetuated the myth of the violent Pashtun, which is a misperceived stereotyping probably based on the widespread possession of firearms. Militancy, along with the Jihadi and Taliban methodologies, emerged amongst the Pashtuns during the Afghan War, fuelled and facilitated by the military under Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq and continued by successive Pakistani governments with the active collusion and patronage of United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Western countries. . ."

From Naeem Khan Wardag's essay, Tariq Ali, Pashtun Nationalism and Taliban: "Alas, when Mr. Tariq Ali writes, he writes only about US imperialism and the status of President Karzai government in Kabul despite the fact that presence of US, Canadian, and NATO troops has been mandated by UN and Karzai has been elected by Afghan people through a democratic process and his govt is internationally recognized, contrary to Taliban who had been imposed on Afghans and were recognized only by their three ideological and political mentors. Mr. Tariq Ali never mentions imperialism in the regional setting and its adverse impacts on the people and communities there. That is why his recipe for the problem is the same as popular with religious and strategic hardliners in Islamabad-Rawalpindi, which implies virtual reversal to pre-2001 like situation. The purpose is the re-instatement of the local/regional imperialism of the dominant nationality and its control over Afghan/Pashtun population through religious fanatics and their medieval ways. If such dreams materialized, it will set the whole of South Asia, Central Asia, and Middle East on fire."

Naeem makes the same point that the Canada Afghanistan Solidarity Committee has been making. And I don't think much of Tariq Ali, either.

See also Farhat Taj, Compatibility - The Pakhtun Culture, Talibanization and Obscenity: "Most Pakhtun [alternative spelling] communities stand for girls’ education: this is precisely the reason why the Taliban, whose worldview has no room for girls’ education, are destroying girls schools and colleges. One can name tens of girls’ schools and colleges in the Pakhtun area that government of Pakistan would have simply ignored to build, but thanks to the Pakhtun elders of the areas, mostly fathers and grandfathers, who pleaded with the government to build those girls educational institutions in their area and their requests finally moved the government in building those institutions.

"The Taliban have now destroyed or are destroying those institutions. In almost very city and town of the Pakhtuns there have been growing number of communities and individual families, who have had exposure to education and modernity. Women in such communities and families have taken up non-traditional roles in the public sphere. Before the rise of the Taliban no one had ever heard of any Pakhtun community or individuals violently reacting to women who broke the confinements of the traditional gender roles.

"The Taliban prohibit music, which is an integral part of the Pakhtun traditions. Before the rise of the Taliban no one ever heard of attacks on musicians and music shops. There have always been men with and without beard among the Pakhtuns. Those with beard never forced the others to grow beard. There have always been Pakhtun who were regular in saying daily prayers and those were not so regular and even those who hardly say any prayers for years and years. . ."

UPDATE: Good news.

The good news:

Pakistan al-Qaeda leaders 'dead'
Al-Qaeda's operations chief in Pakistan and another top aide have been killed, US and Pakistani sources say.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7819305.stm

Mark
Ottawa
 
A letter of mine in the Toronto Star:
http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/573230

A role for us in Afghanistan

Jan 19, 2009 04:30 AM

Re:No light at end of Afghan tunnel, Jan. 18
http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/573041

Allan Woods' story deals with the likelihood that the new Obama administration will put pressure on Canada to continue its military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2011. I'd like to propose one approach to doing that, focused on the Canadian Air Force.

A Canadian Air Wing has just been established at Kandahar. It will have Chinook (transport) and Griffon (escort) helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance; it will also support supply flights by Hercules and C-17 transport aircraft. Why not keep the air wing at Kandahar after 2011?

And, besides the air wing, keep a provincial reconstruction team from the army, some troops to mentor the Afghan army and police, and a small unit based at Kandahar airfield to provide force protection. The primary role of the air wing would be to support our allies and the Afghans in the field.

I would imagine a maximum of some 1,500 Canadian Forces personnel would be required, down from some 2,750 now. Such a contingent would be a significant and useful contribution that would be welcomed by NATO and President Barack Obama.

Mark Collins, Ottawa

Mark
Ottawa
 
When I read that this morning in the People's Daily I figured it had to be an Army.ca type - and I can't say I disagree - it would be an excellent (and potentially more politically palatable) way to keep contributing long beyond 2011.

MarkOttawa said:
A letter of mine in the Toronto Star:
http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/573230

Mark
Ottawa
 
Redeye: Thanks.  Actually the Star's letters people seem pretty fair-minded.  And they do carry Rosie Dimanno's columns.

Mark
Ottawa
 
A (rather lengthy) post at The Torch--notes on public appearances:

The Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith (et al.) on Afstan
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/01/globe-and-mails-graeme-smith-et-al-on.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
I have had to remind people over and over that North America has TRIED just turning our backs on conflicts abroad.

Turning our backs, hoping the baddies stay over there and behave NEVER EVER WORKS.

This is one of the reasons we have to be over there. You don't make peace with Hitler by hoping he will go away. You make peace by closing with and destroying him.

History has proven that all that happens when despots with infectious messages of hatred and oppression of others are left to their own devices, everyone loses.

We can't fight every war, everywhere, at all times. We can, however, fight wars where it will do the most good and have the greatest long-term effect.

Right now, the Canadian stance is that this is in Afghanistan. We can not only help them suppress the destructive effects of totalitarian insurgents bent on world domination, we can show them that, yes, the non-Muslim world is not the enemy, because we who are from the largely non-Muslim world are not there to crusade against Islam. We are there to help them to be free from oppression, and choose their own destiny without a knife to their throats.

To betray them is to betray ourselves and cover our faces with shame.
 
Dexter Filkins has a good piece in the New York Times about NATO's failure to secure the population. I really wonder how effective can be in defeating the insurgency when a large urban area like Kandahar city isn't a security priority.

It is perhaps in Kandahar, one of the provincial capitals, where the lack of troops is most evident. About 3,000 Canadian soldiers are assigned to secure the city, home to about 500,000 people. In a recent visit, this reporter traveled the city for five days and did not see a single Canadian soldier on the streets.

The lack of troops has allowed the Taliban to mount significant attacks inside the city. Two clerics who joined a pro-government advisory council, for instance, have been gunned down in the past two months, bringing the total assassinated council members to 24. Over the summer, a Taliban force invaded Kandahar and stormed its main prison, freeing more than 1,200 inmates.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22taliban.html?_r=2&ref=world&pagewanted=all
 
john10 said:
Dexter Filkins has a good piece in the New York Times about NATO's failure to secure the population. I really wonder how effective can be in defeating the insurgency when a large urban area like Kandahar city isn't a security priority.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22taliban.html?_r=2&ref=world&pagewanted=all



Maybe when the other NATO nations start coughing up real numbers and stop hiding in KAF, Kabul or Bagram NATO can start being effective. Another thing is to get the floppers off of KAF and push them out...but that's another thing altogether. The AUP and ANA have higher numbers in Kandahar City than we have. It is a security priority...it's just a big city. It's up to AUP and ANA to step in and sort it out. We are there to help guide them.

The insurgency isn't only in the city either. It's in the country side being fought every bloody day....you don't hear about it nor see it in the news because the reporters for CTV and CBC are too scared to leave KAF and get their hands dirty, unless someone gets hurt or worse.

I see it, hear it and live it every day. There is alot being done....there is alot of progress....

Just no one gives a rat's arse unless it's negative news.

Sorry for the rant folks....been going solid since September and this comment just pisses me off.

Regards
 
john10 said:
I really wonder how effective can be in defeating the insurgency when a large urban area like Kandahar city isn't a security priority.

Your wording is coming off poorly and you are wrong about KC not being a priority.  And it is by and large much harder to secure an urban area than an outlying one. 
Canada isn't in charge of securing KC.  The ANA and ANP are.  We help them where we can but it isn't our gig.
And the article is rather misleading.  There are 3000 odd Canadians here, but they certainly aren't all posted to deal with KC.  In fact, the vast majority of them are support staff.  Kandahar is a rather large province and we are spread quite thin. 
As for "defeating the insurgency" our American friends that are inbound will go a long way to helping out.  But until someone wants to go after the governance piece we are spinning our wheels and wasting our nations treasures. 
From your article:
A force of about 20,000 American, British, Canadian and Dutch soldiers have been trying for years to secure the 78,000 square miles of villages, cities, mountains and deserts that make up southern Afghanistan.
So that is 3.9 square miles of area for each dude here.  I hope I get the desert part, not the urban area.
The article isn't too bad, but when it starts throwing around numbers they are skewed.  I'm just not sure why. The part about Tsapozai is funny though.  That part looks like a verbatim exchange. 

Recce By Death said:
Sorry for the rant folks....been going solid since September and this comment just pisses me off.

At least you get to turn them into a fine red mist.  ;D  What I would give....
 
zipperhead_cop said:
At least you get to turn them into a fine red mist.   ;D  What I would give....

True enough....forgot about that open, physical way to try and "negotiate" (a la Jack Layton) with the Taliban.

Kind of cathardic....

Regards
 
A thoughtful post by Vampire 06 (at his blog, AFGHANISTAN SHRUGGED), an American soldier embedded with the ANA:
http://afghanistanshrugged.com/2009/01/22/dear-president-obama.aspx

Dear, President Obama

I know that you just took office about 48 hours ago and you’ve got a lot on your plate; but I thought I’d provide you with a small letter for SA, situational awareness.  I’m sure that GEN Petraus will provide one for you also; but mine comes from the trenches of the War On Terror.  My team is out here every day making sure that the policies you set forth get carried out; so we see the impact, successes and failures first hand.

First, let me describe the current situation from my fighting position.  It’s not great.  Currently we’re chasing the wrong thing, that being enemy forces.  They can always recruit more people, we need to attack the motivations to join the enemy.  Eliminate the supply. 

Predators, ROVER and other implements that we’ve paid billions for are most often used to second guess the guys on the ground and tell them that they’re not seeing what they’re seeing.  If this seems convoluted it is!  It boils down to this, you’re getting shot at and some dude a long way off is telling you you’re not and that by the way you better not shoot back at the enemy.

Logistics suck!  No if, and or buts about it.  This is day 26 for this team without mail.  This is a lot different then you’ll see at the big FOBs where there’s ubiquitous ice cream, coffee and hot chow, and totally different than Iraq.  They throw away more than we eat.  I haven’t seen a PX in three months and I just ran out of deodorant and soap today, my wife mailed some to me in the middle of December but haven’t seen it yet.   As they say, “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics”.

There are some great American Warriors here doing their darn best to win the war, but the higher ups are too afraid; so they won’t let them off the FOB to do the work that needs to be done.  They track things like how many rounds we expended and what patch you’re wearing on your ACUs instead of issues like how many feet of road or the number of schools built.

So now that I’ve painted a little picture of what it looks like, let me indulge myself and highlight a couple of things I think we could do to close the deal.

Roads, we need more of them.  A lot more!  This is the cornerstone to building Afghanistan and the government. The Romans were successful not because of military technology, it helped, but because they built an extensive road network.  Many of which still exist today and are in better shape than roads in Afghanistan.

Without roads the Afghans don’t really need a centralized government.  That’s a broad statement but I’ll qualify it here in a minute.  The tribe pretty much provides what they need.  The tribe protects them, settles disputes and enforces laws.  They’re more than capable of doing this and have been for the last several centuries.  They fulfill the basic governmental requirements common defense, law and order.

The tribes though can’t build and maintain roads.  Now, you need a centralized government to construct, maintain and protect the roads.  You get an influx of money as people work on the roads and they quit getting paid to blow us up and it stimulates a demand for goods and services.

With the road comes inter-province commerce for which you need regulation by a central government; a function a tribe can’t accomplish.  Sounds kind of like a little situation we had around 1776.  The road brings money, communication and progress.  You cut the link between Pakistan and the tribal regions because it’s now easier to travel to the interior of Afghanistan to get medical treatment, goods, services the whole lot.

So with a simple road we’ve now created an environment friendly to the support of the Afghan central government.  That doesn’t exist now.  It’s a lot easier to explain to the Afghans that the Army and police protect the roads and regulate commerce.  Additionally taking the, “this is a war on Islam” factor out of the situation.

We’re making sure people can conduct trade and are free to travel as they wish.  Sounds like freedom.

Democracy and liberty are damn hard concept to explain to someone who doesn’t see any benefit from the government in Kabul.  So what if I elect the guy if he does nothing for me?  The population earns money and then we explain that the government will protect their continued ability to do so and that’s a discussion someone understands.

Next we need education.  Only about 10% of the Afghans are literate.  This means that 90% of knowledge and news is spread through verbal means.  Thus, you’re at the whim of whoever is telling you the information.  You get the info with the bias and slant of the communicator, no real way to get an independent source.

If we start educating people they can form their own opinions.  Once again this sounds a lot like freedom to me.  But, I’m just a dumb ground pounder.

We open up a whole new world to people if they can read and write.  The Taliban has the corner on the market for information; they tell the locals what they want.  We don’t even participate in the information operations fight.  We’ve put in radio stations but that’s a small step, they need to be able to read and write for themselves.   

Finally, start letting us make decisions at the tactical level.  That doesn’t mean we go out and start shooting everyone.  It means we go out with our Afghan brothers and protect roads, trade and schools.  We help them enforce the laws that have come with the roads.  It’s damn hard to do that sitting on a FOB or only going out to attack people.  Quit rewarding commanders who only think they’re killing enemy.  No one ever won an insurgency by killing insurgents.  Instead reward those guys making a real long term impact and get the counter-insurgency fight.

Also, force the Afghan government to start taking the lead.  Make them build roads outside the major cities and quit letting them do nothing while we shovel money into this country to no avail.  Make the government a meritocracy instead of a means of rewarding tribal loyalty, this goes for the Army and police too.  As long as these guys just enrich themselves nothing is going to happen and the people will become more pessimistic forcing them back to the tribe that looks out for their welfare.

So Mr President just a few thoughts from the trenchline.  You probably won’t hear any of this from the higher ups.  They’ll tell you we need more combat troops, but we can’t even support the ones we already have here.  They should tell you to send engineers and logisticians, but that’s not too sexy.

Very Respectfully,

VAMPIRE 06
     

Via Paul Synnott:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/01/please-send-mail.html

UPDATE Just by coincidence:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012303505.html
...
Dalawar, a member of the Mohmand tribe, said he is no fan of the Taliban. But in places such as Khuga Kheyl, the pressure on tribal elders to join the Taliban is intense. Electricity is scarce. Paved roads are nonexistent. And insurgent hideouts are abundant on both sides of the border. Dalawar said insurgent commanders regularly try to entice him to join the fight against coalition forces.

"They tell us to fight alongside them. They say: 'We will give you roads emphasis added]. We will give you electricity.' The Taliban, they tell us: 'Look, the Afghan government has given you nothing. If you fight with us, you can have everything,' " Dalawar said. "When we tell them, 'No, we will not do this,' then they tell us they will take our villages by force if they have to."..

Mark
Ottawa
 
Now there is a blog (from Vampire06) that I can relate to and support.
 
The best thing we can do to hurt the taliban is to defoliate the poppy fields. They have become the leading opium producer in the region and as such is their primary source of income. Numbers cannot defeat the insurgency. The Russian puppet government had 350,000 troops plus 150,000 Russians and they still couldnt control the countryside. The Russians were successfully attrited by the insurgency and the taliban are trying this same strategy today. If we cannot stop the flow of fighters/supplies from Pakistan then we arent going to defeat this insurgency. If we dont get the Karzai government to be more agressive we will not be successful.Karzai now wants to approve NATO troop deployments and the locations they are to be deployed. He also wants more say in the strategy. At the sametime he is hamstringing us by siding with the "dont bomb civilians" crap when everyone knows they were taliban. I suspect at some point we might be better off offering to pull out and reminding Karzai what happened to Najibullah.

 
Recce By Death said:
Maybe when the other NATO nations start coughing up real numbers and stop hiding in KAF, Kabul or Bagram NATO can start being effective. Another thing is to get the floppers off of KAF and push them out...but that's another thing altogether. The AUP and ANA have higher numbers in Kandahar City than we have. It is a security priority...it's just a big city. It's up to AUP and ANA to step in and sort it out. We are there to help guide them.

The insurgency isn't only in the city either. It's in the country side being fought every bloody day....you don't hear about it nor see it in the news because the reporters for CTV and CBC are too scared to leave KAF and get their hands dirty, unless someone gets hurt or worse.

I see it, hear it and live it every day. There is alot being done....there is alot of progress....

Just no one gives a rat's arse unless it's negative news.

Sorry for the rant folks....been going solid since September and this comment just pisses me off.

Regards
Sorry Recce, I didn't mean to come off the way I did.

best,
 
tomahawk6 said:
The best thing we can do to hurt the taliban is to defoliate the poppy fields
Poppy production is a leading source of income for a large portion of the Kandahar/Helmand/Uruzgan population. The people. Win the people. Hearts and minds. Any of this sound familiar? Do you have any options for attracting popular support once you've destroyed their livelihood?

Numbers cannot defeat the insurgency
If the "numbers" tend to be hunkered down in FOBs or creating powerpoints in KAF, you're likely correct. Historically, insurgencies have been defeated by people (governance, military, law-enforcement, development) out on the ground, interacting with the people. It's a big country; that suggests a lot of "numbers" may be required. It's all a matter of using them to best effect.

If we cannot stop the flow of fighters/supplies from Pakistan then we arent going to defeat this insurgency
A fine platitude. How?

Karzai now wants to approve NATO troop deployments and the locations they are to be deployed. He also wants more say in the strategy
Perhaps a niggling detail, but Karzai is the duly elected President of the country. If anyone has a "say," I think he'd be the one.

At the sametime he is hamstringing us by siding with the "dont bomb civilians" crap when everyone knows they were taliban
My response to this has been typed/erased too many times to count. In the end, this site's  guidelines do not allow the appropriate response. " ::) " will have to suffice.

I suspect at some point we might be better off offering to pull out and reminding Karzai what happened to Najibullah
Or maybe President Thieu?
 
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