AAD and NGS (split from JSS Amphib Capability thread)
- Thread starter Cdn Blackshirt
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Is that a certainity based on fact or an opinion?
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An informed opinion.........based on 12 years of sea time/training.
I am a child of Paramax and Unysis CCS through training in Montreal (CPF) and watched the bungled CCS-330(Tribal) upgrades and band-aids throughout the 90's and the early millennium. (I have sailed on both classes)
The money and commitment already put into these projects (CCS) is enormous.
Canada would have to cut it's losses and establish AEGIS infrastructure and training.($$$)
Reconfigure the entire ship sensors and weapon systems. ($$$)
Massive combat trials and recertification. ($$$) (more Standards/Sparrows/Harpoons away) (not a bad idea)($$$$)
There goes our 13 billion dollar budget. The Airforce and the Army would snap.
It will not happen before 2020.
Crow
I am a child of Paramax and Unysis CCS through training in Montreal (CPF) and watched the bungled CCS-330(Tribal) upgrades and band-aids throughout the 90's and the early millennium. (I have sailed on both classes)
The money and commitment already put into these projects (CCS) is enormous.
Canada would have to cut it's losses and establish AEGIS infrastructure and training.($$$)
Reconfigure the entire ship sensors and weapon systems. ($$$)
Massive combat trials and recertification. ($$$) (more Standards/Sparrows/Harpoons away) (not a bad idea)($$$$)
There goes our 13 billion dollar budget. The Airforce and the Army would snap.
It will not happen before 2020.
Crow
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LOL maybe just a little.
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I am looking for a few of the articles mentioned in the piece reproduced below. I especially like the comparisons between the BB and the DDX or even a carrier in the Reilly article. Whatever the Canadian Navy does in the future with respect to new warships and supporting the troops ashore, there are precious gems in these articles that are important to all of the services. If anything, I am now more in favour of a minimum 5" NGS gun on the new frigates and destroyers, along with land attack missiles of some variety. [if the ships are ever built]
The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
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Dread not the DD(X)By James G. Zumwalt
Published July 7, 2005
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I have followed with interest the debate in The Washington Times sparked by Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton's article on the June 13 Op-Ed page on the need for the Navy to focus on getting the DD(X), the next generation destroyer, out into the fleet rather than bringing back our nation's two remaining serviceable battleships, vessels historically referred to as "dreadnoughts."
Adm. Hamilton's article was criticized by James O'Bryon (June 17) and Dennis Reilly (June 21), both of whom tout perceived advantages of the battleship over DD(X) technologies.
I have a personal interest in the DD(X) as this new class of warship will be named after my late father, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Accordingly, I feel it appropriate to assess the Zumwalt Class DD(X) from the same perspective as would he. After all, in 1966 my father was the Navy's first director of Systems Analysis and was responsible for analyzing competing weaponry systems to ensure the Navy got the biggest bang for its buck. His honest assessments, regardless of the politics involved, earned him both respect and criticism. Time eventually proved his assessments right.
I sense Adm. Hamilton, in similarly providing an honest, albeit unpopular (in view of the battleship's popular "mystique"), assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship, is suffering such criticism but that time will prove him right as well.
A comprehensive systems analysis approach to this issue involves weighing numerous cost factors -- hidden as well as directly related to hard costs of a battleship's modernization.
The defense budget's costliest element is manpower. An Iowa Class battleship requires a 1,500-member crew. That many sailors could man 10 DD(X) destroyers. No one on active duty in the Navy is trained to operate a battleship's steam plant, weapons and fire-control systems. Training personnel to do so would involve a costly expansion of the Navy's school system.
There are limited shipyard facilities capable of handling larger warships like battleships and carriers. Reactivating the former would greatly impair maintenance support of the latter absent additional funds for expanding the facilities.
The battleship is a single-mission ship, with no viable anti-air or antisubmarine capability. Unlike the DD(X), which has a multiple mission capability and can operate independently, battleships require escort ships to defend them against those threats.
The battleship is particularly susceptible to targeting. Its very noisy propulsion plant, its sheer size and the additional escort ships would make it easy to locate. The DD(X), with its quiet propulsion system, stealth technology and ability to operate independently, would be much more difficult to target.
The battleship is the most heavily armored warship afloat. As such, it could survive hits from conventional guns along the armor belt positioned on the sides of the ship; but such armor is not optimally positioned for hits above that belt.
Reactivation of the Iowa Class battleships exceeded $2 billion in the 1980s. Reactivating two battleships today, updating radars and communications, procuring spare parts from firms no longer making them, and training crews would probably cost more than $2 billion per ship.
While modernization and conversion is possible, it would take time, involve great cost and leave unchanged certain aspects of these battleships -- e.g., their inefficient oil-burning propulsion plants and the large number of personnel necessary to man their engineering departments.
With the global war on terrorism stretching our defense dollars thin, we must now, more than ever, maximize our return. Funds must be spent in a manner most capable of cost-effectively addressing the Navy's future long-term needs. Putting them into a short-term naval gunfire support (NGFS) solution, such as battleships, is unresponsive to this requirement.
Thirty-five years ago, the Navy faced a similar situation. Tough decisions were needed on how best to spend defense dollars on short- and long-term needs while the Vietnam War drained limited funds. As head of the Navy at that time, my father decided to retire older ships early to fund new ones -- opting to address the Navy's long-term needs to counter a growing Soviet threat to U.S. control of the seas.
As U.S. control of the seas face future Chinese challenges, we must meet that long-term threat as well as the short-term need for NGFS. The DD(X) program will do exactly that.
James G. Zumwalt, a Marine veteran of the Persian Gulf and Vietnam wars, is a contributor to The Washington Times.
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The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
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Battleship misinformation
By Dennis Reilly
Published July 14, 2005
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James Zumwalt's July 7 Commentary "Dread not the DD(X)" could not have been more aptly named. As was stated in my June 21 Op-Ed, "Battling for battleships," the Navy's misguided effort to develop the DD(X) is effectively dead. Our purpose here is to correct misstatements regarding the battleship, presumably obtained from the Navy.
Mr. Zumwalt appears unaware that his famed father was a proponent, not an opponent, of battleship reactivation during his tenure.
Contrary to the Zumvalt article, Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton did not provide "an honest ... assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship," as is clear from James O'Bryon's June 17 Op-Ed, "Distortions about ships." A document, now under review by the Government Accountability Office (www.usnfsa.org), presents a side-by-side comparison of official Navy claims with detailed rebuttal by U.S. Naval Fire Support Association.
The article implies that the battleship would be vulnerable. The latest Rolling Airframe Missiles provide competent anti-air/anti-missile protection to our carriers, and even destroyers. Modernization of the battleships would surely include this protection. The battleship's deck and turret armor, not just the belt, as claimed in the article, were designed to and proven to take hits. Should a weapon get through, no other ship would have a greater chance of remaining operational.
But, one has to ask why, in a high-threat environment, would not a battleship, like a carrier, be entitled to its own battlegroup with overlapping protections against threats from above and below the sea surface. After all, within the range of its guided projectiles (near-term 52 miles, midterm 115 miles, long-term 450 to 600 miles) the battleship has firepower comparable to that of a carrier. But unlike the carrier, the battleship's firepower is all-weather with tactical response times. Because its projectiles are immune to anti-aircraft defenses, the Hanoi Hilton problem disappears.
The Navy has failed in its attempt to discredit the battleship's firepower potential, so it has turned its attention to the cost and availability of manpower. The rational way to discuss costs of any weapons system is in terms of costs per unit of firepower.
It would take 19 DD(X)s to put the same number of pounds on target per minute (at the Marine Corps' near-term goal of 52 miles range) as can a single battleship. The 1,100-man battleship crew with a $1.5 billion modernization and reactivation cost will be doing the work of the 1,900 men manning 19 DD(X)s costing a whopping total of $32 billion to build (at the unrealizable congressionally mandated $1.7 billion per copy). Would not the $30 billion savings pay for crew training and reconstitution of the spare parts, ammunition, and support infrastructure trashed by the Navy, with some of this in clear violation of the law, (PL104-106)?
The battleship's boilers are fired by "diesel fuel marine," not oil, as stated in the Commentary article. It uses the same power plant and the same fuel as the AOE-1 fast supply ships that support our carriers today. Presumably, AOE-1 ships will be replaced by the gas-turbine-powered T-AOE(X). There is wonderful synergy going on here. This would free up a considerable pool of sailors who would be quite familiar with the battleship's propulsion system, answering another manpower issue cited by the Navy.
Contrary to the article, the battleships would be far from single mission platforms. They would, in the near term: 1) meet the Marine Corps' near-term requirements for naval surface support; 2) be an extremely effective anti terrorist platform in the Pacific littorals because of their unique capability to obliterate training camps before the "students" could disperse; and 3) serve as deterrent to Chinese adventurism in Taiwan, and North Korea's threat to the South. On the longer term, the battleship's long-range guided projectiles could open a new strategic and tactical dimension, with guided ballistic projectiles arching over uncooperative states to reach targets many hundreds of miles away in a matter of minutes.
The Navy has made decisions that there never again will be a need for forced entry by the sea, and invasions, should they be called for, will be accomplished by audacious 50-to-100 mile incursions using the unproven V22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. The Navy suggests that fire support will be provided by $500,000 per-copy cruise missiles and by the (endangered) aircraft-launched Joint Standoff Weapon, a GPS-guided gliding bomb of comparable cost.
The slow speeds of these weapons compared to battleship-launched projectiles result in inadequate tactical response times and vulnerability to antiaircraft defenses, severely limiting the viability of this form of fire support. The costs per round are more than 10 times that of the tactically responsive, anti-aircraft-fire-immune,battleship-launched guided projectile.
What in the world can the Navy be thinking? As detailed in June Op-Ed, "Battleships fit for Duty," they do not even recognize the real strategic threats we face. The Marine Corps generals (Semper Fidelis?) dare not contradict their Navy bosses. It is time for Congress to impose some rational supervision.
Dennis Reilly, a physicist, serves as science adviser to the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association.
The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dread not the DD(X)By James G. Zumwalt
Published July 7, 2005
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I have followed with interest the debate in The Washington Times sparked by Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton's article on the June 13 Op-Ed page on the need for the Navy to focus on getting the DD(X), the next generation destroyer, out into the fleet rather than bringing back our nation's two remaining serviceable battleships, vessels historically referred to as "dreadnoughts."
Adm. Hamilton's article was criticized by James O'Bryon (June 17) and Dennis Reilly (June 21), both of whom tout perceived advantages of the battleship over DD(X) technologies.
I have a personal interest in the DD(X) as this new class of warship will be named after my late father, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Accordingly, I feel it appropriate to assess the Zumwalt Class DD(X) from the same perspective as would he. After all, in 1966 my father was the Navy's first director of Systems Analysis and was responsible for analyzing competing weaponry systems to ensure the Navy got the biggest bang for its buck. His honest assessments, regardless of the politics involved, earned him both respect and criticism. Time eventually proved his assessments right.
I sense Adm. Hamilton, in similarly providing an honest, albeit unpopular (in view of the battleship's popular "mystique"), assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship, is suffering such criticism but that time will prove him right as well.
A comprehensive systems analysis approach to this issue involves weighing numerous cost factors -- hidden as well as directly related to hard costs of a battleship's modernization.
The defense budget's costliest element is manpower. An Iowa Class battleship requires a 1,500-member crew. That many sailors could man 10 DD(X) destroyers. No one on active duty in the Navy is trained to operate a battleship's steam plant, weapons and fire-control systems. Training personnel to do so would involve a costly expansion of the Navy's school system.
There are limited shipyard facilities capable of handling larger warships like battleships and carriers. Reactivating the former would greatly impair maintenance support of the latter absent additional funds for expanding the facilities.
The battleship is a single-mission ship, with no viable anti-air or antisubmarine capability. Unlike the DD(X), which has a multiple mission capability and can operate independently, battleships require escort ships to defend them against those threats.
The battleship is particularly susceptible to targeting. Its very noisy propulsion plant, its sheer size and the additional escort ships would make it easy to locate. The DD(X), with its quiet propulsion system, stealth technology and ability to operate independently, would be much more difficult to target.
The battleship is the most heavily armored warship afloat. As such, it could survive hits from conventional guns along the armor belt positioned on the sides of the ship; but such armor is not optimally positioned for hits above that belt.
Reactivation of the Iowa Class battleships exceeded $2 billion in the 1980s. Reactivating two battleships today, updating radars and communications, procuring spare parts from firms no longer making them, and training crews would probably cost more than $2 billion per ship.
While modernization and conversion is possible, it would take time, involve great cost and leave unchanged certain aspects of these battleships -- e.g., their inefficient oil-burning propulsion plants and the large number of personnel necessary to man their engineering departments.
With the global war on terrorism stretching our defense dollars thin, we must now, more than ever, maximize our return. Funds must be spent in a manner most capable of cost-effectively addressing the Navy's future long-term needs. Putting them into a short-term naval gunfire support (NGFS) solution, such as battleships, is unresponsive to this requirement.
Thirty-five years ago, the Navy faced a similar situation. Tough decisions were needed on how best to spend defense dollars on short- and long-term needs while the Vietnam War drained limited funds. As head of the Navy at that time, my father decided to retire older ships early to fund new ones -- opting to address the Navy's long-term needs to counter a growing Soviet threat to U.S. control of the seas.
As U.S. control of the seas face future Chinese challenges, we must meet that long-term threat as well as the short-term need for NGFS. The DD(X) program will do exactly that.
James G. Zumwalt, a Marine veteran of the Persian Gulf and Vietnam wars, is a contributor to The Washington Times.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Battleship misinformation
By Dennis Reilly
Published July 14, 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
James Zumwalt's July 7 Commentary "Dread not the DD(X)" could not have been more aptly named. As was stated in my June 21 Op-Ed, "Battling for battleships," the Navy's misguided effort to develop the DD(X) is effectively dead. Our purpose here is to correct misstatements regarding the battleship, presumably obtained from the Navy.
Mr. Zumwalt appears unaware that his famed father was a proponent, not an opponent, of battleship reactivation during his tenure.
Contrary to the Zumvalt article, Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton did not provide "an honest ... assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship," as is clear from James O'Bryon's June 17 Op-Ed, "Distortions about ships." A document, now under review by the Government Accountability Office (www.usnfsa.org), presents a side-by-side comparison of official Navy claims with detailed rebuttal by U.S. Naval Fire Support Association.
The article implies that the battleship would be vulnerable. The latest Rolling Airframe Missiles provide competent anti-air/anti-missile protection to our carriers, and even destroyers. Modernization of the battleships would surely include this protection. The battleship's deck and turret armor, not just the belt, as claimed in the article, were designed to and proven to take hits. Should a weapon get through, no other ship would have a greater chance of remaining operational.
But, one has to ask why, in a high-threat environment, would not a battleship, like a carrier, be entitled to its own battlegroup with overlapping protections against threats from above and below the sea surface. After all, within the range of its guided projectiles (near-term 52 miles, midterm 115 miles, long-term 450 to 600 miles) the battleship has firepower comparable to that of a carrier. But unlike the carrier, the battleship's firepower is all-weather with tactical response times. Because its projectiles are immune to anti-aircraft defenses, the Hanoi Hilton problem disappears.
The Navy has failed in its attempt to discredit the battleship's firepower potential, so it has turned its attention to the cost and availability of manpower. The rational way to discuss costs of any weapons system is in terms of costs per unit of firepower.
It would take 19 DD(X)s to put the same number of pounds on target per minute (at the Marine Corps' near-term goal of 52 miles range) as can a single battleship. The 1,100-man battleship crew with a $1.5 billion modernization and reactivation cost will be doing the work of the 1,900 men manning 19 DD(X)s costing a whopping total of $32 billion to build (at the unrealizable congressionally mandated $1.7 billion per copy). Would not the $30 billion savings pay for crew training and reconstitution of the spare parts, ammunition, and support infrastructure trashed by the Navy, with some of this in clear violation of the law, (PL104-106)?
The battleship's boilers are fired by "diesel fuel marine," not oil, as stated in the Commentary article. It uses the same power plant and the same fuel as the AOE-1 fast supply ships that support our carriers today. Presumably, AOE-1 ships will be replaced by the gas-turbine-powered T-AOE(X). There is wonderful synergy going on here. This would free up a considerable pool of sailors who would be quite familiar with the battleship's propulsion system, answering another manpower issue cited by the Navy.
Contrary to the article, the battleships would be far from single mission platforms. They would, in the near term: 1) meet the Marine Corps' near-term requirements for naval surface support; 2) be an extremely effective anti terrorist platform in the Pacific littorals because of their unique capability to obliterate training camps before the "students" could disperse; and 3) serve as deterrent to Chinese adventurism in Taiwan, and North Korea's threat to the South. On the longer term, the battleship's long-range guided projectiles could open a new strategic and tactical dimension, with guided ballistic projectiles arching over uncooperative states to reach targets many hundreds of miles away in a matter of minutes.
The Navy has made decisions that there never again will be a need for forced entry by the sea, and invasions, should they be called for, will be accomplished by audacious 50-to-100 mile incursions using the unproven V22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. The Navy suggests that fire support will be provided by $500,000 per-copy cruise missiles and by the (endangered) aircraft-launched Joint Standoff Weapon, a GPS-guided gliding bomb of comparable cost.
The slow speeds of these weapons compared to battleship-launched projectiles result in inadequate tactical response times and vulnerability to antiaircraft defenses, severely limiting the viability of this form of fire support. The costs per round are more than 10 times that of the tactically responsive, anti-aircraft-fire-immune,battleship-launched guided projectile.
What in the world can the Navy be thinking? As detailed in June Op-Ed, "Battleships fit for Duty," they do not even recognize the real strategic threats we face. The Marine Corps generals (Semper Fidelis?) dare not contradict their Navy bosses. It is time for Congress to impose some rational supervision.
Dennis Reilly, a physicist, serves as science adviser to the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association.
- Reaction score
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- 430
While nothing matches of firepower a battleship brings to the battle its still only one ship.....I notice Dennis Reilley all but scorning the DDX, saying it would take 19 to equal an Iowa. Ok maybe so, but at the end of the day that is 19 more ships you can task elsewhere. The versatility for the variety of missions you may have for them is tremendous whereas you only have 1 or 2 battleships. The DDX(s) will already be there as escorts for either the ESG or as part as the CVBG. With the battleships being brought in (in the 80s they were organized into SAGs (Surface Action Groups) IIRC), it may take some time before they can be deployed. Sorry, but me personally I think the battleships gave honourable service but its time to let go of them. Completely and totally.
- Reaction score
- 1,697
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Yes, they were called SAGS, and they were a sight to behold from the view of our tiny little IRE's. But, we had more beer on our ship than they had in their whole SAG. 8)
I think what is Reilly is driving at, by the nature of his affilliation with the USNFGA, is the unsurpassed role of NGS with the all weather capability afforded by the platform [which is a little questionable]. I think there are elements in the USN who are convinced that there really is no other solution to the "pounds on target" problem than the battleship. Clearly, this is not a classic naval ship on ship problem, but more of a Marine Corps requirement - although I am told there are many documented examples of the battle wagons being totally ineffective.
What I really, really like about the articles is the explicit recognition on both sides of the continued long term need need for NGS for even the most sophisticated navy in the world. This is a capability which I would argue Canada must regain if there are any serious plans at all about conducting land operations close to the shoreline. Gunfire is cheaper by far than missiles, and a ship can carry many more 5" rounds than missiles- although missiles are still a necessity as well. There is also something to be said for the pleasure of being aboard ship on the NGS range and bustin' caps all day long at old pick up trucks. Many, many, custom made ashtrays flood the market after that.
I am very surprised at the price tag of the DDX - that is a lot of money per copy so they must be getting a lot of bang for the buck. I hope our projects on the horizon are not that expensive, but just as capable.
I think what is Reilly is driving at, by the nature of his affilliation with the USNFGA, is the unsurpassed role of NGS with the all weather capability afforded by the platform [which is a little questionable]. I think there are elements in the USN who are convinced that there really is no other solution to the "pounds on target" problem than the battleship. Clearly, this is not a classic naval ship on ship problem, but more of a Marine Corps requirement - although I am told there are many documented examples of the battle wagons being totally ineffective.
What I really, really like about the articles is the explicit recognition on both sides of the continued long term need need for NGS for even the most sophisticated navy in the world. This is a capability which I would argue Canada must regain if there are any serious plans at all about conducting land operations close to the shoreline. Gunfire is cheaper by far than missiles, and a ship can carry many more 5" rounds than missiles- although missiles are still a necessity as well. There is also something to be said for the pleasure of being aboard ship on the NGS range and bustin' caps all day long at old pick up trucks. Many, many, custom made ashtrays flood the market after that.
I am very surprised at the price tag of the DDX - that is a lot of money per copy so they must be getting a lot of bang for the buck. I hope our projects on the horizon are not that expensive, but just as capable.
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 430
With Joint Ops being the Drink of the Day, then regaining NGS shouls be a priority. Our biggest gun in our naval inventory (76 mm Oto Melara) is not designed for NGS and as whiskey has pointed out you want at least a 5".
Another idea we might want to consider is the project the German navy had a couple of years ago where they mounted a 155mm howitzer turret from a PZH2000 SPG to on of the new Brandenburg class FFGs. As far as I remember the test was a success. Maybe we should try the same with our surplus M109s.
Another idea we might want to consider is the project the German navy had a couple of years ago where they mounted a 155mm howitzer turret from a PZH2000 SPG to on of the new Brandenburg class FFGs. As far as I remember the test was a success. Maybe we should try the same with our surplus M109s.
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 1,120
Hey Ex,
I think I tried to start something on the idea of adding a vehicle type weapons turret to a CPF to add a land attack capability for NGS.
I was leaning towards a 120mm Automatic mortar system I believe, max range of about 12 Km, and the place to put it would have been one of the hangar wings, lose part of the torpedo storage on one side or the other (honestly, do we need that many torps?) and it would provide an additional capability with only a partial loss of what we have now.
Just an idea, but hey, it'd be better than what we have now.
NS
I think I tried to start something on the idea of adding a vehicle type weapons turret to a CPF to add a land attack capability for NGS.
I was leaning towards a 120mm Automatic mortar system I believe, max range of about 12 Km, and the place to put it would have been one of the hangar wings, lose part of the torpedo storage on one side or the other (honestly, do we need that many torps?) and it would provide an additional capability with only a partial loss of what we have now.
Just an idea, but hey, it'd be better than what we have now.
NS
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 430
Interesting idea NS...but that means an additional weapon system that we would have to establish doctrine on, buy and train people on. Other then that I would thing that could be a very versatile system. What of this approach? Seeing how some ships don't sale with an Air Det, what if we put a temporary mount for a 155mm M109 turrent on the flight deck? Seeing how we already have them in the system and it would be an increase in range as well. We could remove the torpedoes and keep the charges in one magazine and the projectiles in the other.
- Reaction score
- 4,019
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- 1,120
I was leaning towards the 120 type mount because it gives quite good range for the size of weapon. Also, the footprint of the weapons system on the ship could be limited to the rear portion of one of the torpedo mags. You'd still be able to carry the tubes, and the torps in the other mag (transfer them over when you need to load/fire the tubes) but with a 120 up top, and the space below, you'd be able to fit a HUGE amount of ammo in there. Heck, you could even do palletized loadouts, making it a REAL easy system to ammo/de-ammo!
The bonus that you wouldn't lose the helo capability would be the deciding factor I think. Losing the helo when you're in a situation where NGS is needed means you've lost a huge extension of your ship's detection bubble.
The ability to maintain helo ops while doing NGS would mean that you could also be a platform for medevac/etc if needed.
Another big concern would be the recoil impulse. An M-109 has a significant amount of it, and mounting just the turret on the flight deck would probably not work out so well (understood not through the deck, but on top of it)....the 120 mortar would have significantly less recoil, and you wouldn't screw up your flight deck certification either. (Probably have to do a re-cert every time it was mounted/fired, and check for recoil damage.)
NS
The bonus that you wouldn't lose the helo capability would be the deciding factor I think. Losing the helo when you're in a situation where NGS is needed means you've lost a huge extension of your ship's detection bubble.
The ability to maintain helo ops while doing NGS would mean that you could also be a platform for medevac/etc if needed.
Another big concern would be the recoil impulse. An M-109 has a significant amount of it, and mounting just the turret on the flight deck would probably not work out so well (understood not through the deck, but on top of it)....the 120 mortar would have significantly less recoil, and you wouldn't screw up your flight deck certification either. (Probably have to do a re-cert every time it was mounted/fired, and check for recoil damage.)
NS
- Reaction score
- 1,697
- Points
- 1,160
Would this mortar be something that is snap in and snap out, plug and play etc? If so, would it be a good system to make provisions for on arctic sovereignty ships which can land troops up on some the northern islands? [an idea I have been toying with]
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Good point on the recoil and flight deck...I guess thats why you are the tech and I am the operator.
I would like to see some sort of extended range munitions developed for the weapon as well.
x-grunt
Full Member
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 230
When you metinoned this, I immediately thought of the MCDV's modular payload system, I can imagine having 120 mortars mounted on them and in essence creating a coastal gunboat squadron on the cheap. I do not know anything about structural issues that may be involved, but it's a thought.whiskey601 said:
- Reaction score
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On the quarterdeck?
- Reaction score
- 4,019
- Points
- 1,120
Part of the issue with loading these up on an MCDV might be the stabilization.
I don't believe that MCDV's have a gyro that puts out all the correct H/P/R signals for gun stabilization (I could be wrong on this one, if someone knows, correct me)
Also, the platform size for stability/accuracy is an issue, not to mention speed.
However, that said, the MCDV has a shallower draft, and would be able to work in closer than a CPF, so that's a definite advantage too.
The other consideration is survivability. A CPF is a larger, more survivable platform against potential return fire. An MCDV doesn't have much going for it on that front.
NS
I don't believe that MCDV's have a gyro that puts out all the correct H/P/R signals for gun stabilization (I could be wrong on this one, if someone knows, correct me)
Also, the platform size for stability/accuracy is an issue, not to mention speed.
However, that said, the MCDV has a shallower draft, and would be able to work in closer than a CPF, so that's a definite advantage too.
The other consideration is survivability. A CPF is a larger, more survivable platform against potential return fire. An MCDV doesn't have much going for it on that front.
NS
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 430
Merged for NGS continuity.
- Reaction score
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You know whats ironic in the NGS issue? Its the fact that Peru has one of the best units to conduct shore support...the old light cruiser Almirante Grau with her 6 inch guns.
- Reaction score
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Maybe the OPV that the Navy was talking about last year might be a good platform for a 120mm auto mortar system.
