So the main criticism is that I didn't provide examples, fair enough. In order to conduct the interviews I had to convince people I would not provide names or examples so they wouldn't think they're in danger.
You want examples, boy, where do I start:
- A WO on Phase 3 infantry threatening to "pierce" us (Je vais vous percer mes tabarnaks, those were his exact words.).
- A Major in Haiti belittling his young lieutenants, ridiculing them in front of their troops for the whole tour. Two of them left the Army and one went to therapy for years.
- A CO of a Bn belittling his majors constantly, to the point that half of them started suffering panic attacks, something they'd never experience before.
- A CO of a Bn having a fist fight with a CWO in front of troops.
- a MGen harassing his staff in NDHQ constantly. One of them contacted me because he went into depression and divorced his wife.
I could go on and on but I promised not to name anyone.
The US Army recognized 10 years ago they had a toxic problem (see below). This April, CWO McCann told the brass in NDHQ that they had a toxic leadership problem in their ranks (look it up). I served 22 years for those who asked, and the last 9 years I spent as a consultant in DND, surrounded by military personnel, always working for a military boss. Do I think we have superb leaders, yes. But we also have incompetent and toxic one, all the way to Generals. And that needs to be acknowledged. I'm hammering this point because I expect change, for the future generations to come.
Why have so many soldiers committed suicide in recent years? The Army is looking beyond post-traumatic stress and asking whether bad commanders and destructive leadership are taking a toll.
www.wbur.org
Thank you for you examples. I note that none of them are RCAF or RCN related. In fact, they seem pretty confined to one Regiment. I could (but won’t) draw an inference that we have a R22eR problem. That would not be fair and misses the point. Which also gets to your original title- it misleads.
I think that you are correct in stating that there are problems with leadership training in the CAF (and, we have to be very careful here, because there isn’t one CAF- a fighter Sqn is not a ship which is not a Regiment which is not a headquarters. We have many different cultures and paths to leadership. What works in one place does not work in another, necessarily.) The complete solution is not that simple.
Over 4 decades, I have noticed a real erosion in the “know your subordinates, promote their welfare” ethos. I will posit (without any real evidence, I admit) this comes from several factors. The first reason is innocent- our subordinates are generally older, with families and lives of their own; don’t live in and aren’t as much “property” of the CAF as they used to be viewed. We afford our subordinates much more privacy and many more rights, which is both good and bad. Sometimes problems fester and go uncorrected, because leaders are reluctant to wade into a potential harassment minefield. I know many leaders with a “fuck it, drive on attitude” towards correcting poor/inappropriate behaviour because some subordinates have learned to weaponize the harassment system.
The second reason is related to the first- we have stripped junior leaders of their authority and centralized that in various headquarters because we are afraid they will make mistakes that will make the CAF look bad. News flash- leaders are humans and will make mistakes. The key is for people to own their mistakes, learn from them, and to grow. I don’t see that attitude much coming from NDHQ. I see a “suspend the CO/sub-unit commander because of an allegation, investigate for a year and then quietly move them someplace else attitude”, regardless if the allegation was founded or not. That is a problem and is demoralizing. Good people are destroyed by it and the true monsters are undeterred.
The third reason is that we have over-officered the CAF. Many functions/problems that used to be solved at a low level by MCpl or a Sgt now seem to require an officer to be involved.
I wonder how many problems have been created by short staffing so many units, so that when any kind of deployment comes along, we rapidly throw together many augmentees from many units and just expect that to work out ok?
I look in horror at the changes to the military justice system and wonder how discipline can be truly enforced now with now nearly empty tool kit that a CO has?
I have watched Commanding Officers work for two solid years to kick a complete miscreant out of the CAF, only to be over-ruled by a staff officer in CMP who does not know the subordinate, because “that trade is red”. Tell me, do you think that helps?
We have problems, but they aren’t simple to solve.