Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[a_majoor]

WRT UAV's as CAS platforms, I am of the opinion that technology is advancing to the point that the weapons will be the things providing the manoeuvrability to take on difficult targets.

For an example, look at the Harvest HAWK kit to turn an ordinary C-130 into a support platform. A sensor pod takes the place of one external fuel tank, and a pylon with 4 Hellfires takes the other. A pod carrying 10 "Griffon" missiles fits in the lowered ramp, and if you want, an automatic cannon can be placed in the jump door. For our purposes, the pylon with the Hellfires and the pod on the ramp should interest us.

Hellfire is a pretty solid and reliable weapon, and if you wanted to upgrade the Harvest HAWK (or a UCAV like the Reaper) then you might consider the BRIMESTONE missile, which has a millimetre wave seeker and can be launched as a true fore and forget missile. If it is on a higher performance platform it can achieve a range of up to 30 Km. The small missiles launched off the back to the Harvest HAWK would work very well off any small aircraft, helicopter or UCAV, and they can be substituted by small long range glide weapons like the Viper (itself an evolution of the BAT from the 1990's).

Now to my thinking, if a large range of platforms can carry these weapons, then the "quantity" argument gets covered off as well. Maybe we need to use the best platforms first to break into the target area if there is GBAD or a serious air threat, but more and more weapons can be delivered through the "hole" once it is made, and the delivery platform becomes less of an issue. (if you can get enough stand off from your weapons, then the AD issue becomes far more difficult for the defenders, which also means the platforms no longer have to be as capable to deliver the weapons).

Having the pilot see the target to bomb and strafe the target was appropriate with contact patrol aircraft in 1918, but since the 1970's weapons systems have evolved to see the targets remotely from the pilot. We can certainly take advantage of that to deliver ordinance without having to get up close and personal with the target.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Talking about risk... I do not believe that the risk level was the reason we did not send Hornets in Afghanistan.  In relative terms, Afghanistan was (for a fighter aircraft, not ground troops or helicopters) safer than say, Libya.  Nothing too crazy Manpads wise and mostly Small Arms fire.

I also do not believe it was risk from enemy action, but I do believe there was political concern about explaining that sort of risk in warfare to a skittish Canadian pubic>>especially in regards to bombing or strafing the wrong targets [innocent or friendly targets] by accident (equipment malfunction) or even worse, good faith error.

And again, I truly believe that the cost of procuring any weapon, aircraft, or vehicle in the absence of an adequate platform was NOT the pre-dominant consideration blocking deployment. Look at the war and see what materialized: tanks, helicopters, drones, artillery systems, special mine protected trucks, C17's, engineering vehicles - all really expensive stuff that was genuinely required for that mission. A half dozen aircraft specialized for CAS had to be within the realm of possibility whether the capability exsted in the air force or could be sourced in time. But, I am not seeing anywhere in this thread that there was truly a need to have any specific CAS platform owned/operated by Canadians. Perhaps the answer is so sensitive that it is classified.

And, I accept what T6 points out, the US and others had plenty of CAS platforms, but that doesn't address the issue of whether they were as readily available to our own ground forces as perhaps they might be to the ground forces of the coalition nation supplying CAS and boots on the ground.
 

I am still trying to understand if some of the CF18's that are presently in service are worthy CAS platforms. I know they are a multi role aircraft with a little bit of everything, but perhaps there are only certain types of CAS missions that the CF18 can perform to reasonable expectations.

From what I gather from this thread is that CAS seems to require real-time voice and data communications with a pilot that by training and instinct will quickly grasp the tactical appreciation of the ground force situation. The aircraft should be on or near station to the ground force for the purpose of delivering precision bombing, A/G missile strikes, perhaps A/G rocket attacks [guided, I presume], and an awful lot of cannon fire [ie more than one pass], and on a really bad day possibly execute all of the foregoing in the same sortie, at a rate of perhaps 2 or 3 sorties a day.  If I've summarized the requirement correctly at a high level (and perhaps I have failed to do so), can the RCAF deliver with what is in service currently?



           

 

[SupersonicMax]

In all honesty, with the Sniper ATP, JDAM, GBU-49 (dual, GPS/Laser guidance), 20mm, we can do a great job at CAS.  We have radios compatible with FACs (DCS) where he can send a full 9-line with with no voice (can do that with Link 16 as well) and our Sniper are VDL capable (FACs see what we see in our pod).  From the time I am handed over to a FAC, if he is proficient, I can get eyes on target within a minute and bombs on target a minute later, is my positioning to the target is correct.

The only things I wished we kept are Mavericks and Rockets. 

FWIW, all our. Hornets are equals.  We don't have better ones than others (minus the odd system that has been removed for maintenance on some)

 

[Cloud Cover]

Thank you!

 

[Loachman]

I don't think[/color] that UAVs have the maneuverability that an A 10 has when it comes to supporting a TIC scenario.

It takes forever to line a Predator or Reaper up, so second drops/launches require a fair amount of patience. They were built for surveillance, and that long, thin wing that makes it easier to stay up for longer while burning less fuel does not add to manoeuvrability. Some near-future designs will permit more manoeuvring.

One does not need a lot of manoeuvrability to drop something on somebody with amazing accuracy in an Afghan scenario. One does not need a lot to fire something at somebody in a conventional setting, either.

is not the vision of the operators restricted to the FOV of the cameras and the speed that the cameras can traverse?

No different for a fighter or bomber guy in an Afghan situation. The imager can move pretty quickly, and we could mark something's position once and return to it blindingly fast - and that with crappy Sperwer, too.

Up close and personal, this would be a serious liability.  It would necessitate them (UAVs) having to be more "stand off" than in the thick of things.

Not at all, in an Afghan situation. Mr Hellfire doesn't seem to mind too terribly much what launches him.

And, I accept what T6 points out, the US and others had plenty of CAS platforms, but that doesn't address the issue of whether they were as readily available to our own ground forces as perhaps they might be to the ground forces of the coalition nation supplying CAS and boots on the ground.

I never saw a shortage of aircraft, manned or not, rotary- or seized-wing. Ramp space, on the other hand, was at a premium. There was no need to clutter it up even more.

There was always lots of stuff up, mostly doing ISR work while awaiting something that needed killing. By the way, Synthetic Aperture Radar on the B1 seems to have a hard time distinguishing between large wild dogs and motorcycles.

Markings on the aircraft had no bearing whatsoever on whose troops got their support.

I only saw one target that should have been hit but wasn't, and I shall forever be bitter about that one, but the fault did not lie with anybody on the air side that time.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.

Thanks for the response, but it's seems that there is a clear difference in an aircraft that can strafe/bomb a target and one that can only bomb. For the latter a modified 737 could literally do the job if properly equipped. As for the former strafing is fairly unique and I just been reading elsewhere that most aircraft guns and ammo loads are optimized for air engagements and not necessarily for ground attack.

As I can see from wiki: "the A10  ammunition drum can hold up to 1,350 rounds of 30 mm ammunition,[49] but generally holds 1,174 rounds."

Another source says the F-35 carries "It looks like either 180 or 182 rounds for the CTOL variant and either 220 or
225 rounds for the gunpod for the CV and STOVL variants. 4,000 shots per
minute is 66 rounds per second which gives the CTOL variant 3 shots with the
gun and the CV and STOVL variants 4 shots with the gun"

I haven't even considered the difference in ammunition effect on target, but it's seems the A10 can fire about 9.7x 2 sec bursts (60rds a sec) vs 4x 1 sec bursts for the F35 . That is a big difference in ability to shoot ground targets. I don't know if the F-35 or other aircraft are as good as or better than the A10 as bomb trucks. I suspect the F-35 will benefit from better and newer sensors for locating and dropping bombs.

I guess the other bits of the equation is repair time for battle damage during low level attacks and also how much time do the pilots get to practice CAS? A F35/F-15 pilot will have to split their training time on a variety of skills. An A-10 pilot world is all CAS so they would have a better skillset for the same number of hours of training.

At the end of the day a military the size of Canada would have to make some hard choices, but for the US, it's pretty darn clear that politics is at work. they can afford to maintain a dedicated CAS aircraft even if it's only in the NG units. Considering the variety of conflicts coming down the pipe and that the A10's were recently upgraded it seems very strange they wish to dump a capacity for a saving that appears to be about 2-3 weeks of operations in Afghanistan in 2013 

 

[Rocky Mountains]

The US Airforce has so totally bought into the F35 concept that it wants to burn the bridges that could take it back on other routes.  Everyone and I mean everyone knows there is no way under the sun that the Air Force is going to order a $ 155 million aircraft to do a strafing run in support of infantry.  Ain't happening.

 

[Loachman]

Why fixate on strafing when there are other ways to kill something? Bomb and missile (and Artillery) guidance systems have improved dramatically since the A10 was designed. Guns, not so much.

What gets cut in order to keep an aging niche aircraft operating, and, soon, replace it?

And replace it with what?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Getting rid of the A10 and not replacing it is giving up the strafing ability, but it's also giving up dedicated CAS resources for multi-use platforms and a reduced number of them at that. With the high price and reduced numbers I don't see F-35's doing strafing runs and judging by the ammo load, they will be about 1/4 effective at it as the A10.

Every time I hear the term "multi-use" I shudder because in my experience it means barely adequate at doing everything, I hope I'm wrong.

 

[Loachman]

I see no reason to doubt that F35s will be any less capable of killing what needs killing on the ground than any other aircraft that can do/does that already.

I have reason to doubt that A10s will be limited in future conflicts, as they can do only one thing.

What puts the weapon on target is not important; that it gets there accurately in a timely fashion is.

 

[KevinB]

I will argue that the 30mm cannon with heavier payload is 10-20x more effective per round than the 20mm.

  If you look at the A-10 in low intensity conflicts, it can deal out a lot more ordnance over a longer period of time than any other platform per airframe.

 

[Loachman]

But didn't, from what I saw on my tours.

What is more important, the effect or the delivery system?

Since the A10's creation, we have AHs that can engage multiple targets simultaneously at longer ranges in complete darkness and lower visibility (under some circumstances wherein A10 cannot fly), precision-guided and longer-range artillery projectiles, thermal imagery on everything, and GPS-guided munitions.

The only likely scenario that I can see wherein there would be insufficient aircraft to do CAS reliably, if not actually competing for available targets, would be a high-intensity peer-vs-peer conflict. Moving slowly to get close enough to shoot something with a gun is less likely to be survivable than it was in the 1980s - and, from what I saw of A10s operating in Germany, may not have been as survivable as they hoped back then.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I see no reason to doubt that F35s will be any less capable of killing what needs killing on the ground than any other aircraft that can do/does that already.

I have reason to doubt that A10s will be limited in future conflicts, as they can do only one thing.

What puts the weapon on target is not important; that it gets there accurately in a timely fashion is.

You say "weapon" but we seem to be talking about 2-3 distinct weapon types, gun, guided bomb and air to ground missile. Is there any public data as to what percentage of what was used and BDA's afterwards? Do we have data showing the number of strafing runs done and by which aircraft, do they have have good data on target effects by both bomb and gun. What is the "safety area" for both types when operating close to troops or civilian targets?

 

[KevinB]

I would argue that cost per kill (especially armored or lightly armored vehicles) is lower with the A-10 and a much higher kill/sortie ration than other platforms.

 

[a_majoor]

Thinking back to the various "cool" videos that have been the mainstay of the news and YouTube of air to ground attacks since Gulf War One, I cannot recall ever seeing a gun camera or weapons pod shot of a high performance aircraft dealing out death with its cannon.

Targets on the ground get hit with various sorts of bombs, PGMs and missiles, but they are never strafed. This applies to the USAF, USN, USMC, the RAF, and the Kheil HaAvir (Israeli Air Force). This covers a multitude of wars and actions, several different air forces and many different scenarios. (even if there are shots of F-16 or Hornet pilots rolling in with guns, the fact that they havn't shown up in a cursory review suggests that they really are rare).

Yes, Specter Gunships and armed helicopters do use cannon, and of course the A-10 uses the massive 30mm cannon, but even the helicopters and A-10s seem to use a lot of missile ordinance in preference to a gun run.

My point here is there seems to be far less use of the cannon, partly because stable cannon platforms are less common in the world's air forces (where do you find the "Skyraider" with its 4 X 20mm cannon, or the Corsair which was also considered a good bomb truck and gun platform?), partly because lots of targets are too "hard" to destroy with a few 20mm rounds and partly because a PGM can guide itself to the target far more easily than a pilot can line up his airplane for a gun run. Long stand off distances achieved by various sorts of PGM's also make things less dangerous for the pilot as well.

So I would not be entirely surprised to see gun runs fade away from the Air Force, if only to be taken up by UCAVs like the hypothetical large quad copter that a future fire support platoon unleashed in my earlier post.

 

[Kirkhill]

But if the munition makes its journey to the target by means of a self-propelled missile then the launch platform itself becomes immaterial.

We have already seen that with guns themselves.  Guns - launchers of unpowered munitions carrying missiles - are found ubiquitously.

Launchers of self-propelled missiles can equally be fixed in field installations or mounted on vehicles (trucks, ships and planes).

The longer the range of the missiles, the greater their ability to negotiate the modern battlefield and the cheaper they are to manufacture - together with the with the continuing tendency for glide bombs, single use missiles, recoverable drones, UAVs etc to converge in capabilities then the less need there is for both Victorian gunners and Edwardian flyers.  The gunners suffer from the increasing cost of the ever more complex systems that need to be grafted on to their guns.

Meanwhile - stowed rounds, ready to launch - is ever more common in every field.

The real purpose of the exercise is to get rounds from the warehouse to the target in the most timely fashion.  Rounds distributed forward represent rounds unavailable elsewhere that need to be duplicated at additional cost. 

Max may not be popular when he points out the financial benefits of centralization but that doesn't make him wrong.  The question is one of how to get the best balance between the polar extremes of flexible efficiency and rigidly effective response.

What has to be done and what can be lived with.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Thinking back to the various "cool" videos that have been the mainstay of the news and YouTube of air to ground attacks since Gulf War One, I cannot recall ever seeing a gun camera or weapons pod shot of a high performance aircraft dealing out death with its cannon.

Targets on the ground get hit with various sorts of bombs, PGMs and missiles, but they are never strafed. This applies to the USAF, USN, USMC, the RAF, and the Kheil HaAvir (Israeli Air Force). This covers a multitude of wars and actions, several different air forces and many different scenarios. (even if there are shots of F-16 or Hornet pilots rolling in with guns, the fact that they havn't shown up in a cursory review suggests that they really are rare).

Yes, Specter Gunships and armed helicopters do use cannon, and of course the A-10 uses the massive 30mm cannon, but even the helicopters and A-10s seem to use a lot of missile ordinance in preference to a gun run.

My point here is there seems to be far less use of the cannon, partly because stable cannon platforms are less common in the world's air forces (where do you find the "Skyraider" with its 4 X 20mm cannon, or the Corsair which was also considered a good bomb truck and gun platform?), partly because lots of targets are too "hard" to destroy with a few 20mm rounds and partly because a PGM can guide itself to the target far more easily than a pilot can line up his airplane for a gun run. Long stand off distances achieved by various sorts of PGM's also make things less dangerous for the pilot as well.

So I would not be entirely surprised to see gun runs fade away from the Air Force, if only to be taken up by UCAVs like the hypothetical large quad copter that a future fire support platoon unleashed in my earlier post.

There is a fair bit of footage of A10 gun runs with it's distinct sound. The problem as I see it is that many people don't trust the USAF reasoning and for good reasons. So even if they are telling the truth this time, few people believe them and they aren't doing an impressive job by the looks of it of convincing people.

 

[Rocky Mountains]

If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces:  that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft.

http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2013/the-a-10-warthog-a-core-defense-issue.html

Air support for ground forces was seriously deficient in the Second World War.  The Air Force often opposed using aircraft to support infantry attacks and when they did often screwed it up with hundreds of friendly fire casualties on occasions.  I believe the A - 10 was the first ground support aircraft built from the keel up and it looks like it will end up the last.

 

[a_majoor]

If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces:  that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft.

But the argument seems to be that with modern weapons that can function independently of the platform, the platform itself becomes less important. Is a Hellfire less effective when it comes off the rail of a C-130 "Harvest HAWK" than if it is fired from an AH-64? (or from a ground mount, for that matter?). The primary issue with platforms is how available they are, and how well they can operate and survive in a particular environment. While there are lots of C-130's, sending them in to do SEAD probably isn't a smart idea. After the F-35's, Strike Eagles and UCAV's have cleared a path, then having every available platform capable of carrying PGMs working means there will be more platforms to provide support, potentially less time between the call and the arrival of help and more effective support (since it is more likely that PGMs will hit the target).

If I need support, I really don't care who is delivering it or on what platform, so long as it arrives in a timely manner and provides the desired effect.

 

[McG]

So, you are saying that all our aircraft should have hard-points for a Storm Shadow, Kongsberg JSM, or JSOW which would be fired off by the crew of a J-STARS whenever a requirement appears n proximity to the carrying aircraft?