Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[GR66]

Maybe the issue isn't that CAS can't be trusted to an Air Force, but rather that it can't be trusted to an Air Force that has only a single combat platform which is tasked to perform too many different roles to be able to spend the time and money to become truly proficient at CAS. 

An armed Harvard (http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/at-6b-light-attack/) may be nowhere near as capable as a Hornet or F-35 in delivering volume or variety of  munitions to the battlefield, but if CAS (and related ground support roles) are all that the pilots of those less capable aircraft train to do then perhaps they will be nearly as effective in practice (and be much more likely to be actually deployed in those roles).

I know this is creeping back into the "what platform is best for CAS" sidetrack but I think that the physical limitations of what aircraft the RCAF has to work with and the multitude of roles that they are asked to perform with those aircraft has great bearing on their ability to train for CAS and the mindset of the RCAF leadership in balancing the roles assigned to their forces.

 

[SupersonicMax]

The AJs can also support low-level controls (and the majority are retired Hornet pilots with a gajillion hours). Other than not being able to drop and not having the same pod capabilities, the Alphas are what we need in these fiscal times IOT get FACs trained. That being said, new Hornet pilots need to learn how to talk to the guys on the ground too.

Absolutely.  CAS is part of every syllabus throughout a Fighter Pilot career and it should.  It is one of the skillset we need to have. We generally try to align our FG requirements with Army support requests to maximize gains.

 

[Kirkhill]

The AJs can also support low-level controls (and the majority are retired Hornet pilots with a gajillion hours). Other than not being able to drop and not having the same pod capabilities, the Alphas are what we need in these fiscal times IOT get FACs trained. That being said, new Hornet pilots need to learn how to talk to the guys on the ground too.

What would it take to add the wingstations and pods to the Alphas?  Could they be taken into government service (with the government being responsible for damage and replacement) in low threat environments? National Defence? They would become an Aerial PSC.

 

[SupersonicMax]

They can do it (and will soon drop inert practice bombs). They could also do the FLIR and others I am sure, provided the government says they want that capability from the AJets.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks Max.

On a personal note you are doing a pretty fair job of selling the services of 100 fighter jocks to 15000 or so ground pounders of the Combat Arms.  But given those odds you are going to have to keep selling hard to keep your 60 or 70 seats in the air.  The needs of the many ..... as somebody mumbled round here recently.  Take nothing for granted when you are posting.  Just pretend you are talking to somebody that has zero background knowledge.... someone like me.  ;D

 

[Zoomie]

Just got back from a two week long CAS support to 5,000 armoured CAV at Ft Irwin.  Pretty eye opening as to the effectiveness of a two-ship of vipers.  FwIW, COIN is dead, the main thrust now is to get the army back into force on force engagements.  The fighter guys were told to expect less than realistic battle damage assessments, as they could effectively destroy the entire threat and nullify the next two weeks of training in the process.  Where they might have destroyed a column of armour, they were told to expect a BDA of "one truck". 

Apparently the boys down south can play well together - why can't we?

 

[SupersonicMax]

We can and we do.  This discussion is purely an operationnal-level doctrine one.

In my experience, at the tactical level, we have no issues.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Just got back from a two week long CAS support to 5,000 armoured CAV at Ft Irwin.  Pretty eye opening as to the effectiveness of a two-ship of vipers.  FwIW, COIN is dead, the main thrust now is to get the army back into force on force engagements.  The fighter guys were told to expect less than realistic battle damage assessments, as they could effectively destroy the entire threat and nullify the next two weeks of training in the process.  Where they might have destroyed a column of armour, they were told to expect a BDA of "one truck". 

Apparently the boys down south can play well together - why can't we?

They are probably in the fortunate position of having more assets to play with, so get good at it faster and with larger formations.

I recall the USMC treated CAS, and other air assets, like taxis: 'you call and we haul'. They had at least 18 x F-18s in support of one Brigade. I'm betting that our 'few' are much more stretched in comparison.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I'm all glad we've had this great big group hug and statistical info provided by Max.

And Max has done a great job defending the priorities that the RCAF has to deal with it's limited amount of aircrew and minimal platforms, even though that Command might decide a strong point 70 km away is more important to hit, strategically, than getting your own out of shit on the ground.

The problem remains.

If I get in shit on the ground, I need CAS now. Not when they get around to it, or after they're done with whatever the RCAF thinks is a higher priority. I don't care what kind of a\c it is, or it's capabilities.

I need to know that when I get on the horn, while I'm pinned down, I can expect to be supported.

 

[George Wallace]

I'm all glad we've had this great big group hug and statistical info provided by Max.

And Max has done a great job defending the priorities that the RCAF has to deal with it's limited amount of aircrew and minimal platforms, even though that Command might decide a strong point 70 km away is more important to hit, strategically, than getting your own out of shit on the ground.

The problem remains.

If I get in shit on the ground, I need CAS now. Not when they get around to it, or after they're done with whatever the RCAF thinks is a higher priority. I don't care what kind of a\c it is, or it's capabilities.

I need to know that when I get on the horn, while I'm pinned down, I can expect to be supported.

Let's not pussy foot around.  That is what it boils down to.  Saving Canadian Soldiers/Sailors/and even Airmen's lives when they are in need of it.  Not wacking some target in some grand strategic plan or a target of opportunity that some pilot or commander far removed from the Theater or Operations thinks is necessary.  Now is "NOW!" and lives depend on it.  Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not an immediate threat and can be taken out anytime in the future.

 

[McG]

Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not an immediate threat and can be taken out anytime in the future.

Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not necessarily things that we can get to at our leisure.  Senior HQs or senior commanders can move about and their appearances may be fleeting.  It may suck to be the platoon in contact (and guys may end up dead), but that fight needs to be behind as a priority next to whacking the enemy Corps HQ or the MRLS battery racing to a new hide.

 

[Old Sweat]

While researching my book on Operation Totalize, I was struck by how little the senior British and Canadian commanders really know about the application of air power. They could have been accused on occasion of frittering it away on less than the met important targets, but on the other hand the commander and staff of 2 TAF erred on at least as many occasions by insisting on upholding the premise that the air force was a separate service and independent of the army's chain of command. (I'll leave Bomber Command out of the discussion other than to note the army knew even less about the capabilities and limitations of the heavy bomber force.)

It is one thing to hit a formation headquarters and 2 TAF did seriously wound the commander of Panzer Group West and kill the commander of 12 SS Panzer Division in separate attacks early in the Normandy campaign. On the other hand 2 TAF ignored a request by First Canadian Army to apply a priority of effort along the Caen-Falaise road between Point 122 and Quesnay Wood on 8 August 1944. As a result 12 SS Panzer Division was able to deploy about 40-50 Mk IVs and Panthers and eight Tigers as a blocking force which delayed the advance of the Phase 2 forces, ultimately delaying the closing of the Falaise Gap by perhaps a couple of weeks. (In his memoirs Kurt Meyer remarked on the absence of Allied fighter bombers.) Instead 2 TAF Typhoons and Spitfires swept the rear areas as far as the Seine, attacking wheeled vehicles across a wide area instead of concentrating on the key terrain for the operation. I should have been blunter in my book as it was a major blunder on the part of the RAF, and a major misapplication of air power.

I wonder if both services might not make the same mistakes if given the opportunity again? 

 

[daftandbarmy]

While researching my book on Operation Totalize, I was struck by how little the senior British and Canadian commanders really know about the application of air power. They could have been accused on occasion of frittering it away on less than the met important targets, but on the other hand the commander and staff of 2 TAF erred on at least as many occasions by insisting on upholding the premise that the air force was a separate service and independent of the army's chain of command. (I'll leave Bomber Command out of the discussion other than to note the army knew even less about the capabilities and limitations of the heavy bomber force.)

It is one thing to hit a formation headquarters and 2 TAF did seriously wound the commander of Panzer Group West and kill the commander of 12 SS Panzer Division in separate attacks early in the Normandy campaign. On the other hand 2 TAF ignored a request by First Canadian Army to apply a priority of effort along the Caen-Falaise road between Point 122 and Quesnay Wood on 8 August 1944. As a result 12 SS Panzer Division was able to deploy about 40-50 Mk IVs and Panthers and eight Tigers as a blocking force which delayed the advance of the Phase 2 forces, ultimately delaying the closing of the Falaise Gap by perhaps a couple of weeks. (In his memoirs Kurt Meyer remarked on the absence of Allied fighter bombers.) Instead 2 TAF Typhoons and Spitfires swept the rear areas as far as the Seine, attacking wheeled vehicles across a wide area instead of concentrating on the key terrain for the operation. I should have been blunter in my book as it was a major blunder on the part of the RAF, and a major misapplication of air power.

I wonder if both services might not make the same mistakes if given the opportunity again?

It would be interesting to see how things would have turned out differently if, say, the USMC landed at Normandy vs. the Armies that actually led the invasion.

 

[Old Sweat]

It would be interesting to see how things would have turned out differently if, say, the USMC landed at Normandy vs. the Armies that actually led the invasion.

Interesting thought, but the USMC was deficient in armour, medium artillery and anti-tank resources compared to the Overlord divisions. The corps was tailored for a short, sharp battle over a limited range. It essentially would have been the same as inserting six more airborne divisions into the battle, but over the beaches instead of from the sky. The Allied divisions were competent at amphibious landings and in fact landed much heavier material than the Marines could have. The latter, however, had the edge in air-ground cooperation. Still, it might be interesting to war game it.

 

[George Wallace]

Strategic targets and targets of opportunity are not necessarily things that we can get to at our leisure.  Senior HQs or senior commanders can move about and their appearances may be fleeting.  It may suck to be the platoon in contact (and guys may end up dead), but that fight needs to be behind as a priority next to whacking the enemy Corps HQ or the MRLS battery racing to a new hide.

In cases such as you stated, those would become "Priority Targets", and as such I will agree with you.  There are other targets that would fall into the realm of 'strategic' that would have a much lesser priority and less mobile, if not fixed installations, and it those I was thinking of when I posted.

 

[Good2Golf]

I recall the USMC treated CAS, and other air assets, like taxis: 'you call and we haul'. They had at least 18 x F-18s in support of one Brigade. I'm betting that our 'few' are much more stretched in comparison.

D&B, that's because a Marine aviator is a soldier first and pilot second...being a pilot, even flying a Harrier or Hornet, is ONLY a means of supporting fellow soldiers, not a basis for self-aggrandizement in the spirit of Douhet, Mitchell or Harris love-ins.

You want to see the difference between the Marines and the true spirit of "Air Force" you just search the record and see who showed up to COL(USAF) John Boyd's funeral...the singleton USAF duty 2-star, and an enormous contingent of the US Marine Corps. Read the whole story here: "John Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Chamged the Art of War". Colonel Boyd's story should be mandatory reading for fighter pilots....but it isn't. :not-again:

An interesting question would be how many Army folk have seen a fighter pilot show up in the mess in Edmonton, Wainright, Petawawa, Valcartier or Gagetown. I'm not talking the G3 Air or a JTAC sent to support an ex, but that kinds of guys who 'get together at the tactical level' to chat about what the 'service provider' can do for the 'user'?

:2c:

G2G

 

[Transporter]

An interesting question would be how many Army folk have seen a fighter pilot show up in the mess in Edmonton, Wainright, Petawawa, Valcartier or Gagetown. I'm not talking the G3 Air or a JTAC sent to support an ex, but that kinds of guys who 'get together at the tactical level' to chat about what the 'service provider' can do for the 'user'?

:2c:

G2G

The answer to that would be... about the same number as the number of AF folk who have seen an Army officer show up in the mess at Cold Lake or Bagotville (other than the AD guys/gals that is). 

 

[Old Sweat]

The question might be if anybody ever thought to organize a get together. When I was a subbie in 1 RCHA in Gagetown we used to have back and forth officers hockey games with RCAF Chatham. Heck, even cross pollination between units in the same brigade got guys talking and explaining why things were do the way they were.

 

[Good2Golf]

The answer to that would be... about the same number as the number of AF folk who have seen an Army officer show up in the mess at Cold Lake or Bagotville (other than the AD guys/gals that is).

Which was and is not the point...

It might be considered a "bad thing" if the Army were the service provider to the Air Force, vice the other way around.  There is a material challenge for the concept of "supported" and "supporting" commands to be understood by many wearing light blue.

Note that this whole thread's underlying theme is related to whether the boots on the ground get, or feel as though they get, the kind of service they should be getting from the air force.  Many either in the Army, or organizations working very closely with the Army get the feeling that the fast-air Air Force is pretty much disconnected from the end-user when it comes to CAS.

Question...is it reasonable then, for the Air Force to expect the Army to support it in joint and higher-level discussions when it comes to helping make the case for support to the overall activity envelope?  It should not come at a surprise that the "they don't do much for us" sentiment can rise surprisingly high up the ladder.

In my experience, at the tactical level, we have no issues.

This kind of view tends to reinforce the fact that even at the closest levels to dispensing of aerial violence, the fast-air Air Force doesn't think there is a significant issue. 

The truth is the institutional Air Force, certainly over the last couple of years, has steadily diverged from meaningful relation building with the Army.  The fact that rather than fighting to stay engaged during Army force generation activity with the Air Force, the institutional Air Force appears to place greater and greater reliance on 3rd-party contractors to maintain the training link with the soldiers (i.e. Top Aces soon to be dropping inert munitions and even less 18's on task with the Army, etc..) than seeing how it can further reinforce those relations, could be seen to not bode well for those relationships.

:2c: more...

G2G

 

[brihard]

Credit where credit's due, Max has done an excellent job of articulating why those of us in the combat arms cannot trust or rely upon RCAF fast air to kill people and break their stuff when they're really close to us and our day sucks. RCAF has its own priorities, got it. What is telling and disconcerting is Max's utter disconnect with what pretty much everyone else is saying, and that at this time I have no reason to disbelieve that he doesn't represent the rest of his community.