USAF Woes

[SupersonicMax]

In a saturated IADS filled with RF and IR threats?  Good luck.

 

[Jarnhamar]

How many planes do you need to take out a military frozen in time ?

2 outta do it.

 

[BurmaShave]

Not for North Korea.How many planes do you need to take out a military frozen in time ? In the first 24 hours their navy and air force would cease to exist. SAM defenses would be destroyed AAA would be a problem. Lil Kim would probably be a casualty in the ensuing power struggle .Kim goes and a deal might be struck.

The DPRK military is frozen in time, but they’re huuuge. In a sense, they’ve got the mass, cohesion, and artillery support of a WWI army, combined with early Cold War era gear. They also have a comprehensive IADS (integrated air defence system- radar, IR, and kinetic weapons with a centeralized detection and control system) with which to whack any commander who sends in gunships and A-10s.

This is where the military puzzle comes from. Not beating them, but beating them without mass casualties. It’s not WWII anymore, we can’t accept that.

Any plan to fight them needs to stop Seoul from being laked, stop the nuclear option, avoid an asymmetric war, and neutralize an IADS, all while fighting a massive (albeit antiquated) army in a mountainous, forested hell. It’s way, way beyond my pay grade.

(More topically, war in Korea requires the absolute best and brightest to plan and execute it. The stop losses may be to recover those folks, alongside numbers.)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

From what I read, South Korea has done a terrible job of "hardening" Seoul to survive the attack and protect the population, almost as if to force everyone away from the military option due to the potential high cost. They should be investing in Iron dome right now and start work on shelters.

 

[tomahawk6]

Seoul is what 35 miles from the DMZ with a population of 25 million. The city does have extensive air raid shelters.

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/seoul-bomb-shelters_us_59927081e4b09071f69c2539

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I read that article before, they are only just waking up to the issue, despite having "shelters". It would be good to liaise with the Israeli Civil Defense management to help get their systems up to speed. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

RCAF?

Fewer planes are ready to fly: Air Force mission-capable rates decline amid pilot crisis

The readiness of the Air Force’s aircraft fleet is continuing its slow, steady deterioration — and this could spell trouble for the service’s effort to hold on to its pilots and its ability to respond to contingencies around the world.

According to data provided by the Air Force, about 71.3 percent of the Air Force’s aircraft were flyable, or mission-capable, at any given time in fiscal 2017. That represents a drop from the 72.1 percent mission-capable rate in fiscal 2016, and a continuation of the decline in recent years.

Former Air Force pilots and leaders say that this continued trend is a gigantic red flag, and warn it could lead to serious problems down the road.

“It scares the heck out of me,” said retired Gen. Hawk Carlisle, former head of Air Combat Command. “It really does.”

“We are seeing an Air Force that is back on its heels,” said John Venable, a Heritage Foundation fellow and former F-16 pilot who flew in Iraq and Afghanistan. “They’re all on the backside of the power curve.”

Look closer at some of the service’s most crucial air frames, and even more alarming trends emerge.

In fiscal 2014, almost three-quarters of the Air Force’s F-22 Raptors were mission capable. But since then, the Raptor’s rates have plunged — by more than 11 percentage points in the last year — and now less than half are mission-capable.

The F-35, the Air Force’s most advanced fighter, also saw a nearly 10 percentage-point drop [read on]...
https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/03/05/fewer-planes-are-ready-to-fly-air-force-mission-capable-rates-decline-amid-pilot-crisis/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

More on USAF pilot woes, esp. fighters (RCAF)?

Air Force in Crisis, Part II: How Did We Get Here?

The U.S. Air Force is 2,000 pilots short, and the shortage is getting worse. Part I of this series outlined the importance of retention. Now, to answer why retention fell, it’s best to first understand when it fell. The Air Force hopes to retain 65 percent of pilots eligible to leave, yet the service last met this goal in 2013. While that tells a story, it’s not necessarily the right story. Like most generalizations, this statistic suffers from a flaw of averages. In this case, these annual metrics are snapshots — the shortfalls are additive. Of the 2,000 pilots the Air Force is currently short, 1,300 of those are fighter pilots. Since the Air Force produces roughly 300 fighter pilots a year, simple math says it took more than a few years of shortages for this crisis to manifest. Distilling internal Air Force retention data by flying community reveals the true crisis: the Air Force has not met its fighter pilot retention goal in 10 years.

When there is a pilot shortage, the Air Force fills cockpits at the expense of leaving staff positions unfilled. Looking at the problem through this lens, the Air Force pilot shortage goes back as far as 2004, even during years it was meeting retention goals. Back then, upwards of 22 percent of all fighter pilot staff billets were unfilled. Despite eliminating 46 percent of fighter staff positions since then, Aircrew Crisis Task Force data reveals that 71 percent of fighter pilot staff positions in the Pentagon are currently unfilled. The chart above shows fighter pilot retention started falling below overall pilot retention in 2008. So, what happened?

1. The Air Force Got Too Small (People)

Senior leaders, choosing between modernization and readiness during times of fiscal constraints, have gradually reduced the size of the Air Force. This started in 2008, when leadership decided to trade people for programs. The Air Force cut 40,000 personnel, including 9,000 experienced aircraft maintainers — despite the fact that aircraft maintenance required per-flight hour had risen 62 percent since 1991. This marked the beginning of a startling disconnect between aircraft maintenance and flight operations that has been seen in virtually every fighter squadron over the past decade. With fewer people, even maximum efforts by aircraft maintenance squadrons to fill a flying schedule fell below the minimum requirement for flying squadrons to sustain readiness. This led to over-worked aircraft maintenance squadrons, resulting in burned-out and fed-up aircraft maintainers.

As experienced maintainers left, providing flyable aircraft became more difficult and pilots grew frustrated with the growing number of creative-yet-painful workarounds. Local leadership continued to stress the quantity of flying hours in order to report high readiness to their superiors, even though the quality of training became worse down the chain of command. This fostered a growing dissent against local leadership, who were perceived to be more company men than leaders of men.

During the same time period, fighter pilot production was slashed to grow the fledgling remotely piloted aircraft community. Internal Air Force data reveals the service produced just 100 fighter pilots in 2007, and 110 in 2008 — far less than the roughly 300 fighter pilots the service needed to produce annually. Concurrently, the wildly unpopular TAMI-21 initiative was launched. This directed a one-time redistribution of 180 pilots to other airframes — 140 of which were fighter pilots. Most of these went to MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper units to lend experience to the growing fleets. Since budget sequestration hit in 2013, the Air Force has produced roughly 175 fewer active duty pilots annually than it had before sequestration. According to the Aircrew Crisis Task Force, at its lowest point in 2014, the Air Force produced fewer than 90 fighter pilots. To an extent, falling production can be offset with higher retention. However pilot retention had been quietly falling in each of those same years.

The personnel cuts also led the Air Force to consolidate administrative squadron support. In 2008, flying units’ support staff was centralized in large new buildings in the name of greater efficiency. When the staff was physically in the squadron, support was always a few feet away — a critical characteristic for those who live by the flying schedule. Now aircrew had to travel across base, during the posted office hours, to get support. Jobs that weren’t moved out of the squadron were absorbed by pilots as extra duties, detracting from mission focus. After nine years, the Air Force finally acknowledged the issue and announced plans to add 1,600 personnel to restore the support staffs.

In 2015 the active duty force hit 311,000 airmen, the lowest since the Air Force became a separate service. Having admitted that the service mistakenly downsized too much, too fast, the Air Force is now slowly rebuilding the ranks. The Air Force ended 2017 with roughly 321,000 airmen, but openly says it needs to grow to 350,000 airmen — a level not seen since 2005, but what is required to fully man every current squadron.

2. The Air Force Got Too Small (Airplanes)

When it comes to aircraft, the Air Force is in an efficiency paradox. It has too many types of aircraft to maintain but too few planes to cut anything, and is too slow at replacing an aging fleet...

Mike Benitez is an F-15E Strike Eagle Weapons Systems Officer in the U.S. Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/air-force-in-crisis-part-ii-how-did-we-get-here/

Lots more.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Journeyman]

For those who don't like reading lots of words, I think this is the key paragraph posted (I confess, I did not read the whole, original source because.... well, because I have no dog in this fight):

As experienced maintainers left, providing flyable aircraft became more difficult and pilots grew frustrated with the growing number of creative-yet-painful workarounds. Local leadership continued to stress the quantity of flying hours in order to report high readiness to their superiors, even though the quality of training became worse down the chain of command. This fostered a growing dissent against local leadership, who were perceived to be more company men than leaders of men.

A quick read of this one paragraph shows two or three obvious problems (even without assuming that the higher leadership was probably aware of the issues without the 'yes man' stats sent higher).

 

[tomahawk6]

Offer them more money for the regular force and the reserve/national guard.

 

[tomahawk6]

Its not entirely about money.Reducing the OPTEMPO is ongoing.Bringing jobs stateside IS part of the fix.Ramping up pilot training is part of the mix as is bringing retired pilots back into service.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/03/26/air-force-cuts-overseas-tours-to-ease-pressure-on-airmen-is-your-job-coming-home/

 

[CBH99]

I was reading on a USAF discussion forum that overseas postings were actually preferred.  The guys & gals stationed in Korea & Japan were saying the bases are so huge & so Americanized, they even have their own shopping malls & fast food joints.  The quality of life was better, the schools were safer than stateside, significantly less crime, drugs, closer social networks, etc etc. 

From the raising a family perspective, they all seemed to agree that as far as the USAF went, overseas postings offered significant advantages & their kids/families grew up with experiences with kids/families stateside just didn't get.

The big issue I noticed being raised was the safety & quality of the schools, compared to stateside.

A lot of the folks posting on that forum (which ironically enough, the topic was actually "What aircraft do you fly & why do you like it") -- but a lot of them seemed to make the decision that coming back to the US was ultimately when they decided to get out.  Unless your flying out of cool places like Florida or California, Vegas, and a few other preferred locations....nobody was excited to be riding a desk in Nebraska, where they didn't know anybody.  (One of the other best US postings I noticed, where people said they loved the quality of life & general vibe, was actually in Alaska.)


The biggest complaint I found was pilots/aircrew being forced to transfer bases every few years, which made putting down roots very difficult & was difficult on families.  And the fact that they received less & less flying time the higher the ranks they went.

The USAF seems to be pretty adamant about taking career courses & progressing through those courses.  Yet the more courses you take, the higher than rank you are promoted to, the less flying time you have.  So you end up having a situation where your riding a desk more & more, in locations where you don't know many people or have many connections.  As I said, not many folks were pumped to be riding a desk more & flying less, in places like Nebraska or Kentucky.  That seemed to be the biggest complaint I read.

:2c: 

 

[SupersonicMax]

I doubt it talked about schools in Korea:  it is a 1 year unaccompanied posting.  These unnacompanied postings (there are a lot, including in operations areas such as Iraq) may be fun for the single guys but if you have a family, they take their toll over the years. 

A friend of mine did 1 year in Korea (Seoul) and 3 years in Japan flying the Viper.  Work was really interresting but life wasn't that great in Korea (he was also lucky his wife was also stationed in Korea, in Kunsan).  He did enjoy Japan however.

 

[winnipegoo7]

It seems that sponsored accompanied postings to Korea are possible. My guess is that two things are limiting the number of accompanied postings:
1 - the US military is trying to keep it small (there seems to be a lack of infrastructure)
2 - it seems that US service members who go to Korea unaccompanied get priority when choosing their next posting (ie. do a 1 year in Korea away from the family and then get posted somewhere nice like Hawaii)

** it seems to be called homebasing/follow on tour
http://www.afpc.af.mil/Assignment/Home-Basing-and-Follow-On-Program/

There are currently approximately 28,500 U.S service members in South Korea and about 7,700 dependents with them.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-weighs-barring-u-s-military-south-korea-bringing-families-n844041

At Osan,

Only 8% of the families at Osan AB are Command Sponsored.  The vast majority of personnel come to Osan on an unaccompanied one-year assignment.

http://www.osan.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/639999/command-vs-non-command-sponsored-benefits/

more info:
http://www.osan.af.mil/Portals/72/Docs/Newcomers/Command%20Sponsorship%20FAQ%2010.10.17.pdf?ver=2017-10-10-000511-613

And there appears to be 11 schools for US military dependents in Korea
https://www.dodea.edu/Pacific/west/About-Pacific-West-District.cfm

 

[MarkOttawa]

Not just USAF, USMC and USN too:

The military’s stunning fighter pilot shortage: One in four billets is empty

The military’s fighter pilot shortfall is reaching alarming proportions — and a new report from the Government Accountability Office shows just how bad the problem has become.

The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps are each short about a 25 percent of the fighter pilots they need in crucial areas, according to the GAO report released Wednesday, titled “DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements.”

The problem has grown worse in recent years. And because it takes the Air Force, for example, about five years of training — and costing anywhere from $3 million to $11 million — before a fighter pilot can lead flights, holding on to these pilots is vital to recouping the military’s investments and making sure the services can carry out their required missions.

Over the last two years, the Air Force has particularly sounded alarm bells over its pilot shortfalls. The service has stood up a team led by a one-star general to find ways to stem the bleeding of its pilot ranks. Efforts include dramatically increasing retention bonuses, cutting out paperwork and other non-flying duties that keep pilots out of the cockpit, and taking many other steps intended to keep pilots in the service...
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/04/11/the-militarys-stunning-fighter-pilot-shortage-one-in-four-billets-is-empty/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[tomahawk6]

DoD has stopped accepting F35's due to the cost of repairs.

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2018/04/11/defense-department-halts-f-35-deliveries-amid-repair-bill-disagreement-with-lockheed/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Breaking%2004-11-18&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Breaking%20News

 

[MarkOttawa]

Brief excerpts from a substantial piece:

A Call for Senior Officer Reform in the Air Force: An Insider’s Perspective

...putting people on the fast track so early in their careers comes with many negative consequences. First and foremost is the lack of strategic mindedness in many senior Air Force leaders. A great tactical operator does not a strategist or leader make.

...most successful high-potential officers are those who make their seniors look good in shallow pursuit of the latest fad, thereby avoiding potential mistakes that could result from taking actual risks to advance the mission.

...If you want to know why colonels are leaving the Air Force in unprecedented numbers, look no further than the colonels you usually select for wing command and promote into the general officer ranks...

“Ned Stark” is the pseudonym for an active duty Air Force high-potential officer with multiple combat tours, several distinguished graduate honors, and both command and staff experience at multiple levels from the flight line to the corridors of the Pentagon.
https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/a-call-for-senior-officer-reform-in-the-air-force-an-insiders-perspective/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[tomahawk6]

I have never cared for the USAF promotion system.I like the Israeli model better,but its a smaller force.Pilots should fly until they cant, then they should move to staff jobs.

 

[tomahawk6]

An update on retired pilots being offered a return to active duty.

https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-tries-to-ease-pilot-shortage-by-asking-more-retirees-to-come-back-1.528869

KAISERSLAUTERN, Germany – Commercial airlines may be hiring retired pilots, but so is the Air Force.

The service announced on Wednesday that it may return as many as 1,000 retired pilots, combat systems officers and air battle managers to active duty for up to 48 months under a major expansion of a voluntary recall program.

 

[Kirkhill]

Curious:

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/13/time_to_get_the_black_out_of_the_blue_113532.html

....Every year, the Air Force budget includes tens of billions of dollars in “non-blue” pass-through money which funds people and institutions that are not the Air Force—most notably the intelligence community. Even at the height of sequestration, these non-service funds accounted for about $30 billion annually. In the current request, that figure has shot up to $38 billion—about one-fifth of the total service budget.