Troops Leaving Bosnia-Article

[Infanteer]

I think it is important that we were in Bosnia.

Peace and security in Europe is one of our fundamental national interests.  Conflagration in the Balkans is antithetical to this, as the events of 1914-1918 proved.

Sure, civilizational faultlines and very old hatreds like these mean that further conflict is not a matter of if but when, but I think that Canada has been very smart to contribute are meager resources to staving off the "when" for as long as possible.  I'd rather see Canadian soldiers putting it on the line in the Balkans, where efforts serve to further our immediate and important security concerns (see the peace and security in Europe thing), then to see them dieing in the middle of Africa where, despite the human tragedy, affects upon our well being are minimal at best.

 

[aesop081]

Yes , i agree, Canada's role was important but also it is time to use our resources somewhere's else.  We have serve our purpose in Bosnia.  Does anybody remember Cyprus ?  we were there for what ? 27 years ?  Did it acomplish anything ?

Are you saying that the lives of africans are less important because they have less of an impact on canadian daily lives ?  I thought that a basic canadian value was that we attach the same value to ALL human beings.

 

[Infanteer]

Yes , i agree, Canada's role was important but also it is time to use our resources somewhere's else. We have serve our purpose in Bosnia.

I am trying to justify the last 12 years we've spent in the Balkans.   I am also trying to highlight why it is important to disengage (which we are doing) from BiH rather then abruptly pulling out.   I think our troop contribution now is minimal and is no longer a big drag on the commitment/capability gap - perhaps DGlad could confirm this.

Does anybody remember Cyprus ? we were there for what ? 27 years ? Did it accomplish anything ?

I would consider preventing all out war between to NATO "allies" who composed a very important Southern Front during the Cold War to be an accomplishment.

Are you saying that the lives of africans are less important because they have less of an impact on canadian daily lives ? I thought that a basic canadian value was that we attach the same value to ALL human beings.

I was waiting for this.

I am in no way trying to argue that any one human life is worth more then another, nor am I trying to say that the savagery that engulfs much of the developing world should be "ignored" or "written off".   However, I do believe in two key fundamentals when determining where to commit our troops:

1) Conflict is a part of the human condition.   Like I said before, in most cases it's not a matter of "if" but a matter of "when".   As such, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that a HESCO-fortified Maple Leaf flag in the middle of a conflagration will make things better.

2) Canada's standing (how it perceives and is perceived by others) gives us a certain outlook on the world and its endless supply of conflicts.   This outlook helps us to define our National Interest and to determine where, when the call is made, to place our chips.   The state, as a self-serving entity (you don't elect governments to take care of France or Bhutan, you elect them to oversee Canada), must define its interests along self-serving goals.   Although we can say and believe that our national value is to "attach the same value to ALL human beings", that is alot harder to define then "a secure and stable European continent" - which has a mcuh more immediate impact on Canada (and it's citizens) as a whole.

When the government wants to send soldiers, at great risk, on foreign operations, it must do its best to ensure that the effort (and lives) expended by these soldiers goes to serving the tangibles.   If we don't apply this (calculating) principle, then our Foreign Policy will have no real focus and we'd end up sending troops willy-nilly to die in far-off places - achieving nothing for the cost because #1 was ignored ("let's stop the war!" - remember, "when" and not "if") and #2 was discarded.

I think Lord Palmerston's dictum applies to here; "States don't have friends, they have interests".

 

[Pikache]

Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?

Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?

 

[pbi]

Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?

Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?

This is an excellent question that has been the object of much spilled ink over the years. A few reasons I have heard are:

-it's a "cheap" way to stay on the world stage;

-it's a "nice" way to use Armed Forces that you're embarassed about having in the first place and don't really understand;

-it used to be that "the Americans don't do it" (now well OBE);

-it allows some people to avoid taking a moral and political stance on a conflict by claiming that "both sides are equally bad";

-it contributes to world peace and security by preventing conflicts from flaring out of control;

-we have a moral obligation to do it;

-it is something we do very well;

-our Armed Forces can't do anything else; and

-it earns us brownie points with the US by taking on the "odd jobs" so that they don;t have to do them (also OBE IMHO)

Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Why does Canada send its troops on peacekeeping and peacemaking tours?

Maybe because we think civilization is worth it?

I'd argue that Peacekeeping tours meet the Realpolitik demands that I mentioned above.   Why do you think Canada contributed 3 battalions to the Balkans at one point (CANBAT 1, CANBAT 2, CANLOGBAT) and yet in terms of real gestures ignored places like Rwanda, the Congo, and Cambodia.   "Peacekeeping" is just an easy "sell" to the Canadian public (for many of the reasons that PBI mentions) because it makes us think we have the moral highground.

"We're refuse to debase politics to a Machiavellian level, we're Canadians and we're better then that.   As such, our military force will be used to Peacekeep."

While it may sound awefully enlightening, I think this is a "feel-good" smokescreen.   Just look at the record of Peacekeeping and Interventions and come to your own conclusions.

- Korea (Ok, before the time of peacekeeping, but along the same mentality of intervention in other peoples conflicts.): Second challenge (After Greece and the Marshall Plan) to the policy of Containment that the US adopted.

- Suez (The original Peacekeeping Mission): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Paris and London into parking lots over the issue.

- Golan Heights (yep, we're still there too): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Haifa and Tel Aviv into parking lots if the IDF marched into Damascus and Cairo?

- Cyprus: As I said before, staving off a war between the two allies who made up NATO's "Southern Front".

- The Balkans: As I said before, a stable and secure Europe.

- Somalia: A little more difficult to define, I think this one was executed with in a manner of "chasing" a new outlook on security with the post-Cold War "peace dividend" on the mind.   We got away from the two principles I mentioned earlier; as a result, the mission was an unmitigated disaster (both for Canada and for the US/UN forces in general).

- East Timor: Were we really concerned for the Timorese?   Or were we concerned about the stability of a Muslim state of about 200,000,000 people that was right next door to our Allies in the Southern Pacific, Australia (yes, they have their own interests).

- Afghanistan (Op Athena): That's a no-brainer.

Of course, you're going to find outliers (Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia as mentioned above) which may not have so obvious of a purpose, but these missions are usually the ones that are launched to satisfy intense public outcry, and these are the missions that are folded up as soon as the media (and the public) loses interest and finds something else to watch.

Peacekeeping, then, is merely an "extention of politics by other means" (Didn't someone say that already?).   As such, the politics of Peacekeeping are informed not so much by idealism and notions of "the value of human life" and "a belief that civilization was worth it" - although elements will exist; look at Llyod Axworthy (and his failure).   Rather, these commitments are determined by self-serving, calculated decisions - and, for the sake of you and me - it's how they should be.

 

[dglad]

Indeed, Canada's ongoing commitment to the Balkans is small, and quite specialized.  Having a BG here today would be inappropriate given the security situation.  Having the ~85 pers we do have, contributing what they do contribute, is a worthwhile and appropriate investment.

I think Infanteer summed up our reasons for involving ourselves in these type of ops very well.  I would only add that I disagree that the tension in the Balkans is necessarily GOING to flare up again, regardless of what we do.  One could have said the same thing about 18th century Germany or 19th century Italy.  There was no way a contemporary could have imagined these diverse and acrimonious groups of city-states ever forging stable, lasting nations from themselves.  However, the world evolves.  Some of the older Bosnians remember the bitter conflicts in the region during WW2; many in their mid-20's and up remember, of course, the war in the 90's.  However, a new generation of Bosnian citizens is growing up in a region that is relatively peaceful; they are well connected to the outside world through the mass media and the Internet, and it is by no means certain that they will share the same visceral ethnic divides that affect the older generations.  Of course, this implies that it may be necessary to maintain a SASE in Bosnia for many years yet, until things are irreversibly on track to peace and prosperity.  Maybe the implication of this is that rebuilding a nation, following a devastating war, is something that does, literally, take years, even generations. 

Now, does Canada have to be part of the entire process?  Perhaps not.  That would depend on the prevalent Canadian strategic interests...and, frankly, contributing to stability in Europe is a key and enduring Canadian strategic interest.  The US is clearly our major trading partner, but the EU is beginning to apply itself to the world stage in a bigger way, and the government has decided that a trans-Atlantic (and, probably, a trans-Pacific) political, economic and military alignment for Canada is of increasing strategic importance.  (This is perhaps something someone better versed in current Canadian foreign policy than I could commment on; I sense that we're trying to shift from a mainly north-south strategic axis to one aligned more east-west.)  Moreover, at the operational and tactical levels, working with the EU military force replacing SFOR in the relatively benign environment of Bosnia is allowing us to establish joint systematics and processes against the day we may have to work with EU forces in more hostile environment.

As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources.  Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations.  Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever.  It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.

 

[pbi]

Peacekeeping, then, is merely an "extention of politics by other means" (Didn't someone say that already?).  As such, the politics of Peacekeeping are informed not so much by idealism and notions of "the value of human life" and "a belief that civilization was worth it" - although elements will exist; look at Llyod Axworthy (and his failure).  Rather, these commitments are determined by self-serving, calculated decisions - and, for the sake of you and me - it's how they should be.

As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources.  Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations.  Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever.  It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.

I agree wholeheartedly with both of these summations. Peacekeeping, or peace support, or peace enforcement, or Chapter VII, or WTF we call it at the moment, involves the deployment of Canadian soldiers into harm's way, with a greater or lesser degree of potential that they will get into combat, but never the certainty that they won't. Therefore, such operations should only be undertaken when we can clearly articulate a  national interest sufficient to the risk of Canadian blood and treasure. Now, it is not impossible nor perhaps even difficult to identify and articulate these: both dglad and Infanteer have done so. A national interest can be as simple as peace and stability (before you dismiss that, try living with war and instability for a while...), or it can be more  complex as both posters have suggested. But, whatever it is, it must resonate with our national interests or it borders on the pointless and a soldier might rightly ask what his life was being risked for.

As for the concept of estblishing a "counterweight" to the influence of the US, this has a pretty lengthy history in our post-WWII foreign policy and is usually referred to as the "Third Option" concept. This term was, IIRC, first used by Mitchell Sharp when he completed a course of action analysis(COAA) for Trudeau to determine a "way ahead" for our foreign policy. The "Third Option" postulated that rather than complete isolation from the US, or complete integration and dependence, we could pursue a COA in which we would forge strong politico-economic relations outside the poweful North-South axis, in order to counterbalance the power of the US. We ciould argue from now until the cows come home about the efficacy or realism of this, but like it or not it has to  a certain extent informed our foreign policy development over the decades since. It has been taken to extremes by some (arguably PET himself, and to a degree Chretien) and played down by others (Mulroney) but it has been there. Martin seems inclined not to over-emphasize it, as he pursues a cautious COA of fence-mending with the US (wisely, IMHO...). Cheers.

 

[aesop081]

I am trying to justify the last 12 years we've spent in the Balkans.   I am also trying to highlight why it is important to disengage (which we are doing) from BiH rather then abruptly pulling out.   I think our troop contribution now is minimal and is no longer a big drag on the commitment/capability gap - perhaps DGlad could confirm this.

I was waiting for this.

I am in no way trying to argue that any one human life is worth more then another, nor am I trying to say that the savagery that engulfs much of the developing world should be "ignored" or "written off".   However, I do believe in two key fundamentals when determining where to commit our troops:

1) Conflict is a part of the human condition.   Like I said before, in most cases it's not a matter of "if" but a matter of "when".   As such, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that a HESCO-fortified Maple Leaf flag in the middle of a conflagration will make things better.

2) Canada's standing (how it perceives and is perceived by others) gives us a certain outlook on the world and its endless supply of conflicts.   This outlook helps us to define our National Interest and to determine where, when the call is made, to place our chips.   The state, as a self-serving entity (you don't elect governments to take care of France or Bhutan, you elect them to oversee Canada), must define its interests along self-serving goals.   Although we can say and believe that our national value is to "attach the same value to ALL human beings", that is alot harder to define then "a secure and stable European continent" - which has a mcuh more immediate impact on Canada (and it's citizens) as a whole.

When the government wants to send soldiers, at great risk, on foreign operations, it must do its best to ensure that the effort (and lives) expended by these soldiers goes to serving the tangibles.   If we don't apply this (calculating) principle, then our Foreign Policy will have no real focus and we'd end up sending troops willy-nilly to die in far-off places - achieving nothing for the cost because #1 was ignored ("let's stop the war!" - remember, "when" and not "if") and #2 was discarded.

I think Lord Palmerston's dictum applies to here; "States don't have friends, they have interests".

Infanteer,

Thank you very much for the clarification, i now see exactly where you are coming from.


BTW......Clauswitz said "War is a continuation of political intercourse interspersed with the use of other means"

 

[Edward Campbell]

- Suez (The original Peacekeeping Mission): Did we really care about who won in the Middle East inferno - or were we concerned because the Soviet Union threatened to turn Paris and London into parking lots over the issue.

One of my favourite nits need picking: I suggest that United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan which was established in 1948, without Lester Pearson's help, was the original peacekeeping mission. (See:   http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html )   The myth that Canada is somehow or other the pioneer of peacekeeping is built on a lie - a little white lie, to be sure, but a lie all   the same.   Pearson deserves much credit for stick-handling the 1956 resolution through the UN - diplomatic skill and skulduggery of   the first order - but he certainly didn't invent peacekeeping by any sensible definition of either word.

 

[aesop081]

the "pearson-era" peacekeping ( sorry ROJ) has died a long and hardous death due to the inability of the UN to resolve the conflict once the fighting has started.  Better for canada to concentrate its limited  resources on short-term assistance missions than get bogged down in inefectual long-term endevours.

Infanteer:

Yes i agree that in Cyprus we stopped a major war between to allies but i somewhat doubt that it was for benevolent reasons ( NATO southern flank !!) but did we realy acheive anything ?  It's been how long now and there still exists the need for UN troops.  The whole idea of peackeeping is to create the conditions for a peacefull resolution of the conflict followed by the withdrawl of the UN force isn't it ?

 

[pbi]

Actually, I would say that the first "peacekeeping" mission in the 20th Century was the International Plebiscite force that the Allies deployed into Silesia (a state of eastern Germany, bordering Poland) in the 1920s to supervise the execution of an internationally conducted plebiscite to decide the political future of Silesia. The force was composed mainly of French troops and had the mission of keeping the ethnic Poles    ( covertly supported by Warsaw) and the ethnic Germans (covertly supported by the Reichsheer) from killing each other until the vote could take place. It was a supposedly neutral force put in place to separate two parties with political claims, supported by established governments, who had been engaging in low-intensity combat operations and terrorism against each other. I think that predates  UNMOGIP by about 20 years or so. Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

I would only add that I disagree that the tension in the Balkans is necessarily GOING to flare up again, regardless of what we do. One could have said the same thing about 18th century Germany or 19th century Italy. There was no way a contemporary could have imagined these diverse and acrimonious groups of city-states ever forging stable, lasting nations from themselves. However, the world evolves.

I should state that my "Fundamental Concept 1" (the will to war) doesn't necessarily mean that the enduring conflicts in the region will always contain the same actors.   Whether the fighting looks inward (intrastate) or outward (interstate), the fighting will always be there.   I found it ironic that you'd bring up Germany and Italy - two countries that we spent 6 years fighting with in the biggest conflagration the world has seen to date.   A few points come out of this analysis:

1)   It wasn't that long ago that Germany was divided along ideological lines and the sole existence for our Army was to prepare to turn it into sand if the Warsaw Pact was to cross into the Fulda Gap.

2)   The examples of Germany and Italy have a little different pretext for the violence.   I think that the intercine conflict in those two areas, based mainly upon dynastic causes, is much more inert then the type of conflict we've seen time and time again in the Balkans (one grounded in old, ethno-religious hatreds bred by nationalist mythologies - Kosovo Polje, the Christian Schism, etc, etc).   Balkan "will's to war" seem much more dynamic - hence why I have a little more faith in Germany and Italy then I do in the Dayton Accords.

3)   As well, the fact that the state seems stable today shouldn't necessarily mean that it will be stable tommorrow.   How serious do you think I would have been taken if you and I were sitting in Sarajevo in 1984 watching the Winter Olympics and I told you "It appears that this country will collapse dramitically into a seething pool of ethnic violence and genocide in the next decade".   I probably would have been laughed off the stage.   C'est la vie

4)   The rule that "Democracies don't Fight Democracies" seems to be gathering credibility.   However, I'd challenge this with two caveats:   A) if Democracies aren't busy fighting eachother, they are sure busy fighting others and B) (Real) Democracies haven't really been around long enough for me to support this idea 100% - we've been so preoccupied with staring down other ideologies (absolutism, fascism, and communism) that maybe they haven't had the time to waste each other.   As you say, "The World Evolves" - and we can't afford to be caught flat-footed.

As for involving ourselves elsewhere (Africa, etc)...well, we only have so many resources. Armyrick suggests that we should be employing those resources only in the early (exciting?) stages of operations. Again, a blanket statement to that effect is no more meaningful than saying "we'll only contribute forces when the situation is stable", or "once we commit forces, we'll never leave until military force isn't needed anymore", or whatever. It depends entirely on the security situation and Canadian strategic interests, as defined by the government of the day.

Agree 100%.

BTW......Clauswitz said "War is a continuation of political intercourse interspersed with the use of other means"

Who was Clausewitz?

(If you couldn't tell by now, I was being facetious)

Infanteer:
Yes i agree that in Cyprus we stopped a major war between to allies but i somewhat doubt that it was for benevolent reasons ( NATO southern flank !!) but did we realy acheive anything ?

Well, I guess that the fact that NATO didn't fall apart due a a struggle between its members in the Mediterranean or the fact that Cyprus (or a good portion of it at least) has joined the EU, indicating that it wants to be apart of normative European affairs means that the mission achieved something.

---

As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".

I think that outlooks (like a typically Canadian one) which see "Peacekeeping" (and attitudes favouring it) as some sort of representation of the notion of human progress put too much stock in human nature.

 

[pbi]

As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".

I think there is more to this summation than many people, Canadians among them, would be willing to admit. In the end, peace support operations are the application of military force to achieve a political goal. Cheers.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Actually, I would say that the first "peacekeeping" mission in the 20th Century was the International Plebiscite force that the Allies deployed into Silesia (a state of eastern Germany, bordering Poland) in the 1920s to supervise the execution of an internationally conducted plebiscite to decide the political future of Silesia. The force was composed mainly of French troops and had the mission of keeping the ethnic Poles      ( covertly supported by Warsaw) and the ethnic Germans (covertly supported by the Reichsheer) from killing each other until the vote could take place. It was a supposedly neutral force put in place to separate two parties with political claims, supported by established governments, who had been engaging in low-intensity combat operations and terrorism against each other. I think that predates   UNMOGIP by about 20 years or so. Cheers.

Even better!

...

As for the debate on the first "real" peacekeeping mission - I guess you could say that "Peacekeeping", when you boil it down to interests, is just a way of wrapping up the time honoured tradition of foreign intervention (or small wars) in nice, moralistic, modern and legal "packaging".

I think that outlooks (like a typically Canadian one) which see "Peacekeeping" (and attitudes favouring it) as some sort of representation of the notion of human progress put too much stock in human nature.

I remember, probably not as clearly as I might wish, when we got the first Canadian Army Manual of (for?) Training entitled â Å“Keeping the Peace, Part 1.â ?   I remember, I hope, that the book stressed military operations required to restore and then keep the peace.   After reading Lewis Mackenzie's contribution in today's National Post (See: http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/comment/story.html?id=3752006c-b17d-4efc-b0ea-442cb7be4fd6 ), I think I recall that the army, in the 1960s or thereabouts, was clear in its own mind that military peacekeeping was a job for tough, superbly disciplined, well trained and adequately equipped soldiers and that what Mackenzie calls social work was a job for civilians â “ including NGOs.

If I remember correctly both Secretary of State for External Affairs Mike Pearson and Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General 'Fin' Clark laid considerable stress on the fact â “ they took it as gospel â “ that only well trained professional soldiers would make first rate peacekeepers because the problems facing peacekeepers (as opposed to nation-builders) were to be military â “ low intensity, perhaps, but military, all the same.

I believe that a clique of external affairs bureaucrats, aided (actively) by our national â ?commentariatâ ? waged a highly successful disinformation campaign â “ throughout the '70s, especially â “ which aimed to make social work style peacekeeping into Canada's national military pastime in the hearts and minds of Canadians.

I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Don Denne of 3RCR; I, too, cringe, every time I hear the term peacekeeper.   I think a perfectly legitimate military concept â “ keeping the peace â “ has been debased by people who want Canada to have brigades of uniformed social workers.

</rant> - another one

 

 

[dglad]

I should state that my "Fundamental Concept 1" (the will to war) doesn't necessarily mean that the enduring conflicts in the region will always contain the same actors.   Whether the fighting looks inward (intrastate) or outward (interstate), the fighting will always be there.   I found it ironic that you'd bring up Germany and Italy - two countries that we spent 6 years fighting with in the biggest conflagration the world has seen to date.  

Not the same Germany and Italy, though.   I used these two only to make the point that someone looking at those regions in the 18th or 19th centuries respectively would have laughed at the thought of them some day being stable, unified states--the obverse of your point about telling a Sarajevo-ite in 1984 that their country would fall apart.   The point either way is that the world and its regions, nations, etc. evolve.   Therefore, writing off an area because it will "never be stable" is an unfortunate generalization..

2)   The examples of Germany and Italy have a little different pretext for the violence.   I think that the intercine conflict in those two areas, based mainly upon dynastic causes, is much more inert then the type of conflict we've seen time and time again in the Balkans (one grounded in old, ethno-religious hatreds bred by nationalist mythologies - Kosovo Polje, the Christian Schism, etc, etc).   Balkan "will's to war" seem much more dynamic - hence why I have a little more faith in Germany and Italy then I do in the Dayton Accords.

Perhaps.   However, I don't necessarily buy your supposition that dynastic tension is generally more "inert" than tension based on other causes (a point which could make for some fascinating debate on its own).   I hasten to add, however, that I'm not suggesting that Germany and Italy are about to collapse into anarchy because e.g. of a sudden resurgence of rivalry between Florence and Naples.   I used these two only to illustrate a particular point, and don't really want to morph into a debate about the future of these two countries!

3)   As well, the fact that the state seems stable today shouldn't necessarily mean that it will be stable tommorrow.   How serious do you think I would have been taken if you and I were sitting in Sarajevo in 1984 watching the Winter Olympics and I told you "It appears that this country will collapse dramitically into a seething pool of ethnic violence and genocide in the next decade".   I probably would have been laughed off the stage.   C'est la vie

And the reverse is true, which is my precise point, per above.  

4)   The rule that "Democracies don't Fight Democracies" seems to be gathering credibility.   However, I'd challenge this with two caveats:   A) if Democracies aren't busy fighting eachother, they are sure busy fighting others and B) (Real) Democracies haven't really been around long enough for me to support this idea 100% - we've been so preoccupied with staring down other ideologies (absolutism, fascism, and communism) that maybe they haven't had the time to waste each other.   As you say, "The World Evolves" - and we can't afford to be caught flat-footed.

Agree completely here.   I get a little worried when I hear things touted as truisms such as "Democracies don't fight democracies".   They might very well, if they get the chance and the reasons are there and compelling enough.

Who was Clausewitz?

A dead German guy.   And that is a truism...you can't have a decent military argument (especially if it involves manoeuvre warfare) without invoking, at some point, at least one dead German guy.   (Hitler doesn't count, though...as soon as you bring him into it, you lose the argument, per some Internet Law whose name I forget).

 

[Infanteer]

DGlad,

Agree with all points in your analysis.   I think the important corollary from the last few posts on this thread (relating to our continued presence in Bosnia) is that, as you said, the world evolves.   The dynamic nature of human societies makes for certain types of catalysts that can move the evolution at a pace faster then we can keep up with (The breakdown of the FYR is a good example).

That being said, nothing stays the same and we can never rest on our laurels.  Conversely, we shouldn't resign ourselves to some deterministic fatalism.  Although Machiavelli compared fortuna to a wild and uncontrollable river, he believed that smart policies could "direct" fate in an advantageous manner just as dikes, levies, and sandbags on the Red River attempt to divert the river where we wish it to go.

Saying that we should pull completely out of Bosnia now because future conflict is a forgone conclusion (now I have to look back and make sure I didn't say that, although I'm sure I have in the past   ) is about as smart as saying we may as well pull out because they have free markets and a democracy, so they're on the road to utopia.   As usual, the answer lies somewhere in the middle of the road - where exactly to be determined in a rational calculation of interests.

Thus, in a place like the Balkans, which I've argued holds a great deal of strategic bearing for the interests of Canada, their remains the justification to maintain our vigilance.

A dead German guy.   And that is a truism...you can't have a decent military argument (especially if it involves manoeuvre warfare) without invoking, at some point, at least one dead German guy.   (Hitler doesn't count, though...as soon as you bring him into it, you lose the argument, per some Internet Law whose name I forget).

LOL  

Hitler was an Austrian, so the Law still stands I guess....