Top-heavy military throws spending off-balance

[TangoTwoBravo]

I figure we (Canada) will tend to have a higher proportion of officers due to our small size but wide spread.  There is a certain amount of overhead as a national institution, while the large size of Canada geographically leads to dispersion.  It might be more efficient to have one base for the Army, for instance, but I don't see that as feasible in Canada.

I see the pilot piece as a blind-alley.  If you make them "non-commisioned", how do you train and select them?  Do you make then "instant Sergeants" once they have completed flight training?  I think it could turn into a shell game of sorts.

Regarding platoon commanders as Captains, there are some reasons for that the article does not get into.  Officers who enroll after obtaining a degree at a civilian university will usually become Captains during their first three years at the unit (some even upon completing training if they were in the system for a while).  I grant that there can be issues with this, but I don't see it as relating to the problem of a top-heavy military unless you don't have officers as platoon commanders (tangent alert).  A platoon commander will usually have been at his unit for at least one year and possibly two before going on deployment.  If they become a Captain is this such a bad thing?
 

 

[Kirkhill]

Does the increasing capability of the individual soldier and small "units" factor into this discussion at all?

A 4-man team can now deliver more effect to the battle field than an entire battalion of Wellington's day and yet our rank structure is virtually the same.   There was tacit acknowledgement of this in Recce Platoons being commanded by Captains while Rifle Platoons were/are "commanded" by Warrants with the additional responsibility of shepherding an Officer-in-Training.

With more effective sub-sub-sub-units, with better (more experienced) junior leadership, with more dispersed operations spread over wider areas does the old rank structure/manning ratio still make sense?

Or are we moving towards an army of "Recce Platoons"?

There is precedence for this in that Line Infantry adopted Light Infantry and Rifle Infantry tactics as technology evolved (rapid firing, magazine fed breech loading rifles with smokeless powder and light machine guns) allowing the section lying in the grass to generate more fire power than a standing company armed with muskets.   The Corporal in the Grass now had as much effect on the field action as the Captain in the Line.

Is there room for the "Officer in Training" on today's battlefield?  How many dispersed teams can one individual coordinate over how large an area?   How much of the Command's structure is involved in old-fashioned (and still necessary) leadership in the face of enemy fire and how much is coordination, support and administration?

A while back there was much discussion on this site about the value of splitting the force structure into a fire-team/patrol structure along the lines of the SAS vs the need to be able to concentrate forces for conventional actions.  It seems that realities on the ground have rather dictated that operations are being conducted at the level from Fire-Team to Company with the occasional foray into tactical employment of Battalions as opposed to the Company/Battalion of WW2 being the basic tactical element.  That seems to suggest that operations in the field are driving towards the prospect of something like the SAS Troop, or even for that matter the Armoured Troop, where man-power is less critical than effect and where the role of the Commander is primarily to co-ordinate the effect - moreso than to administer and lead large numbers of soldiers.

Is it unreasonable to suggest that rather than 3x10 under Corporals  with a Warrant/Sgt leading and a 2Lt as the Officer in Training that we might be looking at more need for 4x4 under Sgts with a Captain/1st Lt handling Command and Control, a Warrant to handle administration and a 2nd Lt/1st Lt as 2ic and Officer in Training?

Just some thoughts.

 

[rmacqueen]

I see the pilot piece as a blind-alley.  If you make them "non-commisioned", how do you train and select them?  Do you make then "instant Sergeants" once they have completed flight training?  I think it could turn into a shell game of sorts.

Same as they do in the US, they are senior NCM's who volunteer and are carefully screened for eligibility, just like any other trade.  You do not need a degree to have the necessary skills to fly a helicopter nor, just because you joined the forces instead of going to university, does it mean you are too stupid to learn how to fly.

 

[McG]

Did the US not create a whole new class of military member (the Warrant Officer) to be a pilot (or other technical decision maker) without a commission?  I don't think that approach fits Canada.

 

[54/102 CEF]

- even counter-interoperable, expensive, wasteful, stovepipe systems - each protected by jealous commands, agencies and branches who are far more interested in their own PMLs than in forces wide operational capabilities.  Look at the CFSS Upgrade project: I rest my case.

Excellent

ADM MAT in Jan 06 found they had 35 project control systems - 2/3 of which were dead on the operating table. What does that tell you? HOw about no accountabilty? Time for the Auditor General to step in top to bottom.