Top-heavy military throws spending off-balance

[Edward Campbell]

This article is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen.  It highlights a problem which has its origins in reforms made in the mid-‘60s.  Those problems (too many senior officers, corporals for life, career captains, etc, etc) are blamed on then Defence Minister Paul Hellyer but that’s a bit unfair.  He was trying to solve a real problem: rates of pay for the military were falling behind; the government of the day would not countenance the sorts of pay raises required to make the military a reasonable attractive career so Hellyer’s advisors came up with the one of the few workable alternatives: rank inflation.

http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=886f9c82-bc72-4be2-a3ff-39c026f09053

Top-heavy military throws spending off-balance
Money poured into bureaucracy instead of missions, retired colonel says

Tim Naumetz, The Ottawa Citizen
Published: Saturday, March 17, 2007

The "brass to bayonets" balance in the Canadian Forces has tipped to the point there is nearly one officer for every three members of the enlisted ranks, Defence Department figures show.

Forty years ago, before years of budget cuts and troop reductions, the ratio was approximately one officer for every five enlisted members, according to a historical comparison the department provided to the Citizen.

The accounts show that in 1964, the Canadian Forces totalled 95,379 enlisted personnel and 18,986 commissioned officers in the regular services.

Last month, the figures were 48,555 enlisted and 14,804 officers.

There are 79 generals, but captains make up the largest single cohort at 5,827.

The result, says a senior military analyst, is that the Canadian Forces spends too much on infrastructure, red tape and bureaucracy instead of the foot soldiers and lower ranks required to sustain a major operation such as the Kandahar battle group in Afghanistan.

Retired army colonel Brian MacDonald said the recent numbers confirm the Forces has done little to adjust the lopsided ratio of officers to enlisted personnel that began after the Trudeau government unified the navy, air force and army into one service in 1968.

The Canadian Forces applied the higher officer-to-soldier ratio of the air force to the other two branches and the imbalance was exaggerated in the 1990s when reductions were implemented through a recruitment freeze, says Mr. MacDonald.

He said the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is higher in Canada than the U.S. and Britain.

"We have the only army in the world using captains as platoon commanders," Mr. MacDonald said, explaining the normal rank for that job is lieutenant.

Mr. MacDonald added Canada has too many army bases, which creates more demand for officers for administration and infrastructure.

If the Conservative government keeps a promise to establish new "territorial-defence" battalions across the country, the number of bases would increase.

"One of my fears would be that you would be simply creating new administrative structures and your tooth-to-tail ratio might go in the wrong direction," Mr. MacDonald said.

"It costs you a lot more money in pay," he added, saying training and support for officers through their careers is also more costly than for lower ranks.

The Afghanistan mission has exaggerated the effects of low numbers in the ranks and, combined with the recruitment freeze in the 1990s, has made it difficult to ramp up recruitment now because of a shortage of non-commissioned officers for training, says NDP defence critic Dawn Black.

"They talk about wanting to increase recruitment, then they tell you they can't do it to the numbers they want because they haven't got the trainers here, they're in Afghanistan," Ms. Black said.

© The Ottawa Citizen 2007​

Bran MacDonald cites one symptom: captains doing subalterns’ jobs; and one cause: too many bases with too much infrastructure.  Some Army.ca members, however, pine for the days when we had even more small bases scattered across the country – especially in cities like Calgary, Winnipeg and London.

The problem remains: we have far too many officers in proportion to the sharp end of the military.

There are some solutions – all of which cost money.  I offer a six pack, just as examples:

1. Do a thoroughgoing rank/occupation/remuneration revision.  Pay for the task not some arbitrary rank level.  This probably means, inter alia -

a. Making private and lieutenant the normal working ranks for the bottom level tasks,

b. Increasing the pay-grades and recognition levels(e.g. private 1st class) within the ranks of private and lieutenant, and

c. Separating rank from trade level – it should be possible for technical tradesmen, especially, to advance to (near) the top of their field without being forced into and paid for leadership positions;

2. Return some base functions to units – thus reducing the overhead.  The promise made in the mid ‘60s was that if we adopted one, centralized, administrative system savings would accrue and fighting units would be able to deploy without leaving extensive rear parties, etc.  The promises were never realized and, in my professional opinion can never be realized because they are based on faulty premises.  There is a difference between area support functions – properly belonging to a base or similar organization – and garrison administrative/support functions which remain unique to units even when they deploy.  Proponents of the base concept thought they could and should replace the B Echelon – they couldn’t because they shouldn’t.  The end result is that the CF ended up paying for two or even three B Echelons – one at the home base, one at the national support element and one which, of necessity, persists in the unit because neither of the others ever seems able to do what’s required;

3. Consolidate bases.  I can make a solid, operational/logistical argument for closing at least one or two major bases and consolidating functions at others – probably saving hundred of people, civilians and military, officers and NCMs in the process, enough for, at least, one full, up to strength infantry battalion;

4. In the process restore naval and army aviation – with rank/trade/pay structures which support their operational requirements;

5. Apply sensible, at least sane information technology management into DND.  For 35 years – ever since the Information Handing Agency (established under a young colonel, later general and CDS named Withers) was disbanded computer technology and information management within DND has been a combination of a old fashioned bugger’s muddle and the original amateur hour.  It is time to put the operational, administrative and financial needs of the military ahead of the C&E Branch’s PMLs – and the same should apply to other branches, even <gasp> to the pilots!  Information is a resource – rather like fuel and ammo – and it needs to me managed with at least the same skill, care and professionalism as we manage our logistics.  I did not see that while I served – but, in fairness, I retired many year ago; and

6. Decentralize, sometimes radically, some administration and logistics functions – especially recruiting, education, training  and promotion, giving each service and, sometimes, each unit much more ’hands on’ control over the people in it, using CF wide standards.


Edit: typo

 

[GAP]

Boy, you like poking sticks into hornet's nests don't you.

What you say may be true (I would say it is, but....) I can hear the outraged cries and protection of me and mine raising the roof.

 

[McG]

2. Return some base functions to units – thus reducing the overhead.  The promise made in te mid ‘60s was that if we adopted one, centralized, administrative system savings would accrue and fighting units would be able to deploy without leaving extensive rear parties, etc.  The promises were never realized and, in my professional opinion can never be realized because they are based on faulty premises.  There is a difference between area support functions – properly belonging to a base or similar organization – and garrison administrative/support functions which remain unique to units even when they deploy.  Proponents of the base concept thought they could and should replace the B Echelon – they couldn’t because they shouldn’t.  The end result is that the CF ended up paying for two or even three B Echelons – one at the home base, one at the national support element and one which, of necessity, persists in the unit because neither of the others ever seems able to do what’s required;

Which are the centralized administrative functions you propose re-decentralizing?  The base cashiers?  The infrastructure officers?

3. Consolidate bases.  I can make a solid, operational/logistical argument for closing at least one or two major bases and consolidating functions at others – probably saving hundred of people, civilians and military, officers and NCMs in the process, enough for, at least, one full, up to strength infantry battalion;

Which bases?

4. In the process restore naval and army aviation – with rank/trade/pay structures which support their operational requirements;

Not that I don’t like this idea, but how does putting helicopter pilots in Army & Navy uniforms address the problem you are concerned with?

5. Apply sensible, at least sane information technology management into DND.  For 35 years – ever since the Information Handing Agency (established under a young colonel, later general and CDS named Withers) was disbanded computer technology and information management within DND has been a combination of a old fashioned bugger’s muddle and the original amateur hour.  It is time to put the operational, administrative and financial needs of the military ahead of the C&E Branch’s PMLs – and the same should apply to other branches, even <gasp> to the pilots!  Information is a resource – rather like fuel and ammo – and it needs to me managed with at least the same skill, care and professionalism as we manage our logistics.  I did not see that while I served – but, in fairness, I retired many year ago;

Not sure where you are going here.  Is it that we need to create a new staff to manage administrative information or will this new staff be an ops clerk branch (maybe the conjoining of Sigs with Int)?  Does this really reduce headquarters?

6. Decentralize, sometimes radically, some administration and logistics functions – especially recruiting, education, training  and promotion, giving each service and, sometimes, each unit much more ’hands on’ control over the people in it, using CF wide standards.

Are you suggesting that creating separate recruiting centres for the Army, Navy, and Air Force will reduce overhead?  I think you would triple any overhead as every CFRC would be replaced by three arm specific organizations each with its own staff & CO.

 

[Old Sweat]

To concentrate on the working rank for NCMs, the current situation was created when rank and trade were combined starting in 1965. This was done because the TB had placed a restriction on the number of individuals who could draw the higher levels of trades pay - there were four trade groups with slight variations in groups three and four depending upon the complexity of the trade. In the more technical trades it was not uncommon to see, say a senior RCEME Craftsman (today's LORE Private) drawing group three or four. He or she would probably be at least a sergeant today. The result was rank inflation, compounded by making corporal, not private, the working rank.

The officers were put in the same situation on 1 September 1967 when captain was made the working rank, second lieutenant was abolished and the rank level for entry level positions such as platoon commander was established as captain/lieutenant. Prior to that, it was not unusual to have shortages of captains, the artillery was short five captains in 1966-1967. In a rare example of logic the corps was authorized to conduct a promotion board and five unsuspecting subalterns (including young sweat were promoted acting/captain I add immodestly.) I take this as an indication that the mass promotions a few months later came as a surprise to the forces, and there was informed speculation at the time that this was an attempt to buy the loyalty of the officer corps. Whatever the truth, it certainly removed any control over the number of captains and effectively removed much of the prestige of the rank, just as was the case for corporals.

The whole shooting match became even more skewed when it was decided to create rank profiles so that an increase of x number of captain/lieutenants would create vacancies for y majors, z lieutenant colonels and probably even a colonel or two. In other words establishment places and people faces for both officers and NCMs became career management tools and not operationally driven requirements.

I am not going to get into the rank and position inflation that was created by cetralized administration as Edward
has flogged that sorry horse. Suffice to say, the system delivered the exact opposite of what had been promised. Perhaps a C&E type can comment on whether POET lived up to its billing of removing the technical electronics theory in favour of teaching practical hands-on matters.

As concerns separating NCM rank and trade, I do not see that being addressed anytime soon. In fact I am not sure such a thing is desirable, having seen the vast bureaucratic maze that resulted the last time round. The administrative structure is another thing, although it too will be difficult. The old structure was pre-computer and very paternalistic. As a junior officer I was expected to know all sorts of things about my troops and their families that would drive the privacy police into a frenzy today. I was also expected to handle administrative detail that base specialists deal with today. Whether or not that was a good thins, it worked, albeit slowly and ponderously. It may be that we cannot go back, but I am not in a position to discuss the issue with any first hand knowledge.

 

[Bane]

Just some thoughts I had on this.

1 - Is it really going to save that much money by not promoting people but increasing their salary? I know you'll save some on the extra admin for higher ranks but will it be that much? I do agree though that people should not be forced into leadership positions, but then it goes back to my first point.
2- Don't really know enough to comment so I won't
3- Having the military bases connects communities to them, Canada is very big and suffers from not a small amount of regionalism. Their are lots of small units that could be moved with little side effect but closing major bases may create to much distance, both physical and otherwise, to the army.
4- 100% right on
5- 100% - The ground to be made up in admin and managment would, in my opinion, obviate the need for closing many locations. This is also the area of the CF, along with procurment, that needs the most work.
6- It seems like it might be more expensive to run 10 schools instead of 1 or 2. Also having a school where everyone of a certain MOC goes to learn and hash out new ideas and spread valuable practical experience seems like a good idea to me.

My 0.02

 

[Edward Campbell]

Which are the centralized administrative functions you propose re-decentralizing?  The base cashiers?  The infrastructure officers?

Mostly personnel administration which, when I was last in the field - 25+ years ago I hasten to add - was, essentially, duplicated at unit and base level with all the attendant toe-stepping-on which followed, as night follows day.  As Old Sweat says: personnel administration in units may have been cumbersome - it was pre-automation - but it worked, however slowly.  By the '80s it simply wasn't working, albeit it wasn't working much more quickly.

Which bases?

Borden, for a start ... army schools to Gagetown/Valcartier, air force schools to Cold Lake.

Reduce Kingston to RMC + Fort Frontenac.  Sigs School split and pieces sent to Gagetown and Cold Lake.

Not that I don’t like this idea, but how does putting helicopter pilots in Army & Navy uniforms address the problem you are concerned with?

Army pilots become super-deluxe tank commanders or super-deluxe combat bus drivers - possibly NCO pilots; Navy pilots become watch-keepers so that they can, eventually, command ships, including the BHS.

Not sure where you are going here.  Is it that we need to create a new staff to manage administrative information or will this new staff be an ops clerk branch (maybe the conjoining of Sigs with Int)?  Does this really reduce headquarters?

Information is a key tool - like fuel and ammo.  It was, when I retired, poorly, indeed ineptly managed.  DND fails, miserably, to reap the benefits (operational and administrative) which good (even half decent) information management ought to provide.  What we are doing, have been doing for 35 years, is to continue to fail miserably.

Let's stop doing that.

I had the pleasure, several years ago, to sit beside DND's then brand spanking new Chief Information Officer - a pleasant fellow, a civvy without a single day's military experience, a Brit who came to DND from a major international bank - he's gone back to the financial sector, I think.  He explained his job and mandate to me; I haven't been so depressed in years.  So, he told me a couple of years later, was he - his mandate, as the Chief Information Officer for all of DND, extended no father than some offices in Ottawa.  DND had, and still has I am 99% certain a series of non-interoperable - even counter-interoperable, expensive, wasteful, stovepipe systems - each protected by jealous commands, agencies and branches who are far more interested in their own PMLs than in forces wide operational capabilities.  Look at the CFSS Upgrade project: I rest my case.

Are you suggesting that creating separate recruiting centres for the Army, Navy, and Air Force will reduce overhead?  I think you would triple any overhead as every CFRC would be replaced by three arm specific organizations each with its own staff & CO.

Let's just start by delegating recruit selection to services, recruit and leadership training to groups within each service and promotion to corporal and captain and selection for many (most?) courses to unit.

 

[McG]

Mostly personnel administration which, when I was last in the field - 25+ years ago I hasten to add - was, essentially, duplicated at unit and

I’ve found pers admin to be run efficiently in a fd unit.  What are the jobs you think could be eliminated from bases?  Would any of these require new jobs created in the units?

Reduce Kingston to RMC + Fort Frontenac.  Sigs School split and pieces sent to Gagetown and Cold Lake.

and what of the other entities in Kingston?  Sig Regt, EW Sqn, Int School, PSTC, LFDTS?  Regardless, you are not cutting the overhead because RMC & the army staff college will still require much of the base infrastructure (medical, transport, CE, etc).  This is not savings, this is just moving pieces.

Army pilots become super-deluxe tank commanders or super-deluxe combat bus drivers - possibly NCO pilots; Navy pilots become watch-keepers so that they can, eventually, command ships, including the BHS.

But this is just an exercise in moving PYs between commands.  Sure, it may open the opportunity for pilots to command formations not part of Air Command, but where are the savings?

Information is a key tool - like fuel and ammo.  It was, when I retired, poorly, indeed ineptly managed.  DND fails, miserably, to reap the benefits (operational and administrative) which good (even half decent) information management ought to provide.  What we are doing, have been doing for 35 years, is to continue to fail miserably.

Let's stop doing that.

I’m still not clear on the mechanism you are proposing.  I understand you want to better manage information in the CF.  How?  At what levels?  Is it going to cost PYs or does it just involve better training our people in the jobs they already have?

Let's just start by delegating recruit selection to services, recruit and leadership training to groups within each service and promotion to corporal and captain and selection for many (most?) courses to unit.

Delegate recruiting to the services = 3 times more recruiting centres with three times more COs, three times more staff, and three times more infrastructure.  Most courses are already loaded by units.

 

[observor 69]

Better link to article:

http://206.75.155.198/showfile.asp?Lang=E&URL=/archivenews/070317/otct/070317g1.htm

 

[dynaglide]

. In the more technical trades it was not uncommon to see, say a senior RCEME Craftsman (today's LORE Private) drawing group three or four. He or she would probably be at least a sergeant today. The result was rank inflation, compounded by making corporal, not private, the working rank.

Just to clarify:  LORE no longer exists.  It actually is EME/GEM and the rank is indeed Craftsman, not Private. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

I’ve found pers admin to be run efficiently in a fd unit.  What are the jobs you think could be eliminated from bases?  Would any of these require new jobs created in the units?

My experience differs - but mine is also 20+ years ago.  I would disband the entire Base Pers Admin Branch and delegate all the functions to units with only minimal clerical staff increases in units.  When we made the changes, 40 years ago, units were stripped of people but they ended up still doing (often redoing) most of the work of the Base Pers Admin Branch.

It's quite possible that a miracle occurred circa 1990 - it sure didn't in the preceding 25 years.

and what of the other entities in Kingston?  Sig Regt, EW Sqn, Int School, PSTC, LFDTS?  Regardless, you are not cutting the overhead because RMC & the army staff college will still require much of the base infrastructure (medical, transport, CE, etc).  This is not savings, this is just moving pieces.

RMC already has (had) considerable infrastructure of its own - quite separate and independent of CFB Kingston.  We were amazed and appalled when we (Doug Green, mostly) established the Canadian Tech Staff course in RMC back in the late '80s to discover that RMC was, nearly, self sustaining.

I was unclear: Fort Frontenac needs to stay, for purely historical reasons, the staff courses can/should go to Gagetown, with the Sigs Regt, etc.

But this is just an exercise in moving PYs between commands.  Sure, it may open the opportunity for pilots to command formations not part of Air Command, but where are the savings?

No it isn't.  I would make aviation an integral component of the Navy and the Army (with lots of tri-service training) and let them decide how pilots and other aircrew should be selected, recruited, trained and employed.  Navy aviators would be, above all, sailors, and army pilots would be soldiers.  It is, as I said, possible, that many army pilots would be senior NCOs with attendant reductions in the size of the officer corps.

I’m still not clear on the mechanism you are proposing.  I understand you want to better manage information in the CF.  How?  At what levels?  Is it going to cost PYs or does it just involve better training our people in the jobs they already have?

I'm not, never was, in the IT business but I have been assured that DND has the least effective IT in government and that the Government of Canada is far behind other governments and the private sector.

Going back to the Canadian Forces Supply System Upgrade project - which I regard as a classic example of waste and mismanagement:  I had the occasion - after I retired - to be asked to advise on how the Navy might increase the size of its communications pipe to allow the CFSS (as then designed) to work, as designed.  I offered this advice: change the CFSS design to use less pipe because warships (any mobile ‘platforms’) have practical (laws of physics) constraints on how big their pipes can be.

Delegate recruiting to the services = 3 times more recruiting centres with three times more COs, three times more staff, and three times more infrastructure.  Most courses are already loaded by units.

You appear to be assuming that the way we do business now is sound.  I'm assuming it isn't and that the three services will adapt what we have now (e.g. CF Recruiting Centres) and how we use it to suit their specific needs and, in so doing, will create efficiencies.

 

[observor 69]

Ref recruiting centres. I joined up in 1963 at Saint John, N.B. When you walked into the recruiting centre you were confronted with a square. One side was the door you just came through, the other sides were Army, Navy and Air Force.
One CO, one admin staff and one facility.

 

[McG]

Does this not create enviromental stovepipes in which cross postings are no longer possible with a clerk, Medic, Constr Engr, etc?  Edward, is your proposal that we abolish the single service in favour of the three enviromental stovepipes (in both careers, administration, and ops)?

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

As usual when the media reports on rank issues, there are more than a few red-herrings here.

First, the officer to NCM ratio in units isn't all that different than in previous decades.  The fact that a platoon commander may wear an extra half stripe is (1) still not the norm - despite what MacDonald would have us believe; (2) a relatively recent phenomena; and (3) of such minor difference financially that it hardly matters.

Secondly, the demands for specialists is much higher now than previously.  We have a plethora of social workers, PSOs, nursing officers, communications advisors, public affairs, lawyers and the like - all of whom are commissioned.  Again, the problem isn't in the line units.  A doctor joining is automatically a Captain, as are dentists and some other trades.  At one time, IIRC, medical personnel were regarded as "special" and were not formally commissioned (and therefore not counted) - like padres they held honorary rank.  Old Sweat hints at this in his post.

Third, and this was hinted to as well, the legislative demands on the CF are much greater than previous years.  The Privacy Act demands a whole separate reporting chain for some issues - all requiring staff of relatively senior rank (because of the issues involved), Access to Information creates huge headaches, demanding (some) dedicated staff simply to handle the requests, financial oversight is much stricter now...I could go on, but you get the idea.

Finally, the field force has increasingly demanded specialist support on operations - more int, better comms, more systems, more welfare - all of which requires, you guessed it, more "geek" staff of relatively lofty rank.

I do agree with Edward - the IT side is out of control and we've allowed it to rule the roost for far too long - to the point where "systems" can, in some instances, drive operational priorities.  But suggesting that there's some easy answer to the manning issues created by history, legislation, public expectations and operational demands is disingenuous at best.

As an aside - oddly, I agree (to some extent) with Dawn Black...will wonders never cease...

 

[RCD]

They said this twenty year's ago also.an still nothing has been done

 

[Old Sweat]

Dynaglide, I apologize for using LORE, but I had a brain cramp.

We are butting our heads against a wall, as the CF has experienced an explosion in special staffs. Having said that, the only way to slay the snake is by an arbitrary downsizing of the headquarters worlds. I am not sure, however, that that is a viable proposition because of the number of functions that have been mandated by legislation or just because we can. It may not even be necessary.

For one approach, I suggest a look at Bomber Harris's memoirs (I am not home to be able to cite a source, but I think the title is Bomber Offensive). Before he took over Bomber Command, he was Vice Chief of the Air Staff in the Air Ministry. The headquarters was bogged down in papers, meetings, working groups, etc, and there were constant calls for more and more personnel. Harris ordered an immediate decrease in personnel in the order of 40%. He claimed there was an immediate increase in efficiency with a concurrent decrease in the work load. If we tried that today, a cynic might suggest that the folks let go would all come back as consultants and bog the thing down even more.

TR notes that the officer to NCM ratio is not historically out of line and I agree. I checked the 1938 figures while researching my book. The ratio then was roughly similar to now (again I am not home to check my figures - I am in North Carolina) even though the services were not very sophisticated, administration was decentralized and most units were on a severely-restricted cadre basis.

Whether we could make things more effective or more economical or both as compared to more efficient is a moot point, given the penchant of the Canadian bureaucracy for process over results.

 

[Garett]

And we're actually still hundreds of officers short, there isn't one trained platoon commander in four platoons where I'm currently employed (LFAA TC).  Sounds like our manning priorities might be a bit mixed up. 

 

[Centurian1985]

4. In the process restore naval and army aviation – with rank/trade/pay structures which support their operational requirements;

5. Apply sensible, at least sane information technology management into DND.  For 35 years – ever since the Information Handing Agency (established under a young colonel, later general and CDS named Withers) was disbanded computer technology and information management within DND has been a combination of a old fashioned bugger’s muddle and the original amateur hour.  It is time to put the operational, administrative and financial needs of the military ahead of the C&E Branch’s PMLs – and the same should apply to other branches, even <gasp> to the pilots!  Information is a resource – rather like fuel and ammo – and it needs to me managed with at least the same skill, care and professionalism as we manage our logistics.  I did not see that while I served – but, in fairness, I retired many year ago; and

Good stuff except these two points:
4. Re-etablshing the naval and air units would also increase the administrative systems and supporting processes.  You would lose money not save it.

5. "Sane information technology management" does not exist.  Each element has its own interpretation of what it needs for IT support.  Plus the level of technical support for some elements is perceived as inadequate and unresponsive for other units requiring higher levels of support and expertise.  The IT staff are in fact a common obstacle to the effective use of "information resources" you mention.   

 

[eerickso]

This article is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen. 

4. In the process restore naval and army aviation – with rank/trade/pay structures which support their operational requirements;

Edit: typo

While it might be easy, cheap and administratively convenient to say, "we don't need you now, so go fly griffins instead of sea kings", but are we really developing professional sailors, soldiers or airmen by doing this?

Or if we want to take integration further, how about the combining of the Sig Op and NCS officer trades?

 

[Journeyman]

Or if we want to take integration further, how about the combining of the Sig Op and NCS officer trades?

Ever reply to a post, just knowing that you're going to regret asking?

OK, I'll bite..... what do you think SigOp and NCS officers (NavRes Int (Sea) ) have in common that could justify, or even permit, integration?



----------------------
Oh, and perhaps if your profile contained more than just dust bunnies, your expertise in this subject would be glaringly obvious   

 

[rmacqueen]

Reading this story I can't help but wonder if the Citizen didn't just dust off the same one from 20 years ago.  The numbers may change but story is the same, top heavy military.

The problem, IMHO, is that we have an elitist military.  This is an opinion I have held for a long time and it still hasn't changed.  Too much weight is placed on book learning and little on operational or trade experience.  This is partially the reason there is an imbalance when compared to other militaries.

For instance, as has been pointed out previously, the US Army employs senior NCO's in air roles whereCanada insists they be officers.  Financially speaking it may not make a big difference in money spent on personnel but it would make a difference when it comes the personnel numbers, less officers versus enlisted.  You see this trend in other trades as well, very capable people with years of experience and knowledge are dissed because they are not officers.  During my career on the Admin side I saw Corporals and Master Corporals with vast amounts of knowledge stuck in tiny jobs simply because of their rank.

No where more is this evident then when one looks at the requirements for commissioning from the ranks.  A quick example was a friend of mine, a clerk, who was sent to RMC to get a degree in psychology.  Her future trade?  Logistics Officer.  The mentality being that as long as you have book learning you can do any job where as some one who has not gone to university but has years of experience can't.  The business world has learned these lessons the hard way (remember when an MBA was what everyone wanted as CEO?  Enron, Worldcom and Nortel showed the value of this mentality)  Unfortunately, it is culture perpetuated by universities and won't change until someone from the outside changes it.  Take a look at the want ads for universities and you get a quick glimpse of the mentality (a university degree to fix the elevators?  UWO ad)