To convoy, or not to convoy

[McG]

Our forces might take a page from Robert Kaplan who writes of American forces moving around Afghanistan in Toyota pick-up trucks.

Let's stick with the LAV III.  Pickup trucks are great until the shooting starts.

..., just thinking that lumbering convoys attract the wrong sort of attention and require more and more resources in and of themselves. Since our force structure is so small, any means we have to increase the actual "boots on the ground" as opposed to bulking up the echelons and absorbing troops in the Force Protection role need to be explored.

I don't think the convoy will disappear any time soon.  Sure it may be a big target and attract attention, but it integrates a lot of combat power and it is the only way to move personnel and resources to sustain operations.  Smaller vehicles moving about in smaller numbers will not meet our requirements and they will probably just find that they are easier prey for the enemy.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think we need echelons, as living off the land isn't very feasible.  I figure that convoys are the way to go for the same reasons that ships formed convoys during WWI.  Single vehicles can be picked off at leisure and if a single vehicle is hit then the bad guys have control over our people.  A convoy is a much tougher proposition and it simplfies your escort/protection piece.

That being said, anything you can do to reduce the number of convoys is generally a good thing.  Aerial resupply is an obvious choice, but that isn't risk/threat-proof either.  Every measure has a counter-measure I suppose.

 

[dglad]

There's a reason ships took to convoying during WW2, as did bombers (a formation of B-17s really being a "convoy" of bombers heading for a specific target/destination).  Mutual protection is a good thing; having all of your charges together also makes it easier for the escorts (be they destroyers or P-51s) to do their job.  The downside, of course, is you make a bigger target which, if compromised, can cause the whole collective to fail.

The opposite approach, which is a sort of "swarm" approach, would suggest having your individual components follow different routes and converge on their destination.  Their are advantages to this, mainly involving saturating the enemy's ability to deal with so many dispersed targets, especially if they're moving at unpredictable times and along unpredictable routes.  Taking out a few of the individuals doesn't necessarily threaten the whole, especially if some of the individuals are actually redundant, or decoys.  The downside is the coordination involved and the vulnerability of individuals (which can have significant psychological drawbacks).  Also, to be effective, you need many routes (hard to "swarm" along a couple of roads).

I think we'd be asking a lot of our soldiers if we wanted them to "swarm", by driving individual vehicles along different routes at different times.  It might work for short hops, or as something to do occasionally, to keep your opponent guessing, but convoying is probably safest in the long-run.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Another issue to consider with "swarms" is the nature of the conflict.  If you are fighting WWIII against a super-power when everything is on the line then losing a truck and its occupants is not a big deal, while getting the supplies through is.  If you are fighting a counter-insurgency then not getting the supplies through is not a catastrophe, but having two captured soldiers displayed on the internet is.

 

[alfie]

Back in my RCASC days I was taught the conventions of convoy travel, what comes to mind is the "Paquet" system (maybe mispelled) the idea was to break vehicle convoys up into small units of about 5 -6 trucks. This came out of WWII. This helped us prevent huge traffic jams for the civies on the highway as most of our dueces were lucky to do 55mph usually the 3/4 s were even slower. I remember reading about the Mitla Pass during the Oct 73 war between Israel and the arab countries and that Egypt had taken the long full convoy into the pass, the Israelis disabled the first  :skull:and last  :skull:then had a turkey shoot. The vehicles were still there in 76. Might be workable in the Ghan with some good Taliban suppression as part of it maybe one of the new Leopards.

 

[Big Red]

There's always the option to run mixed contractor/mil convoys.  Have TCNs driving cheap unarmoured/uparmoured supply trucks with a handful of .mil vehicles providing security.  Reduce the number of coalition casaulties when the weaker vehicles get destroyed. Also cuts down on the number of troops required for the mission.

 

[Belce]

For the North Atlantic convoys, it was done mainly as an offensive atcion against submairnes.  Convoy system allowed the Canadain navy to mass asw assets to attack and defend shipping on convoy.  I t was effective in part because the subs had to attack well defended convoys and that any air cover could be provided as well. Just as naval assets were placed at the point of conflict, air assests could be used as well to secure the path and help keep it clean.  Canada was successful in the Battle for the North Atlantic with a convoy system because the targets it killed were experienced German sub commanders over time.  They couldn't be replaced easily.  I think with the trouble with IED's in Afganistan is that person that is the experienced hard to replace part is not there when it happens. 

In the situation of overland supply, the departure and arrival points are fixed, you need to make the best area possible outside of that safe and then use a variety of routes between to insure success.  This should be more than a route A, B or C idea, since as soon as you commit to A your path is defined.  You could have a few IED's set, a few people and have them move to to set them off and those people are running for 10 seconds away from behind cover. 

Don't drive through towns, if necessary do a by pass and pay the people affected, if we are going to suck up a sucide bomber, its better that it happen outside of the local population so we don't have 1 or 2 wounded Canadians and 25 dead Afghans in the market place. 

 

[TCBF]

"I think we need echelons, as living off the land isn't very feasible."

- Yes, but we have to return to the INTEGRAL echelons our Cbt A sub-units had.  A Corps 86 WE tabled 19 Tanks and 19 "Tracks and Trucks" in a Tank Squadron.  The A1, A2, and B Echelon had a lot of 'Mechs and Techs' (16 Trades in an Armoured Regiment, remember?), but most of the soldiers were 011 Crewman.  This meant that the Echelon also provided immediate replacement for F Ech crew casualties.  Try THAT with the 'Plug n' Play' CSS Mafia being prodded out the wire theses days. 

Also, those Support Trades in the 'Old' Echelons were trained in tactics by the SSM - who led the A1 echelon.  They moved tactically and their Battle Discipline (Formations/Camoflage/Noise and Light Discipline/Dress/Hide, Harbour, Leauger Routine, etc) was as tight as the F Ech Tank Troops.

THAT Army is no more.

Tom

 

[Belce]

Big Red,

Frist of all, these guys get better airplay when they kill Canadians.  I think their action is directed more so to create a case to remove Canadians from there. 

Based on what Canadian solders have done before, I wouldn't want to be up against them . 

 

[Jarnhamar]

I'm a fan of more armor.
Driving supplies around in pickup trucks might work in the future but for the time being (ie the current mission) I don't think it's a good idea.

Trading off speed and mobility with heavier armor and more survivability will always have pros and cons.

Right now it's not a matter of if you will get hit but when, and when you do get hit you're going to be VERY thankful for having the most armor possible. Agreed they can always build a bigger bomb so nothing is 'bomb proof' but I still think armor is the way to go.  Very light convoys with low capacity for goods probably won't be able to effectively resupply FOBs or who ever.

Not to mention a convoy can only move as fast as it's slowest vehicle, if your stuck escorting and protecting something doing 30 or 40KPH (or 15...) speed and mobility becomes less of a factor.

Local civilian dudes who we hire to bring in supplies and do other services seem to be getting the shit kicked out of them. Taliban were sick when they were teaching the hearts and mind classes.

 

[APOLLOVet]

Gentlemen,

Good points, all.

In my opinion, we have no choice but to retain convoys for resupply in theater, and that is mainly due to the dearth of road options. When we were running resupply to the PRT (Camp Nathan Smith) from KAF, one of the first things we did was try to open up additional routes so that we had the option of varying our movement.

Unfortunately, logistic vehicles tend to be large and heavy, and cart paths through wadis tend not to be able to support them.

What we eventually decided upon in order to minimize our vulnerability was to vary times (always), take advantage of hours of darkness, only run heavy convoys on routes that supported heavy convoys (all light convoys used the wadis etc), carefully consider packet size and composition (force protection vs unwieldiness) and minimize the amount of material that was carried via military tpt. If it could be delivered via jingle truck, it was.

This turned out to be relatively effective in my opinion. We generally got everything through in a timely manner, and reduced the risk to our personnel as much as possible.

To minimize risk further, of course, we treated all personnel as fighters. I am extremely proud of our CSS troops' performance. While they would not be my first choice to go assault an MG position on a hill, they displayed excellent abilities in terms of protecting their convoys and maintaining vigilance.

CDS drops are good, but they will never fully replace resupply on the ground. For time sensitive material, or materials that do not justify the resources of an aerial mission (cargo lift, gunships, mission planning time/pers, loss of ability to react elsewhere) convoys are the way to go.

 

[TCBF]

"I am extremely proud of our CSS troops' performance. While they would not be my first choice to go assault an MG position on a hill, they displayed excellent abilities in terms of protecting their convoys and maintaining vigilance."

- I agree 100%.  The FOB concept, 'Plug n'Play', career attrition and the demise of the echelon system is pulling our over-tasked and under-strength CSS in all directions.  However, if the CSS world splits into 'outside the wire' and 'inside the wire' sects, the latter will hold no credibility in the eyes of the former, and some harmful friction will result.

 

[dglad]

"I am extremely proud of our CSS troops' performance. While they would not be my first choice to go assault an MG position on a hill, they displayed excellent abilities in terms of protecting their convoys and maintaining vigilance."

- I agree 100%.  The FOB concept, 'Plug n'Play', career attrition and the demise of the echelon system is pulling our over-tasked and under-strength CSS in all directions.  However, if the CSS world splits into 'outside the wire' and 'inside the wire' sects, the latter will hold no credibility in the eyes of the former, and some harmful friction will result.

Not only that, it's a waste of potential combat power.  In an era of "unrestricted warfare" or "asymmetric warfare" or whatever you wish to call it, we need to, as much as possible, divest ourselves of the "inside the wire" mentality.  Our army is too small to accommodate it.  It's as bad as the REMF thing that led to the idea that some troops in a conventional theatre could get away with driving or maintaining or whatever, but really nothing else, because they were so far "in the rear".  I never liked it and, in my experience, never found many CSS personnel that liked it either.  Most CSS soldiers I've worked with have been dedicated not just to their primary role, but also being good and effective soldiers, who could hold their own against a determined enemy.

Unfortunately--and I hate to say this, but it's sadly true--the REMF mindset has been more prevalent among certain CSS leadership I've known.  This has led to the tragic situation in which CSS personnel who genuinely WANT to be better soldiers haven't been properly given the opportunity.  Thankfully, this is less true today than it was a few years back.

 

[APOLLOVet]

Gentlemen,

We are going in the proper direction, at least in my experience. There was one 411 tech (name withheld as I don't have his permission to broadcast) whom I worked with who was OUTSTANDING in terms of his tactical skills. Not only was he a fine soldier in terms of his specialty, he was completely focused on the tactical impacts of his trade in terms of recovery in contact etc.

There was nothing that he would not do to minimize the exposure of the 031s who were providing him security, and I know of him (and his crew) performing miracles with respect to recovering vehicles that we were not equipped to recover. Then, when it was time to redeploy, he demanded to be allowed to remain in theater until he could pass on his tactical recovery lessons learned to the new crew. I was humbled by his professionalism.

This is not an isolated case. More and more I am finding that if we give CSS troops the proper training, mindset, and motivation in terms of ensuring that they know that we 031 and 23A appreciate what they do, we (031 and 23A) are shocked by how well they perform in not only their "proper" trade but as soldiers overall.

 

[combatbuddha]

I agree 100% with APOLLOVet, as I was one of the CSS clag (Armour 1) that was heavily involved in the convoy duties. I believe that our OPs people did things smartley. Small, fast and unpredictable is the way to go.
We were a small crew and it was tough enough. As I had nothing better to do, as the requirement for my trade was almost nil, I ran 100 + trips from KAF to CNS, with a few little extra adventures thrown in. I shudder at the logistical nightmare of supporting the whole TF.

On a side note, I had the oppourtunity to talk with an Afghani Immigrant prior to my deployment in July 05. The taxi ride from Edm Airport to The Garrison can be a long one. This fellow had fought against the Russians as well as the Taliban in the cival war later on. He told me of one Russian convoy they hit that had mixed soft skin and armour and was about 20 vehicles long. They dessimated the convoy in a narrow mountain path by knocking out the first vehicles after letting the first tanks pass through. With fire and movement they picked off the supply vehicles with RPGs, LMGs and supporting mortar fire. Never bothered with the tanks for obvious reasons. APCs were easy targets for "booby traps" as he called them. They lost only 33 of 100 fighters that embarked on the ambush.
Makes me wonder if NATO has approached the Russian Army for pointers. I am sure that books have been written, but to go to the source would be invaluable.