Paratroopers discuss fight in Afghanistan
By ADRIAN JAWORT
EDITOR’S NOTE: Billings writer Adrian Jawort interviewed American paratroopers just back from Afghanistan while he was in Italy earlier this year. They agreed to be interviewed on condition of anonymity. The Feb. 24, 2005, Outpost carried an interview Mr. Jawort conducted with a Billings soldier serving near the Iran-Iraq border.
“Typically, we don’t talk to the media, because they’re always trying to tell (U.S. soldiers) how to ‘fight a war’ without even having been in a fistfight themselves,” says a staff sergeant of the 173rd paratroopers who has done four tours in Afghanistan since Sept. 11 and one in Iraq.
The 173rd Airborne Brigade “sky soldiers” contain the 1/508th, 2/503, and 74th Long Range Surveillance Detachment. They’re hardcore, front-line infantry men who in 2005 accounted for more combat “kills” in Afghanistan than all other units combined throughout 2002 to 2004. Not authorized to speak with the media, all quoted have chosen not to give their names in exchange for honest and straightforward answers.
“The media drives politics, and politicians keep us from doing our job,” says another staff sergeant. “The media is killing our ability to fight this war. I have little or respect for the ‘angle’ or what their aim is to portray.”
The men are stationed around perhaps the most volatile region in Afghanistan, in and around the former stronghold of the Taliban and southern city of Kandahar.
The forces of the Taliban are said to be a “ground up” military force, as each foot soldier is basically his own boss. This works as an advantage in that they don’t need leaders to continue their own fight - they just need an enemy to fight. It also works as a disadvantage, as they’re rarely well coordinated with each other.
Aside from the hierarchy of sorts that lists Mullah Omar at the top, “The Taliban has a loose organizational structure - it always has. Most of the leaders hold a Mullah (Islamic teacher) status and title, and gain their positions of authority while training the mujahideen fighters in Pakistan,” notes a staff sergeant.
“Pakistan is and always been the key to the fight,” he continued. “Every year they regroup in Pakistan to refit and rearm and replace their losses from personnel. The low-level fighters are transient, but most of the ‘lieutenants’ and section leaders are hardcore and stable.”
The singular word for Taliban is “Talib,” which means “student.” Pakistan is where a lot of madrassas (religious schools) teach the fundamentalist brand of wahhabism Islam that is so associated with the Taliban and drives their radical values. Anti-western and anti-American sentiments run deep. Often, these madrassas are the only semblance of an education that many young men and boys ever receive.
Pakistan was and has been a base for foreign elements and Afghan fighters alike since the Soviet-Afghan War. Al Qaeda is actually Arabic for “the base,” or even “foundation.”
When asked if the Taliban recruits by force as they did in years previous throughout the 1990s, a paratrooper said, “They do intimidate a lot of locals into shooting a bit and running away, but there are more dedicated crews from Pakistan that are in it for the long haul. We’ve also encountered an Arab or two and a handful of Chechen fighters who serve as bodyguards for the high-ranking mullahs, core fighters and strike elements.”
Troops express frustration that the Taliban launch a lot of attacks in Afghanistan and then seemingly relocate undetected across the mountainous border into the more pro-Taliban area of Pakistan, where U.S. and Coalition forces aren’t allowed.
“Pakistan is the key to this whole war, bottom line. If we do not absolutely destroy their bases of operation and logistics in Pakistan, this war is a farce that will never end,” a staff sergeant said.
Pakistani troops have had clashes with the predominantly independent-minded Pashtun villages that may have been harboring known Taliban or foreign al-Qaeda elements. The results have typically been bloody for both sides.
The Pashtuns have long been recognized as the fiercest warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is believed that they harbor “guests” that are Taliban or foreigners with utmost regard to their “Pashtunwali Law,” which states that they must receive guests - hostile or friend, American or Taliban - and possibly protect them with their life if need be, unless it’s a guest who has taken advantage of the kindness granted for selfish means.
An estimated 85 percent of Afghanistan’s 25 million or more people live in rural areas, so they are very “tribal.” Tribal ways may keep the mindset of rural Afghan people in an almost perpetual “backwards” sense of not embracing modernity. However, this tribal structure also serves as a leverage as it gives them a sense of their own structure and law when their own country’s central government collapses. That has been the oft-repeated case in war-torn Afghanistan for more than 20 years until the re-established government after 9-11 (unless one includes the Soviet’s occupation or Taliban’s form of control as government).
It is interesting to note that when Taliban leader Mullah Omar and the Taliban first gained its rise in power in the early to mid 1990s, he was said to have followed the Pashtunwali Law to the degree that he gave all tribal leaders a say in matters in an egalitarian and near democratic sense. But soon after the Taliban rose to its greatest strength, it became totalitarian in its rule, which was of course to follow the wahhabist ways and nothing else.
In Afghanistan, one paratrooper said of those who are aiding the Taliban, “All of the local people are complicit in aiding the Taliban, because the Taliban are local, and when we leave, all the Afghans who helped us at all suffer greatly. So it’s a matter of survival - not religious fanaticism - in most cases.”
There have been many reported instances where the U.S. troops came in and gave villagers luxury items, such as power generators, and when they left the Taliban would immediately swoop down from their mountain hideouts and tell the villagers that any more people who received gifts from the Coalition forces would be killed.
To counter the intimidating tactics of the Taliban, “The best way I gained the trust was to move our company of soldiers into their valley and towns and live there,” the paratrooper continued. “Once we could project force and provide real security, the tips started to roll in. Most Afghans don’t care about the Taliban; it’s whoever has the most cash.”
Indeed, money is a prime motivator for tips of enemy activity, and for acquiring scouts who know the areas as well. “Everyone is in it for the dollars,” a soldier said. “There were some people who genuinely disliked or hated the Talibs, but it was still ‘how much you got?’ The local contacts were mostly telling us what we knew or were scam artists, but a couple were full of good tips.”
Said another staff sergeant, “Afghans can be some real bastards sometimes.”
Among those who “genuinely disliked” the Taliban was a large bear of a man named Saadique “The Skinner.” He fought in the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, and against the Taliban throughout their rise.
He received his nickname after skinning a Talib alive, and then hanging him up with a knife in his chest with a note on it that essentially stated, “such was the fate of any more Taliban who came into that area.” He assisted U.S. forces in the hunting of Taliban.
As for the newly contrived Afghan National Army? “The Afghan forces are about 40 percent in cahoots with the Taliban or ACM (Anti-Coalition Militia),” a soldier said. “Most of them are in it for the paycheck. They are the most unmotivated, undisciplined excuse for an army or fighting force I have seen in my life.”
Not exactly the highest of praise, but on patrols where the paratroopers were adjoined by Afghan forces, many were said to practically desert in the middle of a mission. They simply lost motivation and left after a day or two to go home or wherever.
Out of the Coalition forces, however, high praise was always reserved for the French Special Forces. One soldier’s quick assessment of troops he’s fought alongside went like this: “French Special Forces are awesome, hardcore and great guys; the Canadian infantry are not bad, and have potential; Romanians are useless, goldbricking losers; and any Egyptian is untrustworthy and useless.”
It must be stated that the Canadian Coalition troops are replacing the 173rd in Afghanistan, and the green troops are already seeing the forefront of a lot of enemy offensives coming their way. The 173rd Paratroopers have suffered more than their share of casualties.
To make matters more complex, the Taliban has recently begun using more IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices, or roadside bombs) in their arsenal as is common in Iraq.
“The supply of munitions (for IEDs) is endless and very inexpensive. IEDs will never go away,” says one paratrooper.
But how should one counter a skilled ambush in the middle of an area where the landscape puts one at a disadvantage? Turn the tables on the attackers:
“You have to read the terrain quickly,” says a paratrooper. “It’s always a different scenario, but basically try to outflank them if possible, and use whatever terrain is available to your advantage.”
The paratrooper had more useful advice to counter ambushes: “Aggression, aggression, violence of action!” he said. “Move as fast as possible and engage the enemy. Flank him and move to cut off his retreat or ex-filtration routes. Cowardice and ‘driving through the ambush’ is not fighting the war!”
Many lessons are to be learned from the previous Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s, and one of the main ones is that superior firepower alone can not win a war. The Soviets were brutal in suppressing the rural population, and as a result made the people willing participants to help the Mujahideen fighters set up ambushes and assaults.
So the war must be won through the hearts and minds of the people themselves. It’s going to take a lot of boots on the ground, patience and basic “grunt” work to help stabilize Afghanistan.
“What we really need is to permanently set up shop like the old British Empire,” says one sergeant of the War on Terror abroad. “This isn’t a five- or 10-year job, but a 50-year job.”
America is indeed an impatient country, so this may be hard for Americans to swallow. Americans want to “get in and get out,” and presume all will be well. That mindset won’t prevent another generation of young people growing up hating and denouncing America, however.
What else should the United States do militarily? “Focus on intelligence-driven missions from the bottom up with decentralized command and control, and we need a vast increase in quality light infantry forces to engage the enemy effectively,” says a paratrooper. “There’s a lot more, but that’s a good start.”
And of course, let the fighters fight and just do their job without complications on the home front or elsewhere. These were the first soldiers called upon in America’s darkest hours in the days following 9-11, after all.
He concludes, “Politicians out of our war!”
