Tom Morgan, from Canada: I am a supporter of the Afghan mission and believe that any progress in development and stability does require a combat role for Canadian forces. It's hard to build a school when opposing forces are shooting at workers and burning it down once work is complete. However, any mission is subject to improvement, and changes in policy and direction may be required. My question is: Why is the Afghan government not able to take a more active role in security and fighting the Taliban? The Taliban were able to control the majority of Afghanistan and defeat opposing forces without the benefit of substantial support from the international community. From what I understand, the majority of Afghans do not want a return of Taliban rule and prefer an environment where they are able to send their daughters to school, watch movies, listen to music, fly kites, etc. The Afghan government receives money, training, weapons, logistic support, information on Taliban locations and active combat support. Why are they not able to achieve the success of the Taliban?
Mr. Koring: Good question. And I don't know the answer. Every time I go to Afghanistan I try and get some idea of the progress of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Every time, senior Canadian officers and Afghan commanders assure me (and try and provide examples) of the improvement in the Afghan army and how much, more capable they are. But, frankly, the grim reality on the ground suggests the opposite, that the ANA, even backed by NATO and U.S. forces now operates comfortably in less territory than a year ago. My guess (and that's all it is) is that the army, despite training and effort and weapons, is a long way from winning the "hearts-and-minds" battle. It may be that many, maybe most, Afghans now expect the Karzai government to fall once the Western troops propping it up go away.
F.T. Ward, from Canada: I am concerned that the failed Western policy of providing local security forces low pay, poor equipment and truncated training is continuing. For example, police training courses in Afghanistan are usually four weeks long compared to the six months to one year we would expect for a well-educated and literate Canadian police recruit, who is not expected to fight insurgents on graduation. Have you seen any evidence that NATO is moving toward quality and not just quantity?
Mr. Koring: I think there is greater effort and focus on training but little evidence yet that it is actually having much impact. The police are used (at least in Kandahar) as a sort of second-tier military, manning checkpoints or being left in outposts. Their equipment, training and morale all remain sub-standard. Even with a near-doubling of their pay rates, a policeman can make in two or three days picking opium during harvest season what he might make in a month otherwise. It's no surprise that many of them disappear at harvest time. Corruption remains rife. There are "good cops" but it will take a long, very long, time to build a credible, honest, well-trained police force that can earn and keep the respect of the population in a country where no such force has ever existed and where most recruits are illiterate or with only minimal education. If creating real and respected Afghan institutions, including courts, police and army is the aim, then the time frame is decades.