The War in Ukraine

[SeaKingTacco]

The KGB hasn’t been called that since 1991, IIRC.

 

[Rudburg]

The KGB hasn’t been called that since 1991, IIRC.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

View attachment 85474

I didn’t say they didn’t exist. The content creator should be using the current nomenclature.

 

[GK .Dundas]

While very heavily armed, these are not deep sea fighting vessels. They are designed to perform the task they are currently performing with little to no damage control capability if they take a hit from a drone. They can fall back under the cover of land based defences to reload, refuel and rest.

They are not launching and recovering huge ASW helicopters, providing continuous air defence, surface strike, ASW, surveillance and other missions 10,000 kms from home port with only an occasional fill up from a tanker and a weekend port call every 3 weeks.

It is true though that the western navies are not put enough emphasis on magazine and silo capacity, and the idea that every strike will be a pin point strike - in an age of massive drone swarms and volley fired missiles, is a bit of a problem.

The Russians are using these missile corvettes more as a nuisance and terror weapon. No battles have been won or lost because of them, no objectives taken BUT sea lanes and maritime traffic have been denied.

I get that Corvettes are coastal patrol vessels. And while I wouldn't mind seeing them added to the Navy's Order of Battle. I suspect that the powers that be would use them as a excuse not purchase Frigates and Destroyers.

 

[TacticalTea]

A series of editorials discussing the political infighting within the Russian power structure from an insider now in exile.

BLUF the KGB is consolidating power and is in the process of decapitating the Army (the only real threat to Putin). This should be to Ukraines advantage given how vertical the power structure in the army is.

If true, I see two or three long-term outcomes:

A united KGB exercises total control of the State, with or without Putin.
Or, KGB replicates the status quo ante within itself, with internal divisions now spying on and scheming against each other.

 

[Rudburg]

I didn’t say they didn’t exist. The content creator should be using the current nomenclature.

I was joking; I don't think Konstantin Samoilov is. I haven't watched all of the videos, but when he is referring to "the KGB," I don't think he necessarily means the KGB/FSB as an organization. Rather, I think he is translating siloviki into English for his audience. This is a term that refers to the security officials within Putin's inner circle, many of whom are ex-KGB men.

 

[Rudburg]

A series of editorials discussing the political infighting within the Russian power structure from an insider now in exile.

BLUF the KGB is consolidating power and is in the process of decapitating the Army (the only real threat to Putin). This should be to Ukraines advantage given how vertical the power structure in the army is.

I would be careful trying to read too much into Russian officers being arrested for corruption. First, there is a good chance that those allegations are true. But it's also true that the government has demonstrated a willingness to tolerate (or indeed, to benefit from) open corruption.

The Russian General Staff has been pruned before by Putin. In 2008 lots of senior officers were let go connected to the New Look reforms, and those sackings weren't entirely random. The General Staff's senior leadership was opposed to the reforms for a variety of reasons. Plenty of these officers were sent into early retirement, while those that stuck to the party line got rapid promotions.

 

[Skysix]

I would be careful trying to read too much into Russian officers being arrested for corruption. First, there is a good chance that those allegations are true. But it's also true that the government has demonstrated a willingness to tolerate (or indeed, to benefit from) open corruption.

The Russian General Staff has been pruned before by Putin. In 2008 lots of senior officers were let go connected to the New Look reforms, and those sackings weren't entirely random. The General Staff's senior leadership was opposed to the reforms for a variety of reasons. Plenty of these officers were sent into early retirement, while those that stuck to the party line got rapid promotions.

But isn't the underlying aim the same? To remove potential threats to the power structure/Putin?

 

[Skysix]

I was joking; I don't think Konstantin Samoilov is. I haven't watched all of the videos, but when he is referring to "the KGB," I don't think he necessarily means the KGB/FSB as an organization. Rather, I think he is translating siloviki into English for his audience. This is a term that refers to the security officials within Putin's inner circle, many of whom are ex-KGB men.

"KG used to B" (old movie quote from '94)

 

[Rudburg]

But isn't the underlying aim the same? To remove potential threats to the power structure/Putin?

It's certainly one of the most likely solutions.

With the Russians it's always hard to know what is going on behind closed doors.

 

[KevinB]

There has been some FSB restructuring as well, I don’t think the videos are actually that insightful as he misses some rather important points.

 

[ueo]

There has been some FSB restructuring as well, I don’t think the videos are actually that insightful as he misses some rather important points.

Which are?

 

[GR66]

Some interesting notes regarding EW effects on precision weapons from ISW's daily reporting on the Ukraine war:

Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race. The Washington Post and the New York Times (NYT) reported on May 24 and 25, respectively, that senior Ukrainian military official sources and confidential Ukrainian military assessments described how Russian EW has previously decreased the effectiveness of Western weapons in Ukraine.[25] The NYT reported that the success rate of M982 Excalibur guided artillery shells fell from 55 percent to seven percent between January and August 2023 and that Ukrainian forces stopped using the shells.[26] Ukrainian forces also reportedly experienced issues with Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided munitions in early 2023.[27] US JDAM-ER manufacturers reportedly delivered more EW-resistant systems to Ukraine in May 2023, but Russian forces adapted their countermeasures, causing the JDAM-ER's success rate to drop to its lowest point in July 2023. The Washington Post noted, however, that the JDAM-ER's success rate was more than 60 percent for much of 2023. The Washington Post reported that the effectiveness of Ukraine's M30/M31 rockets for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) also decreased but that the Ukrainian military assessment that the Washington Post reviewed did not discuss these issues. The NYT stated that Russian forces often deploy EW systems near headquarters and command centers, and Thomas Withington of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told NYT that Ukrainian forces have focused on striking fixed Russian radars and other EW equipment, especially in occupied Crimea, in order to then strike Russian command posts and supply depots.[28] The Washington Post noted that the United States has the means to combat Russian EW jamming, stating that the US military would likely not experience the same issues with Russian EW since the United States has a more advanced air force and "robust" EW countermeasures.[29] Ukrainian forces have notably recently conducted successful ATACMS missile strikes on Russian targets in occupied Ukraine, including Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been able to at least partially overcome Russian jamming and/or that Russian EW capabilities are not pervasive throughout all of occupied Ukraine.[30] Both the NYT and the Washington Post noted that Russia and Ukraine are engaged in an offense-defense race as both sides aim to adapt to the other's innovations – as ISW has frequently assessed.[31]

 

[KevinB]

Which are?

Before anyone suggest the Army has been minimized, Shoigu was moved from MoD to Secretary of the Security Council. Not an unimportant job (one Putin had for a few months years ago as well) and Shoigu replaced a long term FSB crony of Putin, Nikolai Patrushev, (who also used to be the FSB Chief) who was moved to ‘aide to President’, which is not a promotion from the previous position. His move is probably the most significant thing that came out of the entire shuffle last week. He is a hard liners hard liner - and when he falls out of a building or has some bad tea, it’s a lot easier to have an aide disappear than the Sec of the Sec Council.

Beyond those changes I have not seen anything that isn’t FOUO or beyond, but to say the Army is getting minimized in Russia isn’t the correct take away at this point. More that a light it being shone into a lot of areas of Russian politics and their are doing some housecleaning more than usual. Things that have happened in the past wrt corruption aren’t getting the same passes as before and certain points of view are being taken differently.

 

[Rudburg]

Beyond those changes I have not seen anything that isn’t FOUO or beyond, but to say the Army is getting minimized in Russia isn’t the correct take away at this point. More that a light it being shone into a lot of areas of Russian politics and their are doing some housecleaning more than usual. Things that have happened in the past wrt corruption aren’t getting the same passes as before and certain points of view are being taken differently.

Perun's video today did a good job of describing corruption charges in the Russian Army by equating them to a personnel management tool. Want to get rid of a guy who is popular with other generals, or with the troops? Charge him with corruption, because it is almost certainly true.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

The KGB hasn’t been called that since 1991, IIRC.

Except in Belurus, still called KGB.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Mark Galeottie has a series of podcasts dedicated to Russia, including corruption. They can be found here, but are also available on Apple podcasts, Spotify, etc.

 

[Good2Golf]

Looks like Russia just lost its main OTHR (over the horizon radar) covering the South axis down through Asia into the Middle East….that’s >1,600km deep into Russian territory from Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1795028227087274008

 

[brihard]

Looks like Russia just lost its main OTHR (over the horizon radar) covering the South axis down through Asia into the Middle East….that’s >1,600km deep into Russian territory from Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1795028227087274008

Wow, if they actually landed the punch, that’s a hell of a hit. I know the took out the other one covering Crimea.

Taking out Russia’s strategic missile warning is quite a message and display of capability.

 

[Good2Golf]

Wow, if they actually landed the punch, that’s a hell of a hit. I know the took out the other one covering Crimea.

Taking out Russia’s strategic missile warning is quite a message and display of capability.

Indeed!

Losing long-range eyes to Iran, Syria, Israel, Pakistan and China is….not insignificant.