The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

[Edward Campbell]

I wouldn't underestimate the importance of symbolic and political military deployments.  The whole concept of NATO's collective defence is the understanding by Russia that an attack on ONE member is an attack on all.  Having even an handful of Canadian fighters (or ships, or troops) in the line of fire and potentially suffering casualties along with the targeted ally lets the Russians know that the consequences of an attack are potentially far greater than the local effects.

As for the article you posted, the commentary about the Russian policy document reads much more into it than what is actually stated.  The commentary talks about exercises where missiles were targeted in various places around the globe (including the continental United States) but nowhere in the posted document does it talk about nuclear attacks against the US as a "de-escalation" policy.  It simply states that Russia reserves the right to use all weapons...up to and including nuclear weapons...in response to a conventional attack "in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation". 

I don't see Russia initiating a nuclear war with NATO over limited political objectives like Ukraine or the Baltic States.  They may have political and economic objectives in those areas but I seriously doubt they would INITIATE nuclear war and all that it risks to their very existence over those objectives. 

The stated policy sounds much more defensive in nature to me, so unless you foresee NATO launching an offensive against Russia I don't expect to see Russian nuclear cruise missiles heading over the pole.

Slightly  ff topic:  but you're quite right.

Putin, who is not, in my estimation, the sharpest knife in the drawer, has learned from history: the American led West hammered the old USSR into submission because, in part, we always reserved the right to use maximum (nuclear) force, first, whenever we felt our vital interests were threatened. We were, thus, able to shift resources, (massively) in the 1950s, away from conventional military forces and devote the savings to civilian industries that made us rich and happy while the USSR, which had made an ill conceived "no first use" promise, languished in "second world" status (despite some great arts and science achievements): poor, dejected and always on the outside, looking in.

Only stupid people want wars.

Smart people, like Sun Tzu and Eisenhower, want to win without fighting, but they are, always, prepared to fight if they have to ... that's something Justin Trudeau doesn't quite grasp ~ one of many, many things.

Putin is not, in my opinion, all that smart or, in any meaningful way, a really good leader ~ he's crafty and, as I have said elsewhere, an "opportunistic adventurer" or "adventurous opportunist" as e.g. Crimea showed ... but, so was Hitler (sorry, but the comparison does need to be made because Hitler had one run of good luck despite having dreadful strategic judgment).

The one big thing Putin has going for him, I think, is that Donald Trump appears to be a bloody fool ... which is bad enough, but Xi Jinping is neither foolish nor adventurous and he is, I believe, waiting, patiently, to pick up the pieces.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So if all these aircraft are Networking, are they not producing great blobs of EM signature? Are we assuming that a peer enemy can't track that activity and can't jam it?

 

[Good2Golf]

Spread-spectrum links are generally -50dBm+ below background noise, so very low probability of intercept...

Regards
G2G

 

[Underway]

This looks like a good place for this article...

China's Quantum Radar

This is where I think the message is getting lost.  They spent so much time talking about how the F-35 is stealthy and almost no time talking about how it's the ultimate in networked/electronic warfare. If the F-35 loses stealth it's still a spectacular plane.  The Red Flag exercises show how it can change a battlespace with its data sharing tools, more so than it's stealth capability.  Can a new F-18 do that?

 

[Kirkhill]

Given all the talk these days about US political appointments I started to wonder about this one:  Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.  That office has had quite a bit to say about the F35, often in opposition to positions claimed by the Department of Defence.

Apparently the DOTE is also a political appointment - not a bureaucratic one.  Is it unreasonable to suggest that the analyses generated and the conclusions reached may be politically flavoured?  If the administration were looking for opportunities to stall on making a big decision might this not be a vector for providing evidence in support of that position?

10 U.S. Code § 139 - Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
US Code
Notes
Authorities (CFR)

(a)
(1) There is a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office of Director. The Director may be removed from office by the President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/139

I note that the outgoing Director issued a missive on 17 January (Inauguration -2) and that he had been in place since Sept 23 2009. 
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/policies/2017/20170117_Clarification_on_Guidance_on_the_Validation_of_ModSim_used_in_OT_and_LF_Assess(15520).pdf
https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/602704/j-michael-gilmore



His acting replacement was appointed on 20 January

Mr. David W. Duma
Acting Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Duma is the Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation as of January 20, 2017. Mr. Duma was appointed as the Principal Deputy Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in January 2002. In this capacity he is responsible for all functional areas assigned to the office. He participates in the formulation, development, advocacy, and oversight of policies of the Secretary of Defense and in the development and implementation of test and test resource programs. He oversees the planning, conduct, analysis, evaluation, and reporting of operational and live fire testing. He serves as the Appropriation Director and Comptroller for the Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense Appropriation and coordinates all Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution matters. He previously served as Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation from February 2005 to July 2007 and again from May 2009 to September 2009.

http://www.dote.osd.mil/

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Was just reading how inter service politics intervened between the US Army and the USN in regards to the Flying Fortress vs the B10. So would not be surprised that they will stab each other in the back over the F-35.

 

[Kirkhill]

Was just reading how inter service politics intervened between the US Army and the USN in regards to the Flying Fortress vs the B10. So would not be surprised that they will stab each other in the back over the F-35.

Americans love to compete. More Americans strongly agreed than any other surveyed country’s residents that they like situations where they compete.1 Praised in various contexts,2 competition is the backbone of US economic policy. The US Supreme Court observed, ‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.’3 The belief in competition is not only embodied in the antitrust laws. Every US executive agency, for example, is legally required to have an advocate for competition.4

https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/1/1/162/274807/Is-competition-always-good

Kinda also relates to what you were saying about democracy - and what happens when the centre becomes too stable.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Gr66, E.R. Campbell:

US certainly takes Russian cruise missile threat (however armed) as very real--so must we in NORAD, main RCAF fighter job.  And RCN might pay attention too

US Worrying Seriously About Russian Cruise Missiles
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/06/19/mark-collins-us-worrying-seriously-about-russian-cruise-missiles/

NORAD Note: Russian Bomber (with cruise missiles) Strikes in Syria
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/11/20/mark-collins-norad-note-russian-bomber-with-cruise-missiles-strikes-in-syria/

NORAD to Face Escorted Cruise Missile-Carrying Russian Bombers?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/04/11/mark-collins-norad-to-face-escorted-cruise-missile-carrying-russian-bombers/

USN “Admiral Warns: Russian Subs Waging Cold War-Style ‘Battle of the Atlantic’”–and RCN? [note Kilo subs and cruise missiles]
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/06/03/mark-collins-usn-admiral-warns-russian-subs-waging-cold-war-style-battle-of-the-atlantic-and-rcn/

And note this regarding US Army:

JLENS: Co-ordinating Cruise Missile Defense – And More

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/jlens-coordinating-cruise-missile-defense-and-more-02921/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

According to the Swedes the Russians have 27 TU-95 MS6 and 30 TU-95 MS16 Bears dating from 1984 as well as 13 TU-160 Blackjacks from 1987 for a total of 70 Bombers to deliver those missiles.  Of those Bombers the number of runners is up for debate

Table 2.4  p.41


On the other hand

Russia possesses a growing number of offensive non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sutyagin (2016)
estimates that in mid-2016 there were 156–200 operationally assigned warheads for ship-launched
cruise missiles, an increase of 50 per cent since 2012. The number of operationally assigned
warheads for the Tochka-U and Iskander-M short-range surface-to-surface missile systems has almost
doubled to 248–372 warheads according to Sutyagin (2016), who also holds it possible that warheads
still are operationally assigned to heavy artillery units. Kristensen and Norris (2016: 132) do not
mention artillery but ascribe merely some 140 warheads to the Tochka-U and the Iskander-M missiles.
Finally, according to Sutyagin (2016), the Air Force operates several kinds of aircraft and a total
of 264 operationally assigned warheads and another 36 for naval fighter-bombers. This also differs
significantly from Kristensen and Norris’ (2016: 131) estimate of approximately 570 warheads. Even 
with the lower estimates, the number  of operational warheads is significant. The marked increase
in offensive non- strategic nuclear weapons noted by Sutyagin is mainly due to the deployment of
Kalibr and Iskander-M LACMs.
Regarding  the  distribution  of  warheads  between Russia’s

Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016 via
https://www.foi.se/en/pressroom/news/news-archive/2016-12-08-russian-military-capability-is-strengthened-and-increasing.html
The pdf download is free

I recommend reading it.  212 pages of statistical goodness and analyses of what the Swedes think the Russians can do with what they have available.

 

[Loachman]

http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/hawn-choosing-super-hornet-over-f-35-will-just-keep-canada-grounded

Hawn: Choosing Super Hornet over F-35 will just keep Canada grounded

Laurie Hawn

Published on: February 28, 2017 | Last Updated: February 28, 2017 12:11 PM EST
​
"Per Ardua Ad Dis-Astra." This altered RCAF motto sums up what the federal the government’s convoluted process to buy 18 "interim" Super Hornets to fill a "capability gap" really means. It will kill Canada’s fighter force.

Everything can be traced to the prime minister’s election campaign promise to never buy the F-35 fighter jet, allegedly because it is too expensive and doesn’t work.

His conclusions are being proven wrong, but he seems determined to proceed without a timely competition, thanks to a politically created "capability gap." That gap was based on aircraft numbers that have never been demanded simultaneously; by fudging actual CF-18 operational serviceability history; and by the false narrative that the CF-18 cannot keep operating until we start getting new aircraft.

Any imagined gap, however, could be filled by 27 available Kuwaiti F-18C/D aircraft for $330 million US. Or, we could upgrade our entire fleet of 76 CF-18s to close to Super Hornet systems status for about 20 per cent of what we’ll pay for 18 Super Hornets. Neither option was explored.

We don't have technicians and support capacity for today. Eighteen Super Hornets will cost about $7 billion Cdn and add 350 non-existent personnel and Super Hornet-specific infrastructure. We are already losing pilots to voluntary release at rates we can't re-generate, and we certainly don’t have extras for the Super Hornet.

Many real experts were never consulted, and 240 were forced to sign lifetime non-disclosure agreements, which hides the truth. The Auditor General, the Ethics Commissioner and the Parliamentary Budget Officer should take an interest.

Competitions don't take five years, and to satisfy everyone, we need to start one immediately. Denmark did one quickly, and Canada already has a (now suppressed) options analysis that points to the F-35. As in the past, the F-35 will win any competition not rigged against it.

The Super Hornet is a fine aircraft for its roles and time, but we need a fighter for projected threats into the 2050s. The Super Hornet also has a thorny safety issue in its oxygen system, which has resulted in 297 incidents and permanent grounding for some aircrews.

One argument that doesn’t stand up is that the F-35 doesn't work. Its operational development continues and in every exercise where F-35 participates, its effectiveness is very evident. In our own primary aim of air sovereignty, the F-35's clean configuration will allow it to conduct higher-altitude intercepts that the Super Hornet cannot.

Another argument that doesn't stand up is cost. The latest cost for the F-35A is $8.5 billion US for 90 aircraft, or $94.6 million per aircraft. But as predicted, that cost will continue to decrease and in 2020, when we should start receiving our aircraft, it will be about $85 Million. The F-35 is cheaper than the Super Hornet.

The Super Hornet will not be interim. Even if the F-35 were to win a competition, we would suddenly realize that we can't afford two small fleets, due to duplication of everything. That will apply to the Super Hornet and CF-18, and assuredly to the Super Hornet and F-35. The Aussies are doing it, but we are not them, and we would be stuck buying more Super Hornets.

Canadian aerospace industries, jobs and the economy will also be losers on our current path. We will lose out on billions in contracts and be out of step with future technology. This will be an industry-killing Avro Arrow redux and/or a costly Sea King redux.

We cannot afford to continue on the current path for many reasons: Canadian sovereignty and security, taxpayers, technical, personnel, moral, commonality with allies and Canadian industry. I have received virtually unanimous support for my position, most importantly from members of the RCAF at all rank levels.

Lt.-Col. (Retired) Hon. Laurie Hawn, PC, CD is a former RCAF CF-18 Squadron Commander and member of Parliament.

 

[dapaterson]

Laurie Hawn was also part of the previous government that did not buy the F35 when they had multiple opportunities to do so.

 

[jmt18325]

The US Navy is going to be grounded. 

 

[OldSolduer]

Ack, missed that line, why does the media love service life cost so much? 7 billion over the 40 years we will use them doesnt sound so bad.......

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk

Simple answer it makes headlines and that's all we tend to read. The average taxpayer will go "they don't NEED those jet fighters when we can use that money to house refugees, etc"

The public support for the military is great as long as it doesn't cost anything.

 

[SupersonicMax]

The US Navy is going to be grounded.

The US Navy does not and will not operate the Super Hornet in isolation therefore you cannot place the same assumptions on them than with us.

 

[jmt18325]

The US Navy does not and will not operate the Super Hornet in isolation therefore you cannot place the same assumptions on them than with us.

Of course they won't.  That will, however, be their main type of aircraft for the next 20 years (by their own claim) and they will continue to operate in much more dangerous environments than we do (routinely).  They will do so with F-35s, yes - but also with F-18 and G-18 aircraft.  Australia will do the same.

On top of that, the idea that Canada's air force will be utterly useless with Super Hornets and hornets instead of just hornets (that's what Laurie Hawn and his gang left us with for ~ another decade) is a complete laugh.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Why buy something that is 20 years old for the same price as something brand new with new technology?

Would you buy a 1990 Ford Mustang when you can buy a 2018 Ferrari for the same price?

 

[dapaterson]

Why buy something that is 20 years old for the same price as something brand new with new technology?

Would you buy a 1990 Ford Mustang when you can buy a 2018 Ferrari for the same price?

1.  What's the lifecycle operating cost?

2.  More importantly, if your bank refuses to loan you money for the Ferrari, but will front the money for the Mustang, what will you do? Refuse to buy a car as a matter of principle?

 

[SupersonicMax]

If the price tag is the same, your bank would have a hard time justifying not lending you money on a car that will keep its value a lot better...  Unless of course it has a political agenda to follow.

Don't buy the SH and conduct a flyoff (send Test Pilots flying all contenders, assess them against specs (they ought to exists after how many years?) and qualitative evaluations).  Plan for 2 months, fly for 3 months, report for 2-3 months and make a decision within 5-6 months. Get your first true replacement aircraft on the line 3 years from now.  I am prety sure this is how we did it in the 70s, well before technology allowed us to plan and report quickly.  No reason we can't do this now.

 

[dapaterson]

Sigh.

This government and the previous government have clearly shown that they are gunshy about the F35.  And will not commit.  So, do you accept 18 x Super Hornet and a future fly off (dates and requirements TBD), or do you refuse 18 x SH and commit to Hope (which is not an option) and a future fly off?

Politics is the art of the possible.  It is indeed remarkable that the RCAF would fight so hard against getting new aircraft, with new avionics, when their preferred choice is so clearly outside the realm of the politically palatable at this time.

 

[SupersonicMax]

I would not buy the SH as an interim aircraft.  This would have been a great decision in 2005.  We're way past the interim replacement at this time.

There will be a procurement at some point.  Do it right. Once. And this goverment (and previous ones) had the opportunity to have a fair competition rather than sole-source. I am pretty sure what the outcome would be and that's a political hot potato that the current government cannot afford, hence putting the decision to buy a replacement down the line and putting the RCAF in a tough spot.

Where do we get the pilots?  The maintainers?  Where do we house this magical new squadron?