The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

[angus555]

Turkey condemns U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish force, labels it ‘army of terror’

If we're getting into the business of repainting aircraft insignia, there might soon be a batch of undelivered F-35's sitting around.

There was talk of blocking delivery of Turkish F-35's a few months ago, even before the Turks committed to buying the Russian S-400's. Never heard anything since. :waiting:

 

[MilEME09]

Turkey condemns U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish force, labels it ‘army of terror’

If we're getting into the business of repainting aircraft insignia, there might soon be a batch of undelivered F-35's sitting around.

There was talk of blocking delivery of Turkish F-35's a few months ago, even before the Turks committed to buying the Russian S-400's. Never heard anything since. :waiting:

Sounds like a situation similar to when the US offered us F-14's that were meant for Iran after the whole iran-contra affair.

 

[QV]

The last time there was a mass retirement of senior pers was during unification and it accomplished the same thing one would today. The reality is that there's always someone else waiting in the wings.

So stand for nothing then.

 

[Rifleman62]

And nothing changes.

 

[Ostrozac]

Sounds like a situation similar to when the US offered us F-14's that were meant for Iran after the whole iran-contra affair.

The Imperial Iranian Air Force took possession of their entire order of 80 F-14 Tomcats prior to the fall of the Shah. You may be thinking of the Iranian order for the F-16 Falcon, which ended up being diverted to Israel, right about the same time that the F-16 lost the fighter replacement competition to the F/A-18 Hornet. But that was long before Iran-Contra.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

It's actually a mix, so to speak, of both of your versions, Ostrazac and MilEME.

Canada started the replacement of its fighter jets competition towards the end of 1977, by 1978, it had short listed the F-16 and the F-18. The F-14's, though they would have been preferred, were excluded from the final short list  because they were too expansive. But the final competition was still to come, in 1979-80.

By that time, the Shah's regime had just recently taken possession of its 80 brand new F-14. Comes the revolution, end of 78- beginning of 79. As a result, the Americans pronounced an immediate and irrevocable embargo on all military equipment to Iran, including spare parts, software update, etc. for the F-14. So Canada, who still had diplomatic relations at that time, tried to negotiate with the Iran revolutionary government for the purchase of the 80 new F-14, but the negotiations did not lead to anything before the Embassy role in the escape of American diplomats became news and Canada had to close its own embassy there.

In any events, that is how close we came to flying F-14's.  ;D

 

[Ostrozac]

It's actually a mix, so to speak, of both of your versions, Ostrazac and MilEME.

Fascinating stuff! Thanks for that.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

So stand for nothing then.

Or affect change from within. It doesnt have to be all or nothing. The belief that retirement will change any government's mind on anything is childish.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

It's actually a mix, so to speak, of both of your versions, Ostrazac and MilEME.

Canada started the replacement of its fighter jets competition towards the end of 1977, by 1978, it had short listed the F-16 and the F-18. The F-14's, though they would have been preferred, were excluded from the final short list  because they were too expansive. But the final competition was still to come, in 1979-80.

By that time, the Shah's regime had just recently taken possession of its 80 brand new F-14. Comes the revolution, end of 78- beginning of 79. As a result, the Americans pronounced an immediate and irrevocable embargo on all military equipment to Iran, including spare parts, software update, etc. for the F-14. So Canada, who still had diplomatic relations at that time, tried to negotiate with the Iran revolutionary government for the purchase of the 80 new F-14, but the negotiations did not lead to anything before the Embassy role in the escape of American diplomats became news and Canada had to close its own embassy there.

In any events, that is how close we came to flying F-14's.  ;D

Actually I thought the deal-killer was when PM Joe Clark (remember him??) stated Canada would move its embassy to Jerusalem.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Full paper is excellent:

New MLI Paper: Amateur Hour: The Interim Super Hornet Saga and the Perils of Prioritizing Politics over Defence

On Dec. 12, 2017 the Liberal government announced the end of the Super Hornet interim purchase, instead acquiring 18 used Australian F/A-18As. It is imperative that we take stock and understand how and why the interim Super Hornet buy was allowed to proceed in the first place, MLI Senior Fellow Richard Shimooka stated today.

MLI's latest study, Amateur Hour: The Interim Super Hornet Saga and the Perils of Prioritizing Politics Over Defence,
https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/MLICommentary_Shimooka_Jan2018_webreadyF.pdf

reveals the hidden history behind the interim Super Hornet purchase. The findings are notable. The process was steeped in politics from the very beginning.

"The government ignored expert views in National Defence, and opted to invent an urgent capability gap in order to rationalize an ill-conceived solution," said Shimooka. "And even that solution, interim Super Hornets, would have done little to achieve its goals – costing billions in the process."

It also ignores the dangers of operating such an aircraft in high-threat environments, such as near Russia's advanced air defence systems in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. As one pilot told Shimooka "“in a shooting war, we’d be dead within seconds of wheels up."

The standard narrative is that the government decided against the interim Super Hornet owing to the spat with Boeing over Bombardier. But that is only part of the story. What was likely equally important were further revelations about the cost of the Super Hornets from the US. Its contents must have come as a shock to the political leadership, which was convinced the cost of the Super Hornet was far lower than the F-35 [emphasis added].

"This could have been one of the most disastrous defence procurements in Canadian history,"By its own numbers, the Liberal government would have committed $5.7 billion dollars to alleviate the ‘capability gap’ for a single year, and that is only in the very best case scenario, since the personnel crisis made even such an outcome impossible.”

The growing shortage in RCAF personnel to fly these planes would make operating two fleets largely impossible [emphasis added--lots more on this in paper itself]. Even with the demise of the interim Super Hornet purchase, the end result is troubling - no new permanent replacement until 2025, "a full 15 years after the original decision to procure the F-35 was made."
https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/new-mli-paper-amateur-hour-interim-super-hornet-saga-perils-prioritizing-politics-defence/

Flipping fighter farce.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Meanwhile, note deadline:

Boeing still evaluating whether to bid for Canadian fighter contract

Boeing has yet to decide whether to compete for a contract worth $12-14.5 billion to replace Canada’s tactical fighter fleet. The airframer once had the deal in its pocket before Ottawa terminated plans to buy the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet after Boeing filed a trade complaint against Bombardier last May.

In a possible sign that the company could forego submitting a bid, Boeing chose to skip a one-day information session for potential bidders on 22 January that was hosted by Canadian agency managing the Future Fighter Capability acquisition programme.

Boeing confirmed the absence and says it remains convinced that the Super Hornet is the best option for the Royal Canadian Air Force, although the airframer has not decided whether to offer the aircraft yet.

“We continue to believe that the Super Hornet is the low-risk, low-cost approach that has all the advanced capabilities the Royal Canadian Air Force needs now and well into the future,” Boeing says.

“We will evaluate our participation in Canada’s Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) after the Government of Canada outlines the FFCP procurement approach, requirements and evaluation criteria,” Boeing adds.

US government officials attended the information session hosted by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), the Canadian government’s acquisition arm, Boeing says.

Boeing may face a deadline in two weeks to make a decision. Attendance at the information session was not mandatory, but PSPC has requested that all potential bidders respond by 9 February to an invitation to join a Suppliers List. Only companies that respond to the invitation will be informed and allowed to participate in all future steps of the FFCP acquisition process [emphasis added], the PSPC says.

The indecision by Boeing reflects a staggering turn-around in the company’s fortunes in Ottawa since last year...
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-still-evaluating-whether-to-bid-for-canadian-445135/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Quirky]

How has his whole fighter procurement gong show affected pilot training and recruiting? I can’t imagine too many coming out of flight school in Moose Jaw wanting to pick fast jets after all this. Flying ancient fighters against modern Russian defences isn’t exactly confidence inspiring.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Quirky--see pp. 8, 9 of full MLI report linked to above.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Something to look forward to--CP story:

Auditor general to issue new fighter jet report in the fall

Six years after his explosive report on the F-35 derailed the Harper government’s plan to buy the controversial stealth aircraft, federal auditor general Michael Ferguson is diving back into the fighter-jet file.

Ferguson’s staff have been going over internal government records for several months, though the auditor general’s office won’t reveal exactly what aspects of the program are under the microscope [emphasis added].

The final report is scheduled for release in the fall.

Ferguson’s last report on fighter jets in April 2012 was a bombshell which found senior defence officials twisted rules, downplayed problems and withheld information about the Harper government’s plan to replace Canada’s CF-18s with F-35s.

The report forced the Harper government to suspend the project pending a complete review, which eventually pegged the full cost of buying and operating the F-35s at more than $45 billion.

Six years later, Canada still has not chosen a new fighter jet to replace the aging CF-18s.

The Trudeau government announced a plan last November to buy used fighter jets from Australia, while pushing back the expected delivery of new planes until at least 2025.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Whatever one thinks of this piece, it's a pity almost no similar analysis of defence requirements ever appears in Canada (further links at original):

Contested Skies: Australia’s Uncertain Air Superiority Future

By Dr Peter Layton

In war, there’s a constant to and fro. At times defence dominates, at other times offence. Technologies arise and fall. Disruption rules. This is noticeably so in today’s arcane world of air superiority. While much investment has gone into the ADF’s air superiority capabilities—with more coming with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—the operational environment is not standing still.

The skies are increasingly contested. Emerging threats are making Australia’s tanker, and AEW&C (airborne early warning and control) aircraft more vulnerable and advanced surface-to-air missiles, stealth-fighter technology, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and even hobbyist drones are proliferating. The US Air Force (USAF) recently studied what all this means in practice and determined that its ‘projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against [the expected] array of potential adversary capabilities’. If the USAF’s force structure is becoming stretched so, surely, is ours.

Some warn that the 2030 date may mislead, asserting that ‘Integrated Air Defence Systems covering areas in the Western Pacific … may now be able to deny access to all but the stealthiest of aircraft’. The ‘stealthiest of aircraft’ refers to the flying wing B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and forthcoming B-21 Raiders. It seems that F-35s with their vertical tails have some vulnerabilities to emerging multiband digital radars. A RAND study echoes these concerns about current and growing air-superiority shortcomings.

Even so, 2030 isn’t far away in defence terms. It is only seven years after Australia’s F-35 fleet will have—hopefully—reached final (or full) operational status. That is not long in the planned 25- to 30-year life of the aircraft.

Australia has committed to its major air superiority investments, which makes them a good starting point to discuss the strategic impacts of known and emerging changes in the air superiority operational environment. In my new paper published by ASPI titled Contested Skies, I use current air superiority force structure plans to develop three practical strategic options to address these changes.

Two of these options require modifying the current plans. That may worry some, but strategic ‘ends’ can’t be determined independently of the capability ‘means’. The two are interdependent. When the means are fixed, it makes sense to discuss alternative ‘ways’ that might reasonably bring strategic ends into alignment.

The three options are...

Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. He has extensive defence experience including teaching grand strategy at the Eisenhower College, US National Defence University. He has a doctorate from the University of New South Wales on the subject of grand strategy and undertook a Fellowship at the European University Institute. His research interests include grand strategy, national security policies particularly relating to middle powers, defence force structure concepts, and armed non-state actors.
https://balloonstodrones.com/2018/02/06/contested-skies-australias-uncertain-air-superiority-future/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[AlexanderM]

From the same article:

The USAF study mentioned earlier foresees the F-35 losing its strike role at the end of the next decade and then becoming an air defence fighter—taking the ‘strike’ out of ‘Joint Strike Fighter’.

 

[Kirkhill]

Something to look forward to--CP story:

Mark
Ottawa

I hope the Auditor-General does a 40 year life cycle review on the cost of maintaining an Air Combat Capability employing the same assets that we have today.

Then tell me that the F35 is too pricey.

 

[jollyjacktar]

It seems like the plan to purchase used F-18s from down under is being pushed to the right.  Not surprising.

http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/politics/aussie-fighter-jets-1.4530875

 

[PuckChaser]

First full replacements are supposed to be delivered 2025. That means we'll get less than 4 years of service out of the "interim" jets after they undergo huge overhauls that'll probably take at least a year and a few hundred million bucks.

:facepalm:

 

[kev994]

Hey, this has never been about logic, it's about getting through the next election.

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