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The Kingpost is Dead! Long Live the Vertrep!

It would appear so.

Forensically (it would seem necessary, now), I’d be interested to see what the engagement with CAL and FRE was.
You don't engage the ships directly. You engage the LCMM (equipment manager/expert for those who don't know the acronym) and other stakeholders from the coasts, look at the operational records and make a decision using a business case. Money, time, and operational impact are all weighed using data, not someone's personal experiences or "feelings". There is a risk analysis done on losing the capability as well. Are there other ways to do the same thing or some of the same thing?

It is also weighed against "how fast can we re-implement the capability should we need it again".

The real question is, are they still training heavy jackstays/kingposts to the Bos'n. I suspect that they will be because JSS will have that capability and other navies may want to use it. AOPS retains their kingpost (though it's deployed manually, not sure if it can do a heavy jackstay or not). The new drill hall in STADACONA is set up as a RAS trainer and will have a send and receive side to it, so both ends of the skill will be at least retained by the trade.

This means this is an equipment issue on one platform type, not a "lost skill" issue.

For me, given all that, easy decision. Cut the equipment, save money, invest in corrosion protection instead, and if we really need a kingpost again then quickly fix up and reinstall on the next ship during a pre-deployment Short Work Period.
 
We went through something similar years ago when money was tight and capabilities were cut down on the 280s so that we could keep the platforms operating. This is the same idea, and we're already doing it ad hoc on different systems anyway by just never reactivating it. This just made it official because the DWPs are now in the 18 mo+ plus and many tens of millions of dollars range, to get ships back that still need a massive amount of work to just meet SOLAS levels.

You want king posts? Tie up ships. You want all platforms? Cut currently supported capabilities. I don't think this is the last one to go either.

Fortunately our crewing levels will probably push ships off line soon anyway and hopefully restore some sanity to the fleet tempo and let us bring our safety baseline back into a non-rectal puckering zone, but our ice cube already has a baby-butt smooth shave, so something had to give. I'd also say brace for shock and prepare for further hits (don't forget to lift your heels off the deck and bend your knees, makes a massive difference)
 
You don't engage the ships directly. You engage the LCMM (equipment manager/expert for those who don't know the acronym) and other stakeholders from the coasts, look at the operational records and make a decision using a business case. Money, time, and operational impact are all weighed using data, not someone's personal experiences or "feelings". There is a risk analysis done on losing the capability as well. Are there other ways to do the same thing or some of the same thing?
Wasn’t expecting direct to ship comms, however, I would have expected to see some kind of process to get the latest operational feedback. Kind of rings hollow when Naval staff says “no one uses it anymore, so not worth keeping an ‘un-used’ system.”
 
Wasn’t expecting direct to ship comms, however, I would have expected to see some kind of process to get the latest operational feedback. Kind of rings hollow when Naval staff says “no one uses it anymore, so not worth keeping an ‘un-used’ system.”
Every single fueling is reported and tracked, which includes which RAS station. Pretty easy to poll the data and figure out how many times it gets used, and when multiple ships can deploy without it operational over a period of a decade or more, it's hard to argue that you should fix that when the work being cut is choosing between what safety items you'll fix. The 3rd line repairs for these can be in the $100s of thousands to low millions, and then usually can take hundreds of hours of work to get the certification done. It's also one of those ones that can only be done off a specific location in the dockyards and shuts down the jetty and any other work, so you generally have to do it on weekends (which the MSED/bosn's love).

The engineering community looked at the demand/costs and competing priorities, and presented the case to the operational side for options. No one wants to cut capabilties, but it's the least bad option. A working kingpost will do SFA on a ship that can't go to sea, and that's the point we're hitting trying to keep these ships running (even without considering the impact of only having skeleton crews, with a lot of really juniour people, and the failing Martech trade model).

Not trying to be a rain cloud here, but this didn't come out of nowhere. The material state of the CPFs has been getting worse over the last decade, so this is just the culmination of a number of sunny day fleet scheds coming home to roost, and even the operators can't pretend things are still rosy.
 
Well I suppose more than one functioning DG is more important… 👍🏼

Perhaps I misinterpreted a sailor describing what I thought was non-fuel recent provisioning with a Jack stay off the kingpost during a real op. My bad. Back to listening/learning stations.
 
None. FRE's was and is broken.

There is a good reason to have this b 2-point RAS. If a you ever found yourself in an actual combat area, being tied to a tanker would be an uncomfortable and unsound position to be in. You want to get in and get out as quickly a spossible. Being able to replenish both fuel and provisions at the same time is critical, otherwise you have to do them sequentially and end up tied up alongside the tnaker for much much longer.

And if you ever see the US Navy conduct a Strike Group Replenishment, it's a bloody operation. Ship's will form in to a Massive Screen and put a gigantic security bubble around the HVUs.
 
Every single fueling is reported and tracked, which includes which RAS station. Pretty easy to poll the data and figure out how many times it gets used, and when multiple ships can deploy without it operational over a period of a decade or more, it's hard to argue that you should fix that when the work being cut is choosing between what safety items you'll fix. The 3rd line repairs for these can be in the $100s of thousands to low millions, and then usually can take hundreds of hours of work to get the certification done. It's also one of those ones that can only be done off a specific location in the dockyards and shuts down the jetty and any other work, so you generally have to do it on weekends (which the MSED/bosn's love).

The engineering community looked at the demand/costs and competing priorities, and presented the case to the operational side for options. No one wants to cut capabilties, but it's the least bad option. A working kingpost will do SFA on a ship that can't go to sea, and that's the point we're hitting trying to keep these ships running (even without considering the impact of only having skeleton crews, with a lot of really juniour people, and the failing Martech trade model).

Not trying to be a rain cloud here, but this didn't come out of nowhere. The material state of the CPFs has been getting worse over the last decade, so this is just the culmination of a number of sunny day fleet scheds coming home to roost, and even the operators can't pretend things are still rosy.

I have no issue with this explanation, in fact, I think it makes a lot of sense and is pragmatic.

The issue I took is with those saying, it's not a valuable capability from an operational standpoint. It clearly is and I think the realities of COVID and supply chains should prove that beyond a reasonable doubt.

The problem with data and trends taken from the time periods you described is that they are taken from a peacetime and benign operating environment. I think if you went back to the early 2000s, where Ships were spending a couple of months without a Port visit, you would see a radically different data trend.

I do get it though, the Navy is at the point that we just need to try and hold on to what little we have and are going to need to make hard decisions.
 
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