Here's a copy of the letter I wrote to Graham's office back in April...(sorry it's so long) I did get a response.
April 25, 2006
The Hon. Bill Graham,
Leader of the Opposition
House of Commons,
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
Dear Sir:
It is with great dismay that I find myself writing this letter to you with respects to the recent Government’s decision to no longer lower the Canadian Flag as a sign of national mourning when a member of the Canadian Forces is killed while on duty. I am also dismayed that this Government has once again, banned the media as they have previously done with respect to Cabinet meetings. Now, the media can no longer attend or broadcast the ceremonies of grief and remembrance of our returning dead.
As a wife and mother of serving members, I know all too well the potential risks that my family (husband, daughter and son-in-law) take wearing the uniform of Canada and I am also well aware of the terms "acceptable losses" and "acceptable collateral damage". I dare say with our 21st century mechanisms of new gathering and coverage, that my fellow Canadians are also aware of these terms. For our present Government to attempt to shield us, the general public, from the awareness of our Forces body count is a little too late. The Government is making a choice to ignore the "noble sacrifice" that our mean and women have made in order for what? Is it so that the general Canadian public will not notice exactly what the acceptable losses are to this particular Government? I again, daresay to mention that if the current Government is following the standard doctrines of war, then the acceptable losses will be the number of ground forces necessary to complete the mission (excluding Air Force and Navy) before the force becomes ineffective. Is it perhaps that number that is what the current Government is afraid to lower the flag for?
I find the present Government’s attempt to "hide the bodies" into one act of grief and remembrance on November 11th in order to maintain and justify a false sense of public support for our participation in a hostile arena somewhat condescending and patronizing of their constituent’s intelligence and moral turpitude. I find the rationale of "We are returning to the way we used to do it for the last 80 years." simply not good enough as it is demonstrative of a Government falling to recognize the dynamic intellectual growth of our Nation. It also smacks of a Government that is afraid to admit that it does not have a well thought out process for dealing with change and in some cases, especially this case, be accused of resisting change.
While I can appreciate the dichotomy between policy objectives and casualties, it does not excuse the current Government from facing the dilemma of how to respond effectively to domestic concerns about losses in conflicts abroad, while still showing the tangible signs of commitment necessary to maintain a claim to coalition and world security. This is a contentious subject and will continue to give rise to debate and justification in the years to come. I do expect our Government to do more than fall back on a speech that includes, "That’s the way we’ve always done it". The apparent advent of an era of peace operations has posed vexing new problems for government leaders. Such missions do not allow for the use of overwhelming force to attain quick, decisive victories. For a people whose standard for judging the wisdom of military intervention is based upon the results of Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm, peacekeeping operations are viewed with considerable scepticism. To a significant degree, current debates in Ottawa over foreign involvement—in Afghanistan, for example--make central the question, "How many lives is it worth?"
This seems to be a continuation of a trend that reaches back to the start of the Cold War. This trend understandably influenced military strategists to respond accordingly that military commanders were constrained by political realities that precluded the possibilities of total war. The luxury of large, trained forces as seen in WWII were no longer available and doctrines were rewritten to minimise combat losses, or at least to ensure that those friendly casualties suffered could always be justified in terms of commensurately greater injury suffered by the enemy. And as political-military stalemate came to define both conflicts, such justification became more and more difficult. A heavy reliance on air power, precision firepower, and mobility, and increasingly stringent standards for acceptable friendly-to-enemy casualty ratios, came to distinguish the allied way of war and conflict.
In 1970, new army doctrine was developed that focused on "winning the battle of the next war". As Paul Herbert noted in his excellent study of the development of American military doctrine in the 1970s:
The rising costs associated with the volunteer Army [and] the drastically increased cost of fuel . . . combined to make the Army of the early 1970s cost conscious to a fault. . . . The Army's need to preserve its investment in new weapons in an era of strict fiscal controls thus prompted the search for an overarching concept, or doctrine, and insured that the doctrine would have a strong weapons emphasis. A doctrine that maximised the potential of every weapon on the battlefield also appeared to maximise the return on every dollar spent on those weapons.
In the mid-80s, doctrine was again adapted to include limiting a protracted war or battles of attrition. It was clearly a move to prevent involvement of a Vietnam experience and more towards the sledgehammer effect as seen in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf.
What we see now is the current Government attempting to come to terms with either reinventing a new political doctrine for the use of its military or scrambling to assert a more seasoned one of a sledgehammer effect for fear of ending up in a protracted conflict as we saw in Cyprus and Bosnia. And all the while attempting to remain precariously balanced on their fragile minority with the Canadian voting constituency.
So the Government’s first act in this dichotomy is not establish a new army doctrine nor redefine what will be acceptable losses but to stop the lowering of the Flag on the Peace Tower when there is a casualty and to stop the media from covering the return of the remains. I say with tongue-in-cheek, that is brilliant political manoeuvring that sends out a clear message to both the voting constituency and our military that our current government is in a state of inertia by simply rationalising that it’s the way it was done before. The government fails to recognise that Canada is a dynamic society and as such, requires of its Government the ability to be visionaries and look to the ever-changing global network that we are part of and contribute to in every aspect. But because we are part of that network it does not mean we have to follow suit with other countries.
Are we to always follow what the United States does with its flag with respect to their military casualties? Do we not pride ourselves as being different and unique from Americans? I find references to the way Americans do or do not lower their flag as a reasonable explanation as to why we should not do it to be the weakest of all the current Government’s arguments. I would urge the current Government to rethink this argument as it wears a distinct aroma of Bush on it.
I think our current Government would find the public’s relationship with its military very different from that of the United States and even if not all the public will agree to the continued presence in Afghanistan, it will agree to continue to support our men and women of the Canadian Forces. And as such, will want to mourn the loss of each one. All the Government has to do for proof of this act is to observe any given day at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
If the Government continues to assume that the public’s support is more important than supporting its military members then the words of the ancient Chinese strategist and commander Wu Zi who wrote the following will be of a greater concern for the commanders of our Forces:
In general, on the battlefield, if soldiers are committed to fight to the death they will live, whereas if they seek to stay alive, they will die. . . . Thus it can be said that the greatest harm that can befall the army's employment [stems from] hesitation, while the disasters that strike . . . are born in doubt.
I hope this correspondence will assist you in conveying to the current Government that their decision to not lower the Flag and censor the public’s view of returning casualties is erroneous and smacking of an inert Government mired in Americanism.
I remain yours truly,