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Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle - RG-31, LAV Coyote, and (partial) G-Wagon Replacement

Colin P said:
I seen capital money spent on all sorts of things, including salary. Replacing the B fleet is simply a matter of will, the M1078 FMTV 2.5 ton Cargo Truck should be used to replace the medium fleet. Milcots pickups should be purchased on a ongoing basis so no truck is more than 7-10 years old, this is standard practice in most commercial fleets. If you do this your service costs will be less in the long run. Plus it provides jobs for the local economy which makes the politicians happy. Service battalions should have a large wrecker and smaller one based on a pickup. All service battalions should be able to swap out major components in the field, including axles, motors, transmissions and do minor repairs. If Joe's logging can do it out in the bush, so can our Service Battalions.

Many years ago, I was chatting with a friend who happened to be an ex- Regular Force armoured officer. We were debating about the issue of acquiring new vehicles versus maintaining an existing fleet until it is too old to remain viable in any meaningful sense. He tried to tell me that it made more financial sense to endlessly repair the 5/4-ton pickup trucks the military had at the time, rather than buy new.

On an intuitive level, his argument seemed to make sense. What he seemed to neglect is the fact that while endlessly repairing something like a 5/4-ton truck presents a smaller financial hit at least initially, over the long haul it costs more. If you keep that truck 20 years (i.e. well past a reasonable service life given the pounding military vehicles have to take) and keep replacing parts, you will, in the final analysis, have spent almost as much money as it would cost to acquire something new and keep it for a more reasonable period of time, without gaining any greater utility or capability. A newer vehicle may have technological or other engineering enhancements that will make it more effective than retaining an obsolete vehicle for the sake of appearing to save money. In saying so, I am not advocating that the military replace its tanks every year. I personally would like to see a system where the military has reasonably up to date equipment rather than forever having to make do with stuff that is worn out and can only do half the job.

Mind you, I am fully aware that one of the reasons why our military often cannot replace kit when it should be replaced is because of our slow, cumbersome, and horribly messed-up military procurement system.

 
Is it a "horribly messed-up military procurement system" or is it a system imposed upon us by the government owing to overall government regulations?  I often hear how messed up our system is but I also hear how other departments have similar issues...they just are not the easy target DND is.
 
MCG said:
One of the things that has been getting attention (though not necessarily with TAPV) is reduced velocity medium caliber cannons.  Think of something between AGL (with lower muzzle velocities & higher trajectories) and more conventional IFV cannons (with very high velocities and designs focused on Sabot rounds for light armour on light armour battles).

Casings are shortened and propellant reduced.  In theory, you could still have Sabot ammunition but your chances of killing anything lightly armoured would be significantly reduced.  The advantages would be that more ammunition could be carried, platform rock would be reduced, and lighter vehicles could carry the weapon.  While KE projectiles become less useful, more CE projectiles would be used - HEDP-T, HEI-T,  and induction fuzed air-burst rounds.

It might not be perfect, but it may be an adequate compromise to keep some heavier firepower on a lighter vehicle.

As a thought exercise, I've been toying with the idea of whether a 75mm grenade launcher (as opposed to a standard 40mm AGL) would resolve the dilemma you have noted. The 40mm AGL is already seen as capable of laying down considerable suppressive fire and even providing some limited anti-armour capability. A bigger grenade might increase anti-armour capability without increasing weapon size, weight or ammunition space requirements tremendously.

I have trouble seeing how the ATK LW25 25mm chain gun, with its super-short barrel, will be able to provide the answer. As you point out, reduced propellant loads and short barrels usually mean compromised performance.
 
Schindler's Lift said:
Is it a "horribly messed-up military procurement system" or is it a system imposed upon us by the government owing to overall government regulations?  I often hear how messed up our system is but I also hear how other departments have similar issues...they just are not the easy target DND is.

Whether government regulations are at fault or not, it is a messed up system that doesn't operate the way it should. It still amazes me how we managed to get nearly-new Leopard 2 tanks in record time, and all that was needed to break the inevitable logjam in the procurement system was the issuance of an Urgent Operational Requirement. It was a fortuitous thing that the Dutch were getting out of the tank business at the time and they had some Leopard 2A4's sitting in storage that were barely used.

Maybe the simple answer is rather than engage in endless trialling of candidates, and endless contract definition exercises undertaken with the aim of Canadianizing military kit as much as possible or gaining industrial offsets, we should be setting down a list of basic requirements that kit must meet. Then we should be asking ourselves, "does this item meet Canadian Army doctrinal and operational standards, and can our soldiers use it in the field effectively, without having to extensively modify the item so it becomes suitable for use?" Too many times I've seen procurement projects delayed because of a need to Canadianize things.

There's a lot to be said for going the MOTS route if the item meets basic requirements right off the bat and only minimal modifications are required.
 
IMO it's a mixture of us having a poor idea of what we would like, muddled by politics and a horrible procurement process.
 
Eland2 said:
was the issuance of an Urgent Operational Requirement.

That's not what UOR stands for.  It's Unforecasted Operational Requirement.
 
Eland2 said:
Maybe the simple answer is rather than engage in endless trialling of candidates, and endless contract definition exercises undertaken with the aim of Canadianizing military kit as much as possible or gaining industrial offsets, we should be setting down a list of basic requirements that kit must meet. Then we should be asking ourselves, "does this item meet Canadian Army doctrinal and operational standards, and can our soldiers use it in the field effectively, without having to extensively modify the item so it becomes suitable for use?" Too many times I've seen procurement projects delayed because of a need to Canadianize things.

One other thing we have faced in the past two or three decades has been the purchase of equipment that required Corps to redefine their roles and drastically rethink and change their SOPs.
 
Eland2 said:
As a thought exercise, I've been toying with the idea of whether a 75mm grenade launcher (as opposed to a standard 40mm AGL) would resolve the dilemma you have noted. The 40mm AGL is already seen as capable of laying down considerable suppressive fire and even providing some limited anti-armour capability. A bigger grenade might increase anti-armour capability without increasing weapon size, weight or ammunition space requirements tremendously.
You are basically proposing the old AVGP Cougar.  It is not a good idea.  If you want anti-armour punch on a light vehicle, then give it a missile or two.
 
MCG said:
You are basically proposing the old AVGP Cougar.  It is not a good idea.  If you want anti-armour punch on a light vehicle, then give it a missile or two.

So bring the LAV TUA back into regular use? Or make the LAV 6 like the Bradley and strap a couple missiles to the turret?
 
Whatever happened to the LAV TUA turrets? Are they in storage somewhere?

Were all the turrets made before the completion of the final LAV3 RWS?
 
Eland2 said:
Whether government regulations are at fault or not, it is a messed up system that doesn't operate the way it should. It still amazes me how we managed to get nearly-new Leopard 2 tanks in record time, and all that was needed to break the inevitable logjam in the procurement system was the issuance of an Urgent Operational Requirement. It was a fortuitous thing that the Dutch were getting out of the tank business at the time and they had some Leopard 2A4's sitting in storage that were barely used.

Wrong. All hulls made in 1985. Storage was sub par.

Barely used? Hardly. Same thoughts could be said about our subs.

Stick to your arcs, you don't know shit about the tanks.

Regards



 
MCG said:
You are basically proposing the old AVGP Cougar.  It is not a good idea.  If you want anti-armour punch on a light vehicle, then give it a missile or two.

Agreed. The Cougar always struck me as a rather weird vehicle that was neither fish nor fowl. It seemed to be a reconnaissance vehicle and a fire support vehicle and neither at the same time, a cheap alternative for a government that was unwilling to buy modern main battle tanks but was also trying to avoid losing the corporate memory that comes from having a long-standing armoured establishment based on tanks.

My idea was based on the fact that technology has advanced since the days of the Cougar, and grenade launchers do seem to be an effective suppressive fire weapon, so why not make the grenades a bit bigger?
 
Nerf herder said:
Wrong. All hulls made in 1985. Storage was sub par.

Barely used? Hardly. Same thoughts could be said about our subs.

Stick to your arcs, you don't know crap about the tanks.

Regards

Pardon me, but I was going by what media accounts, including DND publications, had stated about the condition of the tanks. I remember reading something to the effect that the tanks that were in storage had about 400km on their odometers. I should have qualified what I meant when I said the tanks were 'nearly new'. What I had read led me to believe the tanks were in effectively close to new condition despite having been manufactured about 30 years ago. Thanks for setting me straight.
 
Eland2 said:
Pardon me, but I was going by what media accounts, including DND publications, had stated about the condition of the tanks. I remember reading something to the effect that the tanks that were in storage had about 400km on their odometers. I should have qualified what I meant when I said the tanks were 'nearly new'. What I had read led me to believe the tanks were in effectively close to new condition despite having been manufactured about 30 years ago. Thanks for setting me straight.

Storage is harder on tanks than you think. Seals dry out, etc etc.

At least we have modern tanks again.

Regards
 
Schindler's Lift said:
Is it a "horribly messed-up military procurement system" or is it a system imposed upon us by the government owing to overall government regulations?  I often hear how messed up our system is but I also hear how other departments have similar issues...they just are not the easy target DND is.

I would say you are on target. The un-scientific (snarky?) generalizations - all of them somewhat true but not actually founded when viewed from a professional perspective- are that of the four big agencies involved in military procurement, (1) DND wants to buy the best kit available regardless of cost, (2) PWGSC wants to ensure a fair process to the point of ridiculousness and protect the GoC from any potential lawsuits, again to the point of ridiculousness, (3) Industry Canada wants jobs for Canadians and doesn't care about the quality of what is bought, so long as it means jobs for Canadians, and (4) the Treasury Board wants to ensure value for dollar but has no idea how much extra money the resultant processes and their associated years (and years) of work, costs taxpayers. All of those are over-generalizations, but each Department has its reputation... and sometimes that one (or two or three) major projects that makes the papers for the wrong reason, negatively impacts the hundreds of other projects that are doing things right, and causes them more work (and thus more time).

Devising checks and balances for all these competing but complementary inter-Departmental requirements has resulted in a procurement structure that takes a decade or more to complete most capital equipment projects, as each and every gateway and each and every agency fulfilling a 'challenge function' requires that their checklists be formally documented, validated, analysed, ad nauseum. This is true even for projects that are procuring existing equipment, already in-service with another military. Its a long process to put an 'x' beside each of the hundreds of boxes that must be checked off along the way. Say something different in year 6 than you do in year 3, and you get delayed. Try to change an element of your requirement half way through (even for a valid reason) and you get delayed. Realize that the years of delays have caused the cost of your project to exceed initial estimates, and you get delayed. Fail to adequately answer a ridiculous question asked  by an ill-informed but key gatekeeper or, God forbid, a Cost Analyst, and you get delayed. Face an un-forecasted election just as your bid prices expire, and you get delayed. Sigh.

So yes, its not 'the military' that is at fault. Frankly we are the ones who know what kit we need and what costs are realistic to buy that kit and deliver the full capability (with a couple high-profile exceptions that cause pain for everyone - F35 cough cough, used subs cough cough, FWSAR cough cough, etc); but we aren't the only ones with a say on how the taxpayers' dollars are spent. The resultant ponderous,  kafka-esque government procurement system is indeed, as you say, messed up. But for whatever reason, we never read about PWGSC being boneheads or Industry Canada causing us to spend more money for a lower quantity of (occasionally) lower quality (but made in Canada) gear. Its only DND that gets bad publicity. Ya, an easy target for an anti-military press that doesn't understand how government works. Did I already say 'sigh'?? Lol.

The good news is that DND remains in the driver's seat no matter what, and the project directors and their supporting staff in NDHQ do a great job of keeping the other departments on target and, to the extent possible, on time. So we do wind up with very good kit. Not always the best kit in the world, but very good kit. Its due to the hard work and perseverance of individuals, though, as they steer the files through an amazingly complex system.
 
HULK_011 said:
Whatever happened to the LAV TUA turrets? Are they in storage somewhere?

Were all the turrets made before the completion of the final LAV3 RWS?

Last I heard both the turrets and the ITAS systems are in storage in Montreal.  The ITAS were deployed as night vision to A-gan starting in 2008, with no missiles.  But since then the turrets and ITAS have been in limbo.  I'm honestly not sure what that Army plans to do with them, but I do know that there are no LAV TUA planned as part of LAVUp...
 
Old EO Tech said:
Last I heard both the turrets and the ITAS systems are in storage in Montreal.  The ITAS were deployed as night vision to A-gan starting in 2008, with no missiles.  But since then the turrets and ITAS have been in limbo.  I'm honestly not sure what that Army plans to do with them, but I do know that there are no LAV TUA planned as part of LAVUp...

Thats a shame, but probably due to the budget, the TUA is a good system that does have its uses in a conventional field of battle. Problem is DND has no priorities, outline of what it wants the CF to fight or look like. Without that kit will remain in storage, and priorities mismanaged, it becomes a loose/loose situation for everyone
 
Eland2 said:
My idea was based on the fact that technology has advanced since the days of the Cougar, and grenade launchers do seem to be an effective suppressive fire weapon, so why not make the grenades a bit bigger?
AGL effects are also derived from their rate of fire.  If you try to put an automatic 76 mm on a light vehicle, such as the TAPV, then you will run into trouble with ammo stowage and platform stability.
 
MCG said:
AGL effects are also derived from their rate of fire.  If you try to put an automatic 76 mm on a light vehicle, such as the TAPV, then you will run into trouble with ammo stowage and platform stability.

Why a 75mm? why direct fire role? why not a high velocity 57mm? or turn something like the TAPV into a mortor carrier?
 
MilEME09 said:
Why a 75mm?
Because a proposal for a 75 mm is what I was responding to.

MilEME09 said:
why not a high velocity 57mm?
Because you run into a problem of platform stability.

MilEME09 said:
why direct fire role? ... or turn something like the TAPV into a mortor carrier?
Sure, but now you are talking about a vehicle of a different role.  We've been discussing a vehicle intended for recce, with a requirement to fight out of (or through) direct fire engagements.
 
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