Good2Golf said:
FJAG, that was what I thought the principle issue was here, the determination of the (constitutional) validity of the "military nexus." I was thinking that the issue of "military nexus", or as noted in several examples upthread, what we might also consider in a "mixed" situation to be a "civilian nexus" (the idea that a civilian was involved, even if on DND property) is, as far as 130(1)(a) [specifically the
domestic situation] goes, determining whether the "militaryishness" or whatever nexus we're considering (domestically) is "military enough" to warrent prosecuction militarily. I see that 'gray' (or grey
) you note, to be the determiniation of "is the nexus military enough to override civilian facotrs of the nexus?"
Let me be cynical for a moment, Good2Golf. I think what the principle issue is in this case is that the convicted individuals do not have to pay any legal fees and are represented by lawyers who have a sufficiently low enough case load that allows them the time to take esoteric case law forward. Generally your average working Joe can't afford such a case; only the very rich or those on a system of legal aid can. My real question is why did the SCC decide to accept these cases.
I don't think that the case addresses the issue of the constitutionality of "military nexus" per se. "military nexus" was simply used by the CMAC to explain why s 130 was not unconstitutionally overbroad (and in retrospect may have been a poor choice of words)
The heart of the appellants' case, once you strip away all the verbiage, is that the military should not have the power to try criminal offences that are the general law of the land and not discipline specific; criminal cases should be the jurisdiction of civilian prosecutors and the civilian courts.
Fundamentally for me the constitutionality of the military justice system is found in s 11(f) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that states: 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (f) except in the case of
an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal , to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment;(my emphasis)
The need for a separate and equal military justice system was stated by the SCC, pre-charter, in R v Mackay and again validated, post-charter, in respect of s 11(f) at R v Genereux. The relevant discussion is in the Moriarity prosecution's factum referred to above. Genereux was particularly significant in that a part of that case was an attack on s 130 in that the appellant alleged that he had lost s 15 equality rights that all other citizens enjoy by being tried for a Federal Drug Act offence by a military court instead of a civilian one.
Generoux ultimately turned on s 11(d) and the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. The court found the then existing CM system inadequate and as a result very major changes have taken place in how we now form and run a CM.
The section 130 argument was that s 130 breached the s 15 Charter guarantee to "equality before the law" protection. In short the court said he was not discriminated against and s 130 was good to go.
The case here, Moriarity et al, deals with s 130 being overbroad and in contravention of s 7. (right to life liberty and security and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice).
Genereux also looked at s 7 briefly and said the more specific challenge was under 11(d) and that the s 7 challenge wasn't any stronger than that. In effect there was never a s 7 challenge in Genereux as to s 130 being overbroad.
Arguments that specific laws are overbroad or arbitrary or disproportionate under s 7 are the new darlings of the legal set (and I think the major reason that Harper is po'd at the SCC. They keep striking down laws, or parts of laws, on this one or the other of these bases which laws he considers perfectly valid.) At their best these concepts are the first line of defence against a government that is too extreme but at their worst they are an unreasonable interference in the legitimate legislative functioning of the government.
My personal belief is that s 130 is part of a legitimate element of the government's legislative function to define the extent and boundaries of military law.
Others may differ; in my mind those are individuals with a vested interest such as defence lawyers, left leaning law professors, people who don't trust the military (or just its officers, take your pick), and or people who do not understand the true nature of the military and just write it off as a uniformed civil service.
Various nations have different ways of dealing with their military law and mostly that is based on their own experiences (periods as colonial subjects, periods of military dictatorships and their excesses). There is no one right answer although some are clearly wrong by our own moral standards.
I'll be very interested in seeing how this SCC will deal with what in my mind is already a fairly well settled issue. Maybe Bev wants to take another poke at Steve's nose? ;D
:cheers: