Strategic Airlift - We need more than the Herc!

[Gobsmacked]

Some additional information....

The last C-141B was originally intended to be retired from service in February of 2004.
There are 20 additional C-141C's that were refit with new avionics starting in 1997 and completed in 2001.
They are currently in active reserve at Wright-Patterson Air Base, Ohio and March Air Reserve Base, California.
Based on cargo capacities they should just be able to carry two combat-loaded LAV-III's each although range would be limited unless we could provide adequate in air refueling.
Unfortunately my recollection is that model uses a different in-air refueling method than our other aircraft (boom versus drogue) which means we'd need to double check our new airbuses have that capability as well, or refit either the airbuses or C-141's to ensure compatibility.
Matthew. 

Although, at first glance, not a bad idea, the USAF will be retiring these remaining upgraded C-141Cs sometime in 2006 - check AIRFORCE magazine for exact dates - and replacing with C-17s.
As previously pointed out, they are as old as our CC-130Es and, with retirement and scrapping of most C-141As & Bs, the USAF has deemed they are unsupportable after 2006 - why would we want another unsupportable aircraft with an almost life-expired airframe - bad enough Herc fleet is only averaging 48-55% availability (currently varying from low of 12 to high of some 16) from 32 airframes.

And as Garbageman noted, "True, but it could be used as a short-term fix while we wait and see what the A400 will look like.  This may be politically difficult though, as it would look like we're asking for new kit yet again 5-10 years down the road."
And we all know how difficult it is to get the Gov't to pony up any equipment acquisition funds in the first place. :

 

[Gobsmacked]

Yes I too am fairly skeptical of Soviet aircraft, and i do prefer western nay N. American kit.
However, with the C-5's just as old as the Herc, we'd have to do some serious upgrades WRT avionics, and even airframes, and control surfaces and that would be costly.
We could buy brand new C-17's but with the Liberals record i sincerely doubt that they'll doll out the needed $ for that. the Airbus 400M is also a new aircraft but the jobs to build it would predominantly be in two factories (one in France and one in Germany)

Retired USAF C-5As are also a non-starter.  If you check through the 2004 issues of AIR FORCE Magazine on the web you will find they currently have the same availability rate as our Hercs - a mere 55%.
Even with the proposed expensive Avionics upgrades and the RERP reengining, a USAF viability board found this would only increase availability to 70% by something like 2012 onwards.
The C-5 is also restricted, as is the An-124-100M, to about 1/3 the airfields that a C-17 could land in, plus takes up the ramp space that about 3 C-17s (which can back up on their own) would require.

As to the C-17 it is doubtfull whether Gov't would provide the massive funds required for purchase.
As per recent USAF contracts and AIR FORCE Magazine, a fully equipped C-17 costs some US$205M, while if you factor in the required support equipment and 3rd line support contracts the cost is actually nearer to US$250M.  At standard DND exchange value of 1.5 this translates into Cdn$307.5-375M each.
As DND noted in 2001, a fleet of 6 C-17 would have cost "Cdn$2.321 Billion" (or US$1.547B) in 2001 - now add inflation. 
This did not account for 3rd line support contracts.

As to waiting for A400M, while RAF expects IOC in 2011, for export 2012 onwards is more realistic, and thats assuming it does not suffer similar delays to redesigned C-130J - some 3 years delay into operational service (with the 55 USAF C-130Js just cleared this past November for operational service overseas).
The mid-December SAAF contract for export A400Ms states that "The cost of 8 aircraft would be Euros 837 Million."  (And thats before adding any optional equipment such as AAR capability or a defensive suite.)  This equates to some Euro 104.625M per A400M, or US$137.122M (or Cdn$205.683M).
A 'C-17 equivalent' fleet of 12 A400M to replace remaining Hercs would cost some US$1.646 Billlion (or Cdn$2.468B). 
And this does not even count the additional Minimum +30% cost for spares, optional equipment and contingency, thus 12 A400M would cost minimum US$2.14B (Cdn$3.21B).

With only 1/4 the cargo capacity of a C-17 or 1/2 that of an A400M the stretched CC-130J (with No Outsize capability) is a bit cheaper.  A recent mid-December USAF contract funded two CC-130J for US$133M or US$66.5M each (or Cdn$99.75M). 
Replacing the 9 CC-130E and 13 various CC-130H/H(T)/H-30 with just 20 CC130J (2 less Js due to efficiency of new airframe compared to Es and Hs) - assuming C-27J purchased for SAR to maintain commonality benefits - would cost a prohibitive US$1.33 Billion (Cdn$1.995B). 
And this does not even count the additional Minimum +25% (5% less than non-Herc options due to some C-130 compatibility) cost for spares, optional equipment or contingency, thus 20 (Non-Outsize capable) CC-130J would cost minimum US$1.663B (Cdn$2.5B).

While seemingly expensive, on overall cost the C-17 was actually the cheaper option back in 2001, but likely equivalent to current cost of CC-130J.
(All information publicly available if you look for it.)

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.mytelus.com/news/article.do?pageID=canada_home&articleID=1819004

Tsunami reaction forces rethink of Canada's foreign, defence policy

I don't know if striking the iron now is going to make any difference, nor is it necessarily going to make the difference we want but I doubt if it is going to get any hotter.

If the gov't doesn't spring for strategic lift now, in the form of C17s, then it is unlikely it is ever going to do so.

I am allowing myself to be slightly optimistice because of Martin's comeback line to Harper during the debates.  "We don't need aircraft carriers.  That is Cold War thinking.  We need Aircraft...."

I paraphrase but that was the sense of the point.

Martin may lack conviction but he knows, or at least his "policy advisers" know, a parade when they see one.

And Gobsmacked, what I take from your post is that all options are "prohibitively expensive" but the A-400 is also less capable and a long way out, while the C130Js are not just expensive but inadequate.

I agree with your 2.321 BCAD valuation, but if you are looking at life cycle costing and we can get as much use out of them as we have had out of the CC130Es (2004-1968? = 36 years?) then the cost amortized over the life of the AC is about 64 million per year or a little more than 10 million per AC.   Also, assuming that they will NOT be used as much or as strenuously as the CC130s - for a variety of reasons I would expect life expectancy could rival that of the B-52s that the USAF operates (>50 years old) which would reduce the annual cost of ownership if not the cost of operation.

A RAF-type lease solution I believe could be made to work.  

Especially if the Boss-man wants   a fancy card to flash around at the next election to trump the Conservatives.

Cheers.

 

[AftOf245]

Gobsmacked,

Where do you get your info on temp certificates for IL76 & AN124??  There is no such thing as a temp certificate.  These aircraft are operating on international routes.  They regularly compete with DC-8 / B747 / L100 aircraft based in North America.  There is actually an Uzbeki company that operates AN-12 / AN26 aircraft based in Opa Locka, Florida.  They are based in the US and given the freedom to sell charters to a third country from the US (7th Freedom).  The An-12 is not certified in the western world.

Please provide a link or some fact that would point to a temporary permit?  IL76 or AN124's will not gain the authority to operate domestically within North America, unless given 8th Freedom rights, but they will not be restricted from operating charters, no matter what the competion offers. 

 

[Gobsmacked]

Gobsmacked,

Where do you get your info on temp certificates for IL76 & AN124??  There is no such thing as a temp certificate.  These aircraft are operating on international routes.  They regularly compete with DC-8 / B747 / L100 aircraft based in North America.  There is actually an Uzbeki company that operates AN-12 / AN26 aircraft based in Opa Locka, Florida.  They are based in the US and given the freedom to sell charters to a third country from the US (7th Freedom).  The An-12 is not certified in the western world.

Please provide a link or some fact that would point to a temporary permit?  IL76 or AN124's will not gain the authority to operate domestically within North America, unless given 8th Freedom rights, but they will not be restricted from operating charters, no matter what the competion offers. 

From both the FAA (although I lost the link when my browser crashed a while back) - do a search on Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards.
Plus the CAMAA Market Analysis CD, 1-2 February 2001, available through the CAMAA Business Office upon request and upon USAF approval.
CAMAA Appendix Y - 'Government Policy and Regulation Impacts On Future AN-124 Operations'
Excerpt - "Although the AN-124 is not certified to operate in the U.S., it currently carries cargo on flights within the borders of the U.S as well as into and out of the U.S. to foreign destinations.  These operations, known as 'cabotage' are exceptional and are through a waiver from the U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT], because the AN-124 is the only type of aircraft commercially available to perform the mission.  No U.S. carrier operates this type of aircraft.
Should the BC-17X/C-17 option become available, it would automatically have sole access to all traffic that would fly on the AN-124 within and to and from the U.S.  The only exceptions would be cargo that could not fit in the BC-17X/C-17 but can fit in the AN-124."  As of 21 July 2000 only 14 An-124-100 (6 - ADB, 6 - VD, 2 - Polet) had Stage III FAA Authority to Operate in the United States, although it is now likely all An-124-100M have Authority.  (Balance of CAMAA report is sensitive info and cannot be redistributed without US Gov't approval.) 
It is likely a similar 'sole access' situation would apply in Canada as Transport Canada regulations are somewhat similar to FAA regs.

Kirkhill,  Congrats on your 1,000th post!

[Modified BOLD in response to following post 18/1/05 - fairly clear english]

 

[AftOf245]

What they are talking about here is the 8th Freedom (Cabotage) flights that the AN124 operates within the US.  This is specific to flights from one point within the US to another point within the US.  This does not cover 5th Freedom flights, which are flights from a 2nd country to points within a 3rd country.

 

[Gobsmacked]

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-airlift.htm
I especially like the business model proposed. Anyone care to chip in?

As noted on CASR, "a radical method of providing an Alternative Service Delivery â “ form a Canadian  'Airlift-for-Hire'  Crown Corporation.  If  Government were to put out the initial capital to create such a Crown Corporation, this 'airline' could provide strategic airlift to 'friendly' countries and to the CF. By working independently of DND's budget, the Crown Corporation might actually be a profit maker.  Moving the equipment outlay for this strategic airlifter from DND to a Crown Corporation may seem rather like robbing Peter to pay Paul. The key advantage is that, as a non-military entity,  this corporation is free to sell its services for profit when the aircraft are not required for use by the Canadian Forces or other government departments.  Costs [for setting up and initial running of the corporation] could be shared by government departments."
See also http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-airlift-il76-1.htm

I am a big fan of this type of solution.  For both air and sealift.
Have the government subsidize a private and/or Crown Corporation (probably Crown) to purchase 12 Airlifters (eg) and paint 4 of them Grey and have the others doing White livery work on the commercial market.  Crewed and maitained by a mix of regs, reservists and civvies.

Although well intentioned, the idea of a Crown Corporation for strategic airlift was previously identified in a suggestion for C-17 operation (during a DND commissioned Options Analysis by BMCI).
It was also categorically rejected in a formal unsolicited BC-17X proposal Bid submitted in August 2003, and followed up during February 2004.  Based on the following, it would not be recommended to pursue the 'Crown Corporation' line of thought.

A released Excerpt obtained from that proposal makes the following points:
Justifiable Peacetime FSA Requirements
    As the 'FSA Study' notes, "if an aircraft fleet is established to accomodate surge deployments, there will likely be excess capability during normal peacetime operations.  As the focus of the 'FSA [Study]' was surge capability . . . the 'FSA [Study]' relied primarily on a study conducted by (DND's resident airlift analyst) Mr. Pierre Fournier . . . for an indicative analysis of potential peacetime utilization.  Mr Fournier examined the use of the C-17 to support the normal peacetime operations of the CF".  From actual usage and Monthly Airlift Plan data "potential C-17 missions were identified and translation from CC-130 and CC-150 to C-17 mission parameters was accomplished. The 'C-17 utilization study' analysis indicated that current peacetime operations could support a minimum of two C-17 tasking lines [operational availability necessitating a fleet size of three aircraft] with an estimated average YFR of 1900 hours (not taking into account pilot YFR requirements). . . . (As) model limitations that suggest that the C-17 usage identified in the study likely represents the lower limit of utilization" it can realistically be assumed that peacetime airlift requirements could utilize up to 4 C-17s (or 4 BC-17Xs) to support 3 lines of tasking. 'Annex A' - prepared by HLB Decision Economics - to BMCI's 'OA' (Options Analysis) report confirms "the (C-17) peacetime requirement equates to 2 lines of tasking, with the occasional 3rd line as an overtask. (This is broken down into) a total of approximately 3,000 hours per year dedicated to CF airlift, and an allowance for 200 hours of non-collateral pilot proficiency training."

Realistic FSA capacity
    The FSA 'OA' extrapolates that the "basic annual airlift requirement that could reasonably be assigned to the aircraft" is 3,108 hours - 3,200 per 'OA Annex A', split among the 4 FSA that CF could reasonably employ during peacetime, giving a notional fleet YFR of 3,500 hours or 875 hours per CF 'militarized' BC-17X FSA. This is derived from eight crew requiring a proficiency YFR of 3,072 hours, rounded up for unforeseen surge airlift requirements (which allows for a ninth crew) and weighted 73% against UK's C-17 use - which with a much larger military has respectively greater outsize airlift requirements for it's larger military commitments. Additionally, this frees up CF aircrews and maintenance personnel to help alleviate critical personnel shortages elsewhere as recently noted by the Senate Defence Committee. Considering DND's 'fiscally constrained' operational posture which has resulted in numerous reductions in aircraft fleet YFR's, to provide funds required for upgrades and operations, 3,500 hours would seem a reasonable YFR. Any supplemental surge capability - in addition to the 4 CF FSA BC-17X required for basic annual airlift requirements - would be provided by Commercial BC-17Xs chartered from start-up outsize/oversize Air Cargo Canadian Commercial Consortium BC-17X only when required. This realizes DND a minimum potential savings of over C$700M in Capital Procurement acquisition costs vs the cancelled FSA projects previously planned 6 C-17s.

FSA SOA marketing
    The FSA 'OA' noted that 6 C-17 are required to meet the SOR surge deployment requirement while "the number of aircraft further dictate the number of aircrews that must be kept proficient and available at two crews per aircraft. To maintain proficiency each crew must fly a minimum of 32 hours per month . . . (resulting) in a required annual flying rate (YFR) of 4,608 hours for the (6) C-17. The analysis has also demonstrated that these numbers exceed the basic annual airlift requirement that could reasonably be assigned to the aircraft by approximately 1,500 hours" for a realistic YFR of 3,108 hours. The December 2001 ADM(Mat) Briefing Note lists a "YFR 1000 hours per aircraft" for 6,000 hours total, which exceeds the basic annual airlift requirement by some 2,892 hours.

The FSA 'OA' spuriously concludes the YFR for 6 C-17 "results in a surplus capacity that could be marketed, through a (Governmental) Special Operating Agency [SOA], to outside government agencies and commercial enterprise without competing with . . . Canadian business."  In Reality, however, this flawed SOA would compete directly with existing (and future potential) Canadian business such as: 'Skylink aviation'; 'Ridgeway North America'; 'C2 Logistics Incorporated'; and 'BAX Global' which are excellent examples of existing Canadian businesses that contract for outsize/oversize airlift charter within the Canadian marketplace.

    The FSA 'OA' notes "there would be minimal operating costs against this revenue, since the hours must be flown for crew proficiency anyway."
BMCI's flawed premise of a SOA did not account for crew costs, which new or existing Canadian business's - including those that charter airlift from an outside CIS 3rd party - must account for in their pricing, and would result in a subsidized government air cargo SOA that has an unfair advantage on the open market. Canadian SOA's are normally set up to assist Canadian business, with . . . an excellent SOA example, not to compete with or inhibit Canadian business. Government should never be in open competition, on a subsidized basis, against established or potential business as this goes against the whole premise of a free market economy and could have resulted in potential lawsuits and legal challenges from numerous venues, potentially including the EHLG (European Heavy Lift Group) and WTO (World Trade Organization), plus the above noted 3rd party Canadian charterers, due to unfair business practices.

BMCI's idea of the SOA was based on four flawed premises noted in the OA under Revenue Generation:

1. - Only two charter carriers in oversize airlift business.
[Besides Ukraine's 'Antonov Airlines' (8 An-124-100M Ruslan & 1 An-225 Miya, plus 1 An-22 turboprop) marketed through UK's AirFoyle/Heavylift joint venture and Russia's 'Volga-Dnepr Airlines' (9 An-124-100M plus 1 An-124-100M construction on-hold & 1 An-124 Condor plus 2 An-124 in storage), additionally: 'AirFoyle/Heavylift' (1 An-124-100M previously owned by Volga-Dnepr) and long-established 'Polet Airlines' (1 An-124-100M plus 1 An-124-100M building & 3 An-124 plus 3 An-124 in storage - incl. 1/1 An-124 leased to Russian Defence Ministry) in Russia - all heavily utilized for OP ATHENA. Also, 'Libyan Arab Air Cargo' (1 An-124-100M recently entered service plus 2nd completed on hold at factory) and 'Iran Air Tours' (2 An-124-100M under construction), plus an unnamed UAE airline with An-124-100M (formerly for Russia's 'Atlant-Souz' from late-2003 (who may still receive up-to 5 ex-Russian AF unmodernized An-124 being loaned 'gratis') until purchase funding fell through).
Total in service: 1 An-225, 21 An-124-100M (plus 5 on-hold or building) & 4 An-124.]

2. - Unlikely additional commercial carriers will emerge in the foreseeable future.
[Besides recently established 'Iran Air Tours' and 'Libyan Air Cargo', additional emergent potential outsize/oversize carriers: BMCI completely misses well-known fact that CAMAA may provide 10-14 BC-17X operated by one or more US air cargo companies from 2008, or later, as part of the CRAF.  France's . . .  - who specialize in facilitation of French military deployments through 3rd party charter - have expressed interest in the BC-17X (5 or more) due to unsuitability of An-124, AirFoyle/Heavylift has also expressed BC-17X interest, while Volga Dnepr's VP Konstantine Vekchine affirms "we think there is room for both" BC-17X and An-225, plus start-up outsize/oversize Air Cargo Canadian Commercial Consortium w\4 BC-17X. A new commercial player from 2004, UAE airline w\An-124-100M (last Ruslan left on assembly line to be assembled from Ukranian Aviant factory).]

3. - "Number of organizations that are potential targets for marketing a (SOA outsize) service without interfering with Canadian commercial business enterprises. Including the United Nations, humanitarian relief organizations, arctic development organizations, and commercial enterprises such as the oil and gas industry, mining, etc."
[These are some of the exact organizations that the start-up outsize/oversize Air Cargo Canadian Commercial Consortium is targeting (not to mention BC-17X CAMAA operators and existing An-124/-225 operators), besides international corporations, proposed EU & NATO Rapid Reaction Forces, other militaries, etc. The only Canadian or international outsize/oversize business the CF can justifiably target with any surplus capacity, on either a free 'humanitarian assistance' or purely 'cost-recovery' basis only!, is other Canadian Government Departments and agencies; foreign militaries and international governmental organizations like the UN.]

4. - Providing competitive service on the 'spot market'.
[As previously stated, Government should never be in open competition, on a subsidized basis, against established or potential business as this goes against the whole premise of a free market economy and could result in potential lawsuits and legal challenges from numerous venues, as noted above, due to unfair business practices.]

The Consortium has absolutely no problem with the GoC buying 6 or even 12 C-17s (or 12 to 24 A400Ms) if it so desires and wishes to spend the massive $Billions that would entail, as that is GoC's perrogative as a sovereign nation.  What the Consortium takes issue with is potentially buying Surplus capacity with the 'intent of selling that Surplus capacity' on the Commercial market in competition with Canadian business.
Excerpt Ends.

 

[Kirkhill]

Great submission Gobsmacked.  It clarifies a lot.  It would be great though if the notions discussed, 4 CF C17s (maybe 6) and a National Outsize Carrier could be removed from the abstract world of plans to a firm reality.  From your earlier post it seems you don't have much hope on the CF C17s.  Do you think there is more chance of the Civvy carrier coming on line anytime soon?

Cheers,

Oh, and thanks for noticing my posts - all it proves is that I have too much time on my hands and difficulty keeping my mouth shut. 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-airlift.htm

The article talks about the Antonov 124 and puts forth the suggestion of the CF using  (old passenger converted to airlifters) Boeing 747s. I would be hesistant and I hope the CF is as well about getting second hand gear from hear on out.

 

[Zoomie]

CASR really likes posting things are full of holes and make zero sense.  They have a real hard-on for ex-Soviet Block equipment and feel that we should replace all of our aircraft with Ukrainian made Antonovs or fighter trainers.

Their idea about converting old 747s doesn't help in our Strat Lift department - we need an aircraft that has STOL capability and can still load/unload a LAV-3 or Coyote without problem.

I don't know if that website is a SFU professor's hobby or not, but everything posted there should be taken with a grain of salt.  Don't get me going about their FWSAR page!

 

[Sam69]

I'm at a loss why the issue of excess capacity during normal  peacetime ops is such a big deal in the strat airlift discussion. Virtually every military capability has a great deal of excess capacity during peacetime. That's because militaries are not primarily structured for efficiency during peacetime (and nor should they). 

I recognize that the decision to buy every additional aircraft comes at an opportunity cost but that is the root of a more sophisticated discussion than simply discussing how many ton-miles per day we need on average sunny afternoon. In my opinion, the number of aircraft required should be determined using the capability-based planning framework and scenario driven. Oh wait, it already has been... and the answer was 4-6.  :


;D
Sam

 

[Kirkhill]

Sam

You are making a radical suggestion.  According to your logic we should have a fire engine in the station house standing waiting doing nothing in case there is a fire.  When actually everybody knows it should be out on the street conducting goodwill missions or home inspections or tied up on a training exercise or possibly in the shop undergoing maintenance.

Respectfully, give your head a shake man.

Cheers ;D

 

[Gobsmacked]

I'm at a loss why the issue of excess capacity during normal  peacetime ops is such a big deal in the strat airlift discussion. Virtually every military capability has a great deal of excess capacity during peacetime. That's because militaries are not primarily structured for efficiency during peacetime (and nor should they). 
I recognize that the decision to buy every additional aircraft comes at an opportunity cost but that is the root of a more sophisticated discussion than simply discussing how many ton-miles per day we need on average sunny afternoon. In my opinion, the number of aircraft required should be determined using the capability-based planning framework and scenario driven. Oh wait, it already has been... and the answer was 4-6.
Sam

October 2003 correspondence from DGSP confirms "Hercules Replacement numbers . . . In an ideal world, we would drive the aircraft quantities from a logistic calculation in terms of ton miles of outsized cargo per day."
Opportunity cost for additional strategic lift aircraft comes at a Premium price of US$137M to US$250M - thats a lot of Taxpayer dollars for extra aircraft not regularly required.

Please note that the BC-17X proposal handily addressed the 'Surge Capability' issue.
DND deemed, through it's stillborn FSA project, that '6 C-17 equivalents' was an 'Affordable Surge Capability'.  The BC-17X proposal provided the equivalent of 8 C-17s (4 CF 'militarized' CF BC-17X and 4 Canadian Commercial BC-17X to handle Surge requirements), whilst addressing DNDs calculation of Surge ton-miles requirements for cargo airlift - all for some 70% of cost of the 6 C-17 option.
As proposed these Canadian Commercial BC-17Xs would be 100% guaranteed available to DND for 30 yrs at guananteed prices (not subject to Massive market driven price hikes like An-124-100M), at DND's FSA SOR timelines.
SURE SOUNDS LIKE A NO-BRAINER DECISION.  8)
Any Liberal's paying attention to this??  :

As the proposed BC-17X configuration is 90% common with C-17, without any of the Restricted Classified equipment that makes Canadian Certification problematic due to ITARs issues (anyone remember the equipment that had to be removed from Cormorant and replaced with Civil Equivalent as our regulators could not inspect Classified equipment to Certify it).  AAR (via probe) is not required, as Brits have demonstrated, as extended-range fuel tank enhances range, while a side benefit to removing the AAR piping (something our MRTTs cannot do for C-17s due to Drogue-only capability) is that the BC-17X Cargo capacity is actually increased by 1,000s of lbs due to lighter aircraft.
Meanwhile, the 'militarized' BC-17X configuration is even more common with C-17 as it retains Military standard cargo floor and Kevlar armour that C-17 is designed with, and potentially the Military engines - undetermined at this point.

As both yourself and Kirkhill have previously pointed out: "moving within Canada itself often engenders crossing what are widely considered to be strategic distances anywhere else.
One of the most powerful arguments for owning Strat Air Lift is the need for assured and timely access. Should the "big one" hit the West Coast, we simply cannot wait for days or weeks to get a contract in place for an Antonov. The oft quoted argument that they have always been there when we needed them is specious, to say the least. They have always been there because we have always adjusted our deployment plans to meet their availability."
Anyone remember the Embarassment of having to 'borrow' (rent) USAF C-17s during Winnipeg Floods and Ice Storm to move heavy equipment we couldn't airlift ourselves.  :-[



  As explained by a former NORAD Deputy Commander, LGen (Ret'd) David Adamson CD, in a 2001 DANN article - 'Canada needs Strategic Air Transport', "Mobility implies the ability to move the full range of DND equipment over intercontinental distances in severely constrained periods of time.  It is apparent that the quality and capability of our airlift resources is insufficient to meet those criteria.

  A second mobility requirement is to maintain national control over the resources we utilize to deploy our personnel and equipment.  The spectre of chartering (foreign owned) heavy lift aircraft . . . which may be operated and maintained at levels that do not necessarily meet our standards, is a derogation of our responsibilities to our personnel.  Moreover, it compromises our sovereign right to act independently in accordance with national policies and leaves our intentions dependent on outside agencies and/or governments, (whether they be Ukranian, Russian or U.S.).

    A further consideration in mobility operations is interoperability - that is the ability to enjoy a common support of our equipment with like-minded allies.  In Canada's case that suggests NATO aircraft, particularly those of the United States.  From an airlift point of view, the Boeing / MDC-17 (before rename to BC-17X  http://www.boeing.com/commercial/pd/bc17x/index.html  ) is the type that could redress the shortfall in our airlift force.  Doing so would provide an opportunity to rationalize the size of the C-130 Hercules fleet while offering the possibility of personnel savings, (just as proposed in the Consortium's BC-17X 'Canadian CAMAA' FSA proposal).  The MDC-17 has the full range of capabilities needed to lift personnel, . . . (LAV III) personnel carriers, (Coyote) reconnaissance vehicles, (Griffon) helicopters, etc., into austere destinations.  A rule of thumb is that, on a ton/mile basis, one MDC-17 has the deployment capability of seven or eight C-130 Hercules, and it could move the full range of DND equipment." 

 

[Gobsmacked]

Great submission Gobsmacked.  It clarifies a lot.  It would be great though if the notions discussed, 4 CF C17s (maybe 6) and a National Outsize Carrier could be removed from the abstract world of plans to a firm reality.  From your earlier post it seems you don't have much hope on the CF C17s.  Do you think there is more chance of the Civvy carrier coming on line anytime soon?
Cheers,

I'm not so much worried about a purchase as the option DND is currently pushing of a C-17 Lease.
According to internal DND SCIP correspondence, obtained through ATI, "CAS gave me a cost for Hercs [early buy] (of 13 Hercs) as Cdn$2.6B.  CAS has worked a lease-to-buy option that comes in at Cdn$4.1B.  Problem: Early buy should be cheaper than later buy, and both should be cheaper than lease.  If the monies needed for a buy are indeed in the Cdn$3B range, Cdn$1.5B in interest [over 15 years] is not out of line if there is no paydown on the principle."
This has implications for the proposed C-17 lease as interest pymts would likely be similar (but likely higher) for 6 C-17s - somewhere along lines of 750M Pounds for 7 yr lease of 4 RAF C-17s.
[Certainly, this additional Cdn$1.5B would be more effectively spent buying badly needed equipment, rather than padding the pockets of Lockheed Martin or Boeing.]

 

[a_majoor]

What a can of worms. You or I, as rational (I hope) soldiers see this in pretty simple terms: our missions for the past decade involve supporting a deployed battlegroup. What are the Logistics requirments to do so by air?

The answer seems to be between 4-6 C-17 sized aircraft, with some wiggle room for spares, training, surge capacity and so on. Purchase price and O&M costs would be quite hard to swallow, so this is not a realistic option. Buying fewer than 4 C-17s is false economy, since that puts us below any rational threashold of lift capability and availability.

Very few people seem to be fans of Russian aircraft, either IL-76 or AN-7x, mostly due to "quality control". IF we could somehow get around this issue, the planes are available and inexpensive. American Starlifters and C-5s are very old, so we would not get much life out of them.

Converting Boeing 747 or 767 freighters is a non starter, since they cannot load and unload the large military equipment we need to carry.

A-400s and other advanced concepts do not exist as real hardware, so any plans made around them involve waiting for years.

Since the Tsunami didn't apparently make a dent in the thinking of our "big heads" in Ottawa (I was going to say "wash away obsolete ideas, but that was too easy), then the answer really seems to boil down to DIY, or nothing.

DIY is the inverse of the calculations offered several posts back, with a private airlift company purchasing some sort of ex military airlifter and offering a "first call" contract to the Government or DND, while making the payments by flying groceries to Inuvik or whatever. The Candid is the "best" candidate only because the Russians built about 500 of the planes (and still are building IL-76MF versions), so there are lots of available airframes. If there were 500 A-400s in service, I would be all over that, but face it, there are not, so we have to go with what is available. At @ $20 million a pop, you could buy 10 for the cost of ONE C-17. Even accounting for a total refurbishing, installing new engines and electronics, you could still double the cost and have the required airlift capability (5 X Il 76) for the expenditure of one C-17.

We need to accept there is no realistic prospect of the Government purchasing C-17s, A-400s, Zeppelins or anything else, and either shrug our shoulders, or think our way outr of this box

 

[Gobsmacked]

I'm actually amazed there was no related comment on the related post I made in the related 'Heavy lift conundrum' thread months ago - main ptn reattached.

Just to add some more 'food for thought',
an Excellent Op-Ed that was released at CANSEC 2004 in April,
OP-ED: STRATEGIC AIRLIFT  by Mark Romanow
Canada's Waning Role of Pride and Influence

True to tradition, Budget 2004 has yet-again ignored DND's desire for an integral
Strategic Airlift capability.  With this in mind, you may recall some recent government
comments:  [see original post - Gob]

These reaffirm well-documented National Defence (DND) urgent requirements for an
integral outsize/oversize Future Strategic Airlift capability of six C-17 equivalent
strategic airlifters for "C$2,320.639M" required to replace 40-year-old CC-130Es,
plus an immediate substantial infusion to DNDs base budget to reduce the rust-out
of ageing equipment and prevent rising maintenance costs from squeezing the
procurement budget.

Integral strategic airlift for the Canadian Forces (CF) could be a source of
pride for all Canadians, especially if Canadian troops and equipment were seen
arriving on Canadian airlifters instead of chartered Russian/Ukranian transports
(with first year of Op Athena requiring a minimum US$65M chartered airlift), and a
way to serve both our own national interest in this dangerous world, such as rapid
deployment airlift for JTF2 and DART that is currently lacking, instead of the embarrasement
of a Hercules fleet that flies less-than half the time.

Astonishingly, an Alberta consortium's innovative BC-17X Canadian CAMAA
(Commercial Application of Military C-17 Airlift Aircraft) joint venture bid, submitted
with tacit pentagon-level USAF support, was seemingly ignored â “ even with potential
massive C-17 cost increases after February 2006.  DND acknowledges the
â Å“proposal certainly attempts to... provide the CF with the sort of airlift capability that
meets our country's needs and within our budget allocations,â ? while in December
2003, the Chief of the Air Staff advised the consortium that the Canadian CAMAA
solution â Å“may be a candidate to meet our future airlift needs,â ? with the Director Air
Requirements confirming â Å“that a project to procure airlift capability is under develop-ment
and, in due course, a competition is anticipated.â ?

The Canadian CAMAA solution would allow DND to acquire the C-17 equivalent
guaranteed capability of eight BC-17X (134% capacity of six C-17s), for some
70% of the six C-17 option cost â “ just C$400M more than maintenance of present
inadequate Hercules fleet until 2038. Canadian CAMAA provides significant
30-year life cycle cost savings exceeding C$14B, allowing DND to recapitalize its
ageing Air Mobility fleet by 2009, while rectifying severe personnel shortages
identified under Project Transform.

The Canadian CAMAA proposal â “ best value at lowest cost â “ should grasp the
attention of a Liberal government whose leader affirms â Å“a dollar misspent is a dollar
unavailable for health care or education.â ?

The poor optics of procrastination, potentially spending additional billions for
Strategic Arilift down-the-road, should Canadian CAMAAs window disappear by
early-2005, in conjunction with a reluctance to expedite replacement of ageing
Hercules (labelled the new Sea Kings by Global News), should read very poorly to a
voting Canadian public.

END

As to converted B747 (c33) this was rejected by USAF as not flexible enough, airfield limited, etc.
I fully agree with AMajor that C33 is a non-starter as, like CC-150 Polaris, it requires specialized AF handling equipment and still cannot carry some of the heavier Outsize equipment in CF inventory.

Although, on issue of An-124 or IL-76, don't forget their Abysmal accident record.
At least 4 Major An-124 Crashes with 50 Fatalities, plus numerous IL-76 Crashes/Incidents (remember a few years ago the IL-76 over Africa which suddenly opened rear ramp and depressurised - losing half it's passengers/cargo in the process) or the Antonov-22? incident where all those unfortunate Spanish soldiers died 2-3 yrs ago.  Again, a non-starter, Transport Canada would be very leery of expending resources on Certification.


Also note a 'Political Level' Press Release sent just before the last election, and amazingly not picked up be any copied Media.  :

PRESS RELEASE              PRESS RELEASE                  PRESS RELEASE

file # PR01,  27/06/04

ATTN: Rt. Hon Anne McLellan, P.C., M.P., Deputy Prime Minister

Dear Mrs McLellan,

    The start-up outsize/oversize air cargo Consortium would like to thank you for your correspondence dated xx May 2004 in regards to our xx February 2004 request to Rt. Hon Prime Minister to advance procurement of Hercules Replacement competition (de facto former Future Strategic Airlift [FSA] programme) from FY 08/09-onwards to 2004/05 timeframe, and provide supplemental funding to the Department of National Defence [DND] to advance this urgent requirement on it's Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP) that was only publicly released late-May.  Especially when considering that the  'Canadian CAMAA' (Commercial Application of Military C-17 Airlift Aircraft - with classifed systems replaced by commercial off-the-shelf systems) BC-17X proposal represents less-than 45% of the "C$4.117,906B" identified in 15 year window of the SCIP equipment annex for Hercules Replacement/Modernization (structural repair liability for E & H-73 models).

    We find it extremely unfortunate that your response completely ignored our request to advance FSA procurement and re-propose our BC-17X bid, especially considering the potential Feb 06 C-17 massive cost hikes, and only shuffled us back to DND as the Assistant Deputy Minister(Material) had only been able to confirm late-March 2004 that "as we develop a way ahead for our military capability over the coming months, the subject of deployability will be one of the continuing themes."  Especially as the Chief of the Air Staff, LGen K.R. Pennie, officially acknowledged xx December 2003 that the start-up outsize/oversize air cargo Consortium's BC-17X joint venture R&D Purchase/Charter "solution you are proposing may be a candidate to meet our future airlift needs.  Nevertheless, any aircraft replacement or contracted airlift capability acquisition would be conducted through an open competitive process.  In accordance with government acquisition procedures, your proposal would be considered during a competition, should you elect to submit a formal bid."  While the Director Aerospace Equipment Program Management, and Chief of Staff DGAEPM, Col Douglas B. Baker, had previously noted that the Consortium's BC-17X "proposal certainly attempts to . . . provide the Canadian Forces with the sort of airlift capability that meets our country's needs and within our budget allocations."

Please reference General Handy's recent March 04 testimony to the Senate Armed Service Subcommittee (as previously provided), in reference to airlift - provided by Pentagon-based SAF\AQX CAMAA manager - whereby USAF may not have long-lead funding in place for FY06.  Gen Handy is the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command (AMC).

    The 'low-cost' Canadian CAMAA BC-17X proposal would significantly reduce the amount of USAF long-lead C-17 funding required (for FY 08) in the FY 06 budget, by extending the current production run until almost FY09 (Oct 08 onwards) with the insertion of minimum 8 BC-17X, as  monthly production averages 1-2-1 or 2-1-2 during June-July-August, and therefore increase the successfull likelihood of adequate FY 06 long-lead C-17 funding in USAF budget request - especially in view of U.S. budgetary deficits in the US$500 Billion range.  Should FY 06 long-lead USAF C-17 funding not be forthcoming it is unlikely the Consortium would be able to continue offering (past 2005) a 'low-cost' BC-17X solution to Canada's strategic airlift requirements.  The demonstrated willingness to quickly spend C$101M on VIP luxury jets from Bombardier (Challenger CL-604s), not required by DND, but a reluctance to expedite replacement of aging 40 year old Hercules that only fly half the time, should infuriate Canadian voters infuriated by the Federal Sponsorship Scandal.

    We are extremely disapointed that Liberal government remains uninterested in revisiting the urgent requirement for Future Strategic Airlift considering recent Liberal pronouncements.  In mid-April the PM affirmed "we must be prepared to do more far from home . . . we can no longer view our security through distinct, domestic, conticental and international lenses.  There is no longer a major problem in the world that does not affect us.  Our approach to Canada's national security must reflect this altered reality.  Canada's presence in Afghanistan has all the hallmarks of the new type of operation that the Canadian Forces will be expected to lead."  As of 15 Dec 03 our continuting Afghanistan commitment alone has required over US$58.341 for strategic airlift charter, with return lift costs by this fall expected to add a minimum US$28M extra.  In early-April the MND made specific observations on "the future of the Canadian Forces.  First: capability.  We know the Canadian Forces must have the capabilities to fulfill a wide range of missions anywhere in the world - from combat operations, to security and stability missions to nation-building.  Second: deployability.  The government must be able to send our people and equipment where they're needed quickly, whether that means across the country or around the world."

    As the BC-17X retains 90% commonality with the C-17 it will remain highly interoperable with USAF/UK C-17 assets, whilst maintaining the ability to rapidly deploy any equipment/units from the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, besides any CF heavy equipment.  As noted recently by DND "Outsized cargo is defined as cargo that, because of length, width, height and/or weight, cannot fit into a Hercules-sized aircraft.  Such cargo includes equipment such as the HLVW used by the Disaster Assistance Response Team [DART]; the Beaver Tail Trailer; 6K and 5K forklifts; and the 6x4 Dump Truck.  Other equipment, such as the Army's LAV-III must be disassembled to enable transport by Hercules.  Three Hercules flights are required to transport two LAV-III vehicles."  As compared to three LAV-III or six LAV-II Bison/Coyote vehicles per BC-17X flight.  As Corrie Adolph,President of Canadians for Military Preparedness, notes about strategic airlift, "If there were an earth quake on the West Coast, and thousands of people were trapped and dying â “ we would not being able to get our military there quick enough to help save many of those lives!  The person hearing that is thinking...my God - my mother (brother, friend, cousin) lives in Victoria!â ?.  Hopefully it does not take such a disaster, and the inevitable wait for rented or begged (from the US) strategic airlift, for the government to wake up to the urgent need for DND to have an integral outsize strategic airlift capability.

PRESS RELEASE              PRESS RELEASE                  PRESS RELEASE

Hopefully the recent DART airlift issue spurs them to revisit the issue? :-\

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Gobsmacked- Excellent work!   This has been a truly eye-opening set of posts.   I've enjoyed them greatly...

A_majoor- I know you are a big fan of the Russian stuff, but you talk about refitting engines and avionics as if it was a just another epsiode of "Overhauln".   It's not.   I've seen simple mods to the Sea King drag on for years and still have unintended consequences that were not discovered until after it was released to service.   IMHO, the design phase, test bench work, actual modifications, test flights and then operational airworthiness/acceptance testing   and certification would take YEARS.   And involve great risk of not actually panning out.   That said, I think that you contributed alot to this debate by forcing me to re-examine my preconceived notions and think hard. Thanks!

We could go C-17s/BC-X17s and most likely be on the production line for 2008-09.   Yeah, a couple of billion is a bunch a money, but I think that we are a rich country and that the overall risk is lower.

 

[a_majoor]

Like I said, we need to go with what's available. The "Airlift Consortium's" proposal is the same thing using civilianized C-17s. The big difference is the start up cost is immense, and the airplanes are not built yet. Since the government has shown no interest whatever, the Airlift Consortium is unlikely to purchase any C-17s, since there is little hope they could recover the cost through civvie charters.

 

[Kirkhill]

a_majoor: Which AC would you honestly prefer to fly in?  For me the answer is clearly the C17 variant.

Given that a week is a long time in politics and this Tsunami response has been a very long three weeks for the Government I think it may be too early to give up hope that Hillier/Graham/Goodale might not come up with something at budget time.  No idea what but I continue to live in hope.

Gobsmacked:  sorry I missed your earlier posts,  don't know what happened there.

One question that keeps coming up when considering a civilian carrier in this role is the impact on hostile activity on flight operations.  What kinds of limitations on AC usage is your company proposing in the event, for example, that CF kit and personnel need to be extracted from a contracting perimeter?

As to the question about flight hours.  While the study focused on CF flight requirements and thus we were going to have to fly empty AC in order to keep enough crew current to handle surge capacity, what happens if we consider having the Government "donate" those flying hours to Foreign Affairs to support International Aid activities?  Finance the flight hours through the Foreign Affairs budget.

 

[Wizard of OZ]

C-17 Globemaster III
The C-17 is the newest airlift aircraft to enter the Air Force's inventory. The C-17 is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or directly to forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft is also able to perform theater airlift missions when required.

The C-17's system specifications impose a demanding set of reliability and maintainability requirements. These requirements include an aircraft mission completion success probability of 93 percent, only 18.6 aircraft maintenance manhours per flying hour, and full and partial mission capable rates of 74.7 and 82.5 percent respectively for a mature fleet with 100,000 flying hours.

The C-17 measures approximately 174 feet long with a 170-foot wingspan. The aircraft is powered by four fully reversible Pratt & Whitney F117-PW-100 engines (the commercial version is currently used on the Boeing 757). Each engine is rated at 40,900 pounds of thrust. The thrust reversers direct the flow of air upward and forward to avoid ingestion of dust and debris.

The aircraft is operated by a crew of three (pilot, copilot and loadmaster). Cargo is loaded onto the C-17 through a large aft door that accommodates military vehicles and palletized cargo. The C-17 can carry virtually all of the Army's air-transportable, outsized combat equipment. The C-17 is also able to airdrop paratroopers and cargo.

Maximum payload capacity of the C-17 is 170,900 pounds, and its maximum gross takeoff weight is 585,000 pounds. With a payload of 130,000 pounds and an initial cruise altitude of 28,000 feet, the C-17 has an unrefueled range of approximately 5,200 nautical miles. Its cruise speed is approximately 450 knots (.77 Mach).

The design of this aircraft lets it operate on small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,000 feet and as narrow as 90 feet wide. Even on such narrow runways, the C-17 can turn around by using its backing capability while performing a three-point star turn. Maximum use has been made of off-the-shelf and commercial equipment, including Air Force standardized avionics.

The C-17 made its maiden flight on Sept. 15, 1991. The aircraft is operated by the Air Mobility Command with initial operations at Charleston AFB, S.C., with the 437th Airlift Wing and the 315th Airlift Wing (Air Force Reserve). The C-17 program is managed by the Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.


Service Life
Based on a buy of 120 aircraft, the last C-17 delivery will be in November, 2004. The original specification from McDonnell Douglas defined a service life of 30,000 hours. Modification programs will keep the aircraft in line with current and future requirements for threat avoidance, navigation, communications, and enhanced capabilities. These modifications should include global air traffic management (GATM) and automatic dependent surveillance to meet anticipated navigation requirements. Commercially available avionics and mission computer upgrades are being investigated to reduce life-cycle costs and improve performance. Also, upgraded communication systems to enhance worldwide voice and data (including secure) transmission will support command and control.

Specifications
Primary Function  Cargo and troop transport 
Prime Contractor  Boeing [McDonnell Douglas Corp.] 
Power Plant Manufacturer Four Pratt & Whitney F117-PW- 100 turbofan engines 
Thrust (each engine)  40,900 pounds 
Wingspan  170 feet 9 inches (to winglet tips) (51.81 meters) 
Length 173 feet 11 inches (53.04 meters) 
Height  55 feet 1 inch (16.79 meters) 
Cargo Compartment Length - 85 feet 2 inches (26 meters);
width - 18 feet (5.48 meters);
height - 12 feet 4 inches (3.76 meters) forward of the wing
and 13 feet 6 inches (4.11 meters) aft of the wing 
Speed  500 mph (Mach .77) 
Service Ceiling 45,000 feet at cruising speed (13,716 meters) 
Range  Unlimited with in-flight refueling 
Crew  Three (two pilots and one loadmaster) 
Maximum Peacetime Takeoff Weight  585,000 pounds (265,306 kilos) 
Load  102 troops/paratroops;
48 litter and 54 ambulatory patients and attendants;
170,900 pounds (76,644 kilos) of cargo (18 pallet positions) 
Date Deployed  June 1993 


What better aircraft is out there that our allies are using???? ummm none that comes to mind.  I bet we could get a lend lease  deal out of the americans for the new anti missle bases they need to build in our country for a couple of these bad boys.  Say about 10 maybe 15.  (on the wishfull side, i know but it is my post)