Should Canada adopt the LAV III (AKA: Stryker) as its primary armoured vehicle family?

[George Wallace]

Remember that an Ambush is set up to kill everything in it.  If it is set up to kill tanks, it will.  The amount of armour you have protecting you is never enough.  You have to use your head to stay alive.  If we don't have tanks, then we must learn to use whatever we have to the best we can.  If it is the LAV, then we will have to use it. 

In an Ambush, everything in the Kill Zone is covered by fire or mined.  There is no way that the forces caught in one should be able to get out.  If they do, then the chances of the Ambushers getting a "Clean Break" and escaping will be lessened.  So it is in their best interest to ensure that no one gets out. 

Will a LAV survive a properly placed Ambush?  No.  Many here have seen the videos from Afghanistan of BTRs being blown up into the air and all killed by double or triple stacked AT Mines. 

GW

 

[a_majoor]

Ambush/counter-ambush drills will have to be adapted for the LAV; some common sense stuff needs to be enforced (i.e. vehicle spacing), surveillance, intelligence and "bush sense" used to the max to sniff out potential ambushes before they are triggered, and agressive counter-ambush drills practiced to give everyone the best possible chance to make it out, or at least take down the bad guys.

LAV-TOW or sucessor vehicles will be important because of the surveillance capabilities. I can see two vehicles from the TOW troop/platoon standing local overwatch while the other pair leapfrog forward (an easier proposition than with Coyotes), and the Infantry travelling "one up", leaving the other two sections and any attached CSS vehicles one and two bounds behind. Considering there should also be recce platoon/troop vehicles forward and Coyote or UAV/Griffon overwatch, the enemy ambush will have to be dug in very deep indeed.....

 

[Zipper]

Question on ambushes?

Remember that an Ambush is set up to kill everything in it. If it is set up to kill tanks, it will. The amount of armour you have protecting you is never enough. You have to use your head to stay alive. If we don't have tanks, then we must learn to use whatever we have to the best we can. If it is the LAV, then we will have to use it.

In an Ambush, everything in the Kill Zone is covered by fire or mined. There is no way that the forces caught in one should be able to get out. If they do, then the chances of the Ambushers getting a "Clean Break" and escaping will be lessened. So it is in their best interest to ensure that no one gets out.

Is this entirely true now a days? If fighting a conventional force I would say yes. But since much of what is happening today is Gorilla ( I spelt that wrong) in nature. It seems it is only hit and run tactics that are used. So the fact that you take out even one vehicle and kill its crew means that it is a success. They know that any deaths are not going to go over well back at home, and thus to even kill one person is a win.

Yes this is not true in Iraq. But that fight is a much larger situation with a larger foe. The opponent is well aware of world issues and would know that Canada will not stomach such things as the Americans are right now.

 

[ArmyRick]

George, would M1s, leopard 2s or Bradleys survive a well placed ambush? No.

Heavy armour is not indestructable.

 

[George Wallace]

Army Rick

I think that is what I said.

Zipper

If you want an Ambush to be solely a Hit and Run Tactic, you had better make sure you have good cover to run away in.  I wouldn't call 'Hit and Run' tactics ambushing in the true sense of the word.  I would say that a properly run ambush will see the troops in the Kill Zone completely destroyed.  If they are not killed, you will land up withdrawing under their fire, and that most likely will mean that sooner or later you will have to expose yourself and become a victim of their fire.

 

[Zipper]

If you want an Ambush to be solely a Hit and Run Tactic, you had better make sure you have good cover to run away in.   I wouldn't call 'Hit and Run' tactics ambushing in the true sense of the word.   I would say that a properly run ambush will see the troops in the Kill Zone completely destroyed.   If they are not killed, you will land up withdrawing under their fire, and that most likely will mean that sooner or later you will have to expose yourself and become a victim of their fire.

Agreed. especially if you try to pull it off in anything other then an Urban enviroment. But considering that most of the attacks happen in the Urban enviroment, it is not hard to hit and run out the back door. Especially with those few seconds of confusion you buy yourself in the initial hit.

Heavy armour is not indestructable.

Your right. It isn't. But it sure as hell can take more then one (or two) hits from lightly armed (RPG's) insurgents. I don't think a LAV could say the same.

 

[Kirkhill]

Zipper, here's some light reading for you.  Maybe these aren't quite the urban deathtraps you are rightly worried about.


http://www.strykernews.com/archives/cat_32_brigade_news.html

December 10, 2004
Stryker vehicle performance passes muster with Army
Link to Full Article
By BETH IPSEN, Staff Writer

Army officials are pleased with the combat performance in Iraq of the Stryker vehicle Fort Wainwright troops are fielding as they work their way toward a combat deployment.

"It's fast, it's quiet and it tracks incredibly well on the snow," said Col. Michael Shields, commander of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Wainwright. "Soldiers have total confidence in the weapon system. It's incredibly accurate and lethal. It works very well in the Arctic environment."

However, Iraq is considerably warmer and more hostile than Interior Alaska.


The eight-wheeled infantry carrier vehicles are at the heart of the new brigades that are aimed at bridging the gap between a slower Army of the Cold War to a faster, more mobile and lethal force of the future. The eight versions in production weigh from 19 tons to 24 tons, which includes the 4,500-pound slat armor that was added to vehicles in Kuwait before they entered Iraq.

The vehicle, which is assembled by General Dynamics in Alabama, is not only quieter than its heavier predecessors, but has digital technology that feeds soldiers simultaneous information on the locations of both friendly and enemy forces.

"If you want to destroy everything in an urban environment, completely level it, then the M1 tank would be the perfect suited weapon or system," said Lt. Col. Karl Reed, battalion commander with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, which returned to Fort Lewis in October after spending a year deployed to Iraq. "This particular war is about balance. This particular war is about insurgents that mix with friendly forces and I think the precision is what's necessary in order to win this type of conflict and the Stryker gives you that."

Reed and other commanders from the first Stryker brigade that served in Iraq talked about instances in which the vehicle and the soldiers inside them survived rocket-propelled grenade attacks, roadside bombs and car bombs while fighting insurgents in Iraq.Soldiers from the Department of the Army headquarters in Washington, D.C., the 3rd Brigade and Fort Wainwright's 172nd held a video conference Thursday to talk about the Stryker vehicle for media at the different sites.

The conference was televised on a large screen set up in a heated tent that is serving as the 172nd's tactical operational center during a simulated combat exercise this week.

Lt. Colonel Gordy Flowers, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, said more than 50 percent of his Strykers were tagged by roadside or car bombs or hit with rocket-propelled grenades.

No soldiers in his battalion were killed in such attacks, Flowers said.

Lt. Col. William "Buck" James, battalion commander of the 3rd Brigade's 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, talked about a fight Aug. 4 with a large enemy force on the western side of Mosul, the third-largest city in Iraq.

The Strykers not only delivered his soldiers to the edge of the battlefield, but gave them up-to-date information on the location of the enemy, giving his troops the ability to strike decisively.

"I think, personally, in my experience in urban combat, the Stryker and the soldiers it delivered were the best force for that mission," James said.

It's these experiences that the 172nd is learning from before they take their turn in Iraq within the next year.

December 01, 2004
Army Finds Stryker Shines In Iraqi Combat Zone
The following article was published by Defense Today, which requires a subscription to view full content. We've included an excerpt below. Thanks to Fred for the article.

By Scott Nance

The Army's project manager of Stryker brigade teams gave the new vehicle high marks in its initial use in the war in Iraq.

Some 311 Strykers in Iraq have driven more than 3 million miles, according to Col. Peter Fuller.

Speaking yesterday at a conference in Washington, Fuller heaped praise onto the new platform for its mobility, survivability and other capabilities.

The first Stryker brigade was deployed in Iraq in October 2003, Fuller said. The Army recently used Strykers as part of its campaign against Iraqi insurgents in the city of Fallujah.

"They road-marched a unit down to support that operation," he said. "And then, when Mosul started to heat up, they ran them back up north. We are finding they are very mobile in the theater."

Stryker has also been "very survivable," Fuller said.

The vehicles have taken numerous improvised explosive device (IED) and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) hits, and "they keep on surviving," he said.

No IED attack has managed to penetrate the Stryker's hull, Fuller said, though he noted that one vehicle was lost due to a secondary fire.

The Army has been using a slat armor, referred to as a "bird cage," around Strykers to defend against RPGs.

"It's working very well," he said.

Fuller displayed a picture to conference attendees of a scene where an IED had exploded next to a Stryker, with the force of the detonation rolling the vehicle twice.

"No one was killed in this," he said.

Fuller also displayed a photo of the Stryker lost in that secondary fire.

"Everyone walked awayâ ”no one gets hurt in this," he said. "As a matter of fact, one individual jumped out and sprained his ankle when he was jumping out." [...]

To maintain the Strykers, the Army has embedded mechanics with the units, whether in the United States or in combat zones, Howe said.

"We're talking about mechanics being embedded in the combat units, just the way reporters were during the initial start of [Operation Iraqi Freedom]," Fuller said.

"They are absolutely embedded with the unit."

I had an opportunity to speak recently with one of the mechanics who was embedded with the 3/2 SBCT last year. He had some very good things to say about the vehicle after seeing it in action during the deployment.

And here's another link with more on the subject

http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4224092p-4014822c.html

Just another point of view,

Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

And another one - a letter to the editor in the Washington Times from a Recce Troop commander that got caught in an ambush himself and relates the results of another ambush in Mosul

There are other reports of Strykers with the cages surviving multiple RPG hits.

Curiously I noticed that when the Black Watch went north during the Fallujah offensive it had Cage armour on its Warriors.  These Warriors are already up armoured and were reported to have survived RPG strikes in the original assault on Basra and survived without the cage.


http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20050213-085725-4274r.htm

Letters to the Editor



Stryker brigades fit for duty
   
    I would like to respond to the opinions Col. Douglas A. MacGregor voiced in his letter to the editor ("Army transformation," Friday).
    First, as a commander of a reconnaissance troop in the Stryker brigade, I do not view myself as the leader of a "SWAT" team, as Col. MacGregor describes Stryker brigades. No offense to the members of those great organizations, but the mission I am trained to handle is far more complex. I am charged with conducting "full-spectrum operations," meaning everything from peacekeeping to high-intensity conflicts. Stryker brigades demonstrated the capability to accomplish these missions on multiple occasions in Iraq. True, there were days spent doing presence patrols of Mosul or handing out school supplies to needy children. But many days were spent conducting successful, productive raids on the homes and businesses of insurgents, as well as other direct-action operations.



 



    Col. MacGregor asserts that the "Army's generals have kept the Stryker land-combat vehicle out of urban fighting in places such as Fallujah and Najaf, where they would have sustained serious losses." To my knowledge, Col. MacGregor is correct that there were no Stryker units in those operations, but he's wrong on the reason why. When U.S. forces launched the offensives to retake those towns from insurgents, the battle-hardened, more experienced Stryker unit â ” the first Stryker brigade â ” had just been sent home after a year in Iraq. The replacement unit â ” the second Stryker brigade â ” had only been on the ground for less than a month. It was still in the process of becoming familiar with the situation and the conduct of missions there.
    As far as the belief that the Stryker would have sustained serious losses if placed in urban combat, I look to personal experience to refute this statement. While conducting escort operations in Baghdad, my convoy came under a well-coordinated combined-arms ambush: small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars. Intense fighting was sustained for some eight to 10 minutes â ” a very long time by close-combat standards â ” without the loss of any U.S. or coalition forces or vehicles. The insurgents lost multiple fighters that day. It was the last serious attack on a Stryker-escorted logistics convoy that I know of until we left Baghdad in early August 2004.
    A second and more telling ambush took place in Mosul on Sept. 5, 2004. This ambush include between 50 and 65 insurgents attacking one of my reconnaissance platoons â ” which consists of four Strykers â ” with no less than 100 rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and improvised explosive devices. Several of the Strykers took multiple RPG shots and continued to roll. Two RPGs hit the gunshield of a Stryker vehicle, causing superficial wounds to the trooper behind it. Remarkably, the trooper continued to fight and earned an Army Commendation Medal with a "V" for valor for his actions in heavy urban combat.
    In my opinion â ” and, I'm sure, in that of many others â ” the Stryker is a keeper.
   
    LARRY R. JORDAN, JR.
    Commander, C Troop 1-14 Cavalry
    Ft. Lewis, Wash

Cheers again.

 

[a_majoor]

It looks like I might have to modify my stand about the LAV III not being designed for the "Stand up fight" instead.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

In my opinion, the whole Stryker debate on both sides of the border focused on the wrong comparisons.  The debate seemed to focus on Stryker vs Tank (strategic mobility vs protection).  The real debate should have been Stryker vs HUMMVW or truck (comparable mobility and improved protection).  I'll say it again, I'd rather have an escort or QRF provided by LAVs, Coyotes or Strykers than HUMMVWs or G-Wagons.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed 2B.

It looks as if the real threat to the LAV-Stryker would be a weapon of 25mm or larger, which requires a vehicle, which would be detectable, which brings us up to conventional army tactics.  And tanks.

Bluntly put Tanks and Strykers should not be in the same battlespace.  But then again, they don't have to be.  LAVs and Strykers can run farther, faster than tanks on tracks or on transporters.  Therefore the issue is Situational Awareness at the Operational Level or what is the Armoured threat in theatre?

The other question that comes to my mind is the effectiveness of the Cage against even the ATGMs.  They and the RPGs share a common warhead - HEAT, that requires split-second timing to get the stand-off distance right to achieve effect.  How well does the Cage disrupt the ATGM, which is the next level of threat that might be found in an urban environment with a well-financed enemy?

 

[Zipper]

Good articules Kirk. Thanks

It would seem that I have to agree with 2B. The comparrison is not right. Nor should it be.

The LAV's are going to do a bang up job for those operations where you are dealing with people on foot with hand held weapons. To go back to Kirk and his ATGM question. I shudder to think.

So I guess I have to ask. Are we limiting ourselves to just these type of operations? Would we be able to participate in an action in Iran, Pakastan, Syria, or another of the ex-russian republics, with just the LAV's?

Would we be able to participate with our allies (with less then a 2 year upgrade) in a larger scale conflict?

I am still unhappy with our loss of capability (training in armoured shock tactics) and the fact that we are deluding ourselves into believing that larger conflicts in which we will be apart will never happen again.

Until history proves me right, the LAV is going to be it and will hopefully serve us well.

 

[a_majoor]

Its not that bad Zipper.

The LAV family is modular and adaptable, with the basic vehicle able to deal with small arms, and adaptable enough to carry different armour arrays to fend off different types of attacks. The cage is a clever, "low tech" way of dealing with a certain threat, but ceramic strike plates can be layered over vital spots, or steel stand off armour, or non explosive reactive armour, or even an active system like the DROZAD or ARENA systems can be added to the basic vehicle.

The real change is organizational; we no longer expect to "walk into" a fight and take it on the chin, but rather infer or discover where the enemy is and pre emptively deal with him. How effective this will be is anyone's guess, but even if we have a 50/50 chance of smoking out the enemy prior to his taking action, we are well ahead of the game.

If you take a close look at the "Objective Force" and FCS programs in the United States, they are taking it as an article of faith that a 20-30 tonne vehicle WILL be the equivalent of a 70 tonne M-1 in 2020. This is not "niche" but rather mainstream thinking on the part of the Americans. Assuming they can actually pull this off, we have the experience of several decades worth of light-medium force experience; and the reasonably close relationship with the US, so perhaps when it is time to retire the LAV III, the replacements will be members of the FCS family of vehicles, which we will already have a force structure and practical experience to take advantage of these attributes. Even if they haven't got it 100%, they will still be the most lethal 20-30 tonne vehicles in the world.

 

[Zipper]

LOL, I am melodramatic eh?

I guess I have little faith in this new concept of 20 being 70. Yes, we have the experience and are already trained in many of the aspects, but it still doesn't "feel" the same without at least 50 tons of armour around you. It is also the fact that I am old school Armour, and do not wish to see the Armour Corps death, nor its taking on a lesser role.

There is still a place for the "heavier" elements (not that we can afford them at the moment), and I just hope we are still around and do not need to learn everything from scratch again.

This is why I am liking Kirk's idea of the Armour having all the turreted vehicles (preferably with an up gunned/TOW turret) with the Infantry in the APC and other variants (TOW, etc). It allows the Armour to keep its roll and still be able to function as part of either the cavalry/recce team or the Infantry support team.

 

[Gobsmacked]

Kirk/AMaj,

Just to play devils advocate, don't forget the other side of the fence.
As I posted on the MGS SOR thread, as noted on the InsideDefence website
Headlines from Inside the Army,  January 24, 2005 - Vol. 17, No. 3
Don't forget that,
"As of early January, nine Strykers were either destroyed or rendered 'non-missiion capable' after hits from rocket-propelled grenades, bombs and small-arms fire.  Two were incapable of executing missions after rolling into a canal, and five were damaged in enemy attacks, according to a former service official."

 

[Kirkhill]

And if we are going there Gobsmacked then let's not forget British and American troopers that drowned when there respective Challengers and Abrams rolled off Canal Dykes. 

Same situation, different vehicle, same result.

This article talks about the early experience of the Brigade in Mosul.  They other articles talk about Stryker ops after about a year in Iraq.

April 03, 2004
Stryker Vehicles in Iraq

April 3, 2004: After four months in Iraq, the Stryker brigade up in Mosul lost its first Stryke[r] armored vehicle to an RPG attack on March 28th. Two RPGs were fired at the vehicle and one was not stopped by the Slat Armor. The vehicle caught fire and was destroyed. None of the crew were hurt. Only the driver was aboard, and he got out. The rest of the crew (an infantry squad) were on foot patrol at the time.

About half a dozen RPG rounds have previously been fired at the brigades 309 Strykers, only causing minor damage. Two Strykers were damaged when hit by a roadside bomb. Only one soldier was injured. Three Stryker crewmen were killed, back in December, when a Stryker rolled over when part of the dirt embankment underneath it collapsed.

The troops like the Stryker, mainly because it's faster than the M-2 Bradley tracked armored infantry vehicle that many of the troops had used earlier in their careers. The Stryker has a smoother ride and it is quiet. This has proved to be a significant advantage when going on raids, or just patrolling. The road wheels and metal pads of a tracked armored vehicle make a lot more noise. The Iraqis are unnerved by silent Strykers sneaking up on them.

http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/04/03/stryker_vehicles_in_iraq.html


The discussion on the site goes on to say that the reason the Stryker caught fire was one of the RPG rounds (the one that got through) actually didn't get through.  It ignited a can of fuel oil being carried externally.

Not to pick fights here but if we are going to reasonably evaluate prospects then all available info should be on the table don't you think?

Cheers

 

[Gobsmacked]

The argument about common logistics is cancelled out in true Canadian fashion by the retention and rebuilding of LAV I (6X6) and LAV II (Coyote, Bison) in the system. While I totally understand the impulse (desperation, since the government agreed to buy @ 400 of the required 1400 LAV III variants identified), it really doesn't help anyone except GD, who get nice contracts to do all this for us.

Here is A thought into what versions the other 1000 LAV IIIs "should" be: (add in the Reserve and there would be more than double the number)

LAV FS: a direct fire support vehicle carrying a small (60-90mm) high velocity cannon and a generous ammunition load (@ 40 rounds). The gun mount is high angled to deal with those annoying rooftop snipers in an urban fight. The same chassis is also available with a breach loading 81mm mortar (since you can pack a lot more 81mm mortar bombs into the vehicle as compared to the 120mm. Numbers do count).

LAV LOGISTICS: configured like a pick-up truck, would carry pallatized or modular supply packs to support the other versions. A "camper top" would be added for ambulance, CP, mobile workshop and other similar vehicles.

The false economies of buying small numbers of equipment is really the crux of the problems accepting the LAV and the entire "wheeled army" thing. (I am aware of the virtue of track, so please don't start  ;D). If enough LAVs were available, then the equipment would be familier; and more people could have the experience to make sensible suggestions for modifications, changes to doctrine and TTPs and so on. A big production run would also invite economies of scale, most of the reason LAVs are so expensive is they are essentially hand built.

This draws a number of threads together, and "perhaps" will stimulate some thinking in the procurment world.....

AMaj,
- In regards to your 1st para, just a slight correc on #'s -
The M-113LE CRS report notes that "Despite a move toward a predominantly wheeled fleet, life-extension of the in-use M-113 tracked vehicles was viewed as cost-effective and affordable.  (Especially in view of a protected Combat Service Support [CSS]) capability shortfall attributed to a decision to purchase 651 LAV-IIIs, against a stated requirement of approximately 1,800 new-wheeled (armoured) vehicles."  The urgent requirement for protected CSS in 'the three block war' that DND expects to find itself is reinforced by the US experience in Iraq which demonstrated that most CSS vehicles require provision of armour protection as there is no defined front line behind which CSS vehicles will operate.

As noted in a 2003 CFC NSSC 5 study paper, 'Not Fighting all the Fights', Col J.C. Collin shows that due to "THE LACK OF TOP-DOWN, PRECISE, CONGRUENT DIRECTION" some of the above noted wastefull spending need not have occurred.  "Three anecdotal examples will serve to illustrate the importance of this precise guidance...or lack thereof.  First, the CF's main battle tank, the Leopard, has just completed a refit program to obtain thermal imagery and greater accuracy [at a cost of Cdn$139 million] just in time to be placed in preservation, based on the current belief that the Army should be a wheeled and light armoured force, (plus the discovery of serious hull deterioration on 38 tanks).  Similarly, the Department is spending Cdn$366 million to life-extend the tracked armoured personnel carrier fleet (- just to prematurely retire them in 2005) - again whilst announcing a rapid transition to a wheeled fleet.  This paper will not debate the merits of the 'wheeled' versus 'track' decision, but simply highlight that such a drastic change in equipping philosophy [and thus capability] has been done without a national security policy or Defence White Paper that clearly articulates what is expected of the Canadian land forces.  Another example is the purchase of the Griffon helicopter which neither meets the needs of the White Paper, Strategy 2020, or the Army's requirements for the future battlefield.  At a cost of Cdn$1.2 Billion (actually Cdn$1.097B), the need for clear top-down guidance beginning with a national security policy is clear, (especially considering 13 of these relatively new platforms have been declared surplus to requirements - a Cdn$142.61M waste).  These arguably needless projects are examples where long-term policy would better focus acquisition.  As one somewhat frustrated Lieutenant-Colonel in the Directorate of Land Requirements at National Defence Headquarters announced: 'From my own experience the greatest challenge the Army has faced in the past has been to sort out what we want given the available funding and not change the entire plan every second year . . . Buying equipment takes 5 to 10 years [or more!] on average and if you keep changing your mind all the time you do not get anything at the end of the day.' " 

To the above examples must be added the 1990s ill-considered Cdn$278M LSVW procurement, plus the 100x Cougars that recently underwent depot level inspection and repair (part of the AVGP Cdn$230.4M life-extension reft - yet another example of 'Lack of Direction'), but have been prematurely retired and replaced by G-wagons for Militia close recce, plus planned premature retirement of Leopard I Badger AEV - delivered from March 1990 for Cdn$51.521M - if the CF eliminates its MBT fleet.  This is without even counting the untold Cdn$ Millions spent during the mid-late-90s in acquiring advanced AHEAD ammunition, acquired for the 35mm/Skyguard II air-defence combo - purchased in 1989 (as part of the Cdn$1B LLAD acquisition of 36 ADATS, 10 Skyguard II radars, and 20 twin-35mm GDF-005 guns) and now deemed surplus to requirements, for well over Cdn$978M wasted on Army related procurements in just the past decade.  Surely not a sign of forward thinking force planning.  :blotto:

The 12 Dec 02 BN 'Strykers for Canada' provides recent Army Transformation costs.
"Canada is in the process of taking delivery of 651 new 8x8 LAV-III Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles [AIFV] at a cost of approximately Cdn$2.327B and not so long ago took delivery of 203 Coyotes [8x8] at a cost of approximately Cdn$882.8M.  When the new LAV-IIIs and Coyotes are combined with the approximately 500 Bison [8x8] (199 acquired for Cdn$100M in early-90s) and Armoured Vehicle General Purpose [AVGP] 6x6 Grizzly vehicles soon to be re-roled and life extended at a cost of approximately Cdn$230.4M.  Canada will be close to having a completely wheeled mechanized force.  Canada will continue to operate 289 Life-extended M-113 tracked APCs in a Combat Service Support [CSS] role."

"With the exception of a wheeled Direct Fire Support Vehicle with adequate firepower . . . to date, approximately Cdn$5.340B has been spent procuring and upgrading the Army's wheeled armoured vehicles.  Used a rough estimate of Cdn$2.0B for the initial procurement costs of the 500 remaining Grizzly, Husky, Bison and Cougars."
Another recent pre-MGS 'Transformation' cost was the Leopard IC2 Thermal Sight project completed 11 September 2001 for Cdn$139M (final Cdn$200K payment committed in FY 2004-05), that included 18x Gunnery Trainer Simulators - under a Cdn$14M subcontract.  Additionally, as part of the Cdn$630M Omnibus ISTAR project, Cdn$93M is being spent to Enhance and integrate Existing Sensors on: ADATS (during MMEV v2 conversion); LAV-III; LAV-Recce Coyote; and Skyguard air defence radar, Cdn$44M for C4I, plus Cdn$123M to Enhance EW Sensors on Bison EW variants (per Spring 2003 Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, ISTAR Primer).  To this must be added Cdn$68.97M for 1,061 'Silverado' Light Utility Vehicles Wheeled (LUVW) from Nov 2002, and Cdn$130.44M for 1,159 G Wagons and 180 Armour kits from Oct 2003, as part of the Army Transformation effort, Aug 2004 Cdn$22.85M LAV-TUA upgrade, plus the now-defunct Cdn$366M M-113/MTVL life-extension upgrade, for an overall to-date Army Transformation vehicle cost of a Whopping Cdn$6.65B.  This does not even account for the: Cdn$691M MGS project, proposed Cdn$136M TOW Missile acquisition, planned Cdn$400M MMEV-ADATS, 'Interim' Cdn$96M MAVS acquisition, and planned Cdn$210M Coyote Life Extention project costs, or premature LSVW Cdn$150M replacement, basically an additional Cdn$1.68B in Army Transformational vehicle costs (nearing Cdn$8.33B total), whilst still leaving the army with a protected CSS "capability shortfall".  Also, not including the Cdn$6.1-million August 2003 contract awarded to General Dynamics Canada for the development and evaluation of a Multi-Mission Virtual Vehicle (MMVV) as part of the Multi -Mission Effects Vehicle [MMEV] technology demonstration project.

[Unfortunately, an April 2003 DND report by CRS notes the "Low Risk" (as with MGS) M-113 Life-extension ran a to-date Cdn$95M cost-overrun for a total cost of Cdn$366M, with project completion "on track at March 2007", and some 200 M-113/MTVL upgrades completed by 2005.  The reduced 289 M-113/MTVLs are a "substantial 29%" vehicle reduction from originally planned 406 x M-113 Life-extension, with a 40% cost increase per vehicle ("assuming the project remains at Cdn$366M, the per unit vehicle cost will have risen from Cdn$0.9M [Cdn$366M/406] to Cdn$1.26M [Cdn$366M/289]" each), while "at this stage, there remains little margin for error as all contingency funds have been committed".  Even the much touted 'expenditure review' that accompanied the back-loaded 2005 budget increase notes that Accelerated Retirement of the tracked M-113 fleet "in line with Army transformation objectives", after spending between Cdn$366M to Cdn$328.479M (as identified in the 2004-05 RPP - with Cdn$311.542M spent by 31 March 2005) on upgrading the fleet, only saves a minimal "Cdn$24M Total" by 2009-2010 ("FY: 06 - Cdn$3M; 07, 08 and 09 - Cdn$7M each") when Cdn$5.7B of the Cdn$12.8B increase kicks in.

Even though just 289 M-113A3 / MTVL variants are currently being upgraded for the CSS role, 'Jane's Armour and Artillery' notes DND "awarded a Cdn$215M contract to DEW Engineering and Development of Ottawa for the M113 APC-LE programme.  United Defence LP . . . is the main subcontractor, and was awarded a Cdn$147M contract by DEW for the supply of 156 M-113A3 upgrade kits, and 174 upgrade kits for the stretched MTVL version, engineering data and integrated logistic support."  Therefore, even though DND has paid for 330x M-113 upgrade kits (Cdn$0.445M each) and integrated logistics support, DEW has 41x unused M-113 upgrade kits in stock that DND has paid Cdn$18.245M for.  A mixed tracked-wheeled fleet provides some flexibility when terrain and/or weather conditions limit the deployability of the wheeled LAV-III.


- As to your 'LAV FS' - I suggest the twin-120mm turreted AMOS mounted on the 8x8 LAV-III chassis, those meant for the ADATS (due to the 'Top-Heavy' issues noted elsewhere) in the guise of an AMOS MMEV-FSV (Multi-Mission Fire Support Vehicle).  AMOS (Advanced MOrtar System) twin-120mm MMEV-FSV on LAV-III, with twin, breech-loading, semi-automatic mortars capable of achieving 14 multiple rounds simultaneous impact (MRSI) out to 10 km, is preferable vs GDLS 120mm Armoured Mortar System (AMS) with its much slower rate of fire (4 MRSI) and requiring twice as many vehicles (and PY) to deliver equivalent firepower.  AMOS, with its computerised fire-control system capable of 'scoot and shoot' techniques, also has an impressive maximum rate of fire stated to be 26 rds/min.  AMOS on 6x6 XA-203 has a demonstrated loadout of 90x 120mm mortar bombs (ie. 84x HE & 6x Strix PGMM - with 30x of these rounds stored in the turret bustle), the 8x8 LAV-III chassis should easily surpass this loadout and handsomely beat the limited 18x 105mm round ammo capacity of the MGS.  The streamlined AMOS turret also incorporates stealth characteristics.
[Note: I'll present a separate post expanding on this when time permits later in March.]


- As to the 'LAV LOGISTICS' - see below:
The wasted Cdn$978M noted above could, for comparisons sake, have covered the procurement of 300 CSS LAV-III CSV, plus over Cdn$348M for other high-priority projects.  At DNDs valuation of "Cdn$2M per (basic) LAV-III chassis", plus Cdn$30M in NRE outfitting costs, some 300 LAV-III CSV variants could have been acquired for Cdn$630M - providing the Army a protected, wheeled CSS CSV fleet that would fully interoperable with the current fleet, and reduce logistics costs, whilst enabling equivalent mobility to US Stryker brigades.  As a NZ Army logistics officer, responsible for developing the 1st line CSS organisation to support their newly acquired LAV3's, noted elsewhere "it is only recently with the lessons learnt from Iraq and Afghanistan that CSS A-line security has started to be taken seriously, after all it is no good having a fleet of top of the line LAV 3's as your teeth, if the tail is naked" (ie. unarmoured).  As previously noted, the requirement for protected CSS vehicles, in 'the three block war' that DND expects to find itself, is urgent as there is no defined front line behind which CSS vehicles will operate.

The 15 October 2003 'JDW' noted "Details have been revealed of a dedicated logistics support variant of the General Dynamics Land Systems (Canada) Australian Light Armoured Vehicle [ASLAV] that will enable fast-moving and far-ranging Australian Army cavalry units to double the duration of combat operations remote from support echelons.  Known as the Combat Support Vehicle [CSV], the 8x8 vehicle was developed several years ago be the Land Systems Division of BAE Systems Australia and has since undergone trials with the army's 2nd Cavalry Regiment across northern Australia. . . . Based on a Type 2 ASLAV hull, three to four CSVs would typically be attached to a cavalry squadron. . . . In addition to increasing the endurance of the squadron from two days to four, the CSV, with the same mobility and protection levels as the standard ASLAV, removes the need to return to forward arming and refuelling points for resupply.  The semi-permanent installations in the CSV require no modifications to the base vehicle and make use of the internal volume in what is normally the rear troop compartment.  To undertake the replenishment mission, the CSV is fitted with two 650-litre tanks for diesel fuel and racks for carriage of twenty 20-litre jerrycans for water or petrol, oils and lubricants.  Additional replenishment items such as ammunition and ration packs can also be carried.  An internal rail system mounted on the underside of the hull roof permits the two-person crew to move jerrycans along the length of the vehicle under armour protection."

Acquisition of the AMOS MMEV-FSV would provide an opportunity to inexpensively redress some of the CSS mobility shortfalls as the 24x Bison LAV-II (w\ boxy capacious compartment and hinged roof hatches - ideal for CSS conversion) 'Wolf' 81mm (turntable mounted) mortar carriers (that would be replaced by AMOS MMEV-FSV) that could be re-roled to a CSS Combat Support Vehicle [CSV] role to support the five LAV-II Coyote Recce squadrons, as this would enable a logistically compatible LAV-II fleet in the Recce sqns.  Meanwhile, transfer the 24x 81mm 'Wolf' turntable mountings to all-terrain BV-206 carriers to enable comparable dedicated Company-level mortar support (as presently provided by the dual-tasked LG1/81mm artillery batteries) to the three light battalions - or LAV-III companies operating in a 'light' role, until such time that a lightweight-120mm mortar is acquired.

SUGGESTED:
BDE Recce Sqn {9-27-157} 197 PY  [w\ 27x COYOTE, 2x LAV-TUA, 4x BISON CSV]
SHQ {4-3-12}19 PY
    Comd {2-2-4}- COYOTE x2 (command, remote-tripod)
    SHQ Sec {2-0-4} - LAV-III CP; GRIZZLY CP
    Sigs Sec {0-1-4} - LUVW; GRIZZLY (Radio Relay) x2
    Anti-Tank Sec {0-2-6} - LAV-TUA (Overwatch/AT)
(x3) Recce Tp {1-4-27} 28 PY - COYOTE x8 (2x mast, 4x remote-tripod, 2x command);
Close Recce Tp {1-3-20} 24 PY - LUVW G-Wagon x8
1st Line CSS Admin Tp {1-7-38} 46 PY  [Note: based on interpolation of DF Sqn Admin Tp]
    Comd Section {1-3-3} - COYOTE (command); GRIZZLY CP; MLVW,
    SQMS {0-1-2} - LSVW; MLVW,  Medical {0-0-3} - BISON AMB,
    Tpt Section {0-1-16} - BISON CSV x4; MLVW x1; HLVW x2; HLVW POL x2,
    Food {0-0-2}- MLVW w/ Kitchen Trl,
    Maint Section {0-2-12}- BISON MRV; BISON MRT x2; GRIZZLY MRT x2; HUSKY ARV.

Note: Addition of: 2x LAV-TUA, 4x CSV, close recce troop, plus additional: COYOTE (command); and radio relay, address Recce Sqn structural issues raised in recent past issues of the 'Armour Bulletin' by numerous Armour experts, while CSV addresses the Sustainability/Survivability issue, thus allowing a fully armoured LAV-II-based A1 support echelon for improved battlefield mobility/survivability.
CSS excerpt noted below by the previous Corps Adjutant RCAC in v33:
"SUSTAINABILITY.  Reconnaissance forces can expect to be in operations for extended periods of time.  The concept of resupply well forward of friendly lines and perhaps behind enemy lines has always been of great concern.  The administration troop is normally divided into A1 and A2 echelons.  This organisation of B vehicles has a self-defence capability limited to small arms and some handheld anti-tank weapons.  It is a very vulnerable target on the battlefield.  The introduction of the Coyote has placed a strain on the administration troop.  The troop organisation has changed little while the squadron equipment has changed drastically with the implementation of the Coyote, certainly in the area of ammunition requirements.  During intense and prolonged operations the squadron will require frequent resupply of combat supplies, ie. ammunition, POL.  Therefore, the administration troop will be moving continuously and will be susceptible to enemy observation and destruction.  Further, the troop, as organised, has insufficient lift to carry the ammunition required."


Kirk,
As to the situation of the Canals, I agree they are just as deadly to tracked as to wheeled. 
The point I wanted to make was that LAV is Not Invulnerable, just like Tracked, they can be destroyed, even in the Non-Combat (in the traditional Red vs Blue sense).  Definitely Not something any 'US Army Approved' News Item or Press Release will hype up or even fully acknowledge.  As you say, all available info should be out there.
For some non-conformist opinions, besides POGO, check out  http://www.g2mil.com/Spring2005.htm

But I agree, for Patrol against Aysymetrical forces (without Tanks or other Armoured vehicles) the faster/quieter LAV is Ideal - But not suited for Combat, especially the MGS which is not (in US service) even tested/trialed/equipped in Anti-tank role.

 

[Zipper]

I guess we have to just answer the question then. Should the LAV III be the "sole" armoured vehicle?

When it comes to Wheeled vehicles. I'd say yes. Lets have economy of one chasis to support and have variants within that.

Should it be the only one? NO! I believe we will eventually HAVE to have tracked vehicles again. Whether that is anothr MBT or something like the CV90, Bradley, or some such I do not know.

 

[Infanteer]

Now I know we have a 20 page argument on the LAV chassis, but this is a simple question.

I see the link to the Aussie ASLAV fleet that Kirkhill provided (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/2cav/newgear.html) shows that they use 3 varients:

The ASLAV 1 (our Coyote) which is the only version fitted with a 25mm turret.

The ASLAV 2, which is a turretless LAV III and requires a crew of 2.

The ASLAV 3, which is the recovery and maintence/fitter varient.

Would our mechanized force benefit in terms of O&M costs, training requirements, parts, ect, etc if we binned the Bison and all its varients and adopted the turretless LAV III as a general purpose vehicle?  Out LAV fleet would resemble the Aussies to some respects in that we have:

- Coyotes
- Turreted LAV III
- Specialty LAV III (recovery, maintenance, engineering?)
- General Purpose LAV III

The eventual goal would be to eliminate the Coyotes (as the turreted LAV III can fulfill that role) and move to a single chassis - perhaps by this time frame we might be moving beyond the LAV III anyways to either a FCS-type light tracked system or a SEP-like modular wheeled system.

 

[Zipper]

I agree. But would you want our forces to resemble the theories already being discussed in the "light" threads?

This is what I would like to see:

Infantry

All light

Cavalry (Armoured) This would almost be a combined arms unit

LAV III (General) To haul either infantry or supplies
LAV III Turret (Upgunned and with TOW with some staying with 25mm and coyote capability)
LAV III Maintence/recovery/engineer
LAV III TUA/Morter/MGS (both of these handled by RCHA) either/or all of these.

I don't know what the role of the RCHA is right now with the lose of the M109, but it would give them three great vehicles.

Arty

105mm/morters/etc.

But if not. Yours sounds good too. ;D


Scrap all other chasis (AVGP, LAV II) and stick with the one until we eithre look at getting another entirly, or wish to expand our capabilities by adding track.