Senate Committee Report Excerpt: "Creating Real Reserves"

[Dissident]

Well, before you hoist 15 MP as the paragon of all that the Reserves could be, remember that they're filling a very specific role, with very specific limitations.  Could 15 MP deploy en masse - tomorrow - to an operational theatre to conduct policing duties?  I suggest not.

By the way, you earlier suggested that there's a relationship between 15 MP Coy and 1 CMBG.  There isn't.  15 MP Coy works for 1 Area Support Group and is the only Reserve Force unit in that formation.

That's not exactly what I am saying. I am not trying to say that we are the end all be all. My point is that with resources and commitment, there is disproportionally more that can be done with militia units, not just 15 MP coy. But then, asking a reservist to drop everything for a possible year long commitment at the drop of a hat is at the crux of the misemployement of the reserve. With enough warning(a year and a half?) I guesstimate that our company could generate the manning for a platoon, for a roto. As far as "policing" duties goes, I will not comment on that, as it seems everyone as a different opinion on the definition of "policing".

And yes, that was a mistake, I did mean ASG, not brigade.

 

[Echo9]

So, let me get this straight Guy- you don't mean to flame, yet you state things in the most blunt and offensive manner possible.

OK.  Reg/ Res flame wars are counter productive, but there are a few items that I want to correct from your jeremiad:

1.  Training for reservists is not poor.  I would say that it's uneven.  The quality of training that's received by a reservist in one unit can be markedly different from that in another.  I would suggest that from my experience, there are some Areas that are conducting training that is completely relevant, others not.  There's also the impact of parading differences- guys who miss training are obviously below the curve.  One word of warning that I would give you is that things have changed substantially since you were reserve, and probably changed since you were RSS.  Be open to that possibility.

2.  The delta is not the same for different trades.  Clearly, where the reserves are going with the armoured cavalry is concerning, in that they are developing a skill set that may be useless in the current environment.  I've had gunners mention to me that the delta for tube arty is almost negligible between reg/ res.  The one key delta that exists that is not easily bridged is that of physical fitness. 

3.  The comment about relying on the reserves for force generation is a fair one.  However, I'd suggest that if you're looking for the budget vs. deployability balance, you've got bigger fish to fry.  If I look at a recent piece in the army journal (who knows, you may have even written it), the Reg F ratio is around 60% (HQ) to 40% (deployable) to 10% (deployed). Not really a huge difference, particularly when you consider that the Res non-deployable number costs a heck of a lot less than Reg F HQ.  Oh, and I should note that the 60% number doesn't include green suits in purple chairs, and doesn't include the huge cost of DND IT systems, which were designed by consultants looking to maximize the feed off the public teat (that's my area of civy expertise, and it burns me that we waste so much there).

4.  The workup training serves to even out most of the delta between Reg and Res skill sets.  Yes, there's an experience and leadership gap, but it's not unbridgeable.  My own unit has had Sgts, WOs and a MWO on op tour in Afghanistan, a couple of whom returned home with commanders commendations. 



Look, we'll both agree that the army is underfunded for the jobs that it's being asked to do.  That shows up in the number of pers in the field force, the number of vehicles (losing regimental fleets is an embarrasment), doctrinal disasters (pioneer/ mortar), high levels of res augmentation for regular achievement of op tasking.  No question, there needs to be probably at least 2-4 more regular infantry battalions, and the existing battalions need to be rounded out to full strength to just maintain the current pace.  Add to that probably 4 int companies and 2-3 engineer regiments (or 8-9 squadrons).  Let's not even get started on the mess that is the logistics trade these days.


Ultimately, I guess that where this ends is whether you believe that there's a place for anything other than a standing full-time, professional army to achieve the defence needs of the country.  Nothing that I'm going to say is likely to change an opinion once formed.  The thought that I'll leave you with is that there are three major wars with a lot of evidence that the part timers can make all the difference.

 

[SuperTrooper]

PPCLI guy, I think you should state what trade is weak in the resF, the arty is equal in most respects.

As for job protection, well that sounds great, but I don't think it works for the guys who are self employed or run they're own biz.

My beef with some guys in my unit are the ones that are to scared/can't get a real job who end up being class b, but, not enough nerve to go reg, that part I just don't get.

I know for a fact that when your all gung ho and doing your part, they love ya, soon as you get your life together and have a civ job, they can't be bothered with you.

RSS staff being bad, I would disagree, I would say 99 % were and are an excellent bunch that I came across.

Reg vs Res, well its black and white to me, I look at it like the NHL vs Farm team, some people have to untwist they're panties and come to grip.

I don't speak for all but these are my observations of 14 years res which totals 4 yrs 123 days reg, + or - a couple.

 

[Infanteer]

The thought that I'll leave you with is that there are three major wars with a lot of evidence that the part timers can make all the difference.

I thought we got rid of the Militia myth?  CEF or Special Force doesn't really equal "part-timers".  Can we focus on "now" and not a 50 years ago during national mobilization....

 

[Gunnerlove]

So I get called up for a year, push back my retirement by a year, take a huge pay cut and tank my career.

So, what's the down side? Oh right my unit is down an instructor while I am deployed.

Check please.

 

[Echo9]

OK, so I vented last night, here's my thinking on the original proposal.

On the whole, I think that it's pretty uncontroversial.  The 18 months for a tour isn't really a big change- we're already pretty much doing that.

Some of the suggestions would be helpful for us in simply managing our less committed soldiers- the max time to get trained and such.

Employer protection is a mixed bag.  If you want to be able to compel reservists to go on ops, then it's a must.  If we maintain the volunteer approach, then it's utterly unnecessary.  In my experience with being compelled to be on ops, employer issues were non-existent.


Oh, and Infanteer- while you're absolutely correct that the bulk of the troops were callups off civi street, the leadership was formed from the part timers.  I'll leave it as an open question whether those lessons still apply- I'm just not as prone to dismissing it as you. 
I also wouldn't compare it to NHL vs farm team.  In that case, there's a clear talent difference.  The comparison only makes sense if there are NHL caliber players who choose to play on the farm team for reasons other than the on-ice factors.

 

[SuperTrooper]

OK, how about ice hockey vs field hockey then.

 

[John Nayduk]

We will be kicking this kind of thing around for ever and not everyone will agree, ever.
How about this, we train the reserves on all the basic soldiering skills to give a solid foundation.  Then, when needs are identified, they fill a spot and get the mission specific training during the work up that the whole Task Force goes through anyway.  Of course they have to go through the trade training but with all of the basic soldiering skills required (including advanced first aid, patrolling, force security, FIBUA, weapons handling, etc) there is more then enough things to train in the 37.5 days allotted for the average reservist.  Since we will not be deployed on formed sub-units but only as individuals, why not concentrate on solid training to give a solid foundation to build on?

 

[Rockhound]

Some have questioned my stats of 80-90%... this is what I am familar with

In the King's Own Calgary Regiment (an armoured regt) - By all those of a said rank who have NOT done at least one tour:

Sgt - 1/ WO- none (several have done 2 tours)/ CWO, MWO - none (ex reg too)/ Capt -1 / Maj - 1 (1 has done 3 tour, another has done 2/ the one who has not been overseas was a Coy Comd for Op Perigrine)

I won't get into a breakdown of how many of each rank we have but suffice it to say my percentages are low.

When I look across the parade square to the Calgary Highlanders, the percentages may be lower due a larger influx of new people in each rank, but not much...

My arguement may breakdown with a walk through 41CBG HQ, or another unit, but I am keeping my arcs on what I know...

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Right, and I can point to units where none of the officers and/or Sr NCOs have a tour.  The KOCR - a unit I'm familiar with - has had some success (for a variety of reasons) getting senior personnel overseas in staff positions, but they're hardly indicative of the Reserve Force as a whole.

Another Recce Guy:  +1

 

[Echo9]

Trying to get the thread back to the topic at hand here-

One idea that should perhaps be considered is a greater level of integration reg/ res, so that what is currently a component transfer and is very administratively heavy becomes more of a "sign the dotted line" type of affair.  The bigger gain, to my mind, is the reg to res CT, since it serves to maintain at least some of the experiences within the core knowledge.  This kind of thing would also mean that the notion of the class B bum would disappear- as soon as you've signed on to an extended contract, the terms of service are the same reg & res.  Reg F service would be seen more in terms of a contracted service period (I know, it already is) rather than a distinct entity from Res service.

The reason that the above is becoming attractive to my mind is that there is already a class of reservist emerging that's more Op Tour experienced than many Reg F.  I've got a handful of people in my unit alone who have been on multiple tours (one got 3 in a period of 2.5 years).  The other key factor, of course, is the hemorrhaging of the Reg F field units. 

The other side of this is increasing the "stickiness" of res F service following a Reg F contract.  While most sign on to the sup res, that doesn't really do much good in any foreseeable scenario these days.  It also has the potential of bolstering what is currently the greatest weakness of res units- senior leadership.  There are relatively few units that don't have succession problems (even if they have succession, it's a straight line, without much choice).  Greater stickiness would have the potential of addressing this problem, and at the same time increase the level of proficiency of those who go on tour.

 

[Osotogari]

Much of this navel gazing comes from the fact that post-Cold War and pre-9/11 the CF was gutted by Mulrooney and then Chretien as part of the so-called  peace dividend.  May both of those fine gentlemen rot in hell under unmarked graves.  As a result there wasn't a big mission to take to the Canadian people, and as a result the first thing to suffer in budget cuts was training, specifically reserve training. 

The biggest problem is the CF is the only part of the federal government that is on a war footing, but that does not imply that the entire CF is itself on a war footing.  Put in a damn order in council and organize this thing properly instead of making commitments and then trying to find the guys, and get the entire system behind it.     

As far as reserve augmentation goes, it is still being done the same way since the 1980s, ie., the extemely long pre-training that is characterized by inactivity and cap badge politiking that makes it a relief to actually step on the plane to go to theatre.  As an NCO with a family and a mortgage, that entire pre-training bladefest is more of a disincentive for me than any thought of getting wounded overseas.  In my mind that is the big issue, not job protection.  I am a tradesman from Alberta, I can find work when I get back no problem, even in the unlikely event the price of oil dips below $35/barrel.   

As far as the integration of reservists goes, I have courses that were under the "Total Force" concept as well as integrated Reg/Res PLQ Mod 6 and DP2B Inf, so I assume that in a tour I could at least keep my rank.  The problem goes higher in that with my DP3 level, I have no option but to take watered down reserve courses.  This seems to me that the reserves are still perceived as a threat by someone in Ottawa  and that institutionally the regular force still wants to preseve the caste system in which we continue to work.  To be another blunt infantryman, the message that sends to me is that reservists are fine as 2ICs but don't bother if you want to be anything more. 

 

[John Nayduk]

Further to my last.
As far as job protection goes, why can't the government use a system that is already in place.  They ensure  job protection for new parents.  Why not do the same for a reservist?  When all is said and done, the reservist needs about a year for work up training, the tour and repatriation.  The argument that no one will hire a reservist, in my opinion, doesn't fly because every new hire is a potential new parent and they still get hired.  I think that employers have accepted the paternal leave issue so for the small number of reservists it would not be a major issue in a vast majority of the cases. 
Couple the training to give the reserves a solid foundation to build on during work up training and a protected year off for the tour and you can get reservists that you can use where and when you need them.
And yes, I acknowledge that there must be a way for reservists to train in their trade and advance through the ranks.  And since we talking about a way for every reservists to do a tour, why not also make a tour a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant or major.  This will ensure that the leadership of the reserves has course knowledge AND real tour experience.  I also think that the army should be able to call up reserve members and give them the "shit or get off the pot" option.  Go on tour or get out.  That will leave the people who are useful and not just in for the beer money.  In the end, we'll have a reservse force that is flexable, usable, and in time, experienced. 

 

[Bobbyoreo]

I like it!!!

 

[cplcaldwell]

The other side of this is increasing the "stickiness" of res F service following a Reg F contract.  While most sign on to the sup res, that doesn't really do much good in any foreseeable scenario these days.  It also has the potential of bolstering what is currently the greatest weakness of res units- senior leadership.  There are relatively few units that don't have succession problems (even if they have succession, it's a straight line, without much choice).  Greater stickiness would have the potential of addressing this problem, and at the same time increase the level of proficiency of those who go on tour.

I think there is another thing to look at here. This is a bit of lateral thinking in a way (or a thread hijack if you prefer...), as it illustrates this concept of Res/Reg integration.

Too often we think of Res/Reg integration as a way to get the Reserve tradesman 'up to speed' on gucci Reg force kit/methods. It's a 'move the Reservist up' mentality not a 'Move the Regular down' mentality (I know, that's a flawed analogy... bear with me...)

The point made above is that Res F units often suffer from succession problems, and that even if sucession does exist it's linear. This means that too often (Cl A) Maj Longname gets the corner office at his Res F Regt even if he's a bag. The outcome is virtually assured.

On the other hand. My unit has been extremely successful in the last little while, not in spite of succession 'problems' but rather because of them. A couple of rather senior Majors retiring in the last six or eight years may have seemed to have been leading 'us' to a rut.

Now I understand from my position of lowly grandeur that my perception of this may be skewed but I would rather like to dwell on this following point...

'We' have been extremely fortunate, at my unit, to have had talented serving Reg F LCols appointed to command. The knowledge and presence of such individuals greatly enhance the Res F unit. In addition the 'knock on' effect of having a 'pro' at the helm greatly enhances the Cl 'A' types (at all levels).

When one couples this, with as Echo9 precisely pointed out, ex Reg members, and again my unit is very fortunate to a have couple of these folks as well, the effect is really quite something to behold.

So how about it? how many Reg F officers are out there, chained to a desk, who would like to 'downgrade' for a quick posting to a senior position at a Res F unit?

How would such a phenomenon enhance the Res F?

 

[Brad Sallows]

The question of employment protection is answered by the earlier posts which underscore the meaning of "militia".

If we don't have a reserve capable of providing formed elements and the political will to deploy them as such, then regardless of the "delta" the requirement for employment legislation doesn't reasonably exist.  To select individuals and invoke a legislative provision to mobilize each while protecting his job passes a threshold of ridiculousness.

Whatever our formed mobilization base militia gains us, it isn't a useful standing augmentation force for expeditionary operations short of national mobilization.  For those, we work within the means of our Regular Forces.  If we need more of that capability, then we need more Regular Forces.  We know the vast majority of useful reserve augmentation to meet operational needs is found at the ranks Pte-MCpl and Lt, and is by individuals.  I grant there are also domestic administrative needs which chiefly require higher rank levels.

The "delta" between the 37.5 day part-timer and the regular is much vaster than it was in 1989, let alone 1939.  I expect there are potential Curries and Hoffmeisters out there in the senior militia leadership, but they are much more likely to be the officers and senior NCOs with at least one operational deployment under their belts.  There is too much on the plate now for it to be otherwise: the professionally-minded militia officer or senior NCO should be striving to learn and retain at least a basic familiarity with operations from peace to war, domestic to foreign, national to combined, elemental to joint.  There is more than just a canned GenForce enemy to consider.  It will of necessity be almost entirely theoretical.  All of it is on top of mastering and applying the institutional administrative burden applicable to militia units, and arguably not less important than the latter despite what the institutional system formally and informally measures.

It adds up to a militia that could be suited to immediate employment for (and only for) Public Welfare emergencies and limited roles in Public Order emergencies, depending on organization and equipment.  Otherwise, the militia functions pretty much as just a screening service for potential regulars, a holding pen for a few deployable people who like to move between full-time and part-time service, its own bureaucracy, and the organizational equivalent of a heritage building that is almost impossible to renovate.  If those alone are not worth the cost, then the militia should either be scaled down to what is worth keeping or beefed up to standard for the aforementioned domestic emergencies.

 

[dapaterson]

Cpl Caldwell:

Why does your unit need a LCol?  Unless you're 55 Svc Bn you're never fielding more than a Coy worth of trained soldiers - most reserve units, if tasked to provide a single trained coy, would fail, lacking the regularly parading soldiers to do so.  Keep in mind that a significant portion of the Army Reserve at any time is not yet DP1 qualified, and thus not employable militarily.

Perhaps the Army Reserve needs to take a long hard look in the mirror, and ask why 200 LCols parade regularly to command 16000 (all ranks).  Maybe we can (gasp) admit that Majors can command - and let them command.  The Comm Res has had some success in instituting reality on its units, having appropriate ranks to command their units.

The constant push to get "the next CO" means that Reserve officers often lack experience in their ranks, and also means they never get true command experience; a LCol in command of a company (no matter how it is grouped) is still just a company commander.

The CLS provides a very limited pool of Reg F officers to a small number of reserve units that have succession problems.  But it's the same units time and again that draw on that pool.

Maybe it's time to admit that Canada's Army Reserve doesn't really have 51 Infantry bns, and downsize the RHQs in consequence.  Keep the cap brass, but admit that the unit is a company, and group it under some new HQ element.  This would also let us thin out our 10 CBGs - how about seven: two out west, two in Ontario, two in Quebec (with one of those two picking up the NCR units) and one down east.  Hell, we could increase the size of the CBG HQs by 40% and still be ahead.

But as long as we try to maintain our illusions of regiments on the ground, we'll keep on having the illusion of leaders .

 

[17thRecceSgt]

As an outsider, looking in, I could never understand why Reserves should be considered anything else but p/t Reg Force and trained up to the level that they can transition in and out seamlessly. I assume it was largely budget constraints that initiated it, and then the mentality  set in, but I am probably wrong on the whys.

What matters now, is "what happens now?"

As an aside, are you aware that Senator Kenny (L) is retiring at age 65 (I think next year), even though he could stay until age 75? What this means is that he no longer (if he ever had to) constrain himself from saying it like it is.

Late comer to this thread, and haven't read it all but I wanted to put this in here.

In '95, I was in Ft Knox for SIMNET stuff.  We were using the mess with the Armd Cav troops, on their "QL3" course (sorry, not sure what the Yanks call it...).

I was a MCpl at the time, unable to get an AVGP qual because our unit didn't have them (tell that to your Tp MCpl at TSS the summer before...head scratchin' and "wha?" was the response...).

I was talking to the Cav troops at our table.  One across from me was a "Reg Frce" guy, the guy next to him was a NG type.  Both on the same course (M1 gunner or something like that).  Same course.  Same standard.

We don't necessarily do that here in Kanada-cain.  Like I said, I was in TSS in '94, a MCpl told me me "hop in that Cougar, we are moving it out of the hangar".  I had to tell him I wasn't AVGp qual'd and couldn't be because my unit didn't have AVGP so I couldn't be trained on it.

Its the mindset that needs to change.  No a Res soldier will not be as competent and trained as a Reg guy, how could he be??

But we are "trained" to a certain extent, and can be further trained.

I find the "tours" in the Reg frce units, they will take the "troops" from the Res but not the NCOs.  Not that they should.  Everyone should be lead by the best in theatre, right?

But...there are spots that we (Res NCOs) can and are filling.  CIMIC...PhyOps...etc.

 

[17thRecceSgt]

i agree with what PPCLI GUY says . he and I are former reservists who then went reg and then served with the reserves as cadre. the reserves are good for basic material but in most cases they will still req more training to bringthem up to speed on the latest op tempo . we cfannot blame them as they are generally as good as the system will allow . that is to say with the training days all scattered . attendance at  the spring concenttraion camps are a good way to bring standards up and together.

maybe you might want to PM me or PPCLI GUY and ask what qual we have to say that . its not to flame them . they are hamstrung by basic fact. some over come it and some dont

Thanks for that Axeman, seriously.  Every troop is only as good as the time and training that they get.  We Res ones typically get way less (32 days a year IIRC) funded training.  Not bad on the basics, but the basics don't cut it in places like the sandbox.

Nicely put IMHO.  I appreciate it when someone who came from the Res can appreciate our challenges, and know first hand the delta that exists in training and capabilities.

 

[dapaterson]

There are unfortunately still a large number of folks who don't want one army, one standard for courses - and most of them are senior reservists.  "Too long"  "Too hard to recruit folks for those courses" or, my favourite, "RESO officers are too much like the Reg Force".

I fail to see the logic in piecemealing out courses in two week chunks, so we can recruit who?  That's right, the folks who lack the time to commit.  Perhaps it's just me, but why create a training system designed to bring in folks who lack the time to effectively commit to the Reserves.

There will always be experiential deltas between Reg and Res.  But especially at the DP1/DP2 levels we can create a training system that delivers the same quals to both Reg and Res.  It may mean we'll have to abandon some trades in the Res F as being not cost-effective due to the training burden.  But we will end up with a much more solid base to build on - so that the core skill sets are the same.

Nationally the areas are funded for about 37.5 days per soldier in the Sept-May timeframe.  Unfortunately, Areas are rarely challenged when they spend those funds in other areas.  It's the same with Indiv training funds - the money disappears into a black hole at the Area level (though some holes are blacker than others).

Enough rambling for one night...