Replacing the Subs

[GR66]

Recent news regarding the defence cuts notwithstanding, I will continue to move forward with the thought that the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project will continue because of the potential boost to the Canadian Defence Industry and jobs. Not with the actual building of the submarine, but the components that would into the vessel, and the future upgrades and modernization that would occur after it has been in service.

Excellent article with regards to the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. I'm not an expert about submarine operations and technology but the final choices that came through the filters did surprise me.

Existing Submarine Designs That Could Meet Canada’s Needs​

As the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project considers how to best replace the Victoria-class and deliver the military capabilities that Canada could need in this period of great-power conflict, it might find it useful to understand how well existing platforms deliver those capabilities. Canada’s path to replacing the Victoria class could be easier – both in cost and schedule – if existing designs are able to deliver Canada’s preferred capabilities.

While Canada has not formally announced its requirements for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, public comments indicate that Canada’s requirements may include:

• Diesel attack submarine (SSK)
• Operating range of 6,000 nm
• Under-ice capability
• Interoperable with the U.S.’s Virginia-class combat system (leveraging Canada’s prior investment in this system)
• An established, persistent parent navy (to reduce Canada’s in-service support burden)

Using publicly available information, we assessed 41 allied navy submarine designs against these potential requirements (Figure 1), identifying 3 submarine designs that could meet Canada’s potential requirements: Japan’s Soryu and Taigei classes, and South Korea’s KSS-III class.

If valid, this assessment has potential implications for Canada’s approach:

• Canada’s potential requirements may not be commonly found together, implying that Canada might need to be flexible on requirements (e.g., under-ice capability, persistent parent navy), willing to engage in a limited-competition procurement (e.g., 1 or 2 bidders), or able to shoulder the design-build cost of a new, bespoke design
• The combination of SSK and under-ice capable is relatively rare – many nuclear submarines can operate under-ice, but not many diesel attack submarines can
• Several potentially attractive designs have not been built (e.g., Shortfin Barracuda, Type 216, A26-ER), and Canada would likely incur additional costs due to first-of-class cost growth and the in-service support burdens that fall to a parent navy
• If only 3 operating submarine designs meet Canada’s potential requirements, there may not be an opportunity to buy a “used” submarine (like Canada did with the Upholder / Victoria), potentially forcing Canada into a more expensive acquisition of new submarines

Figure 1. Comparison of 41 allied submarine designs with Canada’s potential requirements.

Conclusion

It is possible that the requirements that best meet Canada’s needs are a rare combination: few navies need to cover Canada’s extent of Arctic territory, and those that do (e.g., Russia, U.S.) choose to do so with nuclear, not diesel, submarines. Understanding the implication of requirements on available designs could help the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project optimize Canada’s capability needs, schedule requirements, and available budget. Conversely, setting requirements before understanding which existing designs are feasible could put Canada on the same path that Australia recently abandoned: a prohibitively expensive, bespoke, diesel submarine.

This article discusses arctic capable submarines in a Chinese context but they are equally applicable to Canada.

Despite the seeming potential for an Arctic (or “Near-Arctic”) capability, AIP systems will likely continue to be insufficient for the harsh requirements of the Arctic environment. They are fairly low-power and do not appear capable of propelling submarines at high speeds for long durations, making their increased endurance more suitable for extended loitering missions within a relatively small area, rather than oceanic transits and distantwater patrols, as would be the case for any Chinese boat attempting to reach the Arctic. Even if an AIP submarine reaches the Arctic Ocean, air access would remain essential for when the AIP fuels are exhausted. Air-fed diesel operations will continue to constrain where and how such submarines could operate under ice. Indeed, the constant search for polynyas or transient leads would dominate AIP sub planning and areas of operation.Furthermore, non-nuclear submarines tend to be smaller than their nuclear counterparts, which reduces the mass with which they can push through the ice cover when surfacing.12As a result, despite the narrowing gap in underwater endurance between AIP and nuclear propulsion, the latter remains necessary for any Chinese Arctic-capable submarine. In the context of the PLAN submarine force, this means that of the current fleet of 66 submarines, the 55 that are diesel-electric-powered are unsuitable for Arctic operations. Although nuclear submarine numbers are expected to grow to thirteen SSNs and eight SSBNs by 2030, any level of continuous Arctic presence would cut into this small force by at least 15% assuming the highly unlikely probability of 100% availability. As we have previously argued, given the limited land attack and sea denial opportunities available in the North American Arctic, this would be a poor use of resources.

The article goes on to discuss many of the design requirements in building a submarine capable of breaking through the ice (and the risks involved).

Then there are the difficulties of operating in an under-ice environment while also remaining undetected

Because of the difficulty and potential damage from surfacing through ice, submarines try to avoid it when possible. As such, one of a boat’s chief navigational concerns is keeping track of polynyas, thin ice, and open leads. This consideration means equipping submarines with upward-looking sonar or light sensors, which allow a boat to detect thin ice, at least when sailing directly beneath it. The ever-shifting nature of leads, and to a lesser extent polynyas, means that any submarine seeking assured access to the air above will need to continually map the underside of the sea ice with these sonars, potentially revealing their location to enemies, despite the relatively short range of these sonars. In areas of thinner ice, light-based sensors can accomplish the task with greater stealth and, as such, the equipping of vessels with that technology is a potential indicator that a submarine is being prepared for Arctic operations. The risk of discovery through the use of active navigational sonar also applies to the journey to the Arctic. Chinese submarines would need to traverse the narrow and shallow Bering Strait to reach polar waters and those geographical constraints are an important consideration. As a submarine attempts to make its way through the confined waters of the Bering Strait, it encounters not only the relatively shallow bottom, but –especially in winter – compressed sea ice above that reaches down for dozens of metres below the surface in the form of ice ridges and pinnacles. This unpredictable “ice jungle” defines the Bering region (as well as other marginal ice zones) and requires specialized systems. A safe path has to be identified using the boat’s obstacle avoidance sonar, systems that are also used to look for underwater mines. As with the upward-looking sonar search for polynyas, the use of such forward-looking sonars, combined with the Bering Strait’s narrowness, makes submarines vulnerable to detection. Any Arctic submarine would therefore have to be equipped with both upward- and forward-looking navigational sonars, generally mounted on the sail, in order to operate successfully in the region. While specialized equipment is essential, optimizing an Arctic submarine is also a matter of size. In peacetime, transits through the worst of the ice jungle can be made without much trouble. In a wartime environment, however, it becomes more difficult because of the need to minimize active ice-avoidance sonar and transit at greater speeds. A quick transit is also safer and easier for smaller craft, a conclusion that the US Navy’s Arctic Submarine Laboratory (ASL) came to decades ago. Waldo K. Lyon, ASL chief and father of the US Arctic submarine program, argued that contrary to Cold War trends, smaller and shorter submarines would have a dramatic combat advantage in the marginal ice zone. Their ability to sail between and under the ice both allows them to hide from other submarines and position themselves for an attack. Cold War torpedo trials showed the difficulties of tracking and identifying targets in the ice jungle, owing to interference with sonar signals. Meanwhile, a submarine already within the ice could more reliably achieve an accurate torpedo track on a submarine that was outside the ice. A submarine built to maximize its ability to fight in ice-covered waters would be relatively small, closer to second generation American SSNs like the 292-foot Sturgeon class than the current 362 foot Los Angeles, 353-foot Seawolfs, or the 377-foot Virginias (increased to 460 feet for the future Block V variant). A smaller diameter hull would also be favourable, as it reduces the clearance needed to sail safely between ice keels and the seafloor, increasing maneuverability as the boat banks during turns. Such maneuverability would also be assisted by retractable auxiliary motors, enabling the submarine to move with much greater agility at low speeds between ice keels. Such motors were employed by the Sturgeons to position themselves under polynyas in preparation for surfacing and have since been installed on all American SSNs to assist with docking and special warfare missions.

If Canada gets SSKs (AIP or not) I don't really see us planning on any extensive under-ice operation. Much more likely we will patrol the choke points leading out from under the ice and use alternative sensors to detect foreign subs trying to operate in the narrow confines of the NWP. So I think that makes the original article's filters for "Arctic near-ice Capability" and "Under Ice Capability" somewhat meaningless.

I'm also guessing their classification of their selected subs meeting these filters contains much more fantasy than reality based on the design requirements for under ice operations that are noted in the link I provided. I doubt either the Japanese or Korean subs have included the type of design features that are required for extensive under-ice operations.

 

[Happy Guy]

Interesting perspective, from an American think tank. I like the use of a filter, though I'm a bit confused by the "Favored Nation" filter eliminating the Koreans. Not sure if that term used here refers to a security or a commercial arrangement, but if it's commercial, Canada does have a free trade agreement with Korea, so perhaps it does not apply?

Canada and Korea have had a free trade agreement since 2015.

Canada has a free trade agreement with Korea, and many Canadian goods imported into Korea are not charged tariffs. While Korea charges tariffs on goods from its other trading partners equally, Canada does not pay any tariffs at all because the free trade agreement overrules the most favoured nation principle. As a result, Canadian goods enjoy a competitive advantage in Korea.

 

[Happy Guy]

This article discusses arctic capable submarines in a Chinese context but they are equally applicable to Canada.

The article goes on to discuss many of the design requirements in building a submarine capable of breaking through the ice (and the risks involved).

Then there are the difficulties of operating in an under-ice environment while also remaining undetected

If Canada gets SSKs (AIP or not) I don't really see us planning on any extensive under-ice operation. Much more likely we will patrol the choke points leading out from under the ice and use alternative sensors to detect foreign subs trying to operate in the narrow confines of the NWP. So I think that makes the original article's filters for "Arctic near-ice Capability" and "Under Ice Capability" somewhat meaningless.

I'm also guessing their classification of their selected subs meeting these filters contains much more fantasy than reality based on the design requirements for under ice operations that are noted in the link I provided. I doubt either the Japanese or Korean subs have included the type of design features that are required for extensive under-ice operations.

I am admittedly out of my depth here as I'm Army, but with a interest in submarines. I believe that the RCN needs submarines with some Arctic near-ice and Under-ice capability in order to convince the gov't to procure them. You can monitor choke points with satellites but surface ships can wait for them up top, however you risk having submerged submarine evade detection. In order to truly monitor ship and submarine traffic up north you will need satellites, surface ships and submarines.

Cheers

 

[GR66]

I am admittedly out of my depth here as I'm Army, but with a interest in submarines. I believe that the RCN needs submarines with some Arctic near-ice and Under-ice capability in order to convince the gov't to procure them. You can monitor choke points with satellites but surface ships can wait for them up top, however you risk having submerged submarine evade detection. In order to truly monitor ship and submarine traffic up north you will need satellites, surface ships and submarines.

Cheers

Combined Arms doesn't only apply to the Army

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I am admittedly out of my depth here as I'm Army, but with a interest in submarines. I believe that the RCN needs submarines with some Arctic near-ice and Under-ice capability in order to convince the gov't to procure them. You can monitor choke points with satellites but surface ships can wait for them up top, however you risk having submerged submarine evade detection. In order to truly monitor ship and submarine traffic up north you will need satellites, surface ships and submarines.

Cheers

And some form of underwater monitoring system (A la old SOSUS nets type)

Combined Arms doesn't only apply to the Army

If you call that combined arms, then navies have been doing it forever.

 

[Underway]

I am admittedly out of my depth here as I'm Army, but with a interest in submarines. I believe that the RCN needs submarines with some Arctic near-ice and Under-ice capability in order to convince the gov't to procure them. You can monitor choke points with satellites but surface ships can wait for them up top, however you risk having submerged submarine evade detection. In order to truly monitor ship and submarine traffic up north you will need satellites, surface ships and submarines.

Cheers

Here is my response to under ice operations on another thread and I think it will illuminate you regarding Under Ice and why its too dangerous.

First, a submarine needs to always be able to surface quickly in case of an emergency. Any minor issue can quickly become a major one if you can't get to the surface. I think given the history of RCN submarines we can all understand that.

In order to surface a submarine through ice without power requires 100's of tons of reserve buoyancy. Basically the submarine must be more buoyant than its own full weight plus the 100's of tons of ice it needs to push through. What that means in practical terms is that any submarine that wants to surface through ice either needs a thin piece of ice not weighing much or it needs to power through the ice. DE do not have the power to break through thicker ice when running on batteries (or likely diesel's either).

The next thing is that all submarines have two hulls (or three in some cases). The inner or pressure hull which is designed to withstand the pressure of the dive and the outer or "casing" hull which is not watertight and provides a hydrodynamical shape for the submarine. The casing is used to mount equipment, like sonars, which if attached directly to the pressure hull could cause unnecessary stress. The pressure hull is much heavier than the casing and generally made of high grade steel.

The Victoria class casing (as an example) is made of fibreglass, stainless steel and other materials and coated in anecoic tiling. A Victoria class trying to break through ice would severly damage the casing, rip off sonars, destroy and damage the mast, periscope and some antenna. This would be particularly damaging should the submarine should it hit an ice inclusion which might even crack the pressure hull.

Given this information DE submarines (of any nation) should never go under ice. Even with AIP. Its way to dangerous. Near ice is fine. Nuclear boats go under ice because their casings are often made of steel, titanium etc... which can withstand much more damage ice would cause while surfacing. They have enough power to blast through the ice in an emergency. And they have more reserve buoyancy given their size.

That filter posted earlier needs to completely remove under ice operations as a filter, as well as favoured nation and US Combat System. Then you need to all a filter that says "being built now or soon". I'm kinda a fan of the German Type 212CD right now and the KSS-III. Two very different submarines with pro's and con's to them.

Combined Arms doesn't only apply to the Army

This is what we call JARMY talk. There is not such thing as combined arms in the naval environment because there are no separate "arms". Its called normal naval operations. Navy doesn't think like anyone else.

 

[KevinB]

$6b earmarked already for the P-8A’s. There will be no Cdn Subs without a dramatic revamp of the your budget.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

$6b earmarked already for the P-8A’s. There will be no Cdn Subs without a dramatic revamp of the your budget.

Oh please….

Like we are actually going to buy P8s, either….

 

[Good2Golf]

Oh please….

Like we are actually going to buy P8s, either….

Granted we’ll be directed to buy V-280s after we buy the P-8As…

 

[Happy Guy]

If only, oh if only the Cdn gov't .....

£4 Billion UK contracts progresses AUKUS submarine design ​

Next phase of next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine is underway

UK businesses will be behind the design and manufacture of the world’s most advanced submarines, following the awarding of £4 billion of contracts today [1 October].

The signing of the Detailed Design and Long Leads (D2L2) Phase with BAE Systems (BAES), Rolls-Royce and Babcock represents a significant milestone for both the UK and the trilateral AUKUS programme as a whole, in the lead up to build the future class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, known as SSN-AUKUS.

The contracts totalling £4 billion will progress the programme through the design, prototyping and purchase of main long lead components for the first UK submarines, allowing construction to commence in the coming years and ensure the stability and resilience of our domestic supply chain.
Building on more than 60 years of British expertise in designing, building and operating nuclear-powered submarines, the D2L2 contracts will support thousands of highly skilled jobs in the UK – a clear demonstration of how the AUKUS programme supports the Prime Minister’s priority to grow the economy.

Alongside the design development and long-lead procurement, infrastructure at the submarine shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness and the nuclear reactor manufacturing site in Raynesway, Derby will be developed and expanded where needed to meet the requirement of the future submarine build programme.

The aim is to deliver the first UK submarines into service in the late 2030s to replace the current Astute-Class vessels, and the first Australian submarines will follow in the early 2040s. They will be the largest, most advanced and most powerful attack submarines ever operated by the Royal Navy, combining world-leading sensors, design and weaponry in one vessel.

Construction of the UK’s submarines will take place principally in Barrow-in-Furness, while Australia will work over the next decade to build up its submarine industrial base, and will build its submarines in Australia with Rolls-Royce supplying the nuclear reactors for all UK and Australian submarines.

 

[Kirkhill]

Meanwhile, in Taiwan

Notable in the final video that Canada is given some props for assisting in the development of this sub. Short range diesel-electric.

Hai Kun-class submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Apparently between the 212s and the 216s. About the size of the Dutch Walrus at 2500 tonnes, may be related to the earlier Dutch Zwaardvis.

In April 2018, President Donald Trump approved the technology transfers that would enable Taiwan to build its own submarines

In May 2020, the United States Department of State approved the sale of 18 MK-48 Mod6 Advanced Technology Heavy Weight Torpedoes and related equipment to Taiwan for an estimated cost of $180 million

The UK government has granted licenses to companies to export some £167 million worth of submarine technology and parts to Taiwan,

In November 2021 Reuters reported that Taiwan had recruited engineers and retired submariners from the US, UK, Australia, South Korea, India, Spain and Canada to work on the program and advise the navy

The boats will be assembled using Japanese construction techniques in Taiwan. A Japanese team consisting of retired engineers from Mitsubishi and Kawasaki Heavy Industries is believed to have provided technical support.[15] Reportedly, a version of the AN/BYG-1 submarine combat management system, used in US Navy nuclear submarines, is being offered to Taiwan.

The first of eight.

 

[OldSolduer]

Meanwhile, in Taiwan

Notable in the final video that Canada is given some props for assisting in the development of this sub. Short range diesel-electric.

Hai Kun-class submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Apparently between the 212s and the 216s. About the size of the Dutch Walrus at 2500 tonnes, may be related to the earlier Dutch Zwaardvis.







The first of eight.

Taiwan's subs "no one saw coming".,

Isn't that the point - to not see them coming??

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I don't see us getting 8 subs, but 6 would be nice. That means 2 operational subs, two working up/training and two in some sort of refit. So one operational sub with a backup on each coast. 8 would be better but it is unlikely we can man 4 operational subs at once and we have the above, but with 2 in hot layup at anytime. The plus on that is you stretch out the lifecycles on the whole fleet. Plus can do deep refits without much operational effect. We could even station a sub overseas for a bit and fly the crews to it.

 

[QV]

Do we even deserve to be sovereign at this point?

For a country on three oceans and with the longest coastline in the world, having only two operational subs at any time is pathetic. We should be a major naval power.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Do we even deserve to be sovereign at this point?

For a country on three oceans and with the longest coastline in the world, having only two operational subs at any time is pathetic. We should be a major naval power.

With 15 CSC and 6 KSS-III plus 3 AOR's we would be a fairly powerful navy. Most countries struggle to man or keep operational their entire fleet at once. Even the Germans with one of the most successful sub export programs going, had all 6 of it's own subs tied to the wall awaiting repair.

 

[QV]

With 15 CSC and 6 KSS-III plus 3 AOR's we would be a fairly powerful navy. Most countries struggle to man or keep operational their entire fleet at once. Even the Germans with one of the most successful sub export programs going, had all 6 of it's own subs tied to the wall awaiting repair.

One of anything may as well be none.

 

[KevinB]

With 15 CSC and 6 KSS-III plus 3 AOR's we would be a fairly powerful navy. Most countries struggle to man or keep operational their entire fleet at once. Even the Germans with one of the most successful sub export programs going, had all 6 of it's own subs tied to the wall awaiting repair.

I think you need to accept 9 CSC and 2 AOR at this point baring a drastic change in Canadian culture.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I think you need to accept 9 CSC and 2 AOR at this point baring a drastic change in Canadian culture.

You're probably right...

 

[KevinB]

You're probably right...

Also these times are where I don’t enjoy it.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think you need to accept 9 CSC and 2 AOR at this point baring a drastic change in Canadian culture.

I can dream, ok........