• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Reconstitution

VAC ETB is 40k after 6 years full time, 80k after 12, but after release or transfer to the Supp Res.
There is no requirement for it to be full time. It just has to mathematically add up to the same number of days.
 
Not sure about the NavRes and their health and effectiveness. I know from the ARAF world, RCAF reservists are, generally speaking, former Reg Force mbrs with experience and knowledge in their trade. They have the same Quals from the same TEs as the reg force mbr…they just work 12-14 days a month vice every day. They can and do deploy with no need for XX month “work up” trg.

This is why I have been harping, for years, on the fundamental difference be a Home Guard Militia and a properly constituted Reserve. Ex-Regulars are a valuable commodity that should be husbanded. Keep them around at all costs. They can be both your training cadre for the Militia and augmentation to the Regular Force. The Air Force in particular seems to have an effective working model.

The Militia, with the best will in the world, can not compete with either Regulars or Reserves (Ex-Regs). On the other hand, with a different outlook and organization it can take on a lot of those jobs that the Regs are asked to do that are not frontline fighting positions. Your boss is calling for additional disaster relief resources. I would interpret that as more logistics and comms resources. That means trucks, pumps, chainsaws and radios. With enough military training to manage personal defence and first aid.

If a Militiaman wants more excitement than putting out Forest Fires then he or she can sign up on a short contract with the Regs and retire back into the Reserves, with additional benefits, when that time is up. Or pursue a career with the Regs or the Militia cadre.

This is very Army centric. The RCN and RCAF have everyday tasks to complete with highly complex and expensive machinery. We need full time people and a bank of reserves to augment them.

This might be completely stupid (and is definitely army centric) but this issue got me thinking about other models, and the one that came to mind is the Finns. Small core of regulars, Fixed pool of active 1 year conscripts, fixed pool of reserves (last year's conscripts), massive militia pool from all prior years.

Conscription isn't going to fly, and I don't think that excessively restricted regular core is what we should be looking for, but- what about taking that graduated fixed term service, planned turnover model and applying on a smaller scale it in a way that fits in our society?

There are 300k+ Grade 12's in Canada every year, call it half that will do College/Uni. Paid education to get officers is great, but what about lowering the ask from a 2:1 service ratio to capture a short term, high tempo (relative to current PRes) pool of entry level NCM's?

Proposal- contracts for 1 year of service plus 1,2, or 3 (depending on school duration) 4 month summer stints, maybe with a couple of weekends sprinkled in. Bill it as high adventure guaranteed summer employment with partial tuition subsidy- no post grad strings attached- rather than a pact to give your 20's to the army. Have a proactive plan to use this pool to flesh out a designated unit(s) to full strength every summer, in the 8 months between summers the assignments of this pool/ these units remain static on the books for recall purposes in a time of war.

When the contract is over you have 4 exit streams - apply for a commission, enlist as NCM, find a PRes spot, hang em up. With the two RegF options members (and recruiters) would be encouraged to take their education into consideration and consider any trade CAF wide that they might be qualified for.

I don't like conscripts. I prefer the Danish homeguard. Entirely voluntary.

I would consider rejoining the CAF as a Reservist but the CAF would need to make the conditions more amenable for me to consider it.

1. I'm not screwing around with PLAR assessments and quals. I'd be willing to do a reorientation/familiarization but I'm not going back to the School house to redo DP 1. Whatever, it's not worth it.

2. I need to be reinstated at my previous rank. I'm not taking a pay cut to work for you again, especially when my current job pays me way more per hour than you do.

3. I'm not waiting around for you to get around to enrolling me. If it takes six+ months, forget it. My time is valuable, don't screw with it.

4. I want my VAC benefits I earned from my Reg Force service still. That 80k+ for education is mine and if it's off the table because I join the Reserves, forget it. You clearly don't care about my experience or knowledge if that's the case.

This is just dumb. An unserious organization (although I struggle to call it that) playing silly buggers.

But I do believe that the original sin is in the Regular Force co-opting the Militia as a Reserve Force. The Militia terms of service are entirely unsuitable for generating a proper Reserve. On the other hand keeping in touch with ex-Regs, to fall in with their mates on systems they trained on, shouldn't be that hard to figure out.

The Militia are not Reserves. The CAF and the Government have the ability to create Reserves from released soldiers quite easily - and engage them on the same terms are the RCAF and the RCN.

And if the Militia feels that it leaves them out in the cold - well at least you will have one common set of problems to address independently of the desire to create a functional reserve for a cost effective force.

And, to keep the Honouraries happy you could always lump a couple of companies/squadrons/batteries of Reserves of ex-Regs together with a bunch of Militia companies under one Regiment for local administration.
 

About one-third of Veterans are of core working age

In 2021, 461,240 people were counted as Veterans (see note to readers) in the census. This 2021 Census count is lower than the modelled estimates produced by VAC. Several factors may contribute to this difference. The census information is mainly collected through self-enumeration, which is a different method than the modelling employed by VAC. Also, the census provides a snapshot of the population at a specific moment in time (May 11, 2021). For more details, please refer to the Canadian Military Experience Reference Guide, Census of Population, 2021 and the summary technical report: Veterans data in the 2021 Census of Population.

Key findings about Canadian Veterans from the 2021 Census so far​

A clearer picture of Canadian Veterans has already begun to emerge with the release of 2021 Census data on the population as a whole by age, gender, living arrangements and place of residence.

Results show that almost one-third (32.0%) of all Veterans counted at the time of the census were in the core working age group of 25 to 54. Forthcoming census data on labour, to be released in November 2022, will enable analysis of Veterans' experiences in the labour market after their years of service.


32% of 461,240 is 147,597 between the ages of 25 and 54.

There is your Reserve Force opportunity. Most of that will have slipped through fingers by this time but a Reserve Force target of 150,000 over time should be achievable. What would it take to draw Humphrey and his mates, those that have been out for less than seven years, back into the fold? You seem to be releasing at the rate of 5 to 10 thousand per year. 7 years of recovered releases would create a Reserve of 35 to 70,000 in short order.
 
I don't like conscripts. I prefer the Danish homeguard. Entirely voluntary.
Neither do I. But I do like the idea of tailoring a service model to a stage of life that meshes well with both
A-a high volume of potential recruits
B-a more rigorous training/operational tempo than allowed by someone with a full-time job

500 per year = 1000-2000 Privates, Troopers, and Gunners trained and organized to fill out @FJAG 's hybrid ABCT
 
Which means that about 90% of Class A reservists (Twice the Citizen) don't qualify.

Depends on how long they have served for, and how often they parade. It's not unheard of for some Class A people to do over 100 days Class A days a year. It might take a bit longer, but there are still a number of people who would qualify for it. On top of that you would have the Class B crowd as well.
 
Neither do I. But I do like the idea of tailoring a service model to a stage of life that meshes well with both
A-a high volume of potential recruits
B-a more rigorous training/operational tempo than allowed by someone with a full-time job

No argument. But I'll choose carrot over stick every time.

I would also ensure that the volunteers be given a choice of an array of terms of service - including ones that appeal to those that want to help but don't want to kill. A Conscientious Objector company in every Regiment?
 
Depends on how long they have served for, and how often they parade. It's not unheard of for some Class A people to do over 100 days Class A days a year. It might take a bit longer, but there are still a number of people who would qualify for it. On top of that you would have the Class B crowd as well.

Any Reservist parading more than 100 days Class A a year is usually a double dipping retired Reg F Officer/SNCO who needs the money for the second divorce, so probably qualifies anyways ;)
 
No argument. But I'll choose carrot over stick every time.

I would also ensure that the volunteers be given a choice of an array of terms of service
Fully voluntary. In this case the carrot is the terms of service. Full-time employment for gap year before going to school, guaranteed off-term employment every summer until graduation, maybe throw in a 10% per tuition subsidy per term for every 4 month block of service (4 to 6 depending on the length of post secondary program).
 
Any Reservist parading more than 100 days Class A a year is usually a double dipping retired Reg F Officer/SNCO who needs the money for the second divorce, so probably qualifies anyways ;)
I know quite a few Pte-Sgt with no prior service who hit this mark every year, many of which are in their 20-30s.
 
In any case, it's quite clear that the three elements have vastly different needs in terms of part-timers and there is no need to even attempt to build symmetrical reserve systems. In that sense, it is perfectly sensible and normal that a discussion on the Army's reserves would be ''Army-centric''.

Regarding the ETB for reservists; there's plenty of reservists who take a number of Class B or C contracts for 6 months to 3 years. The Class A days can easily top off the remaining days on the counter, especially if they take part in Exercises and DOMOPS (Laser, Lentus).
 
In any case, it's quite clear that the three elements have vastly different needs in terms of part-timers and there is no need to even attempt to build symmetrical reserve systems. In that sense, it is perfectly sensible and normal that a discussion on the Army's reserves would be ''Army-centric''.

We have a plethora of threads for that.

This is supposed to be CAF reconstitution, not another "how done fix the reserves" thread.

I get that some think the ResF is the way forward, but less not go completely down that rabbit hole yet again.

Took the words right out of my mouth.
 
This is probably one of the best discussions we've had in a long time about the impediments to a seamless transfer to the reserves and reserves in general. I'm just going to add a few more thoughts here.

I suspect you are right that it would fix most of the issues, and it's something that should be achievable for a rich country like Canada. The problem is, what roles, and how expensive is the kit? Can't be issuing the troops "Cadillacs"...
That is never a valid viewpoint but it is one that permeates our entire system.

Regardless of whether you support the ARNG mobilization concept or the Canadian augmentee concept, the ultimate goal is to create a ResF soldier, sailor or aviator who can take his place in combat. That requires the best system that Canada can procure and the best training on that system.

I'm actually an advocate for retaining useable kit we're replacing and leaving it with the reserves in order to train on and, in a pinch, to fight with but quite clearly it needs to have a planned upgrade path to the newer version in due course, maybe at the end of the production run, but eventually. Its the way that the US Army does it and it keeps training moving forward and keeps a viable force in lay even if parts of it aren't the most modern at any given time.
If you're kicking out people from their full-time job because you don't have room for them in the new smaller RegF army, what do you think would incentivize them in numbers sufficient to matter to stick around and play at their old job on the weekends?
You're not kicking them out. You enroll them for a fixed term with clear options at the end of the term. An offer for a further term in one of two systems. You incentivize both forks. I think the discussion so far establishes that there are individuals who would choose the reserve route. Hell, I did.
Also, if they had what it takes to be the best leaders, they'd have been picked up by the RegF to stay on full-time...
IMHO a properly constructed ResF will have RegF leaders and administrators.
That said, I agree that the ResF needs help, and like @KevinB said, it needs a defined realistic role. Capabilities that can be done part-time, and serve a purpose are great for them, capabilities that need full-time people to maintain skills, not so much. I also think the CAF needs to work harder to make transitioning RegF-> ResF, and ResF->RegF a lot easier.
This is where I think the RegF viewpoint of the ResF is entirely wrong. The RegF focuses on "what are you doing for me today" rather than considering the ResF a standby force to be engaged quickly in case of an emergency (whether domestic or war time)

A properly constructed ResF has no peacetime role or purpose other than to train for domestic and international operations. If there is a job that requires to be done day-to-day in peacetime then it's a RegF job and position. I'll go so far as to say that the ResF might also provide temporary replacements in vital jobs when a RegF incumbent is away from their position (such as a course or parental leave)

The Militia Myth rears it's ugly head again!

Those Militia officers were on the books full-time for years before they were leading troops in battle in WWII, they were RegF by that stage, little different from the RegF Lts and Capts leading troops in Afghanistan. That they had been part of a social club prior to the war wasn't likely a significant factor in their performance during the war.
Which doesn't negate the argument. Many of those Militiamen were GOFOs and senior staff officers and senior NCOs who did not have decades of fulltime experience but picked up the skills on the job. Nothing says that even these days that there won't be time for ResF members to do predeployment training.

The biggest problem with your position, however, is that it doesn't see beyond the militia model that currently exists. If you change the model so that ResF members get the same DP1/DP2 training on proper equipment as the RegF during summer months while students and if they are lead at the company and above level by a half dozen or so RegF officers and senior NCOs who have full-time experience for that level of command and if their battalion and brigade officers and top senior NCOs are RegF then you have all the capability that the RegF has now.
That will happen regardless of whether it's a small professional full-time force, or a social club with guns if Canadians and the GoC don't start to take defence seriously. Flipping positions to ResF might slow the degradation slightly, but eventually even those part-timers will be viewed as an expensive luxury. So rather than a small full-time force with delusions of grandeur, we'll have a slightly larger, more dispersed force of part-timers with delusions of grandeur.

Fixing the CAF requires a strong ResF, but it also requires a strong RegF, with sufficient funding and public support.
I think that you've put your finger on why the RegF won't fix the ResF.

RegF leadership instinctively believes that if a reformed ResF looks to be a viable option then the RegF will be cut. That's always been a problem with the division between a wartime force and a peacetime force. A peacetime force has to justify its existence every day. The end of the cold war was a crisis point for western armies that were founded on the principle of a full-time professional army that could react immediately to a Soviet invasion. Once that threat disappeared (or appeared to disappear) the necessity for a fulltime force was reduced to just sufficient troops to keep capability skills alive and a very small quick reaction force for contingencies.

At that point one should have reverted to a large reserve force model but the CAF hung on protecting every PY it could manage and going through extremes of capability divestiture to stretch their budgets to keep paying full-timers and a massive bureaucracy. We did that around the perceived necessity to interfere in failed states.

That model failed. It needed massive support from reservists in Bosnia and then needed to to create a managed readiness and managed equipment program to keep struggling along. If you consider a readiness cycle to take one year to reconstitute and train for "high readiness" you could just a simply have had the leadership and technician core of a battalion as full-timers and recruit two thirds of the battle group off the street for a two year contract and train them for their roles.

The problem with the GoC is that it won't change. There may have been ups and downs but basically all parties are basically the same. Defence capabilities are a vague concept to them. Same with the civil service who for the most part are bean counters. They need to see viable options and all they are really being presented with is one option: a PY based option without a clear understanding of capabilities. That needs to change.

And just as an aside, if the ResF is or becomes a social club with guns it's because that's what the RegF leadership wants it to be.

If a war kicks off there will not suddenly be another dozen ships added to the fleet or several additional squadrons of fighters appearing that need to be manned. For the Army however, the expectation is that if a war kicks off the Army will use Reservists to expand the number of Battalions/Brigades/Divisions we are able to field. That's a very fundamental difference between the Elements and strongly suggests that the way we treat the Reserves of each Element very differently.
I'll leave aside the RCAF for the time being because I can't see their ResF system working well except in the case of retired RegF members and perhaps such specialty fields as airfield construction and security.

For the RCN there is a key factor which is the high maintenance needs that ships have which leave a significant number alongside where the need for a full crew (or even any crew) is unnecessary. At first blush it would appear one could do with less full-time crews than there are ships. There is, however, the amount of "at sea time" for a ship that is active (whether training or operational) and whether a given crew on, let's say a two year posting to an active ship, would burn out.

As you say, there will probably not be a rapid buildup of new ships but there should be an increase in the number of existing ships going active if the fleet went from a peacetime footing to a wartime one and all ships deployed. It strikes me that this would create a significant surge in demand for crews.

My question is, what would be a viable ResF model for the RCN to cater to this situation and do we have the plan and model for that now with the existing Naval ResF?

🍻
 
This is supposed to be CAF reconstitution, not another "how done fix the reserves" thread.

I get that some think the ResF is the way forward, but less not go completely down that rabbit hole yet again.

Real Housewives Of Beverly Hills Reality GIF
 
@FJAG the problem with the ResF Navy is much the same as the Air Force. Once you introduce any sort of complex weapon systems, sensors or ships with capabilities greater than an MCDV, a Reservist isn't going to cut it anymore for the most part.

There are certain trades where they can slide in but most would be off limits to them and outside their capabilities.
 
This is supposed to be CAF reconstitution, not another "how done fix the reserves" thread.

I get that some think the ResF is the way forward, but less not go completely down that rabbit hole yet again.
You're right, it's a thread about CAF reconstitution. But it's not a thread about RegF reconstitution. If you ignore the ResF you are simply perpetuating the CAF problem.

@FJAG the problem with the ResF Navy is much the same as the Air Force. Once you introduce any sort of complex weapon systems, sensors or ships with capabilities greater than an MCDV, a Reservist isn't going to cut it anymore for the most part.

There are certain trades where they can slide in but most would be off limits to them and outside their capabilities.
Can that be changed within a framework of trade training the hell out of reservists during their school summer breaks and adding simulators at stone frigates for continuation training coupled with a two week "summer camp" on a ship with RegF leadership.

My understanding is that there are some 5,000 Naval Reservists who if trained up could crew 20-30 ships. Are we simply wasting most of their lives for the benefit of generating a handful Class Bs and Cs every year?

🍻
 
@FJAG the problem with the ResF Navy is much the same as the Air Force.
The RCAF operated (maybe still?) Res Tac Hel Squadrons, sure most are former Reg pilots - but it gives a model for the more complex systems to be seamlessly integrated
Once you introduce any sort of complex weapon systems, sensors or ships with capabilities greater than an MCDV, a Reservist isn't going to cut it anymore for the most part.

There are certain trades where they can slide in but most would be off limits to them and outside their capabilities.
Or you could make it financially incentivized to take a gap year after High School and do a Class C for some of that training.

Pte to Cpl in the PRes is (was) 2 years, IIRC the Naval Reserve held it to 4 (this is years ago so I may have a failing brain) but year as a Pet(3) or Cpl making money for college could go along way for some.
If one joins the Res at 17, probably Grade 11, you get 1 full summer, and then a year and 3 months ish in the gap - you could do a lot of training in that segment, that would make for 1) a Decent Part Time soldier, or 2) Someone who wants to join the Regs.
 
Or you could make it financially incentivized to take a gap year after High School and do a Class C for some of that training.

Pte to Cpl in the PRes is (was) 2 years, IIRC the Naval Reserve held it to 4 (this is years ago so I may have a failing brain) but year as a Pet(3) or Cpl making money for college could go along way for some.
If one joins the Res at 17, probably Grade 11, you get 1 full summer, and then a year and 3 months ish in the gap - you could do a lot of training in that segment, that would make for 1) a Decent Part Time soldier, or 2) Someone who wants to join the Regs.
Also..... a pool of people that have had that training and have a fixed number of 4 month summers where they will be needing employment
 
Back
Top