This is probably one of the best discussions we've had in a long time about the impediments to a seamless transfer to the reserves and reserves in general. I'm just going to add a few more thoughts here.
I suspect you are right that it would fix most of the issues, and it's something that should be achievable for a rich country like Canada. The problem is, what roles, and how expensive is the kit? Can't be issuing the troops "Cadillacs"...
That is never a valid viewpoint but it is one that permeates our entire system.
Regardless of whether you support the ARNG mobilization concept or the Canadian augmentee concept, the ultimate goal is to create a ResF soldier, sailor or aviator who can take his place in combat. That requires the best system that Canada can procure and the best training on that system.
I'm actually an advocate for retaining useable kit we're replacing and leaving it with the reserves in order to train on and, in a pinch, to fight with but quite clearly it needs to have a planned upgrade path to the newer version in due course, maybe at the end of the production run, but eventually. Its the way that the US Army does it and it keeps training moving forward and keeps a viable force in lay even if parts of it aren't the most modern at any given time.
If you're kicking out people from their full-time job because you don't have room for them in the new smaller RegF army, what do you think would incentivize them in numbers sufficient to matter to stick around and play at their old job on the weekends?
You're not kicking them out. You enroll them for a fixed term with clear options at the end of the term. An offer for a further term in one of two systems. You incentivize both forks. I think the discussion so far establishes that there are individuals who would choose the reserve route. Hell, I did.
Also, if they had what it takes to be the best leaders, they'd have been picked up by the RegF to stay on full-time...
IMHO a properly constructed ResF will have RegF leaders and administrators.
That said, I agree that the ResF needs help, and like
@KevinB said, it needs a defined
realistic role. Capabilities that can be done part-time, and serve a purpose are great for them, capabilities that need full-time people to maintain skills, not so much. I also think the CAF needs to work harder to make transitioning RegF-> ResF, and ResF->RegF a lot easier.
This is where I think the RegF viewpoint of the ResF is entirely wrong. The RegF focuses on "what are you doing for me today" rather than considering the ResF a standby force to be engaged quickly in case of an emergency (whether domestic or war time)
A properly constructed ResF has no peacetime role or purpose other than to train for domestic and international operations. If there is a job that requires to be done day-to-day in peacetime then it's a RegF job and position. I'll go so far as to say that the ResF might also provide temporary replacements in vital jobs when a RegF incumbent is away from their position (such as a course or parental leave)
The Militia Myth rears it's ugly head again!
Those Militia officers were on the books full-time for years before they were leading troops in battle in WWII, they were RegF by that stage, little different from the RegF Lts and Capts leading troops in Afghanistan. That they had been part of a social club prior to the war wasn't likely a significant factor in their performance during the war.
Which doesn't negate the argument. Many of those Militiamen were GOFOs and senior staff officers and senior NCOs who did not have decades of fulltime experience but picked up the skills on the job. Nothing says that even these days that there won't be time for ResF members to do predeployment training.
The biggest problem with your position, however, is that it doesn't see beyond the militia model that currently exists. If you change the model so that ResF members get the same DP1/DP2 training on proper equipment as the RegF during summer months while students and if they are lead at the company and above level by a half dozen or so RegF officers and senior NCOs who have full-time experience for that level of command and if their battalion and brigade officers and top senior NCOs are RegF then you have all the capability that the RegF has now.
That will happen regardless of whether it's a small professional full-time force, or a social club with guns if Canadians and the GoC don't start to take defence seriously. Flipping positions to ResF might slow the degradation slightly, but eventually even those part-timers will be viewed as an expensive luxury. So rather than a small full-time force with delusions of grandeur, we'll have a slightly larger, more dispersed force of part-timers with delusions of grandeur.
Fixing the CAF requires a strong ResF, but it also requires a strong RegF, with sufficient funding and public support.
I think that you've put your finger on why the RegF won't fix the ResF.
RegF leadership instinctively believes that if a reformed ResF looks to be a viable option then the RegF will be cut. That's always been a problem with the division between a wartime force and a peacetime force. A peacetime force has to justify its existence every day. The end of the cold war was a crisis point for western armies that were founded on the principle of a full-time professional army that could react immediately to a Soviet invasion. Once that threat disappeared (or appeared to disappear) the necessity for a fulltime force was reduced to just sufficient troops to keep capability skills alive and a very small quick reaction force for contingencies.
At that point one should have reverted to a large reserve force model but the CAF hung on protecting every PY it could manage and going through extremes of capability divestiture to stretch their budgets to keep paying full-timers and a massive bureaucracy. We did that around the perceived necessity to interfere in failed states.
That model failed. It needed massive support from reservists in Bosnia and then needed to to create a managed readiness and managed equipment program to keep struggling along. If you consider a readiness cycle to take one year to reconstitute and train for "high readiness" you could just a simply have had the leadership and technician core of a battalion as full-timers and recruit two thirds of the battle group off the street for a two year contract and train them for their roles.
The problem with the GoC is that it won't change. There may have been ups and downs but basically all parties are basically the same. Defence capabilities are a vague concept to them. Same with the civil service who for the most part are bean counters. They need to see viable options and all they are really being presented with is one option: a PY based option without a clear understanding of capabilities. That needs to change.
And just as an aside, if the ResF is or becomes a social club with guns it's because that's what the RegF leadership wants it to be.
If a war kicks off there will not suddenly be another dozen ships added to the fleet or several additional squadrons of fighters appearing that need to be manned. For the Army however, the expectation is that if a war kicks off the Army will use Reservists to expand the number of Battalions/Brigades/Divisions we are able to field. That's a very fundamental difference between the Elements and strongly suggests that the way we treat the Reserves of each Element very differently.
I'll leave aside the RCAF for the time being because I can't see their ResF system working well except in the case of retired RegF members and perhaps such specialty fields as airfield construction and security.
For the RCN there is a key factor which is the high maintenance needs that ships have which leave a significant number alongside where the need for a full crew (or even any crew) is unnecessary. At first blush it would appear one could do with less full-time crews than there are ships. There is, however, the amount of "at sea time" for a ship that is active (whether training or operational) and whether a given crew on, let's say a two year posting to an active ship, would burn out.
As you say, there will probably not be a rapid buildup of new ships but there should be an increase in the number of existing ships going active if the fleet went from a peacetime footing to a wartime one and all ships deployed. It strikes me that this would create a significant surge in demand for crews.
My question is, what would be a viable ResF model for the RCN to cater to this situation and do we have the plan and model for that now with the existing Naval ResF?