- Reaction score
- 21,838
- Points
- 1,360
Hopefully, significantly more detail comes out once the investigation is released, concerning what the TC-DND MOU for the CZ/MTCA contained. The transition is definitely a concern, and why I would have thought that the CZ and the MTCA would more appropriately be activated at the same time, otherwise inbound IFR traffic would be controlled(Class A)-uncontrolled-controlled(Class D) and the handover between Arctic Centre and Resolute Tower would have to have been a well-coordinated activity. I think there remains the question of understanding by all as to what Classes of airspace were active in the 10-20 August period. I still am left with the sense that, while the Class D CZ was activated by NOTAM on 10 Aug, that it was not specifically manned until much later, thus leaving the CZ as Class E until then, and even then, I'm unclear as to what level of control (or advisory?) was being provided on the day of the crash. If the CZ is active and IF there is a controller, then it is Class D and IFR traffic requires clearance to commence an approach and VFR traffic must initiate communication with the tower.
I don't know enough about the particular avionics configuration of the incident aircraft, re: Nav1/2 select, but the ramification of having the VOR feeding the HSI/OBS with the ILS/LOC inbound course dialled in, vice the ILS receiver is certainly unsettling. In the discussion on AvCanada, some people were implying that if the crew of 6560 had a G/S flag on approach, they should have conducted a missed approach right away. I don't think that is or should be an expectation. Potential of a VOR vice ILS/LOC track inbound aside, a reversion to LOC-only after established on the ILS(/DME) so long as still above MDA (or FAF crossing hight, if prior to) is quite reasonable. In fact, I can't think of an ILS approach that I've ever flown where I didn't brief a back-up LOC-only if the G/S went U/S during the approach -- of course, starting a timing at the FAF if the MAP isn't DME-based is an important part of having a valid LOC-only back-up.
For those of who have flown the approach into Res, I can see how in lower vis, Char Lake, although smaller, could be mistaken for Resolute Lake, as the geometry (alignment with the runway axis) of flying over Resolute Bay itself, then Char Lake, although offset to the East of the runway by ~1NM (lined up towards the VOR and the actual crash site), looks almost the same as crossing the south shore, then Resolute Lake towards RWY 35T.
Regards
G2G
I don't know enough about the particular avionics configuration of the incident aircraft, re: Nav1/2 select, but the ramification of having the VOR feeding the HSI/OBS with the ILS/LOC inbound course dialled in, vice the ILS receiver is certainly unsettling. In the discussion on AvCanada, some people were implying that if the crew of 6560 had a G/S flag on approach, they should have conducted a missed approach right away. I don't think that is or should be an expectation. Potential of a VOR vice ILS/LOC track inbound aside, a reversion to LOC-only after established on the ILS(/DME) so long as still above MDA (or FAF crossing hight, if prior to) is quite reasonable. In fact, I can't think of an ILS approach that I've ever flown where I didn't brief a back-up LOC-only if the G/S went U/S during the approach -- of course, starting a timing at the FAF if the MAP isn't DME-based is an important part of having a valid LOC-only back-up.
For those of who have flown the approach into Res, I can see how in lower vis, Char Lake, although smaller, could be mistaken for Resolute Lake, as the geometry (alignment with the runway axis) of flying over Resolute Bay itself, then Char Lake, although offset to the East of the runway by ~1NM (lined up towards the VOR and the actual crash site), looks almost the same as crossing the south shore, then Resolute Lake towards RWY 35T.
Regards
G2G