Our North - SSE Policy Update Megathread

[KevinB]

but closer by sea than China

Not really as both SK and China need to go south around Japan. I’d rather the Japanese and South Koreans freeze out China from Antarctica and support Australia there.

 

[MilEME09]

And why is that a bad thing?

As I've suggested before we could do something unusual and plan. In this instance plan to subsidize surplus capacity in Canada's civilian fleets.

Didn't say it was, but we better have a plan to do it

 

[childs56]

I view that in some ways as throwing good money after bad.

A lot of the systems that are missing from a ‘properly equipped and supported LAV force’ are things you don’t want to be using a LAV force for.

I am kind of curious what we dont want to use the LAV for?

 

[GK .Dundas]

I am kind of curious what we dont want to use the LAV for?

As an infantry fighting vehicle.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As an infantry fighting vehicle.

Or a light tank

 

[GK .Dundas]

Or a light tank

Or over fairly rough and boggy terrain.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Or over fairly rough and boggy terrain.

Or as a recce vehicle (because we can't be arsed to procure a proper vehicle for recce)

 

[markppcli]

As an infantry fighting vehicle.

It’s about as well protected as anything else out there. Wheels aren’t ideal but offer some trade offs.

 

[Good2Golf]

By this I assume you mean convening and door opening...

No, nothing to do with Canada’s penchant for big talk and mostly-hollow physical follow-up…but rather a serious question as to why some/many believe that the immutable truism is that troops must (always) occupy terrain. Denial of said terrain from the enemy by a variety of feasible and effective means can achieve the overall aim (recall Clausewitz didn’t rank physical retention of terrain as the ultimate end-state). It’s not the same thing as saying that a war for instance can be won by air or sea power alone, but the case that all domain capabilities enablers serve to keep the grunt alive on Hill XXX, is a bit overly 300-ish.

So a small fleet. As you basically described an Air Guard station.

Not sure what you expect from Canada? We're a tenth the size of the USA by population and GDP and we have some commitments to our citizens the American government has no qualms in ignoring. I'm sure we're all in agreement we want Canada to reach 2% of GDP but it's a little silly to expect we some how mirror the US military in all its excess. It's unrealistic to try and do so and frankly stupid in the Canadian context.

I’m not sure anyone other than China or maybe Russia can (or should) compare their fleets to the US.

Yup. Use the population 10:1 ratio and factor it by a ~3:1 Defence/se GDP ratio of US:CA and you get a force scale factor of 30:1 (US:CA), so for example Canada’s 5 C-17s would proportionately equate to around 150 C-17s in America, so we’re off a bit, but not horribly so. CC-330s? 8 x ‘30’ = 240 multi-role tanker transports US eqvt, which isn’t bad again…and credit to current government to that particular investment. Apply that number (30:1) to a lot of things and the de facto weighted ratios don’t seem as absolutely shameful as a few are portraying…yup, more seriousness would go a long way, but with out forcing growth of the force that would exceed (later) Cold War levels…not that we’re returning in a way to those 70s/80s times.

 

[Fabius]

Well, there is a Managed Readiness Plan and the Army Operating Plan has chapters on readiness along with an associated Enhanced Warfighting Proficiency Directive. We look at readiness through a lens of personnel, equipment, training and sustainment.

"How ready" forces have to be depends on the task that they are assigned. There is a discussion between the force employer and the force generator that drives "how ready" those elements have to be.

Unfortunately I believe that those very documents, if taken as the epitome of the Canadian Army’s thinking on readiness, actually illustrate how much of a dilatant the institution and the CAF overall is in terms of understanding readiness. There is a recognition of this state of affairs in some quarters I think but that recognition seems unable to gain any traction in effecting changes.

Fundamentally a military can be described as Ready, as long as the time needed to convert potential capability into actual capability needed, is not longer than the time between the decision to convert potential to actual and the onset of war. Further adding to that time component which can also be described as speed there is the issue of effectiveness, ie. Readiness must include a component that attempts to measure or forecast satisfactory performance in combat.

Underpinning all the above is a strategic assessment of the threat environment specifically aimed at answering the key questions of readiness.

Readiness for WHEN? What should be assumed about the time available for conversion of potential to actual capability?

Readiness for WHAT? What kind of war? What adversary should forces be prepared to fight, under what conditions and according to what strategy? How much potential capability to achieve success in relation to those questions?

Readiness of WHAT? What are the time requirements for marshalling, training and deploying the various elements of net capability?

These questions require answers delineating a mix of the following items and their understanding;

Speed – Time in which a unit is deployed into combat;

Effectiveness - Mass x efficiency;

Mass – Potential capability in existing force (organized units);

Efficiency – Degree of realized potential of existing force (This is where the Army’s PETS lens really lie);

Operational Readiness – Speed x Efficiency;

Structural Readiness – Speed x Mass;

Mobilization Readiness – Civilian economic and demographic bases x military organizational base x conversion plans;

Readiness Overall – Speed x (Mass x Efficiency)

The Canadian Army’s conception of Readiness as articulated by the Op Plan, MRP and associated documents is almost solely focused on Operational Readiness and specifically Operational Readiness as a wave with individual unit’s readiness waxing and waning in relation to a predetermined tempo. This is a symptom of the last 35 -40 years with the Canadian Army being tasked similar to Roman Imperial Legions or British Empire Regiments, ie constantly on a frontier conducting low level constabulary or COIN tasks.

This reality has driven and reinforced a culture that prioritizes the allocation of resources to operational readiness of small elements on a predictable schedule that is not interrupted ever. This prioritization of operational readiness though has cost the Canadian Army its Mass, its Structural Readiness, and its Mobilization Readiness.

The prioritization of operational readiness with small elements ie a Bn or BG or a Bde HQ on a predictable schedule makes some sense when we get to choose when to commit elements and we refuse to commit elements until we are ready.

Canada historically has been blessed with the strategic space and the allies who can absorb the initial years of heavy combat giving us the time to build Readiness (Readiness= Speed x (Mass x Efficiency).

We can see glimpses of how difficult that will be though. The UORs of the Afghan era gave us a false sense of how fast we can access industry and the demands of LSCO. The last several years with regards to Ukraine indicate that Structural Readiness and Mobilization Readiness cannot be taken for granted. Given the state of overall western industry, Canadian industry, and the CA itself it will likely take 5-7 years from the GoC decision to mobilize until multiple Canadian Army Bde to Division formations could enter LSCO with sufficient readiness to allow satisfactory performance in LSCO against a peer opponent.

Is 5-7 years acceptable readiness for the Canadian Army? I don’t know.